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  ABSTRACT	  
Refugees	  and	  Relief:	  The	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  and	  European	  Jews	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1943	  by	  Zhava	  Litvac	  Glaser	  	  Advisor:	  Professor	  Dagmar	  Herzog	   	  Traditionally,	  pre-­‐modern	  Jewish	  communities	  sensed	  an	  obligation	  to	  bind	  together	  to	  provide	  aid	  to	  Jews	  who	  found	  themselves	  in	  catastrophic	  situations;	  however,	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  modernity	  and	  the	  dissolution	  of	  Jewish	  communal	  authority,	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  Jewish	  communities,	  and	  the	  unprecedented	  stresses	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  communal	  dynamics	  grew	  far	  more	  complex.	  The	  Jews	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  were	  two	  small	  and	  relatively	  remote	  communities	  overwhelmed	  by	  Jewish	  refugees	  fleeing	  the	  Nazis.	  At	  their	  request,	  the	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  stepped	  in	  and	  provided	  both	  the	  funding	  and	  leadership	  that	  both	  of	  these	  locations	  so	  desperately	  needed.	  
The	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  provide	  an	  enlightening	  case	  study	  in	  Jewish	  communal	  dynamics	  in	  a	  time	  of	  catastrophe.	  The	  unrestrained	  menace	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  rather	  than	  bringing	  these	  Jewish	  communities	  together	  to	  provide	  aid	  to	  those	  fleeing	  the	  Nazi	  terror,	  further	  fractured	  tenuous	  inter-­‐	  and	  intra-­‐communal	  relationships.	  Differences	  in	  national	  origin,	  religious	  observance,	  class,	  age	  and	  political	  views	  became	  more	  pronounced	  as	  communities	  fragmented,	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  provide	  the	  aid	  that	  was	  desperately	  needed.	  Yet	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  differences,	  the	  Jews	  who	  sought	  refuge	  in	  
	   	   	   v	  these	  remote	  locations	  managed	  eventually	  to	  create	  transitory	  communities	  united	  by	  thriving	  cultural,	  educational	  and	  literary	  pursuits.	  It	  is	  this	  complexity	  in	  Jewish	  communal	  interactions	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  during	  the	  Holocaust	  that	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  this	  study.	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INTRODUCTION	  
Anyone	  who	  preserves	  a	  single	  life,	  it	  is	  as	  if	  he	  saved	  the	  whole	  world.	  	  — Mishnah	  Sanhedrin	  4:5	  	  Throughout	  the	  course	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  very	  physical	  survival	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  of	  Europe	  was	  in	  doubt.	  When	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazi	  party	  rose	  to	  power	  in	  the	  early	  1930s,	  increasing	  anti-­‐Jewish	  legislation	  forced	  Jews	  to	  flee	  Germany,	  leaving	  their	  loved	  ones,	  assets	  and	  often	  their	  identification	  papers	  behind,	  transforming	  them	  into	  penniless,	  stateless	  refugees.	  In	  response,	  most	  of	  the	  nations	  of	  the	  world	  closed	  their	  doors	  to	  this	  massive	  immigration,	  refusing	  to	  grant	  visas	  to	  Jewish	  people	  fleeing	  persecution,	  and	  placing	  an	  unprecedented	  demand	  on	  world	  Jewry	  to	  take	  action.	  
Holocaust	  scholarship	  is	  a	  vast	  field.	  While	  many	  have	  analyzed	  the	  world’s	  reaction	  to	  this	  horrific	  event,	  few	  have	  examined	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  small,	  isolated	  Jewish	  communities	  that	  were	  called	  upon	  to	  aid	  thousands	  of	  their	  fellow	  Jews.	  	  Neglected	  are	  the	  rich	  communal	  dynamics	  in	  the	  interactions	  between	  these	  communities	  and	  the	  refugees	  who	  descended	  upon	  them	  in	  overwhelming	  numbers.	  This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  supplement	  the	  existing	  scholarship	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  the	  umbrella	  relief	  organization,	  the	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  specifically	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai,	  two	  small,	  remote	  Jewish	  communities	  outside	  their	  main	  area	  of	  operation	  where	  Jewish	  refugees	  from	  Nazi	  Europe	  found	  themselves	  stranded.	  	  
Since	  many	  of	  the	  refugees	  sought	  to	  emigrate	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  American	  response	  in	  particular	  needs	  to	  be	  understood.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  to	  early	  20th	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  centuries,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  begun	  to	  impose	  restrictions	  on	  immigration,	  and	  the	  Emergency	  Quota	  Act	  of	  1921,	  based	  on	  the	  National	  Origins	  Formula,	  greatly	  intensified	  these	  limitations.	  By	  restricting	  immigration	  to	  those	  of	  Northern	  European	  origin	  that	  were	  already	  established	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  Act	  limited	  the	  number	  of	  immigrants	  per	  year	  to	  3%	  of	  the	  number	  of	  U.S.	  residents	  from	  the	  same	  country	  according	  to	  the	  1910	  census.1	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  1921	  Quota	  Act,	  total	  immigration	  dropped	  from	  805,228	  in	  1920	  to	  309,556	  in	  1921-­‐22.2	  	  
The	  Immigration	  Act	  of	  1924,	  in	  light	  of	  rising	  unemployment,	  further	  restricted	  immigration,	  lowering	  the	  3%	  quota	  to	  2%.	  The	  Act	  sought	  to	  limit	  the	  large	  numbers	  of	  immigrants	  from	  Southern	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  (thus	  affecting	  Jews)	  that	  had	  flooded	  into	  the	  country	  just	  before	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  and	  favored	  Northern	  Europeans	  and	  wealthier	  immigrants.	  The	  Great	  Depression	  led	  to	  an	  even	  narrower	  interpretation	  of	  the	  “likely	  to	  become	  public	  charges”	  clause	  contained	  in	  the	  Act.3	  The	  judgment	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  potential	  immigrant	  was	  likely	  to	  become	  a	  public	  charge	  was	  left	  up	  to	  the	  consular	  offices	  abroad,	  but	  they	  received	  increasingly	  restrictive	  direction	  from	  the	  U.S.	  All	  of	  these	  quotas	  and	  directives	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  greatly	  limiting	  Jewish	  refugee	  immigration	  and	  therefore	  escape	  from	  Nazi	  persecution.	  With	  the	  new	  requirement	  to	  demonstrate	  substantial	  financial	  resources,	  and	  as	  Henry	  Feingold	  argues,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  United	  States,	  “Annual	  Report	  of	  the	  Commissioner	  General	  of	  Immigration	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Labor,”	  Bureau	  of	  Immigration,	  1913,	  109.	  2	  Ibid.	  3	  “Urges	  Extension	  of	  Quota	  to	  All,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  24,	  1927,	  11.	  
	   	   	   3	  undercurrent	  of	  distaste	  for	  Jewish	  refugees,4	  by	  1930,	  immigration	  quotas	  were	  approximately	  80%	  under-­‐issued.5	  A	  bill	  for	  a	  90%	  reduction	  in	  quotas	  passed	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  in	  1931	  and	  according	  to	  David	  Wyman	  would	  probably	  have	  passed	  the	  Senate	  had	  not	  the	  legislative	  session	  come	  to	  a	  close.6	  	  
However,	  as	  conditions	  for	  the	  Jews	  of	  Germany	  grew	  more	  oppressive	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Nuremberg	  Laws	  in	  1935,	  President	  Roosevelt	  lifted	  some	  of	  the	  restrictions	  on	  German	  refugee	  immigration.	  Much	  again	  depended	  on	  the	  overseas	  consuls,	  who	  were	  urged	  to	  treat	  Jewish	  refugees	  as	  favorably	  as	  possible	  as	  they	  made	  decisions	  to	  grant	  visas,	  but	  the	  financial	  requirements	  still	  posed	  a	  hardship	  for	  many.	  In	  light	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  policy	  change,	  German	  immigration	  to	  the	  U.S.	  in	  1936	  increased	  by	  20%	  over	  1935,	  and	  1937	  was	  78%	  higher	  than	  1936.7	  	  
By	  1938,	  with	  the	  Anschluss8	  in	  March	  and	  Kristallnacht9	  in	  November,	  President	  Roosevelt	  urged	  for	  the	  full	  use	  of	  the	  existing	  quotas	  for	  refugees	  from	  Nazi	  persecution.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Henry	  Feingold,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Rescue:	  The	  Roosevelt	  Administration	  and	  the	  
Holocaust,	  1938-­‐1945	  (New	  Brunswick	  	  N.J.:	  Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  1970),	  78.	  5	  David	  Wyman,	  Paper	  Walls:	  America	  and	  the	  Refugee	  Crisis,	  1938-­‐1941	  (Amherst:	  University	  of	  Massachusetts	  Press,	  1968),	  4.	  6	  Ibid.	  7	  Immigration	  to	  the	  U.S.	  from	  Germany	  in	  1935	  was	  5,436;	  in	  1936,	  6,538;	  in	  1937,	  11,648.	  (Ibid.,	  226.)	  8	  The	  Anschluss	  Österreichs	  was	  the	  occupation	  and	  annexation	  of	  Austria	  by	  Nazi	  Germany	  in	  March	  1938,	  in	  direct	  violation	  of	  the	  Treaties	  of	  St.	  Germain	  and	  of	  Versailles.	  Austrian	  Jews	  suddenly	  found	  themselves	  under	  the	  same	  antisemitic	  laws	  as	  had	  been	  gradually	  introduced	  in	  Germany.	  9	  Kristallnacht,	  or	  “The	  Night	  of	  Broken	  Glass,”	  refers	  to	  the	  coordinated	  antisemitic	  violence	  that	  swept	  Germany	  on	  November	  9-­‐10,	  1938	  in	  response	  to	  the	  assassination	  of	  German	  diplomat	  Ernst	  vom	  Rath	  by	  Herschel	  Grynzspan.	  S.A.	  paramilitary	  forces	  and	  non-­‐
	   	   	   4	  According	  to	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  by	  September	  1938	  German	  and	  Austrian	  immigration	  quotas	  were	  already	  completely	  filled.10	  	  
As	  extensive	  research	  has	  shown,	  the	  Roosevelt	  administration	  was	  under	  heavy	  pressure	  to	  restrict	  immigration	  just	  when	  the	  threat	  to	  European	  Jews	  was	  intensifying	  and	  an	  open	  policy	  most	  needed.	  Breckinridge	  Long,	  a	  personal	  friend	  of	  Roosevelt	  who	  in	  1940	  had	  become	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  for	  Special	  Problems	  at	  the	  State	  Department,	  had	  a	  paranoid	  fear	  of	  aliens	  and	  Jews	  and	  greatly	  influenced	  the	  president’s	  restrictionist	  policies.11	  James	  G.	  McDonald,	  chairman	  of	  the	  Presidential	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Political	  Refugees	  and	  a	  friend	  of	  the	  Jews,	  tried	  but	  failed	  to	  persuade	  Roosevelt	  to	  loosen	  immigration	  restrictions.	  Long’s	  influence	  was	  too	  strong.12	  
As	  the	  doors	  to	  American	  immigration	  closed,	  Jewish	  people	  in	  Europe	  desperately	  searched	  for	  havens,	  some	  finding	  refuge	  in	  such	  unlikely	  places	  as	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai.	  The	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  these	  locations	  were	  soon	  overwhelmed.	  Aware	  of	  their	  inability	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Jewish	  civilians	  murdered	  more	  than	  91	  Jewish	  people	  and	  over	  30,000	  Jewish	  men	  were	  arrested	  and	  taken	  to	  concentration	  camps.	  More	  than	  1,000	  synagogues	  were	  burned	  and	  over	  7,000	  businesses	  destroyed.	  (“Slayer	  of	  Diplomat	  Acted	  in	  a	  Trance,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  December	  1,	  1938;	  “Arrests	  of	  Jews	  Go	  on	  in	  Germany,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  November	  29,	  1938.)	  10	  “German	  Refugees	  Fill	  Entry	  Quota,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  September	  13,	  1938,	  3.	  11	  See,	  among	  others,	  David	  Wyman,	  The	  Abandonment	  of	  the	  Jews:	  America	  and	  the	  
Holocaust,	  1941-­‐1945,	  1st	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Pantheon	  Books,	  1984);	  and	  Paper	  Walls:	  America	  
and	  the	  Refugee	  Crisis,	  1938-­‐1941;	  see	  also	  David	  S.	  Wyman	  Institute	  for	  Holocaust	  Studies,	  
America’s	  Response	  to	  the	  Holocaust:	  New	  Questions,	  New	  Perspectives	  (Boston,	  MA:	  David	  S.	  Wyman	  Institute	  for	  Holocaust	  Studies,	  2004);	  Yehuda	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  
Holocaust:	  The	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  1939-­‐1945	  (Jerusalem,	  Detroit,	  MI:	  The	  Institute	  of	  Contemporary	  Jewry,	  Hebrew	  University;	  Wayne	  State	  University	  Press,	  1981),	  50.	  12	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  64.	  
	   	   	   5	  provide	  adequate	  help	  for	  the	  steadily	  rising	  wave	  of	  European	  refugees,	  the	  Jews	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  reached	  out	  to	  international	  Jewry	  for	  help.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  comprehend	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  study,	  one	  must	  consider	  the	  changes	  that	  Jewish	  communal	  patterns	  underwent	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  modernity.	  The	  traditional	  kehilah,	  or	  Jewish	  community,	  originated	  in	  Babylonia	  after	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  First	  Temple	  in	  the	  sixth	  century	  C.E.	  Throughout	  the	  pre-­‐modern	  era,	  Jews	  had	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐government	  under	  that	  autonomous	  kehilah	  system.	  All	  Jews,	  unless	  they	  converted,	  were	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  kehilah,	  which	  would	  exercise	  authority	  over	  its	  members,	  among	  other	  requirements,	  to	  provide	  tzedakah,	  or	  aid,	  to	  Jews	  who	  found	  themselves	  in	  catastrophic	  situations.	  Traditionally,	  tzedakah	  was	  not	  a	  choice—it	  was	  an	  obligation.	  The	  process	  of	  modernization	  limited	  if	  not	  eliminated	  such	  communal	  authority,	  but	  the	  cultural	  impetus	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  needy	  remained.	  The	  adage,	  kol	  
yisrael	  areivim	  zeh	  b’zeh—“all	  Jews	  are	  responsible	  one	  for	  another”—was	  ingrained	  in	  the	  Jewish	  consciousness.	  In	  some	  locations,	  Jewish	  poor	  could	  get	  no	  help	  other	  than	  from	  other	  Jews.	  
Jacob	  Katz,	  a	  pioneer	  in	  the	  sociology	  of	  Jewish	  communal	  dynamics,	  postulated	  that	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  modernity,	  the	  internal	  autonomy	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community,	  or	  kehilah,	  was	  seriously	  breached.	  As	  Jewishness	  became	  voluntary	  and	  the	  old	  Jewish	  community	  institutions	  lost	  their	  authority,	  the	  bond	  of	  the	  individual	  with	  the	  Jewish	  community	  loosened.	  Though	  Jewish	  society	  never	  went	  to	  the	  extreme	  of	  disintegration,	  the	  tendency	  toward	  secularization	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  Haskalah	  (the	  Jewish	  Enlightenment)	  did	  undermine	  the	  unifying	  framework	  of	  Jewish	  communal	  life.	  The	  kehilah	  no	  longer	  had	  
	   	   	   6	  compulsory	  power	  over	  the	  individual:	  the	  latter	  could	  not	  be	  forced,	  for	  example,	  to	  contribute	  to	  communal	  needs,	  nor	  could	  the	  individual	  be	  any	  longer	  controlled	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  herem,	  or	  excommunication.13	  
This	  did	  not,	  however,	  result	  in	  the	  disappearance	  of	  Jewry,	  as	  some	  sociological	  models	  predicted.	  Todd	  Endelman’s	  study	  of	  English	  Jews	  in	  the	  early	  phases	  of	  modernization	  showed	  a	  community	  that,	  while	  having	  few	  impediments	  toward	  assimilation,	  did	  not	  disappear.	  Rather,	  though	  losing	  the	  basis	  for	  its	  former	  cohesion,	  it	  retained	  enough	  solidarity	  to	  maintain	  its	  social	  boundaries	  even	  while	  functioning	  among	  society	  at	  large.14	  Lloyd	  Gartner	  reflected	  on	  the	  historic	  continuity	  and	  comparative	  stability	  of	  this	  community	  in	  Britain	  in	  the	  modern	  period.	  
Katz	  observed	  that	  in	  non-­‐English-­‐speaking	  countries,	  particularly	  in	  Europe,	  there	  was	  only	  a	  loosening,	  and	  not	  a	  complete	  separation	  between	  church	  and	  state.	  State-­‐sponsored	  religious	  and	  communal	  institutions	  remained	  in	  place,	  but	  individuals	  gained	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  Jacob	  Katz,	  Tradition	  and	  Crisis;	  Jewish	  Society	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Middle	  Ages.	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press	  of	  Glencoe,	  1961),	  214–218;	  and	  Jacob	  Katz,	  Out	  of	  the	  Ghetto:	  The	  Social	  
Background	  of	  Jewish	  Emancipation,	  1770-­‐1870	  (Syracuse	  University	  Press,	  1973).	  More	  recently,	  Paul	  Mendes-­‐Flohr	  has	  collected	  primary	  materials	  documenting	  the	  radical	  transformation	  in	  Jewish	  life	  caused	  by	  emancipation	  and	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  European	  ghetto.	  See	  Paul	  R	  Mendes-­‐Flohr	  and	  Jehuda	  Reinharz,	  The	  Jew	  in	  the	  Modern	  World:	  A	  
Documentary	  History	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  14	  See	  Todd	  M	  Endelman,	  The	  Jews	  of	  Georgian	  England,	  1714-­‐1830:	  Tradition	  and	  
Change	  in	  a	  Liberal	  Society	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  1999);	  Older	  studies	  of	  the	  Jews	  of	  England	  are	  typified	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Cecil	  Roth	  in	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Jews	  in	  
England	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1964),	  portraying	  English	  Jews	  as	  besieged	  by	  antisemitic	  hostility	  and	  plagued	  by	  intra-­‐communal	  conflict	  that	  undermined	  Jewish	  solidarity.	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  freedom,	  and	  religious	  and	  ideological	  reform	  consciously	  occurred.15	  Michael	  Meyer,	  discussing	  Jewish	  intellectual	  history,	  further	  demonstrated	  that	  in	  modern	  Germany,	  Jewishness	  lost	  its	  all-­‐encompassing	  and	  unquestioned	  character,	  and	  came	  to	  form	  only	  a	  portion	  of	  a	  Jewish	  person’s	  total	  identity	  and	  only	  one	  of	  his	  or	  her	  multiple	  loyalties.16	  
This	  study	  specifically	  will	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  two	  aspects	  of	  Jewish	  community	  organization	  that	  are	  most	  relevant	  to	  the	  communities	  being	  examined.17	  The	  first,	  the	  need	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  community,	  expresses	  itself	  in	  modernity	  in	  Jewish	  philanthropy.18	  The	  strategies	  used	  by	  the	  Jews	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  as	  they	  attempted	  to	  meet	  the	  survival	  needs	  of	  the	  rapidly	  increasing	  influx	  of	  German	  refugees,	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  that	  crisis	  upon	  the	  different	  Jewish	  communities	  involved,	  will	  be	  considered.	  We	  will	  observe	  this	  dynamic	  in	  action	  as	  these	  two	  communities	  reached	  out	  to	  international	  Jewry	  for	  help,	  and	  American	  Jews	  responded.	  The	  second	  aspect	  of	  Jewish	  community	  organization	  is	  the	  need	  for	  self-­‐defense	  against	  a	  sometimes	  hostile	  non-­‐Jewish	  world.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Jacob	  Katz,	  ed.,	  Toward	  Modernity:	  The	  European	  Jewish	  Model	  (New	  Brunswick,	  U.S.A.:	  Transaction	  Books,	  1987),	  2–4.	  16	  Michael	  A	  Meyer,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Modern	  Jew:	  Jewish	  Identity	  and	  European	  
Culture	  in	  Germany,	  1749-­‐1824	  (Wayne	  State	  University	  Press,	  1972),	  8.	  17	  These	  two	  aspects	  are	  loosely	  based	  on	  Daniel	  Elazar’s	  model	  of	  modern,	  voluntary	  Jewish	  community	  life.	  Although	  Elazar’s	  study	  applies	  to	  American	  Jewish	  communities,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  helpful	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  view	  communities	  in	  general.	  (Daniel	  Judah	  Elazar,	  “Jewish	  Communal	  Structures	  Around	  the	  World,”	  Journal	  of	  Jewish	  Communal	  
Service	  74	  (1998):	  120–31.)	  18	  For	  a	  very	  early	  study	  of	  the	  motivations	  and	  problems	  of	  Jewish	  philanthropy,	  see	  Boris	  David	  Bogen,	  Jewish	  Philanthropy:	  An	  Exposition	  of	  Principles	  and	  Methods	  of	  
Jewish	  Social	  Service	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Macmillan,	  1917).	  
	   	   	   8	  This	  study	  will	  show	  the	  response	  of	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  as	  the	  local	  non-­‐Jewish	  populations	  became	  more	  and	  more	  influenced	  by	  Nazi	  propaganda.	  	  
Historiography	  of	  American	  Jewish	  Actions	  
The	  historiography	  of	  American	  Jewish	  responses	  to	  the	  Holocaust	  has	  fluctuated	  widely	  and	  has	  resulted	  in	  ongoing	  debates.	  Early	  studies,	  such	  as	  Roger	  Manvell	  and	  Heinrich	  Fraenkel’s	  The	  Incomparable	  Crime,	  were	  critical	  of	  the	  role	  of	  American	  Jews,	  accusing	  them	  of	  being	  slow	  to	  comprehend	  the	  true	  magnitude	  of	  the	  problem.19	  David	  Wyman	  concluded	  that	  American	  Jewish	  organizations	  did	  not	  do	  enough	  to	  challenge	  the	  conscience	  of	  America	  and	  increase	  the	  immigration	  quotas.20	  Others,	  such	  as	  Saul	  Friedman,	  accused	  American	  Jewish	  leaders	  of	  openly	  collaborating	  to	  preserve	  restrictive	  American	  immigration	  policies,	  due	  to	  their	  fear	  of	  increased	  antisemitism	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Depression.21	  Henry	  Feingold	  also	  attributed	  this	  reticence	  to	  the	  “Jewish	  love	  affair”	  with	  Roosevelt	  that	  caused	  American	  Jews	  to	  avoid	  challenging	  the	  New	  Deal	  humanitarianism.	  In	  addition,	  Feingold	  blamed	  the	  divisions	  and	  squabbling	  among	  the	  various	  Jewish	  organizations	  as	  a	  critical	  factor	  that	  kept	  them	  from	  influencing	  President	  Roosevelt	  with	  a	  unified	  voice.22	  Edward	  Pinsky	  posited	  that	  American	  Jewish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Roger	  Manvell	  and	  Heinrich	  Fraenkel,	  The	  Incomparable	  Crime;	  Mass	  
Extermination	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century;	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Guilt	  (New	  York:	  Putnam,	  1967).	  20	  Wyman,	  Paper	  Walls:	  America	  and	  the	  Refugee	  Crisis,	  1938-­‐1941.	  21	  Saul	  S.	  Friedman,	  No	  Haven	  for	  the	  Oppressed:	  United	  States	  Policy	  Toward	  Jewish	  
Refugees,	  1938-­‐1945	  (Wayne	  State	  University	  Press,	  1973).	  22	  Feingold,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Rescue:	  The	  Roosevelt	  Administration	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  
1938-­‐1945.	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  organizations	  failed	  to	  unite	  due	  to	  divisive	  issues	  such	  as	  Zionism	  and	  assimilation,	  and	  differing	  socioeconomic	  class	  interests	  and	  viewpoints.23	  	  	  
In	  contrast,	  authors	  such	  as	  William	  D.	  Rubinstein	  argue	  that	  there	  was	  nothing	  the	  Allies	  could	  have	  done,	  since	  Hitler	  was	  determined	  to	  destroy	  the	  Jews.	  Bombed	  railroad	  lines	  to	  Auschwitz	  could	  easily	  have	  been	  rebuilt	  within	  days,	  and	  the	  war	  effort	  had	  higher	  priorities.24	  Richard	  Breitman	  and	  Allan	  Lichtman	  take	  a	  middle	  road	  on	  the	  American	  response,	  challenging	  both	  extremes	  that	  the	  Roosevelt	  administration	  actively	  aided	  or	  prevented	  the	  Jews	  from	  escaping	  Europe.	  They	  argue	  that	  in	  some	  cases,	  politicians	  did	  act	  out	  of	  personal	  antisemitic	  sentiments,	  but	  in	  others	  they	  simply	  yielded	  to	  the	  public	  opposition	  to	  allow	  more	  immigrants	  into	  the	  country,	  particularly	  European	  Jews	  that	  raised	  the	  fear	  of	  Nazi	  infiltration.	  They	  pointed	  out	  that	  ultimately,	  domestic	  affairs	  and	  the	  war	  effort	  were	  America’s	  highest	  priority	  and	  the	  plight	  of	  Jewish	  refugees	  was	  just	  a	  political	  liability	  in	  light	  of	  the	  larger	  efforts.25	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Edward	  David	  Pinsky,	  “Cooperation	  among	  American	  Jewish	  Organizations	  in	  Their	  Efforts	  to	  Rescue	  European	  Jewry	  During	  the	  Holocaust,	  1939-­‐1945”	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  Microfilms,	  1984).	  24	  See	  William	  D.	  Rubinstein,	  The	  Myth	  of	  Rescue :	  Why	  the	  Democracies	  Could	  Not	  
Have	  Saved	  More	  Jews	  from	  the	  Nazis	  (London;	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  Taylor	  &	  Francis	  Group,	  2005).	  25	  Richard	  Breitman	  and	  Allan	  J.	  Lichtman,	  FDR	  and	  the	  Jews,	  2013;	  see	  also	  Richard	  Breitman,	  “The	  Allied	  War	  Effort	  and	  the	  Jews,	  1942-­‐1943,”	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  
History	  20,	  no.	  1	  (January	  1,	  1985):	  135–56;	  and	  Bernard	  Mano	  Julius	  Wasserstein,	  Britain	  
and	  the	  Jews	  of	  Europe,	  1939-­‐1945	  (London;	  New	  York;	  London:	  Leicester	  university	  press ;	  Institute	  for	  Jewish	  policy	  research,	  1999).	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JDC	  history	  and	  mission	  
In	  retrospect,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  place	  blame	  and	  conclude	  that	  American	  Jews	  did	  not	  do	  enough	  to	  help	  their	  fellow	  Jews	  during	  the	  Holocaust.	  There	  are	  others	  who	  suggest	  Jewish	  communal	  leaders	  did	  their	  best	  under	  the	  circumstances.	  	  This	  is	  a	  complex	  issue	  and	  the	  research	  can	  only	  go	  so	  far:	  the	  Holocaust	  was	  an	  unprecedented	  genocide	  in	  which	  six	  million	  Jews	  were	  ultimately	  murdered.	  	  
American	  Jews	  did	  unite	  to	  aid	  their	  fellow	  Jews,	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  (JDC).	  Daniel	  Elazar	  has	  traced	  the	  philanthropic	  inclinations	  of	  North	  American	  Jewry,	  who	  “from	  their	  earliest	  years	  in	  the	  New	  World	  were	  prepared	  to	  make	  serious	  efforts	  to	  help	  their	  brethren,	  first	  at	  home	  and	  then	  increasingly	  abroad	  as	  well	  as	  the	  most	  serious	  problems	  shifted	  to	  the	  international	  arena.”	  He	  has	  also	  commented	  on	  the	  success	  specifically	  of	  the	  North	  American	  Jewish	  community	  to	  organize	  aid	  efforts	  entirely	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis	  without	  the	  coercive	  powers	  of	  government,	  calling	  it	  “one	  of	  the	  amazing	  chapters	  in	  Jewish	  history.”26	  	  
A	  1909	  study	  showed	  that	  there	  were	  1,191	  separate	  and	  distinct	  Jewish	  organizations	  providing	  Jewish	  relief	  in	  America.27	  According	  to	  Herman	  Stein,	  in	  the	  World	  War	  I	  era,	  the	  “pressure	  for	  coordination	  and	  centralization	  in	  fund	  raising,”	  together	  with	  the	  emphasis	  on	  overseas	  aid	  as	  a	  primary	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Jewish	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Daniel	  Judah	  Elazar,	  “Organizational	  and	  Philanthropic	  Behavior	  of	  the	  North	  American	  Jewish	  Community”	  (Jerusalem	  Center	  for	  Public	  Affairs),	  1,	  accessed	  July	  16,	  2014,	  http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles2/orgphil-­‐najew.htm;	  See	  also	  Daniel	  Judah	  Elazar,	  
Community	  and	  Polity:	  The	  Organizational	  Dynamics	  of	  American	  Jewry	  (Jewish	  Publication	  Society,	  1995).	  27	  Bogen,	  Jewish	  Philanthropy:	  An	  Exposition	  of	  Principles	  and	  Methods	  of	  Jewish	  
Social	  Service	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  7–8.	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  community,	  precipitated	  a	  united	  effort	  among	  Jewish	  charities.28	  In	  this	  atmosphere,	  JDC	  was	  established	  in	  1914	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  charitable	  funds	  raised	  by	  two	  of	  the	  larger	  relief	  committees,	  one	  Orthodox	  and	  one	  Reform,	  and	  forty	  smaller	  organizations.	  The	  JDC’s	  early	  leaders	  were	  liberal-­‐minded,	  wealthy	  German	  Jews	  who	  felt	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  help	  their	  less	  fortunate	  co-­‐religionists.29	  The	  immediate	  need	  in	  1914	  was	  to	  aid	  the	  Jews	  in	  Palestine	  who	  were	  starving	  once	  Turkey	  had	  cut	  off	  their	  access	  to	  European	  aid.	  But	  the	  JDC	  continued	  to	  function	  after	  the	  World	  War	  I	  crisis	  was	  over,	  advancing	  American	  Jewish	  efforts	  to	  aid	  persecuted	  Jewish	  communities	  overseas,	  particularly	  helping	  relieve	  the	  intense	  poverty	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  following	  the	  First	  World	  War	  and	  rehabilitating	  victims	  of	  pogroms	  after	  the	  Communist	  Revolution.30	  	  
After	  the	  Nazis	  rose	  to	  power	  in	  1933,	  JDC	  concentrated	  on	  providing	  aid	  in	  three	  main	  areas:	  supporting	  Eastern	  European	  Jews	  in	  their	  desperate	  economic	  and	  social	  situation;	  providing	  physical	  and	  cultural	  sustenance	  for	  persecuted	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  Nazi-­‐occupied	  areas;	  and	  facilitating	  emigration	  from	  these	  areas.31	  To	  help	  Jews	  escape,	  they	  made	  travel	  arrangements,	  attempted	  to	  secure	  visas,	  and	  provided	  food,	  housing	  and	  medical	  aid	  to	  stranded	  refugees	  until	  they	  could	  be	  relocated.	  According	  to	  JDC’s	  own	  statistics,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1939,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Herman	  D.	  Stein,	  “Jewish	  Social	  Work	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (1654-­‐1954),”	  in	  
American	  Jewish	  Yearbook,	  ed.	  Morris	  Fine,	  vol.	  57	  (New	  York,	  Philadelphia:	  American	  Jewish	  Committee	  and	  Jewish	  Publication	  Society	  of	  America,	  1956),	  18.	  29	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  22.	  30	  Ibid.	  31	  Ibid.,	  25.	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  JDC-­‐supported	  organizations	  had	  helped	  some	  110,000	  Jews	  emigrate	  from	  Germany—30,000	  in	  1939	  alone.	  In	  1940,	  JDC	  was	  helping	  refugees	  in	  transit	  in	  more	  than	  40	  countries.	  From	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  II	  through	  1944,	  JDC	  enabled	  over	  81,000	  Jews	  to	  emigrate.32	  In	  some	  locations,	  JDC,	  representing	  American	  Jewry,	  was	  the	  main	  and	  sometimes	  the	  only	  international	  organization	  that	  responded	  to	  the	  cries	  of	  persecuted	  Jews	  for	  help.	  It	  functioned	  as	  a	  lifeline	  across	  Europe,	  its	  own	  staff	  members	  remaining	  in	  Warsaw	  and	  joining	  their	  fellow	  Jews	  when	  the	  Nazis	  emptied	  the	  Ghetto.	  And	  by	  its	  actions,	  JDC	  demonstrated	  to	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  stranded	  in	  Cuba,	  Shanghai	  and	  other	  places	  that	  Jews	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  cared	  enough	  to	  come	  personally	  and	  bring	  them	  aid.	  
In	  providing	  this	  aid,	  the	  JDC	  was	  guided	  by	  four	  principles:	  
• A	  determinedly	  non-­‐political	  commitment	  to	  Jews	  based	  on	  need	  
• A	  responsive	  support	  for	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  their	  place	  of	  choice	  
• A	  respectful	  inclusiveness	  for	  diverse	  Jewish	  beliefs	  and	  viewpoints	  
• A	  clear	  intention	  to	  help	  Jews	  help	  themselves—furthering	  self-­‐sufficiency	  among	  individuals	  and	  communities33 These	  guiding	  principles	  reflect	  JDC’s	  non-­‐religious,	  non-­‐political,	  and	  especially	  non-­‐Zionist	  perspective	  (note	  the	  careful	  wording	  of	  “in	  their	  place	  of	  choice”).	  Influenced	  by	  current	  social	  welfare	  trends,	  JDC’s	  intention	  during	  this	  period	  was	  to	  act	  as	  a	  provider	  of	  financing	  and	  supervision,	  allowing	  local	  Jewish	  organizations	  to	  do	  the	  actual	  relief	  work,	  with	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  keeping	  as	  many	  Jews	  as	  possible	  alive	  and	  making	  individuals	  and	  communities	  self-­‐sufficient.	  In	  some	  circumstances,	  JDC	  was	  obliged	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  “History	  of	  the	  JDC,”	  accessed	  August	  6,	  2014,	  http://archives.jdc.org/history-­‐of-­‐jdc/history-­‐1930.html.	  33	  “A	  Joint	  Effort:	  JDC’s	  Beginnings,	  1914-­‐1921,”	  accessed	  August	  6,	  2014,	  http://archives.jdc.org/exhibits/a-­‐joint-­‐effort/?depth=1.	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  send	  representatives	  to	  oversee	  the	  relief	  efforts	  personally.	  In	  extreme	  cases,	  they	  operated	  kitchens	  and	  provided	  housing	  and	  medical	  aid.34	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  stated	  guidelines,	  another	  of	  JDC’s	  goals	  during	  this	  period	  was	  to	  prevent	  further	  antisemitism	  and	  keep	  doors	  to	  immigration	  open	  by	  easing	  internal	  communal	  conflicts,	  building	  morale	  and	  relieving	  the	  burdens	  on	  those	  locations	  that	  were	  still	  willing	  to	  accept	  Jewish	  immigrants.	  
The	  Jewish	  Community	  as	  an	  Entity	  
Yehuda	  Bauer,	  in	  his	  three-­‐volume	  history	  of	  the	  JDC,35	  understandably	  concentrated	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  research	  on	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  where	  Nazi	  brutality	  was	  most	  intense.	  This	  study	  has	  added	  to	  the	  conversation	  by	  focusing	  on	  JDC’s	  wartime	  interaction	  with	  Jewish	  communities	  outside	  of	  these	  areas,	  specifically	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai,	  two	  of	  the	  last	  havens	  open	  to	  Jewish	  refugees.	  	  
The	  relatively	  small	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai,	  two	  of	  the	  last	  destinations	  open	  to	  Jewish	  refugees,	  provide	  a	  prime	  opportunity	  to	  observe	  the	  complexity	  of	  Jewish	  communal	  dynamics	  under	  stress.	  In	  these	  communities	  we	  see	  the	  tensions,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  disintegration	  of	  communal	  cohesion,	  between	  the	  philanthropic	  impulse	  and	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  provide	  for	  himself	  and	  his	  family.	  Small,	  existing	  Jewish	  communities	  were	  suddenly	  overtaxed	  by	  unmanageable	  numbers	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  105.	  35	  Yehuda	  Bauer,	  My	  Brother’s	  Keeper:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  
Distribution	  Committee,	  1929-­‐1939,	  1st	  ed.	  (Philadelphia:	  Jewish	  Publication	  Society	  of	  America,	  1974);	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust;	  and	  Out	  of	  the	  Ashes:	  The	  Impact	  of	  
American	  Jews	  on	  Post-­‐Holocaust	  European	  Jewry,	  1st	  ed.	  (Oxford,	  New	  York:	  Pergamon	  Press,	  1989).	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  destitute	  refugees.	  Far	  too	  many	  people	  were	  vying	  for	  too	  few	  resources.	  The	  resulting	  feeling	  of	  unfairness	  when	  some	  received	  more	  aid	  than	  others	  aroused	  envy,	  competition	  and	  mistrust.	  The	  ever-­‐present	  threat	  of	  antisemitism	  exerted	  further	  psychological	  pressure	  to	  that	  already	  felt	  by	  refugees	  who	  had	  left	  everything	  behind.	  The	  established	  Jewish	  communities	  feared	  that	  the	  influx	  of	  destitute	  refugees	  would	  arouse	  anti-­‐Jewish	  feelings	  toward	  themselves.	  These	  and	  other	  stresses	  further	  damaged	  the	  already	  tenuous	  relationships	  within	  the	  different	  Jewish	  communities.	  
This	  case	  study	  of	  the	  Havana	  and	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  communities	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  unbridled	  menace	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  rather	  than	  unifying	  the	  existing	  Jewish	  communities	  to	  provide	  aid	  to	  those	  fleeing	  the	  Nazi	  terror,	  fractured	  fragile	  communal	  interrelationships	  even	  further.	  Differences	  in	  religion,	  class,	  origin,	  politics	  and	  age	  became	  more	  pronounced	  as	  communities	  fragmented,	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  provide	  the	  aid	  that	  was	  desperately	  needed.	  Yet	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  established	  Jewish	  leaders	  to	  work	  together,	  positive	  forces	  were	  at	  work	  as	  well.	  The	  refugees	  themselves,	  although	  experiencing	  severe	  deprivation,	  managed	  to	  create	  a	  society	  united	  by	  cultural,	  educational	  and	  literary	  pursuits.	  It	  is	  this	  complexity	  in	  Jewish	  communal	  interactions	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  that	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  this	  study.	  
Laura	  Margolis	  Steps	  In	  
Laura	  Margolis	  (1903-­‐1997)	  was	  the	  appointed	  JDC	  director	  in	  both	  of	  these	  locations.	  Born	  in	  Istanbul	  in	  1903	  of	  Ashkenazi	  Jewish	  parents,	  Margolis	  grew	  up	  with	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  social	  responsibility.	  Her	  maternal	  grandfather,	  Solomon	  Schwartz,	  was	  personal	  physician	  to	  the	  Sultan	  of	  Turkey.	  Schwartz	  was	  also	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	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  Jewish	  community	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  had	  a	  special	  concern	  for	  the	  Jews	  who	  had	  taken	  refuge	  there	  from	  persecution	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Her	  father,	  Herman,	  a	  European	  horticulturist	  and	  fervent	  Zionist,	  had	  lived	  in	  Palestine	  for	  a	  time,	  but	  became	  convinced	  he	  could	  do	  more	  for	  the	  Zionist	  cause	  by	  relocating	  to	  Istanbul	  and	  training	  and	  preparing	  the	  refugees	  to	  emigrate	  to	  Palestine.	  Margolis	  married	  Schwartz’s	  daughter	  and	  the	  family	  eventually	  moved	  to	  Cleveland,	  where	  others	  in	  the	  Margolis-­‐Kalvarisky	  family	  had	  settled.	  Laura	  was	  raised	  in	  the	  strong	  Cleveland	  Jewish	  community	  led	  by	  the	  well-­‐known	  rabbi,	  Abba	  Hillel	  Silver.	  Since	  her	  teenage	  years,	  Margolis	  volunteered	  with	  local	  welfare	  services.	  Later,	  she	  received	  a	  degree	  in	  social	  work	  from	  Western	  Reserve	  University.36	  	  
Margolis’	  career	  in	  social	  welfare	  dated	  from	  1930	  when	  she	  was	  employed	  by	  the	  Jewish	  Social	  Service	  Bureau	  in	  Cleveland	  as	  a	  caseworker	  and	  then	  as	  supervisor	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Big	  Sister	  Association,	  working	  with	  maladjusted	  girls,	  until	  1934.	  She	  then	  became	  director	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Welfare	  Society	  in	  Buffalo,	  New	  York,	  where	  she	  served	  until	  she	  was	  recruited	  in	  1939	  to	  work	  in	  Cuba.37	  	  
Margolis	  was	  trained	  in	  the	  predominant	  theory	  of	  social	  welfare	  at	  the	  time,	  which	  emphasized	  bringing	  order	  to	  the	  giving	  of	  relief	  through	  a	  thorough	  evaluation	  of	  the	  client’s	  need	  and	  the	  “weeding	  out”	  of	  individuals	  who	  did	  not	  qualify.	  In	  addition,	  within	  Jewish	  social	  work	  specifically	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  there	  was	  an	  attitude	  that	  Jewish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Now	  Case	  Western	  Reserve	  University.	  37	  Philip	  Zimet	  to	  George	  J.	  Schoeneman,	  Esq.,	  “RE:	  Laura	  Margolis,”	  January	  18,	  1949,	  1.	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  communities	  must	  “take	  care	  of	  their	  own.”38	  The	  training	  Margolis	  received,	  as	  well	  as	  her	  Jewish	  background,	  shaped	  her	  approach	  to	  social	  welfare,	  enabling	  her	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  large	  number	  of	  needy	  refugees	  in	  an	  organized	  way,	  and	  within	  a	  very	  limited	  budget.39	  
Each	  overseas	  location	  where	  Laura	  Margolis	  served	  had	  unique	  political,	  historical	  and	  social	  contexts.	  Each	  demanded	  different	  strategies	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  civil	  authorities	  and	  the	  established	  Jewish	  communal	  leadership.	  But	  no	  amount	  of	  training	  could	  have	  prepared	  Margolis	  for	  the	  difficulties	  she	  faced	  working	  among	  Holocaust	  refugees	  in	  Havana	  and	  Shanghai.	  Due	  to	  her	  language	  skills	  (Margolis	  was	  able	  to	  communicate	  in	  French,	  Spanish,	  German,	  Turkish,	  Greek	  and	  Yiddish)	  and	  her	  unique	  background,	  motivation	  and	  training,	  she	  was	  the	  ideal	  candidate	  to	  work	  with	  JDC	  in	  these	  peripheral	  areas.40	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Stein,	  “Jewish	  Social	  Work	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (1654-­‐1954),”	  20.	  39	  Ibid.,	  19.	  40	  Sources	  of	  information	  for	  Margolis’	  life	  include	  Menahem	  Kaufman,	  “Transcript	  of	  Unpublished	  Interview	  with	  Laura	  Margolis	  Jarblum”	  (Jerusalem:	  Institute	  for	  Contemporary	  Jewry,	  The	  Hebrew	  University,	  1976);	  Linda	  Kuzmack,	  “Interview	  with	  Laura	  Margolis,”	  July	  11,	  1990,	  RG-­‐50.030*0149	  /	  1990.422.1,	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum	  collection	  of	  oral	  testimonies;	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  “Interview	  with	  Laura	  Margolis,”	  July	  11,	  1990,	  RG-­‐50.030*0149;	  Joel	  S.	  Fishman,	  Interview	  with	  Laura	  Margolis-­‐Jarblum,	  July	  2,	  1974,	  Het	  Centrum	  voor	  Onderzoek	  Naar	  de	  
Geschiedenis	  der	  Nederlandse	  Joden;	  Margalit	  Bejarano,	  “Unpublished	  Interview	  with	  Laura	  Margolis	  Jarblum”	  (Institute	  for	  Contemporary	  Jewry.	  Jerusalem:	  The	  Hebrew	  University,	  1987);	  Evan	  Garelle	  et	  al.,	  Havana	  Nagila	  the	  Jews	  in	  Cuba	  (Teaneck,	  N.J.,	  Modesto,	  Calif.:	  Ergo	  Media,	  Inc.;	  Schnitzki	  &	  Stone	  Journalism,	  1996);	  Laura	  Margolis,	  Laura	  M.	  Holocaust	  
Testimony	  (HVT-­‐4355)	  (New	  Haven,	  CT:	  Holocaust	  Survivors	  Film	  Project,	  1980),	  http://www.worldcat.org.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/title/laura-­‐m-­‐holocaust-­‐testimony-­‐hvt-­‐4355-­‐october-­‐8-­‐1980/oclc/702183940&referer=brief_results;	  Zimet	  to	  Schoeneman,	  Esq.,	  “RE:	  Laura	  Margolis”;	  and	  Julie	  Kerssen,	  Life’s	  Work:	  The	  Accidental	  Career	  of	  Laura	  
Margolis	  Jarblum.	  Unpublished	  Master’s	  Thesis	  (Milwaukee:	  University	  of	  Wisconsin,	  2000).	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Sources	  Used	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  this	  dissertation	  has	  focused	  on	  JDC’s	  interaction	  through	  Laura	  Margolis	  with	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  during	  the	  Holocaust.	  To	  accomplish	  this,	  I	  have	  extensively	  utilized	  the	  New	  York	  and	  Jerusalem	  archives	  of	  the	  JDC,	  which	  contain	  the	  professional	  correspondence	  and	  official	  reports	  of	  Margolis,	  her	  coworkers	  and	  her	  superiors,	  as	  well	  as	  JDC	  promotional	  materials	  from	  the	  period.	  I	  have	  examined	  published	  articles	  by	  Margolis,	  as	  well	  as	  newspaper	  reports	  and	  the	  financial	  records	  of	  the	  local	  JDC	  operations	  that	  she	  supervised.	  Also	  analyzed	  were	  unpublished	  transcripts	  of	  oral	  interviews	  with	  Margolis	  that	  are	  located	  at	  the	  Institute	  for	  Contemporary	  Jewry	  at	  the	  Hebrew	  University	  in	  Jerusalem,	  the	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  Het	  Centrum	  voor	  Onderzoek	  Naar	  de	  Geschiedenis	  der	  Nederlandse	  
Joden	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  and	  JDC	  archives.	  The	  Holocaust	  Survivors’	  Film	  Project	  at	  Yale	  University	  in	  New	  Haven	  offered	  a	  video	  testimony	  recorded	  by	  Margolis.	  Insight	  was	  added	  by	  “Lamp	  Unto	  My	  Feet:	  Tzedakah,”	  a	  short	  video	  documentary	  featuring	  Margolis	  and	  produced	  by	  CBS	  News	  in	  1968,	  located	  in	  the	  Steven	  Spielberg	  Jewish	  Film	  Archive	  at	  the	  Hebrew	  University	  in	  Jerusalem.41	  Finally,	  the	  Yehuda	  Bauer	  collection,	  situated	  at	  the	  JDC	  archives	  in	  Jerusalem,	  contained	  many	  of	  Margolis’	  personal	  papers.	  In	  addition,	  Professor	  Bauer	  graciously	  granted	  me	  access	  to	  the	  as-­‐yet-­‐uncatalogued	  research	  files	  that	  he	  donated	  to	  the	  Yad	  Vashem	  archives	  in	  Jerusalem.	  Yad	  Vashem	  also	  granted	  me	  access	  to	  the	  uncatalogued	  files	  of	  the	  late	  Professor	  David	  Kranzler.	  Additionally	  of	  great	  help	  were	  the	  YIVO	  archives	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Jewish	  History,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  the	  New	  York	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Lamp	  Unto	  My	  Feet:	  Tzedakah	  (Jerusalem,	  Steven	  Spielberg	  Jewish	  Film	  Archive	  at	  the	  Hebrew	  University:	  CBS	  News,	  1968).	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  Museum	  of	  Jewish	  Heritage	  in	  New	  York	  and	  the	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Museum	  in	  Washington,	  DC;	  and	  additional	  supporting	  documentation	  for	  the	  period	  from	  contemporary	  archives	  and	  news	  services	  (see	  bibliography).	  
In	  closing,	  there	  is	  no	  simple	  way	  to	  describe	  the	  refugee	  experience.	  The	  individuals	  who	  fled	  the	  Nazi	  terror	  came	  from	  different	  social,	  economic,	  cultural,	  religious	  and	  geographic	  backgrounds.	  Most	  left	  behind	  their	  life	  savings,	  livelihoods,	  and	  loved	  ones,	  and	  were	  confronted	  with	  the	  need	  to	  reconstruct	  their	  lives	  with	  few	  or	  no	  resources.	  The	  small,	  established	  Jewish	  communities	  that	  met	  them	  were	  themselves	  divided	  along	  lines	  of	  geographic	  origin,	  political	  viewpoints,	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds	  and	  levels	  of	  religious	  commitment,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  personal	  rivalries.	  These	  established	  communities	  did	  not	  welcome	  the	  refugee	  inundation	  and	  offered	  relatively	  little	  by	  way	  of	  aid	  considering	  the	  immenseness	  of	  the	  need.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  this	  study	  will	  first	  focus	  on	  the	  refugee	  and	  established	  communities	  of	  Cuba,	  followed	  by	  a	  similar	  examination	  of	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Shanghai.	  The	  conclusion	  will	  compare	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  two.
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  PART	  ONE	  
CUBA	  
By	  the	  late	  1930s,	  Cuba,	  with	  its	  open	  immigration	  policy,	  was	  unique	  in	  that	  had	  become	  the	  major	  transit	  country	  for	  German	  refugees	  planning	  to	  enter	  the	  United	  States.	  After	  the	  Nazis	  came	  to	  power	  in	  Germany	  in	  1933,	  refugees	  who	  wanted	  to	  enter	  the	  U.S.	  would	  be	  first	  admitted	  to	  the	  U.S.	  as	  temporary	  visitors	  and	  were	  sent	  to	  Cuba	  by	  the	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee	  for	  Aid	  to	  Refugees	  and	  Emigrants	  (NCC)1	  or	  by	  relatives	  to	  wait	  for	  their	  U.S.	  quota	  numbers	  to	  come	  up.2	  Most	  of	  these	  refugees	  only	  spent	  a	  few	  days	  or	  weeks	  in	  Havana	  before	  reaching	  their	  U.S.	  quota	  number	  and	  returning	  to	  the	  U.S.	  They	  were	  expecting	  to	  return	  to	  America	  quickly,	  to	  conditions	  with	  which	  they	  were	  already	  familiar.	  
By	  1938,	  due	  to	  the	  dramatic	  increase	  of	  German	  immigration	  to	  the	  U.S.	  after	  the	  
Anschluss	  in	  March	  and	  Kristallnacht	  in	  November,	  the	  quota	  available	  to	  Germans	  wanting	  to	  enter	  the	  U.S.	  through	  the	  American	  Consulate	  in	  Cuba	  filled	  up,	  and	  affected	  the	  quick	  flow	  of	  refugees	  returning	  to	  the	  States	  with	  immigration	  visas.	  More	  and	  more	  refugees	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee	  for	  Aid	  to	  Refugees	  (NCC)	  was	  established	  (and	  largely	  funded)	  by	  the	  JDC	  in	  1934.	  The	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  had	  suggested	  that	  a	  group	  be	  formed	  that	  would	  work	  closely	  with	  the	  Intergovernmental	  High	  Commission	  for	  Refugees	  to	  coordinate	  refugee	  relief	  work	  done	  by	  private	  organizations	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  For	  a	  list	  of	  the	  organizations	  involved	  in	  the	  Committee,	  see	  Appendix.	  The	  National	  Refugee	  Service	  (NRS)	  succeeded	  the	  NCC	  in	  1939	  (For	  more	  on	  the	  NCC,	  see	  the	  “Archives	  of	  the	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee	  for	  Aid	  to	  Refugees,	  1932-­‐1940,”	  1940,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  RG	  247).	  2	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Herbert	  R.	  Bloch,	  April	  8,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	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  found	  themselves	  stranded	  in	  Cuba	  for	  months	  and	  even	  years.3	  Between	  1938	  and	  1944,	  12,000	  Jewish	  refugees	  arrived	  in	  Cuba,	  most	  of	  them	  viewing	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  temporary	  haven	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  immigrate	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  About	  half	  of	  them	  reached	  the	  United	  States	  before	  immigration	  slowed	  to	  a	  trickle,	  but	  6,000	  were	  left	  behind.	  
As	  these	  thousands	  of	  refugees	  began	  to	  flood	  Havana,	  the	  local	  Jewish	  leaders	  reached	  out	  to	  the	  international	  Jewish	  community	  for	  assistance,	  and	  the	  NCC	  responded.	  The	  NCC,	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  JDC,	  became	  the	  intermediary	  between	  refugees	  seeking	  entry	  into	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  American	  consulate	  in	  Havana.	  In	  December	  of	  1938,	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  of	  the	  NCC	  came	  across	  a	  job	  application	  from	  35-­‐year-­‐old	  Laura	  Margolis,	  a	  social	  worker	  in	  the	  Buffalo	  Jewish	  community	  fluent	  in	  Spanish	  and	  German,	  and	  recruited	  her	  to	  a	  six-­‐month	  term	  in	  Cuba	  to	  help	  with	  the	  immigration	  process.	  Margolis	  and	  a	  staff	  of	  about	  100	  Cuban	  Jews	  and	  refugees	  faced	  the	  challenge	  of	  providing	  food	  and	  shelter	  for	  the	  thousands	  of	  Jewish	  refugees	  while	  aiding	  their	  immigration	  efforts,	  all	  without	  sufficient	  funding.	  	  
Social	  tensions	  were	  also	  increasing	  between	  the	  small,	  established	  Jewish	  community	  and	  the	  new	  immigrants,	  who	  were	  faced	  with	  longer	  and	  longer	  stays	  in	  Cuba	  as	  their	  immigration	  opportunities	  evaporated.	  There	  were	  conflicts	  between	  Ashkenazi	  and	  Sephardic	  Jews,	  Zionists	  and	  non-­‐Zionists,	  and	  between	  those	  of	  orthodox	  and	  liberal	  Jewish	  outlooks.	  Additionally,	  the	  refugees,	  who	  were	  far	  from	  a	  homogeneous	  group,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ibid.	  
	   	   	   21	  struggled	  with	  the	  language,	  the	  climate,	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  livelihoods,	  financial	  resources,	  family	  and	  social	  environment.	  
These	  were	  the	  challenges	  facing	  Laura	  Margolis	  when	  she	  arrived	  in	  Cuba.	  She	  regularly	  attempted	  to	  draw	  together	  representatives	  of	  the	  established	  Jewish	  communities	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  unified	  effort	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  refugees.	  To	  better	  utilize	  available	  funds,	  she	  set	  out	  to	  completely	  reorganize	  the	  system	  of	  granting	  aid,	  requiring	  investigations	  into	  the	  corruption	  she	  discovered	  among	  the	  refugees,	  which	  was	  a	  source	  of	  much	  community	  dissention.	  	  
Margolis’	  reports	  from	  Cuba	  give	  us	  firsthand	  insights	  into	  the	  changing	  and	  complex	  needs	  of	  refugee	  communities.	  After	  the	  United	  States	  severely	  restricted	  its	  immigration	  quotas,	  the	  JDC	  through	  Margolis	  sought	  to	  provide	  vocational	  training,	  business	  loans,	  and	  job	  placement	  assistance	  to	  those	  refugees	  that	  remained	  in	  Cuba.	  All	  of	  this	  took	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  impending	  anti-­‐immigration	  legislation	  and	  increasing	  antisemitic	  propaganda	  fed	  by	  the	  Cuban	  government	  and	  the	  military	  and	  disseminated	  by	  the	  Cuban	  press.	  
The	  growing	  antisemitic	  trajectory	  eventually	  culminated	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  crisis	  of	  June	  1939.	  Many	  books	  and	  articles	  have	  been	  written	  about	  the	  voyage	  of	  the	  M.S.	  St.	  Louis,4	  but	  very	  little	  scholarship	  has	  covered	  this	  period	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See,	  for	  example,	  Jeffrey	  P	  Widem,	  “The	  Spirit	  of	  the	  Other	  St.	  Louis:	  The	  1930’s	  Refugee	  Crisis	  and	  Levels	  of	  Hope,”	  1998;	  Sarah	  A	  Ogilvie	  and	  Scott	  Miller,	  Refuge	  Denied:	  
The	  St.	  Louis	  Passengers	  and	  the	  Holocaust	  (Madison,	  Wis.:	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  Press,	  2006);	  John	  Mendelsohn,	  Jewish	  Emigration:	  The	  S.S.	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  and	  Other	  Cases	  (New	  York:	  Garland	  Pub.,	  1982);	  Stefanie	  Fischer,	  The	  Fiasco	  of	  the	  SS	  St.	  Louis:	  History	  and	  Myth,	  2002.	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  communal	  context	  in	  great	  detail.	  This	  study	  will	  highlight	  in	  detail	  the	  specific	  negotiations	  and	  the	  great	  efforts	  made	  by	  the	  JDC—representing	  the	  American	  Jewish	  communities—to	  ameliorate	  the	  crisis.	  	  
Robert	  Levine,	  in	  his	  comprehensive	  social	  history	  of	  the	  Jews	  in	  Cuba,5	  focused	  on	  the	  role	  of	  antisemitism	  when	  discussing	  the	  World	  War	  II	  period.	  However,	  his	  analysis	  of	  this	  time	  period	  is	  not	  lengthy6	  and	  his	  discourse	  on	  antisemitism	  does	  not	  differentiate	  between	  Cubans’	  fear	  of	  economic	  competition	  from	  the	  wave	  of	  Jewish	  immigrants	  that	  was	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  that	  country,	  and	  ideological	  antisemitism,	  which	  occurred	  sporadically	  yet	  was	  not	  rampant	  among	  the	  population.	  
Yehuda	  Bauer,	  the	  historian	  of	  the	  JDC,	  only	  mentions	  Cuba	  in	  passing	  in	  the	  context	  of	  general	  Latin	  American	  immigration.7	  There	  have	  been	  no	  in-­‐depth	  studies	  of	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  JDC,	  the	  main	  relief	  body	  active	  at	  the	  time,	  to	  ensure	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  over	  6,000	  Jewish	  refugees	  stranded	  in	  Cuba	  just	  prior	  to	  and	  during	  the	  Holocaust.	  
This	  study	  will	  add	  to	  the	  conversation	  by	  focusing	  specifically	  on	  the	  aid	  provided	  by	  the	  American	  Jewish	  communities	  through	  the	  JDC,	  their	  umbrella	  relief	  body,	  examining	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  different	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Cuba.	  The	  JDC	  and	  its	  representative,	  Laura	  Margolis,	  through	  careful	  use	  of	  funds	  and	  efficient	  strategies,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Robert	  M.	  Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba	  (Gainesville:	  University	  Press	  of	  Florida,	  1993).	  6	  Levine	  devotes	  only	  20	  of	  410	  pages	  to	  the	  wartime	  period	  and	  30	  to	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident.	  7	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust.	  
	   	   	   23	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  victims	  of	  Nazi	  terror	  who	  found	  shelter	  in	  Havana.	  
The	  first	  chapter	  will	  examine	  JDC’s	  early	  involvement	  in	  Cuba	  through	  Laura	  Margolis	  and	  her	  attempts	  to	  stretch	  limited	  funds	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  increasing	  need	  of	  the	  refugees	  from	  Nazism,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  bring	  the	  local	  Jewish	  leaders	  together	  and	  awaken	  their	  sense	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  toward	  their	  fellow	  Jews.	  
The	  second	  chapter	  will	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  rising	  antisemitism	  upon	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  Cuba.	  After	  Hitler	  rose	  to	  power,	  the	  German	  embassy	  in	  Havana	  attempted	  to	  incite	  anti-­‐Jewish	  sentiments	  in	  the	  local	  population	  through	  the	  use	  of	  propaganda.	  The	  perfect	  storm	  formed	  by	  the	  convergence	  of	  U.S.	  immigration	  law,	  the	  influx	  of	  European	  immigrants	  and	  increasing	  Nazi	  propaganda,	  fueled	  the	  rise	  of	  antisemitic	  sentiment	  in	  Cuba.	  This	  culminated	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident,	  where	  over	  900	  refugees	  were	  refused	  entry	  into	  Cuba	  (and	  all	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  Americas),	  and	  found	  themselves	  stranded	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  The	  details	  surrounding	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident	  will	  be	  documented	  and	  attempts	  made	  by	  the	  established	  Jewish	  leaders	  and	  the	  JDC	  representatives	  to	  intervene	  in	  this	  crisis	  will	  be	  evaluated,	  highlighting	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  rise	  in	  antisemitism	  upon	  the	  existing	  and	  refugee	  communities.	  
In	  both	  chapters,	  a	  pattern	  will	  emerge:	  the	  lack	  of	  tolerance,	  reciprocity	  and	  trust	  among	  the	  leaders	  of	  Cuba’s	  small	  Jewish	  communities	  hindered	  the	  work	  of	  rescue	  and	  relief	  among	  the	  European	  refugees.	  JDC	  representative	  Laura	  Margolis	  provided	  the	  leadership	  and	  the	  needed	  resources	  to	  mitigate—though	  not	  always	  successfully—the	  crises	  that	  arose.	  However,	  when	  that	  funding	  diminished	  significantly,	  some	  of	  the	  refugee	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  leaders	  responded	  positively	  and	  achieved	  enough	  unity	  to	  provide	  the	  social	  services	  that	  were	  needed	  to	  form	  a	  functioning	  and	  culturally	  flourishing	  refugee	  society.	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  CHAPTER	  ONE	  
THE	  JEWS	  OF	  CUBA	  
This	  chapter	  will	  begin	  by	  setting	  the	  context	  with	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Jews	  in	  Cuba,	  tracing	  the	  immigration	  patterns	  of	  the	  established	  Jewish	  communities.	  Then,	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  the	  1930s	  will	  be	  examined,	  followed	  by	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  waves	  of	  refugees	  who	  arrived	  in	  rapidly	  increasing	  numbers	  in	  the	  period	  under	  discussion.	  The	  chapter	  will	  evaluate	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  refugees,	  their	  call	  for	  international	  help,	  and	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  organizations	  that	  stepped	  up	  to	  help.	  	  
The	  local	  Jewish	  communities,	  rather	  than	  contributing	  to	  provide	  the	  needed	  aid,	  instead	  erected	  obstacles	  against	  it.	  This	  was	  largely	  a	  result	  of	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  leaders	  and	  factions	  to	  cooperate	  with	  each	  other.	  Fracturing	  under	  pressure	  along	  ethnic,	  class,	  economic,	  and	  language	  lines,	  their	  lack	  of	  unity	  impeded	  the	  work	  of	  rescue	  and	  relief	  among	  the	  European	  refugees,	  but	  the	  provision	  of	  funds	  and	  leadership	  by	  the	  JDC	  through	  Laura	  Margolis	  was	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  6,000	  Jewish	  refugees	  stranded	  in	  Cuba	  and	  their	  eventual	  safe	  arrival	  at	  their	  permanent	  destinations.	  
A	  Brief	  History	  of	  the	  Jews	  of	  Cuba	  
Before	  the	  influx	  of	  German	  Jewish	  refugees,	  Cuba	  had	  a	  multiethnic	  Jewish	  population	  of	  between	  10,000	  and	  12,000,	  composed	  of	  a	  mixture	  of	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  European,	  Turkish,	  and	  American	  Jews.	  Cuba	  established	  an	  open	  door	  immigration	  policy	  when	  it	  achieved	  independence	  from	  Spain	  in	  1898	  and	  liberated	  itself	  from	  U.S.	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  occupation	  in	  1902.1	  Under	  U.S.	  occupation,	  the	  Jews	  attained	  freedom	  of	  worship	  and	  began	  holding	  religious	  services.	  In	  1902,	  the	  Cuban	  Constitution	  declared	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state.2	  These	  factors,	  as	  well	  as	  Cuba’s	  proximity	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  ease	  of	  immigration,	  made	  it	  attractive	  to	  Jews	  fleeing	  increasingly	  hostile	  treatment	  in	  Europe.3	  This	  section	  will	  examine	  the	  waves	  of	  Jewish	  immigration	  and	  will	  survey	  the	  different	  Jewish	  communities	  that	  called	  Cuba	  their	  home	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  context	  for	  the	  difficult	  communal	  interactions	  in	  the	  period	  being	  studied.	  
❋ Immigration	  to	  Cuba	  had	  begun	  on	  a	  small	  scale—folklore	  has	  it	  that	  three	  members	  of	  Columbus’s	  crew	  on	  his	  first	  voyage	  to	  the	  New	  World	  were	  Jewish.	  Whether	  this	  was	  true	  or	  not	  cannot	  be	  substantiated,	  but	  we	  do	  know	  that	  Portuguese	  individuals	  and	  families	  from	  Curaçao	  and	  Panama—conversos	  or	  crypto-­‐Jews—did	  form	  a	  trading	  network	  and	  settle	  throughout	  the	  Caribbean	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Cuba	  before	  the	  20th	  century.4	  However,	  these	  early	  Jews	  did	  not	  found	  any	  community	  structures,	  since	  the	  Inquisition	  was	  still	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Cuban	  independence	  came	  rather	  late	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America:	  Paraguay	  became	  independent	  in	  1811,	  Argentina	  in	  1816,	  Venezuela	  in	  1818,	  Colombia	  in	  1820,	  Uruguay	  and	  Peru	  in	  1821,	  Ecuador	  in	  1822,	  Bolivia	  in	  1824,	  and	  Chile	  in	  1826.	  Cuba	  only	  attained	  independence	  after	  three	  failed	  independence	  wars,	  the	  last	  of	  which	  resulted	  in	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  the	  1898	  ten-­‐week-­‐long	  Spanish-­‐American	  War.	  The	  1898	  Treaty	  of	  Paris	  allowed	  the	  United	  States	  temporary	  control	  of	  Cuba.	  (For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  history	  of	  Latin	  American	  independence,	  see	  Jaime	  E.	  Rodriguez,	  The	  
Independence	  of	  Spanish	  America	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  2	  “Comunidad	  Hebrea	  de	  Cuba	  -­‐	  HISTORIA,”	  accessed	  January	  7,	  2014,	  http://www.chcuba.org/english/community/history.htm.	  3	  Margalit	  Bejarano,	  “Sephardic	  Jews	  in	  Cuba,”	  Judaism	  51,	  no.	  1	  (2002):	  99.	  4	  Well	  into	  the	  19th	  century,	  Jews	  were	  still	  banned	  from	  Spanish-­‐controlled	  territories.	  (Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  3.)	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  effect	  and	  it	  was	  illegal	  to	  be	  openly	  Jewish.	  According	  to	  Levinson,	  Cuban	  social	  aristocracy	  was	  based	  upon	  the	  length	  of	  time	  a	  family	  had	  resided	  in	  Cuba,	  and	  although	  the	  sources	  of	  historical	  and	  demographic	  information	  for	  these	  early	  centuries	  were	  “incomplete	  and	  of	  dubious	  validity,”	  the	  Jewish	  community	  nevertheless	  took	  pride	  in	  their	  historic	  presence	  in	  the	  land.5	  
Spain	  officially	  authorized	  Jews	  to	  enter	  Cuba	  in	  1881,	  although	  religious	  services	  were	  not	  allowed.6	  Between	  50	  and	  100	  families	  of	  Jewish	  origin—many	  of	  whom	  were	  intermarried	  with	  Catholics	  and	  raised	  in	  the	  Catholic	  religion,	  and	  others	  of	  whom	  were	  largely	  secular—migrated	  to	  Cuba	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century.7	  In	  1906,	  Romanian	  and	  other	  Eastern	  European	  Jews	  escaping	  from	  pogroms	  found	  a	  receptive	  haven	  in	  Cuba.	  By	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  Cuba’s	  culture	  had	  developed	  a	  distinctively	  European	  flavor	  where	  Jewish	  immigrants	  felt	  comfortable.8	  
Eleven	  American	  Jewish	  immigrants	  formed	  the	  first	  Jewish	  organization	  in	  Havana	  in	  1904,	  the	  United	  Hebrew	  Congregation	  (UHC),	  and	  in	  1906	  purchased	  land	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Jay	  Levinson,	  Jewish	  Community	  of	  Cuba:	  The	  Golden	  Age,	  1906-­‐1958,	  1st	  ed.	  (Nashville,	  TN:	  Westview	  Publishing	  Co.,	  2006),	  xviii–xix.	  6	  Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  2.	  7	  Well-­‐known	  Cuban	  Jewish	  families	  such	  as	  the	  Maduros	  and	  Brandons,	  some	  of	  whom	  had	  extensive	  links	  to	  family	  members	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  Caribbean,	  established	  themselves	  in	  Cuba	  at	  this	  time.	  (Ibid.)	  8	  More	  than	  850,000	  new	  Europeans,	  mostly	  from	  Spain,	  arrived	  from	  1898	  through	  1932;	  Cuba	  also	  had	  a	  population	  of	  over	  300,000	  Chinese	  and	  250,000	  Haitians	  and	  Jamaicans.	  (Ibid.,	  2,	  10;	  for	  more	  on	  the	  indigenous	  tribes	  in	  Cuba,	  see	  Aviva	  Chomsky,	  Barry	  Carr,	  and	  Pamela	  María	  Smorkaloff,	  The	  Cuba	  Reader:	  History,	  Culture,	  Politics	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2006).)	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  Guanabacoa	  for	  the	  first	  Jewish	  cemetery.9	  This	  affluent	  Reform	  congregation	  conducted	  services	  in	  English,	  although	  many	  of	  its	  early	  members	  were	  Yiddish-­‐speaking	  Romanian-­‐born	  Jews	  who	  had	  emigrated	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  been	  naturalized	  before	  going	  to	  Cuba.	  The	  enclave	  of	  American	  Jews	  did	  not	  associate	  with	  other	  Jews	  on	  the	  island.	  The	  UHC	  continued	  to	  function	  in	  Cuba	  until	  1980.10	  
Meanwhile,	  according	  to	  historian	  Margalit	  Bejarano,	  Sephardic	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  Cuba	  occurred	  in	  two	  waves,	  between	  Cuba’s	  independence	  (1902)	  and	  the	  economic	  crisis	  of	  1930.	  Just	  before	  World	  War	  I,	  in	  1914,	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  Sephardic	  Jewish	  immigrants	  from	  Turkey	  arrived	  in	  Cuba.	  These	  Jews	  were	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  migration	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  to	  the	  Americas	  due	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  the	  difficulties	  of	  life	  there	  during	  World	  War	  I.11	  The	  first	  Turkish	  Jews	  who	  arrived	  in	  Cuba	  were	  largely	  fleeing	  the	  mandatory	  military	  inscriptions	  which	  began	  in	  Turkey	  in	  1908,	  and	  which,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “Young	  Turks”	  revolution,	  were	  designed	  in	  part	  to	  assimilate	  minorities.12	  
Because	  of	  their	  Sephardic	  background	  and	  their	  knowledge	  of	  Ladino	  (a	  combination	  of	  medieval	  Spanish	  and	  Hebrew),	  Spanish-­‐speaking	  Cuba	  was	  an	  ideal	  haven	  for	  these	  Turkish	  Jews,	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  sugar	  industry	  provided	  ample	  economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Robert	  M.	  Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba	  (Gainesville:	  University	  Press	  of	  Florida,	  1993),	  2,	  10;	  For	  more	  on	  the	  indigenous	  tribes	  in	  Cuba,	  see	  Aviva	  Chomsky,	  Barry	  Carr,	  and	  Pamela	  María	  Smorkaloff,	  The	  Cuba	  Reader:	  History,	  
Culture,	  Politics	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  10	  Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  3.	  11	  Bejarano,	  “Sephardic	  Jews	  in	  Cuba,”	  1–2.	  12	  Bruce	  Masters,	  Christians	  and	  Jews	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Arab	  World:	  The	  Roots	  of	  
Sectarianism	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  135.	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  opportunities.	  These	  Jewish	  immigrants	  did	  not	  cluster	  in	  Havana,	  but	  rather	  spread	  out	  throughout	  the	  country.13	  Immigration	  from	  Turkey	  continued	  until	  after	  World	  War	  I	  due	  to	  increased	  antisemitism	  in	  that	  country.	  Following	  the	  War,	  the	  men	  who	  had	  immigrated	  to	  Cuba	  began	  to	  bring	  their	  wives	  and	  children	  to	  their	  new	  adopted	  country.	  According	  to	  Judith	  Laikin	  Elkin,	  between	  1902	  and	  1914,	  5,700	  Jews	  had	  immigrated	  to	  Cuba.14	  These	  Turkish	  immigrants	  established	  the	  first	  Sephardic	  synagogue,	  Congregación	  
Unión	  Israelita	  Chevet	  Ahim.15	  
A	  third	  wave	  of	  Jewish	  immigration	  came	  between	  1925	  and	  1935,	  when	  approximately	  4,000	  Eastern	  European	  Jews	  who	  spoke	  Russian,	  Polish	  and	  Yiddish	  migrated	  to	  Cuba	  to	  flee	  persecution	  in	  their	  home	  countries.	  The	  move	  to	  Cuba	  was	  in	  large	  part	  influenced	  by	  the	  United	  States’	  Emergency	  Quota	  Act	  of	  1921	  and	  Immigration	  Act	  of	  1924,	  which	  tended	  to	  favor	  “old	  immigrants”	  from	  Northern	  and	  Western	  Europe	  (British,	  German,	  Irish	  and	  Scandinavian)	  versus	  new	  ones	  from	  Southern	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  (Italians,	  Poles,	  Russians,	  Austro-­‐Hungarians	  and	  others).16	  The	  Eastern	  Europeans,	  like	  those	  Jews	  who	  came	  before	  them,	  found	  Cuba	  to	  be	  a	  place	  where	  antisemitism	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  their	  everyday	  interaction	  with	  their	  neighbors.	  The	  climate	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Bejarano,	  “Sephardic	  Jews	  in	  Cuba,”	  1.	  14	  Judith	  Laikin	  Elkin,	  The	  Jews	  of	  Latin	  America,	  Rev.	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Holmes	  &	  Meier,	  1998),	  69;	  statistics	  found	  in	  the	  Leizer	  Ran	  collection	  at	  YIVO	  are	  also	  quoted	  in	  footnote	  18	  in	  Bejarano,	  “Sephardic	  Jews	  in	  Cuba.”	  15	  Sapir,	  The	  Jewish	  Community	  of	  Cuba,	  14.	  16	  See	  Helen	  F.	  Eckerson,	  “Immigration	  and	  National	  Origins,”	  Annals	  of	  the	  American	  
Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  Social	  Science	  367	  (September	  1,	  1966):	  1–2.	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  favorable	  and	  the	  economy	  provided	  opportunities	  for	  economic	  advancement.17	  In	  addition,	  these	  immigrants	  received	  assistance	  to	  become	  established	  in	  Cuba	  from	  JDC	  and	  the	  Hebrew	  Sheltering	  and	  Immigrant	  Aid	  Society	  (HIAS)18	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  time,	  these	  Eastern	  European	  Jews	  settled	  largely	  in	  Havana	  and	  were	  able	  to	  blend	  in	  to	  Cuban	  culture	  and	  economic	  life.19	  They	  founded	  the	  first	  Ashkenazic	  synagogue,	  Adas	  
Israel,	  in	  1925.20	  
The	  Jewish	  community	  in	  1930s	  Cuba	  was	  fractured	  along	  ethnic	  lines.	  The	  most	  deeply	  rooted	  community	  in	  Cuba	  prior	  to	  1935	  consisted	  of	  a	  small	  Portuguese-­‐Dutch	  “colony”	  of	  Jews	  from	  founding	  families	  such	  as	  the	  Maduros	  (finance),	  Lobos	  (commerce),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  “La	  Presencia	  Hebrea	  En	  Cuba,”	  1,	  accessed	  October	  13,	  2013,	  http://www.enlacejudio.com/2011/08/04/la-­‐presencia-­‐hebrea-­‐en-­‐cuba-­‐parte-­‐ii/.	  18	  HIAS	  was	  originally	  founded	  as	  the	  Hebrew	  Immigrant	  Aid	  Society	  to	  aid	  Russian	  Jewish	  immigrants	  to	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century.	  In	  1909	  it	  merged	  with	  the	  Hebrew	  Sheltering	  House	  Association	  to	  become	  the	  Hebrew	  Sheltering	  and	  Immigrant	  Aid	  Society.	  HIAS	  provided	  immediate	  shelter,	  aid	  and	  medical	  care	  for	  newly	  arriving	  immigrants,	  first	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  then	  internationally.	  They	  also	  searched	  for	  relatives	  who	  could	  provide	  affidavits	  to	  facilitate	  immigration	  to	  the	  U.S.	  (“HIAS,”	  accessed	  January	  20,	  2014,	  http://www.hias.org/;	  See	  also	  Bejarano,	  “Sephardic	  Jews	  in	  Cuba,”	  3).	  19	  Jaclyn	  A.	  Steinberg,	  “An	  Ongoing	  Jewish	  Diaspora—the	  Story	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Jews”	  (Emory	  University,	  2007),	  8.	  20	  Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  23.	  
	   	   	   31	  and	  Poliakoffs	  (oil),	  who	  were	  highly	  esteemed	  and	  respected.	  Solomon	  Maduro21	  and	  Adolfo	  Kates22	  were	  among	  the	  leading	  Jewish	  men	  active	  during	  this	  time.23	  
Among	  the	  Americans,	  Albert	  Hartman24	  had	  a	  social	  position	  similar	  to	  Kates	  and	  Maduro.	  The	  American	  Jews	  by	  and	  large	  continued	  to	  support	  the	  United	  Hebrew	  Congregation,	  now	  a	  Reform	  Temple,	  led	  by	  Rabbi	  Meir	  Lasker,	  a	  young	  rabbi	  from	  Providence,	  Rhode	  Island,	  who	  was	  also	  the	  Anti-­‐Defamation	  League	  representative	  in	  Cuba.25	  	  
The	  second	  group,	  the	  Sephardic	  Turks,	  were	  a	  close-­‐knit	  society,	  mainly	  traders,	  who	  kept	  to	  their	  religious	  traditions.	  The	  third	  group,	  the	  Ashkenazic	  Eastern	  Europeans,	  known	  as	  the	  “Polacos,”	  had	  no	  leading	  personality	  but	  were	  represented	  by	  the	  organization	  known	  as	  the	  Centro	  Israelita,	  a	  Jewish	  community	  center	  for	  immigrants	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Solomon	  Maduro	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  prestigious	  Maduro	  family,	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  families	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  community	  that	  had	  extensive	  familial	  connections	  throughout	  the	  Caribbean.	  A	  Dutch	  citizen,	  he	  was	  a	  respected	  attorney	  and	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  Jewish	  men	  in	  Cuba.	  He	  was	  not	  outspoken	  about	  his	  Jewish	  heritage.	  (Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Fred	  Ascher,	  July	  28,	  1939,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.)	  	  22	  Adolfo	  Kates,	  a	  Belgian	  Jew,	  was	  generally	  regarded	  as	  a	  key	  leader	  among	  Cuban	  Jews.	  He	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  the	  Cuban	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  and	  a	  founder	  of	  the	  Miramar	  Yacht	  Club.	  (Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  
Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  225.)	  23	  Frank	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  August	  30,	  1939,	  8,	  1933/44:508,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  24	  Albert	  Hartman,	  the	  president	  of	  Chrysler	  in	  Cuba,	  served	  as	  co-­‐Chairman	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugees	  Committee	  (JRC)	  in	  Havana	  until	  December	  1938.	  (Levine,	  Tropical	  
Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  229.)	  25	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  8.	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  Eastern	  Europe.	  Besides	  these	  were	  6,000	  German	  Jewish	  refugees	  who	  arrived	  after	  1938	  and	  who	  regarded	  themselves	  as	  transients.26	  
Local	  Aid	  Efforts	  
The	  Jews	  of	  Cuba	  had	  been	  called	  upon	  to	  aid	  new	  arrivals	  in	  previous	  waves	  of	  immigration.	  The	  various	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities,	  while	  forming	  their	  own	  societies	  for	  mutual	  benefit	  purposes,	  did	  not	  generally	  associate	  or	  cooperate	  with	  each	  other	  in	  doing	  so.	  The	  Sephardim	  and	  Ashkenazim	  continually	  found	  fault	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  the	  Americans	  did	  not	  associate	  with	  either.	  Few	  Cuban	  Jews	  contributed	  toward	  Jewish	  causes:	  a	  1930	  report	  on	  contributions	  from	  Keren	  Hayesod	  (“The	  Foundation	  Fund”),	  the	  central	  fundraising	  organization	  for	  Israel	  (at	  that	  time	  Palestine),	  placed	  Cuba	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  list	  of	  fifty-­‐three	  countries	  worldwide	  in	  donations.27	  When	  faced	  with	  the	  need	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  thousands	  of	  refugees	  from	  Nazi	  Europe,	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities’	  aid	  efforts	  were	  not	  sufficient.	  
❋ The	  U.S.	  National	  Council	  of	  Jewish	  Women28	  had	  been	  providing	  some	  aid	  to	  the	  Jewish	  immigrants	  since	  the	  1920s,	  but	  their	  efforts	  proved	  to	  be	  insufficient.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ibid.,	  8–9.	  27	  Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  25.	  See	  also	  Jack	  Brandon	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  December	  28,	  1938,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  28	  The	  National	  Council	  of	  Jewish	  Women	  was	  founded	  in	  1893	  at	  the	  World	  Parliament	  of	  Religions	  in	  Chicago	  to	  strengthen	  the	  connection	  of	  women	  to	  Judaism	  and	  pursue	  social	  justice.	  Among	  its	  stated	  tasks	  was	  the	  assisting	  of	  new	  Jewish	  immigrants	  to	  become	  self-­‐sustaining.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Jewish	  Women,	  see	  www.ncjw.org.	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  Emergency	  Relief	  Committee	  of	  the	  JDC	  stepped	  in,	  and	  together	  with	  HIAS,	  in	  1924	  set	  up	  in	  New	  York	  the	  Jewish	  Committee	  for	  Cuba	  to	  Help	  Jewish	  Arrivals.29	  They	  opened	  an	  office	  in	  Havana	  temporarily	  staffed	  by	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  (1891-­‐1968)	  in	  1924.	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  had	  a	  long	  and	  distinguished	  career	  in	  social	  services.	  She	  served	  as	  Executive	  Secretary	  for	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Jewish	  Women's	  (NCJW)	  Department	  of	  Immigrant	  Aid;	  Executive	  Director	  of	  the	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee	  for	  Aid	  to	  Refugees	  (1934-­‐1939);	  Director	  of	  the	  New	  Migration	  Department	  and	  later	  Assistant	  to	  the	  Executive	  Director	  of	  the	  National	  Refugee	  Service	  	  (1939-­‐1943).	  She	  also	  served	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Relief	  and	  Rehabilitation	  Agency	  and	  the	  JDC	  (1944-­‐1948),	  HIAS	  (1957-­‐1958),	  and	  the	  Boards	  of	  several	  other	  organizations.	  Razovsky	  was	  sent	  to	  Cuba	  for	  a	  short	  time	  in	  1924	  to	  assist	  and	  evaluate	  the	  poor	  conditions	  for	  emigrant	  Jews,	  and	  she	  served	  from	  1925-­‐1935	  as	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Committee	  for	  Cuba.30	  
In	  1925,	  the	  United	  Hebrew	  Congregation	  opened	  the	  Centro	  Israelita	  (Hebrew	  Cultural	  Center),	  which	  was	  subsidized	  by	  HIAS	  in	  New	  York	  and	  took	  over	  most	  of	  the	  tasks	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Committee	  for	  Cuba.	  The	  Centro	  provided	  welfare,	  encouraged	  
Landsmannschaften	  (mutual	  aid	  societies)	  and	  sponsored	  an	  orphanage	  and	  an	  anti-­‐tuberculosis	  league,	  as	  well	  as	  cultural,	  educational	  and	  sporting	  events	  for	  the	  Ashkenazi	  Jewish	  community.31	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Sapir,	  The	  Jewish	  Community	  of	  Cuba,	  13.	  	  30	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  “Papers,	  1913-­‐1971”	  (Center	  for	  Jewish	  History,	  1971);	  see	  also	  Bat-­‐Ami	  Zucker,	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  and	  the	  American	  Jewish	  Women’s	  Rescue	  Operations	  in	  the	  
Second	  World	  War	  (London,	  England;	  Portland,	  OR:	  Vallentine	  Mitchell,	  2008).	  31	  Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  44.	  See	  also	  Trager,	  
Havana	  Report,	  9.	  
	   	   	   34	  Although	  Cuba’s	  Jewish	  community	  grew	  with	  the	  various	  waves	  of	  immigration,	  the	  thousands	  of	  Jews	  who	  arrived	  in	  the	  late	  1930s—mainly	  Central	  and	  Western	  Europeans—only	  intended	  Cuba	  to	  be	  a	  stopping	  place	  on	  their	  way	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and	  thus	  were	  not	  actively	  looking	  to	  establish	  themselves	  or	  obtain	  employment	  in	  Havana,	  where	  they	  had	  landed.32	  	  
The	  efforts	  of	  HIAS	  through	  the	  Centro	  were	  proving	  insufficient	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  increasing	  Jewish	  immigration.	  In	  1937,	  William	  Rosenwald,	  an	  American	  businessman	  and	  philanthropist,33	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  reached	  an	  agreement	  with	  Jack	  Brandon,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  long-­‐established	  Brandon	  family	  in	  Cuba,34	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community	  of	  Havana	  to	  set	  up	  a	  new	  agency	  called	  the	  Joint	  Relief	  Committee	  (JRC)	  to	  care	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  incoming	  refugees.	  Brandon	  served	  as	  Director	  of	  the	  JRC	  from	  its	  establishment	  in	  1937	  to	  the	  end	  of	  1938,	  and	  was	  later	  knighted	  by	  President	  Fulgencio	  Batista	  Zaldivar.	  	  
This	  committee	  was	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  destitute	  German	  refugees	  who	  were	  sent	  to	  Havana	  by	  the	  NCC.	  The	  refugees	  would	  travel	  to	  Cuba	  to	  change	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  American	  Friends	  Service	  Committee,	  Refugee	  Situation	  in	  Cuba:	  Summary	  of	  
Findings	  and	  Recommendations,	  May	  12,	  1939,	  pt.	  1,	  1,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  33	  Rosenwald,	  the	  son	  of	  Julius	  Rosenwald	  (former	  chairman	  of	  Sears,	  Roebuck),	  was	  an	  avid	  fundraiser	  to	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  Jews	  in	  distress.	  He	  helped	  establish	  the	  United	  Jewish	  Appeal	  in	  1939,	  later	  serving	  as	  one	  of	  its	  three	  national	  chairmen.	  By	  1948	  his	  family	  foundation	  had	  brought	  over	  300	  family	  members	  from	  Europe	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  providing	  them	  with	  affidavits,	  employment	  and	  housing.	  He	  was	  also	  the	  organizer	  and	  first	  president	  of	  the	  National	  Refugee	  Service,	  which	  helped	  resettle	  refugees.	  For	  over	  50	  years,	  he	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  executive	  committee	  of	  the	  JDC.	  (Lawrence	  Van	  Gelder,	  “William	  Rosenwald	  Dies;	  Benefactor	  to	  Many	  Was	  93,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  November	  1,	  1996.)	  34	  Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  229.	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  their	  temporary	  immigration	  status	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  so	  that	  they	  could	  return	  as	  full	  immigrants.	  This	  was	  an	  advantageous	  route	  for	  the	  immigrants	  to	  take	  because,	  at	  that	  time,	  the	  American	  Consulate	  in	  Havana	  had	  an	  allotment	  of	  German	  and	  Polish	  U.S.	  immigration	  quota	  numbers.35	  The	  JRC	  also	  worked	  with	  the	  NCC	  to	  handle	  the	  direct	  immigration	  to	  Cuba	  of	  concentration	  camp	  inmates	  who	  were	  imprisoned	  and	  then	  released	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  leave	  Germany	  immediately.36	  	  
The	  JRC’s	  program	  began	  slowly	  in	  1937	  with	  217	  cases,	  and	  established	  medical,	  vocational	  and	  educational	  services	  for	  the	  new	  immigrants.	  From	  January	  to	  October	  1938,	  as	  conditions	  for	  Jews	  in	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  worsened,	  the	  number	  arriving	  for	  a	  change	  of	  status	  began	  to	  increase.	  In	  October	  1938,	  with	  no	  notice	  or	  warning,	  the	  allotment	  of	  quota	  numbers	  to	  Cuba	  was	  changed.	  Contemporary	  correspondence	  explains	  that	  this	  change	  was	  based	  on	  a	  new	  system	  of	  assigning	  quota	  numbers	  in	  order	  to	  service	  refugees	  throughout	  the	  world	  according	  to	  their	  date	  of	  registration.	  In	  Cuba	  this	  meant	  that	  many	  refugees	  who	  had	  arrived	  with	  the	  hope	  of	  quickly	  changing	  their	  status	  were	  forced	  to	  remain	  for	  much	  longer	  in	  order	  for	  their	  quota	  numbers	  to	  be	  reached.37	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  modification	  is	  not	  referenced	  in	  any	  official	  Acts	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Government.	  When	  this	  change	  came	  into	  effect	  in	  October	  1938,	  Jack	  Brandon	  wired	  the	  NCC:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Manuel	  Siegel,	  Leon	  Veissid,	  and	  Laura	  Margolis,	  Study	  of	  Change	  in	  Status	  Cases	  
from	  January	  1937	  to	  October	  1940,	  December	  1,	  1940,	  1,	  1933/44:510,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  36	  Herbert	  Katzki	  to	  Albert	  Lieberman,	  December	  6,	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba;	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Memorandum	  of	  
Meeting	  Held	  in	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  May	  23,	  1939,	  1,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  37	  Siegel,	  Veissid,	  and	  Margolis,	  Study	  of	  Change	  in	  Status	  Cases	  from	  January	  1937	  to	  
October	  1940,	  1.	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  CONSULATE	  INFORMS	  EARLIEST	  GERMAN	  QUOTA	  OPEN	  NOW	  IS	  JANUARY	  RELIEVES	  [sic]	  IN	  FORTNIGHT	  EARLIEST	  WILL	  BE	  JULY.38	  The	  following	  day,	  he	  sent	  this	  cable:	  
CONSUL	  INFORMS	  TODAY	  GERMAN	  QUOTA	  CLOSED	  FOR	  TIME	  BEING	  MAKE	  EVERT	  [sic]	  EFFORT	  WASHINGTON	  RECONSIDER.39	  On	  October	  26,	  the	  American	  Consulate	  in	  Cuba	  officially	  informed	  Brandon	  and	  the	  JRC:	  
…You	  are	  informed	  that	  effective	  November	  1,	  1938,	  the	  German	  Quota	  numbers	  available	  at	  this	  office	  have	  been	  reduced	  to	  8	  non-­‐preference	  per	  month,	  and	  8	  preference.	  Formerly	  the	  numbers	  available	  were	  65	  non-­‐preference	  and	  10	  preference	  per	  month.40	  In	  response,	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  and	  the	  NCC	  discontinued	  the	  change	  of	  status	  immigration	  to	  Cuba:	  
We	  are	  at	  a	  loss	  to	  know	  what	  to	  do	  now	  with	  the	  people	  who	  are	  here	  and	  want	  to	  go	  to	  Cuba	  to	  change	  their	  status.	  At	  the	  present	  time	  we	  have	  stopped	  them	  all	  from	  going.41	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  59	  new	  cases	  were	  sent	  to	  Havana	  in	  November	  and	  December	  1938.	  In	  1939,	  185	  additional	  cases	  arrived,	  sent	  by	  the	  NCC.	  In	  addition,	  more	  and	  more	  refugees	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Jack	  Brandon	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  “Cable,”	  October	  19,	  1938,	  1933/44:510,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  39	  Jack	  Brandon	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  “Cable,”	  October	  20,	  1938,	  1933/44:510,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  40	  Jack	  Brandon	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  October	  26,	  1938,	  1933/44:510,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  The	  1924	  Immigration	  Act	  defined	  “preference”	  immigrants	  as	  relatives	  of	  U.S.	  citizens,	  and	  immigrants	  who	  had	  agricultural	  skills.	  All	  others	  were	  “non-­‐preference.”	  (“History	  of	  U.S.	  Immigration	  Laws	  |	  Federation	  for	  American	  Immigration	  Reform,”	  accessed	  January	  9,	  2014,	  http://www.fairus.org/facts/us_laws.)	  41	  Siegel,	  Veissid,	  and	  Margolis,	  Study	  of	  Change	  in	  Status	  Cases	  from	  January	  1937	  to	  
October	  1940,	  3.	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  began	  to	  arrive	  who	  had	  sailed	  to	  Cuba	  on	  their	  own,	  without	  going	  through	  the	  NCC	  or	  any	  other	  agency.	  Many	  times	  these	  refugees	  did	  not	  have	  their	  papers	  in	  order	  nor	  the	  necessary	  referrals	  to	  fulfill	  the	  personal	  or	  monetary	  requirements	  of	  the	  U.S.	  immigration	  laws.42	  These	  refugees	  who	  arrived	  on	  their	  own	  faced	  indefinite	  stays	  in	  Cuba	  in	  a	  strange	  environment	  where	  they	  had	  no	  opportunity	  to	  work,	  study,	  or	  retrain	  to	  prepare	  for	  a	  new	  life	  in	  still	  another	  land.	  	  
This	  influx	  of	  Jewish	  immigrants	  raised	  the	  concern	  that	  the	  Cuban	  government	  might	  consider	  limiting	  immigration.	  On	  November	  18,	  1938,	  shortly	  after	  the	  Evian	  Conference,	  Colonel	  Fulgencio	  Batista	  Zaldivar,43	  who	  was	  backed	  by	  the	  U.S.	  and	  virtually	  dominated	  Cuban	  politics	  through	  a	  series	  of	  puppet	  presidents	  from	  1934	  on	  (and	  who	  later	  ruled	  from	  1940	  until	  1959),44	  issued	  a	  statement	  to	  American	  and	  Cuban	  newspapers	  that	  his	  country	  would	  “heartily	  cooperate”	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  assisting	  refugees,	  and	  that	  Cuba’s	  liberal	  immigration	  policy	  would	  continue:	  
Col.	  Batista	  and	  the	  Cuban	  Ambassador	  Martines	  [sic]	  Fraga45	  held	  a	  long	  conference	  at	  the	  Savoy-­‐Plaza	  this	  morning	  with	  the	  Committee	  for	  Political	  Refugees	  of	  which	  Mr.	  Lawrence	  Berenson46	  was	  Chairman,	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ibid.,	  4.	  43	  For	  more	  on	  Batista	  and	  his	  career,	  see	  Frank	  Argote-­‐Freyre,	  “Fulgencio	  Batista:	  From	  Revolutionary	  to	  Strongman”	  (Ph.D.,	  Rutgers	  The	  State	  University	  of	  New	  Jersey	  -­‐	  New	  Brunswick,	  2004).	  44	  Jacqueline	  West,	  South	  America,	  Central	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  2002	  (Psychology	  Press,	  2001),	  303.)	  45	  Pedro	  Martinez-­‐Fraga	  was	  Cuban	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  States	  from	  March	  1937	  to	  December	  1940.	  46	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  (1891-­‐1970)	  was	  a	  New	  York	  attorney	  and	  a	  personal	  friend	  of	  Fulgencio	  Batista.	  A	  Harvard	  Law	  School	  graduate,	  Berenson	  was	  honorary	  counsel	  for	  the	  NCC	  from	  1938-­‐1939.	  He	  served	  as	  counsel	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cuba	  from	  1934	  to	  1958	  and	  as	  president	  of	  the	  Cuban-­‐American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  in	  the	  United	  States	  from	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  discuss	  ways	  and	  means	  for	  assisting	  political	  refugees	  entering	  Cuba….	  Col.	  Batista	  stated	  that	  he	  was	  deeply	  moved	  by	  the	  sad	  plight	  of	  the	  political	  refugees	  and	  that	  Cuba	  has	  already	  adopted	  important	  measures	  to	  assist	  refugees	  entering	  Cuba.	  He	  stated	  that	  he	  and	  Cuban	  officials	  would	  heartily	  cooperate	  with	  President	  Roosevelt	  in	  his	  plan	  to	  relieve	  the	  terrible	  situation	  abroad.	  He	  expressed	  the	  hope	  that	  all	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  would	  join	  with	  Cuba	  in	  facilitating	  the	  entry	  to	  their	  respective	  countries	  of	  political	  refugees	  from	  Germany.47	  In	  addition	  to	  bolstering	  the	  image	  of	  Cuba	  as	  a	  supporter	  of	  U.S.	  policy,	  as	  long	  as	  American	  Jewish	  organizations	  were	  financially	  supporting	  the	  refugees,	  Batista	  and	  his	  government	  also	  profited	  from	  the	  increased	  trade	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  influx	  of	  immigrants.	  However,	  this	  open	  immigration	  policy	  resulted	  in	  greater	  and	  greater	  demands	  on	  those	  who	  were	  providing	  for	  the	  immigrants.	  Each	  boat	  arriving	  in	  Havana	  brought	  a	  new	  crop	  of	  refugees,	  who	  had	  to	  wait	  longer	  and	  longer	  for	  permission	  to	  enter	  the	  United	  States.	  Thus,	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  became	  a	  steadily	  increasing	  financial	  burden	  on	  the	  JRC,	  the	  end	  of	  which	  could	  not	  be	  discerned.	  	  
On	  November	  10,	  1938,	  for	  example,	  a	  group	  of	  refugees	  arrived	  on	  the	  S.S.	  Hameln48	  and	  immediately	  went	  on	  the	  relief	  rolls.	  They	  were	  Polish,	  illiterate,	  and	  unable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1938	  to	  1944.	  He	  received	  three	  decorations	  from	  Cuba:	  the	  rank	  of	  Cavalier	  Carlos	  Manuel	  de	  Céspedes	  in	  1934;	  the	  September	  Fourth	  Decoration	  and	  the	  rank	  of	  Commander	  in	  1944.	  (“Lawrence	  Berenson	  Dies	  at	  79;	  Counsel	  for	  Pre-­‐Castro	  Cuba,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  December	  22,	  1970.)	  Under-­‐Secretary	  of	  State	  Sumner	  Welles	  had	  advised	  Berenson	  to	  go	  to	  Cuba	  to	  negotiate	  personally	  with	  Batista	  on	  previous	  occasions.	  (Cecilia	  Razovsky	  to	  Paul	  Baerwald	  et	  al.,	  November	  29,	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.)	  47	  Fulgencio	  Batista,	  “News	  Release:	  Col.	  Batista	  Promises	  That	  Cuba’s	  Liberal	  Policy	  for	  the	  Admission	  of	  Political	  Refugees	  Will	  Continue,”	  November	  18,	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  48	  A	  steamer	  of	  the	  North	  German	  Lloyd	  Line	  that	  was	  later	  torpedoed	  en	  route	  from	  New	  Orleans	  to	  Veracruz	  and	  Tampico	  by	  a	  German	  submarine	  and	  sunk	  in	  1942.	  (“HAMELN	  II	  CARGO	  SHIP	  1941-­‐1942,”	  accessed	  January	  24,	  2014,	  http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?152358.)	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  even	  to	  attempt	  to	  support	  themselves	  because	  they	  knew	  neither	  English	  nor	  Spanish.	  They	  came	  with	  $200	  bonds,	  which	  would	  not	  permit	  them	  to	  remain	  in	  Cuba	  for	  more	  than	  30	  days,	  after	  which	  they	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  $10	  per	  person	  per	  month	  to	  renew	  their	  permits	  until	  the	  permits	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  be	  renewed.49	  
The	  very	  apprehensive	  JRC	  then	  requested	  that	  the	  NCC	  in	  New	  York	  immediately	  reiterate	  to	  all	  the	  Jewish	  agencies	  in	  Europe	  not	  to	  permit	  the	  embarkation	  to	  Cuba	  of	  immigrants	  with	  less	  than	  $500	  for	  bonds	  unless	  they	  had	  affidavits	  of	  well-­‐to-­‐do	  relatives	  in	  the	  United	  States	  who	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  give	  them	  financial	  support	  while	  in	  Havana	  waiting	  for	  their	  visas.50	  The	  Cuban	  Jewish	  leaders	  could	  not	  possibly	  have	  grasped	  at	  the	  time	  that	  escape	  from	  Nazi	  Europe	  could	  mean	  the	  difference	  between	  life	  and	  death.	  They	  were	  concerned	  with	  their	  own	  ability	  to	  care	  for	  the	  refugees,	  and	  wanted	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  becoming	  a	  public	  charge,	  lest	  the	  doors	  to	  immigration	  to	  Cuba	  and	  other	  havens	  close	  completely.	  
By	  early	  November	  1938,	  before	  the	  even	  larger	  flood	  of	  immigrants	  began	  to	  arrive,	  the	  JRC	  was	  supporting	  680	  persons,	  which	  resulted	  in	  expenses	  of	  $4,800	  per	  month.	  The	  JRC,	  which	  was	  the	  only	  organization	  that	  had	  the	  personnel	  or	  was	  prepared	  in	  any	  way	  to	  handle	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  refugees,	  served	  to	  assist:	  	  
…those	  needing	  advice	  on	  immigration	  matters,	  localization	  of	  friends	  and	  relatives	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  registration	  as	  aliens,	  placing	  of	  bonds,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Jack	  Brandon	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  November	  10,	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  50	  Ibid.	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  renewals	  of	  stay	  permits	  [to	  stay	  in	  Cuba],	  medical	  attention,	  possibility	  of	  employment,	  [and]	  social	  service	  or	  financial	  relief.51	  The	  resources	  to	  maintain	  this	  level	  of	  expense	  did	  not	  exist	  within	  Cuba.	  Several	  years	  earlier,	  the	  NCC	  had	  sought	  to	  enlist	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  community.	  They	  prevailed	  on	  well-­‐known	  residents	  to	  head	  up	  a	  local	  committee,	  but	  many	  difficulties	  arose.	  There	  was	  considerable	  resistance	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  refugee	  relief	  among	  some;	  among	  others	  there	  was	  tremendous	  apathy.	  Joseph	  Hyman	  later	  wrote	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Rabbi	  Emil	  Leipsiger,	  president	  of	  the	  Central	  Conference	  of	  American	  Rabbis:	  
German,	  East	  European	  and	  Spanish	  Jews	  found	  it	  hard	  to	  sit	  down	  together	  and	  form	  one	  joint	  committee.	  It	  was	  especially	  difficult	  to	  secure	  financial	  help	  from	  any	  save	  a	  handful,	  for	  the	  unfortunate	  refugees.52	  Upon	  the	  JRC’s	  request,	  JDC,	  as	  the	  organization	  that	  was	  providing	  most	  of	  the	  funding,	  agreed	  to	  come	  in	  directly	  and	  attempt	  a	  program	  of	  assistance.	  The	  alternative	  would	  have	  been	  to	  leave	  the	  newly	  arrived	  refugees	  practically	  to	  their	  own	  resources,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  Havana	  community’s	  lack	  of	  unity	  and	  inability	  to	  raise	  funds.53	  	  
Hyman	  went	  on	  to	  describe	  to	  Leipsiger	  how	  even	  an	  impoverished	  community	  such	  as	  the	  one	  in	  Poland	  took	  responsibility	  and	  bore	  nearly	  80%	  of	  the	  total	  budget	  of	  the	  welfare,	  emergency,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  assistance	  programs.	  He	  also	  gave	  examples	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Jack	  Brandon,	  General	  Survey	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Situation	  in	  Cuba,	  November	  15,	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  52	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Rabbi	  Emil	  Leipziger,	  October	  1,	  1940,	  1,	  1933/44:510,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  53	  Ibid.	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  Swiss,	  French,	  and	  Swedish	  Jewish	  communities’	  participation	  in	  fundraising	  and	  community	  welfare	  organization.54	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  attitude	  of	  many	  in	  the	  local	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities	  was	  that	  they	  didn’t	  care	  to	  have	  their	  names	  associated	  with	  any	  phase	  of	  refugee	  work.	  They	  regarded	  the	  coming	  of	  the	  refugees	  as	  an	  annoyance	  that	  created	  new	  problems	  for	  the	  native	  Jews.	  They	  viewed	  refugees	  as	  an	  American	  problem	  and	  considered	  it	  unnecessary	  to	  shoulder	  any	  real	  part	  of	  the	  financing,	  administration	  or	  social	  burden	  involved.	  Although	  there	  were	  men	  of	  considerable	  wealth	  in	  Havana,	  the	  total	  contribution	  from	  the	  community	  in	  1939	  amounted	  to	  less	  than	  $10,000,	  while	  JDC	  was	  called	  on	  to	  spend	  almost	  $200,000.55	  
It	  was	  the	  feeling	  of	  JDC	  leadership	  that	  the	  Havana	  Jewish	  community	  was	  well	  situated	  enough	  to	  make	  a	  substantial	  contribution	  to	  finance	  the	  work	  of	  Cuban	  refugee	  aid.	  A	  small	  advisory	  Council	  was	  eventually	  set	  up,	  but	  it	  hardly	  met	  at	  all.	  Laura	  Margolis	  as	  JDC	  representative	  was	  later	  forced,	  lacking	  community	  support,	  to	  carry	  the	  burden	  of	  responsibility	  and	  find	  solutions	  to	  most	  of	  the	  problems.	  	  One	  can	  hear	  the	  frustration	  in	  Hyman’s	  words:	  
The	  great	  problem	  is	  how	  to	  persuade	  the	  Jews	  of	  Havana	  of	  all	  origins	  to	  get	  together	  and	  to	  make	  adequate	  contribution,	  and	  to	  assume	  social	  responsibility….	  We	  earnestly	  hope	  that	  its…	  Committee	  may	  become	  a	  really	  representative	  body.	  We	  believe	  that	  the	  leadership	  and	  stimulation	  of	  all	  elements	  may	  be	  brought	  together	  in	  some	  coordinated	  form.	  We	  have	  more	  faith	  in	  the	  Jews	  of	  Havana	  apparently	  than	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  have	  in	  themselves.	  We	  should	  like	  more	  and	  more	  to	  turn	  over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Ibid.,	  2.	  55	  Ibid.	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  the	  whole	  job	  to	  them….	  The	  JDC	  does	  not	  want	  to	  run	  the	  Joint	  Relief	  Committee	  in	  Cuba;	  it	  does	  not	  want	  to	  do	  more	  there	  than	  it	  has	  been	  called	  upon	  to	  do	  in	  any	  other	  country	  in	  the	  world.56	  He	  attempted	  to	  end	  his	  report	  to	  Rabbi	  Leipsiger	  with	  a	  measure	  of	  hope:	  
In	  conclusion,	  may	  I	  say	  that	  we	  have	  only	  the	  friendliest	  and	  most	  cordial	  feelings	  for	  all	  the	  good	  people	  in	  Cuba,	  some	  of	  whom	  think	  that	  JDC	  has	  made	  many	  mistakes	  in	  its	  dealing	  with	  the	  situation,	  some	  of	  whom	  feel	  that	  they	  could	  have	  done	  a	  great	  deal	  more.	  The	  real	  test	  of	  the	  pudding	  is	  in	  the	  eating.	  If	  we	  can	  stir	  the	  people	  of	  Havana	  up	  to	  the	  point	  where	  they	  can	  sit	  down	  and	  work	  out	  the	  whole	  situation	  together	  on	  a	  truly	  representative	  basis,	  where	  German	  Jew	  and	  Spanish	  Jew	  and	  East	  European	  Jew	  may	  get	  together	  in	  a	  common	  cause,	  we	  feel	  that	  we	  should	  have	  rendered	  an	  enduring	  service.57	  Unfortunately,	  the	  different	  discordant	  elements	  of	  Havana	  failed	  to	  get	  together	  to	  meet	  this	  dire	  and	  pressing	  need.	  
The	  lack	  of	  participation	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  community	  was	  acutely	  felt.	  To	  further	  complicate	  matters,	  on	  November	  21,	  1938,	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  shipping	  line,58	  which	  brought	  most	  of	  the	  refugees,	  notified	  the	  JRC	  that	  they	  were	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  difficulties	  presented	  by	  the	  Cuban	  Immigration	  and	  Cuban	  State	  Department	  to	  grant	  visas	  to	  the	  immigrants	  and	  enable	  them	  to	  embark.	  They	  asked	  the	  JRC	  to	  take	  over	  all	  of	  these	  cases	  and	  to	  present	  them	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Immigration	  and	  State	  Department.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Ibid.,	  4.	  57	  Ibid.	  58	  The	  Hamburg	  Amerikanische	  Paketfahrt	  Aktien-­‐Gesellschaft,	  known	  in	  English	  as	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line	  or	  HAPAG,	  was	  a	  shipping	  line	  that	  brought	  German	  refugees	  to	  the	  Americas,	  and	  was	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  German	  shipping	  lines.	  In	  1933	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika,	  founded	  by	  Jewish	  entrepreneur	  Albert	  Ballin,	  had	  elected	  a	  Nazi	  chairman	  and	  a	  new	  board	  of	  directors	  to	  replace	  Jews	  by	  Aryans.	  (“Jews	  Resign	  From	  Board	  Of	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line	  BERLIN,	  July	  26,”	  The	  Advertiser,	  July	  28,	  1933.)	  
	   	   	   43	  Jack	  Brandon	  agreed	  to	  do	  this,	  provided	  the	  immigrants	  bring	  with	  them	  a	  minimum	  of	  $400	  each	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  $500	  bond	  so	  that	  they	  could	  support	  themselves	  in	  Cuba	  for	  at	  least	  a	  year.	  Brandon	  realized	  the	  financial	  burden	  this	  would	  place	  on	  potential	  immigrants,	  but	  did	  not	  see	  how	  the	  JRC	  could	  support	  any	  more	  immigrants	  than	  were	  already	  in	  Cuba	  and	  the	  350	  others	  that	  were	  currently	  en	  route	  on	  the	  S.S.	  Orinoco.59	  
Brandon	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  anticipating	  the	  dire	  results	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  funding.	  The	  co-­‐president	  of	  the	  JRC,	  Albert	  Hartman,	  had	  resigned	  a	  few	  weeks	  earlier	  for	  this	  reason.	  Hartman	  had	  repeatedly	  stated	  that	  he	  did	  not	  approve	  of	  the	  JRC’s	  building	  upon	  a	  foundation	  of	  economic	  insecurity.	  Brandon,	  however,	  determined	  for	  the	  moment	  to	  carry	  on,	  feeling	  that	  a	  way	  would	  be	  found	  to	  meet	  the	  emergency,60	  yet	  sounding	  the	  ominous	  note	  to	  the	  NCC	  on	  November	  15	  that,	  “The	  time	  for	  action	  is	  now,	  and	  we	  trust	  that	  a	  constructive	  suggestion	  will	  be	  forthcoming	  from	  you	  without	  delay,	  to	  enable	  the	  writer	  to	  continue	  his	  work.”61	  Yet	  Brandon	  too	  resigned	  his	  position	  (on	  December	  31,	  1938),	  stating	  that	  it	  was	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  assistance	  in	  fulfilling	  his	  responsibilities.62	  
Hartman	  and	  Brandon’s	  opinions	  about	  limiting	  immigration,	  however,	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  NCC,	  whose	  stated	  purpose	  was	  to	  assist	  “all	  refugees	  entering	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  On	  November	  21,	  1938,	  the	  Orinoco	  was	  still	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  on	  its	  way	  to	  Cuba.	  See	  Jack	  Brandon	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  November	  21,	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  60	  Brandon,	  General	  Survey	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Situation	  in	  Cuba,	  1.	  61	  Ibid.,	  2.	  62	  Jack	  Brandon	  to	  Emily	  Perlman,	  December	  30,	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  
	   	   	   44	  Cuba,	  whether	  Catholic,	  Jewish	  or	  Protestant,	  or	  any	  other	  refugees	  who	  have	  been	  compelled	  to	  leave	  European	  countries	  because	  of	  their	  religious	  or	  political	  beliefs…”63	  In	  November	  1938,	  the	  NCC	  issued	  a	  guarantee	  signed	  by	  its	  chairman,	  Joseph	  Chamberlain,64	  to	  the	  government	  of	  Cuba65	  that	  they	  hoped	  would	  be	  accepted	  in	  lieu	  of	  the	  $500	  bond	  in	  exceptional	  cases66	  in	  which	  the	  refugees	  were	  recommended	  by	  the	  NCC	  but	  had	  no	  money	  for	  the	  bond	  (such	  as	  refugees	  from	  concentration	  camps):	  	  
THE	  NATIONAL	  COORDINATING	  COMMITTEE	  FOR	  AID	  TO	  REFUGEES	  AND	  EMIGRANTS	  COMING	  FROM	  GERMANY	  does	  by	  these	  presents	  hereby	  guarantee,	  warrant,	  represent	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cuba	  and…	  does	  hereby	  indemnify	  and	  agree	  to	  protect	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cuba…	  as	  to	  all	  refugees	  who	  have	  heretofore	  entered	  Cuba	  upon	  the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  NATIONAL	  COORDINATING	  COMMITTEE	  or	  who	  may	  hereafter	  be	  permitted	  to	  enter	  into	  Cuba	  upon	  its	  recommendation,	  that	  each	  of	  said	  refugees	  shall	  not	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  violate	  labor	  laws	  or	  any	  other	  laws	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cuba	  in	  any	  respect	  whatsoever	  and	  that	  each	  and	  all	  of	  such	  refugees	  recommended	  by	  the	  NATIONAL	  COORDINATING	  COMMITTEE	  shall	  not	  become	  public	  charges	  or	  subject	  to	  support	  or	  maintenance	  by	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cuba	  or	  any	  official	  department	  or	  any	  municipality	  or	  other	  official	  body	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cuba.	  IT	  BEING	  UNDERSTOOD	  AND	  AGREED	  that	  this	  guaranty	  and	  indemnity	  shall	  be	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee,	  “Guarantee	  by	  the	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  Cuba,”	  November	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  64	  Joseph	  P.	  Chamberlain	  (1874-­‐1951),	  a	  New	  York	  attorney,	  was	  professor	  of	  public	  law	  at	  Columbia	  University	  until	  his	  retirement	  in	  1950.	  In	  1911,	  he	  founded	  and	  then	  directed	  the	  Legislative	  Drafting	  Research	  Fund	  of	  Columbia	  University.	  He	  was	  also	  a	  consultant	  to	  various	  federal	  and	  state	  departments	  and	  was	  counsel	  and	  draftsman	  to	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Charter	  Revision	  Commission	  of	  1935-­‐1936.	  In	  1938,	  Chamberlain	  received	  the	  gold	  medal	  of	  the	  Pi	  Lambda	  Phi	  fraternity	  for	  tolerance	  for	  his	  work	  with	  refugees.	  (“Prof.	  Chamberlain	  of	  Columbia	  Gets	  Gold	  Medal,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  December	  31,	  1938;	  “Joseph	  Chamberlain,	  Law	  Ex-­‐Professor,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  May	  22,	  1951.)	  65	  The	  guarantee	  was	  communicated	  through	  Lawrence	  Berenson,	  who	  had	  a	  relationship	  with	  Batista	  and	  the	  Cuban	  government.	  (Jack	  Brandon	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  November	  25,	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.)	  66	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  to	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee,	  December	  20,	  1938,	  3,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  
	   	   	   45	  lieu	  of	  and	  in	  substitution	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  Secretaria	  de	  Trabajo	  [Secretary	  of	  Labor]	  requiring	  a	  deposit	  or	  bond	  in	  the	  sum	  of	  $500.00	  for	  immigrants	  entering	  Cuba.67	  The	  Cuban	  State	  Department	  agreed	  to	  take	  the	  matter	  under	  advisement,	  although	  they	  procrastinated	  on	  making	  a	  decision68	  while	  attempting	  to	  force	  the	  NCC	  to	  offer	  a	  bribe	  or	  graft	  of	  $50	  per	  visa	  for	  “diverse	  immigration	  expenses.”69	  Meanwhile,	  Colonel	  Manuel	  Benitez	  Gonzalez,	  Director-­‐General	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Immigration	  Office	  and	  a	  protégé	  of	  Batista,70	  controlled	  the	  implementation	  of	  Cuban	  immigration	  policy.	  Benitez	  had	  been	  selling	  illegal	  landing	  certificates	  to	  the	  immigrants	  for	  $150	  or	  the	  highest	  price	  he	  could	  get.71	  In	  order	  to	  sell	  these,	  he	  was	  circulating	  rumors	  that	  the	  $500	  bond	  would	  never	  be	  returned.72	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee,	  “Guarantee	  by	  the	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  Cuba,”	  2.	  68	  The	  guarantee	  was	  eventually	  accepted	  by	  Col.	  Batista	  by	  December	  31,	  1938.	  (Lawrence	  Berenson	  to	  David	  Bressler,	  December	  31,	  1938,	  3,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.)	  69	  Jack	  Brandon	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  “Phone	  Call,”	  December	  15,	  1938,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  70	  Benitez’	  son,	  Manuel	  Benitez	  Váldes,	  had	  played	  a	  prominent	  role	  alongside	  Fulgencio	  Batista	  during	  the	  Sergeant’s	  Revolt	  of	  1933	  and	  was	  allowed	  to	  make	  his	  father,	  Manuel	  Benitez	  Gonzalez,	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Immigration.	  (Jeffrey	  Gurock,	  America,	  
American	  Jews,	  and	  the	  Holocaust	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1997),	  59.)	  71	  According	  to	  U.S.	  estimates,	  Benitez	  had	  amassed	  a	  personal	  fortune	  of	  U.S.	  $500,000-­‐$1,000,000.	  When	  this	  became	  known,	  even	  though	  he	  was	  a	  protégé	  of	  Batista,	  he	  became	  subject	  to	  intense	  public	  scrutiny	  and	  was	  eventually	  forced	  to	  resign	  from	  office.	  (Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Herbert	  Mallinson,	  June	  2,	  1939,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  See	  also	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  “Voyage	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis,”	  accessed	  October	  21,	  2013,	  http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=1,0005267.)	  72	  Berenson	  to	  Bressler,	  December	  31,	  1938,	  1.	  
	   	   	   46	  Brandon	  had	  confidence	  in	  Benitez,	  repeatedly	  assuring	  Berenson	  that	  Benitez’	  landing	  certificates	  would	  be	  adequate	  and	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  for	  immigrants	  to	  put	  up	  a	  $500	  deposit.	  Berenson,	  in	  turn,	  continually	  asked	  Brandon	  to	  show	  him	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  law	  or	  regulation	  that	  allowed	  refugees	  to	  come	  into	  Cuba	  as	  permanent	  immigrants	  based	  on	  these	  landing	  permits,	  but	  Brandon	  never	  produced	  this.73	  Berenson	  requested	  that	  a	  translation	  of	  these	  laws	  be	  sent	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  NCC	  office	  so	  that	  they	  might	  be	  carefully	  studied.74	  In	  the	  meantime,	  Berenson	  insisted	  that	  potential	  immigrants	  make	  the	  $500	  deposit	  in	  accordance	  with	  Cuban	  regulations.75	  
Lawrence	  Berenson	  traveled	  to	  Cuba	  on	  December	  20,	  1938	  and	  met	  with	  Brandon	  and	  administrator	  Emily	  Perlman,	  who	  had	  been	  sent	  down	  from	  New	  York	  to	  assist	  temporarily	  in	  the	  Cuban	  office.76	  It	  was	  Berenson’s	  intent	  to	  point	  out	  to	  Benitez	  the	  possible	  danger	  in	  connection	  with	  accepting	  or	  demanding	  funds	  which	  were	  not	  official.	  Brandon,	  however,	  persuaded	  Berenson	  that	  if	  he	  approached	  Benitez,	  the	  amount	  that	  would	  be	  asked	  per	  case	  officially	  or	  otherwise	  would	  jump	  considerably.77	  Brandon	  suggested	  that	  he	  himself	  speak	  to	  Benitez	  and	  try	  to	  get	  the	  amount	  down	  to	  $10	  per	  person,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  was	  put	  in	  writing	  that	  the	  $10	  was	  being	  requested	  as	  a	  service	  charge	  in	  view	  of	  the	  excessive	  amount	  of	  work	  created	  by	  the	  refugee	  situation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Ibid.	  74	  Ibid.	  75	  Ibid.,	  2.	  76	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  February	  7,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  77	  Berenson	  to	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee,	  December	  20,	  1938,	  1.	  
	   	   	   47	  Berenson,	  perhaps	  naïvely,	  could	  not	  believe	  that	  anyone	  with	  any	  responsibility	  in	  the	  Cuban	  State	  Department	  was	  making	  demands	  or	  requiring	  extra	  payments,	  and	  strongly	  suspected	  some	  underling	  to	  be	  making	  them.78	  He	  suggested	  to	  the	  NCC	  a	  way	  of	  working	  out	  the	  program	  so	  that	  the	  lists	  of	  refugees	  would	  be	  vetted	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Labor	  and	  then	  need	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Acting	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Dr.	  Juan	  Ramos,	  or	  the	  Sub-­‐Secretary,	  Dr.	  Campa,	  thus	  bypassing	  the	  payment	  of	  the	  $150	  graft	  or	  any	  “service	  charge,”	  but	  keeping	  the	  $500	  bond	  as	  a	  requirement	  except	  in	  “exceptional”	  cases,	  which	  would	  be	  covered	  by	  the	  guarantee.79	  
Immigrants	  arriving	  without	  the	  $500	  bond	  would	  be	  allowed	  into	  Cuba	  but	  held	  at	  the	  Tiscornia	  immigrant	  camp80	  until	  they	  could	  produce	  the	  bond	  money.	  On	  November	  25,	  1938,	  Benitez	  confidentially	  told	  Brandon	  through	  an	  intermediary	  that	  he	  would	  allow	  the	  immigrants	  to	  remain	  in	  Cuba	  for	  one	  year	  for	  a	  fee	  of	  $50	  to	  be	  paid	  through	  a	  special	  notary81	  “recommended”	  by	  him	  and	  charging	  the	  exorbitant	  sum	  of	  $10,	  plus	  $2	  for	  the	  services	  of	  two	  witnesses.	  Of	  course	  one	  could	  use	  any	  other	  notary,	  but	  because	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Ibid.,	  3.	  79	  Ibid.	  80	  Originally	  a	  ranch	  known	  as	  Triscornia	  (the	  name	  later	  degenerated	  into	  Tiscornia	  due	  to	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	  Cuban	  language	  to	  elide	  the	  letter	  “r”),	  Tiscornia	  was	  the	  Cuban	  equivalent	  of	  Ellis	  Island,	  where	  immigrants	  were	  housed	  in	  small	  rooms	  until	  their	  immigration	  status	  could	  be	  established,	  and	  were	  charged	  $1.00	  per	  day	  for	  their	  room	  and	  board.	  The	  camp	  was	  converted	  into	  a	  school	  in	  1959	  when	  Fidel	  Castro	  came	  to	  power,	  but	  was	  abandoned	  after	  two	  years.	  (Michel	  Robert	  Moutal,	  My	  Life,	  Reflections	  and	  
Anecdotes	  (Bloomington	  	  Ind.:	  AuthorHouse,	  2008),	  286.)	  81	  In	  Cuba,	  a	  notary	  is	  empowered	  to	  draw	  up	  contracts	  and	  function	  as	  an	  attorney.	  
	   	   	   48	  authorization	  by	  Benitez	  was	  “problematical”	  the	  difficulties	  could	  be	  bypassed	  by	  going	  through	  his	  recommended	  channels.82	  
In	  the	  meantime,	  while	  Benitez	  was	  requiring	  these	  extra	  funds	  from	  the	  immigrants,	  he	  was	  having	  his	  own	  run-­‐in	  with	  the	  Cuban	  State	  Department,	  which	  suspected	  him	  of	  accepting	  illegal	  funds,	  and	  was	  therefore	  refusing	  to	  allow	  the	  Cuban	  Consul	  in	  Germany	  to	  issue	  visas	  upon	  cabled	  instructions	  from	  Benitez.83	  
With	  the	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  immigration,	  Berenson	  felt	  that	  the	  JRC	  office	  was	  badly	  understaffed	  at	  the	  present	  time	  and	  that	  an	  adequate	  staff	  was	  essential.	  He	  urgently	  recommended	  to	  the	  NCC	  that	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  come	  to	  Cuba	  to	  evaluate	  the	  situation	  herself,84	  and	  that	  “a	  capable	  woman	  executive	  and	  a	  young	  Cuban	  lawyer”	  be	  recruited	  so	  that	  the	  office	  could	  be	  “run	  smoothly	  by	  the	  clock	  without	  the	  necessity	  of	  expensive	  cables,	  long	  correspondence	  and	  unnecessary	  comment	  about	  political	  intrigues	  here.”85	  Needless	  to	  say,	  Berenson’s	  opinion	  of	  Brandon’s	  leadership	  was	  less	  than	  favorable.86	  Berenson	  reiterated	  that	  “this	  woman”	  should	  be	  a	  person	  who	  could	  maintain	  an	  office	  “to	  carry	  on	  efficiently,	  quickly	  and	  without	  friction…	  and	  should	  avoid	  the	  local	  gossipy	  influences	  which	  are	  constantly	  in	  play.”87	  He	  felt	  that	  “a	  real	  social	  worker”	  should	  be	  sent,	  who	  “should	  not	  be	  unduly	  worried	  about	  finances	  because	  there	  will	  be	  plenty	  to	  do	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Brandon	  to	  Razovsky,	  November	  25,	  1938,	  1.	  83	  Ibid.,	  2.	  See	  also	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  to	  Joseph	  Chamberlain,	  January	  10,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  84	  Berenson	  to	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee,	  December	  20,	  1938,	  5.	  85	  This	  was	  a	  backhanded	  statement	  about	  the	  way	  Brandon	  had	  handled	  his	  position	  in	  the	  JRC.	  (Ibid.,	  2.)	  86	  Ibid.	  87	  Ibid.,	  5.	  
	   	   	   49	  without	  the	  additional	  burden.”88	  Ideally,	  of	  course,	  this	  person	  should	  speak	  Spanish,	  “at	  least	  enough	  to	  get	  by.”89	  
In	  December,	  David	  M.	  Bressler,90	  JDC	  Vice-­‐Chairman,	  who	  had	  previously	  served	  as	  chairman	  of	  the	  JDC	  Refugees	  Committee	  and	  had	  experience	  in	  handling	  refugee	  problems,	  traveled	  to	  Cuba	  and	  submitted	  a	  report	  on	  the	  situation.	  He	  too	  observed	  that	  very	  few	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  people	  took	  any	  interest	  whatsoever	  in	  the	  JRC	  and	  felt	  no	  obligation	  to	  help	  in	  the	  current	  emergency:	  “…They	  seem	  to	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  conferring	  a	  great	  favour	  [sic]	  upon	  the	  Jews	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  not	  objecting	  to	  having	  these	  immigrants	  come	  here.”91	  Bressler	  admitted	  that	  this	  might	  be	  putting	  it	  a	  little	  strongly,	  but	  he	  did	  find	  the	  local	  community	  to	  be	  filled	  with	  divisions	  and	  jealousies,	  and	  his	  statement	  reflected	  the	  tenor	  of	  the	  situation.92	  In	  his	  opinion,	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  community	  was:	  
…not	  one	  community	  but	  a	  dozen.	  Each	  one	  yells	  for	  its	  own	  prerogatives,	  influences,	  rights	  and	  what	  not.	  The	  so-­‐called	  down-­‐town	  element	  will	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  up-­‐town	  element,	  and	  there	  are	  divisions	  in	  both.…	  We	  must	  face	  the	  contingency	  of	  having	  to	  finance	  the	  entire	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  December	  30,	  1938,	  6,	  1933/44:505,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  89	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  January	  2,	  1939,	  2,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  90	  Bressler	  served	  as	  Chairman	  of	  the	  JDC	  Refugees	  Committee	  (1924)	  together	  with	  Louis	  Marshall	  and	  Stephen	  S.	  Wise;	  he	  also	  served	  as	  chairman	  of	  the	  JDC	  Budget	  and	  Scope	  Committee	  (1937);	  and	  as	  JDC	  Vice-­‐Chairman	  (1937-­‐1942).	  (Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Who’s	  Who	  in	  the	  History	  of	  the	  JDC,”	  n.d.,	  3,	  AJDC	  Israel	  Records.)	  His	  personal	  papers,	  photographs	  and	  newspaper	  clippings	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  “Collection	  of	  the	  Ellen	  Brett	  Aibel	  Bierman	  Family,	  circa	  1865-­‐2002	  (bulk	  1900-­‐1943)”	  (Center	  for	  Jewish	  History,	  2002),	  *P-­‐940.	  91	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  December	  30,	  1938,	  1.	  92	  Ibid.	  
	   	   	   50	  burden,	  with	  contributions	  from	  local	  people	  amounting	  to	  a	  very	  very	  small	  part	  of	  the	  sum	  that	  will	  be	  required.93	  In	  his	  comments	  on	  “uptown”	  and	  “downtown”	  Jewish	  elements,	  Bressler	  was	  referring	  to	  the	  well-­‐known	  dynamics	  between	  bourgeois,	  liberal	  German	  Jews	  and	  “impoverished”	  and	  “ghettoized”	  Eastern	  European	  immigrants	  who	  migrated	  westward	  in	  different	  time	  periods	  as	  conditions	  became	  unbearable	  for	  them.	  The	  German	  Jewish	  “uptown	  element”	  tended	  to	  patronize	  the	  “downtown”	  Eastern	  European	  Jews,	  often	  regarding	  them	  as	  backward,	  uneducated	  and	  “dirty,”	  and	  in	  need	  of	  help	  to	  become	  accepted	  in	  society.	  Jack	  Wertheimer,	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  Germany	  between	  unification	  and	  World	  War	  I,	  acknowledges	  the	  common	  impression	  that	  German	  Jews	  “harbored	  a	  profound	  antipathy	  toward	  their	  [Eastern	  European]	  coreligionists	  that	  smacked	  of	  Jewish	  self-­‐hatred,	  if	  not	  anti-­‐Semitism	  [sic].”94	  Bressler	  projected	  this	  same	  dynamic	  onto	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities	  that	  he	  encountered.	  
While	  in	  Cuba,	  Bressler	  met	  with	  Coert	  Du	  Bois	  (1882-­‐1960),	  the	  American	  Consul	  General	  in	  Havana,	  who	  offered	  his	  cooperation	  “in	  every	  possible	  way.”	  Du	  Bois	  had	  been	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  State	  Department’s	  Visa	  Office	  from	  1924	  to	  1927.	  He	  also	  served	  as	  consul	  in	  Paris,	  Naples,	  Port	  Said,	  Java,	  India,	  Genoa,	  Naples	  and	  Havana	  (1937-­‐1941).	  He	  went	  on	  lead	  the	  Caribbean	  office	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  then	  was	  liaison	  officer	  for	  the	  State	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Ibid.,	  3.	  94	  Jack	  Wertheimer,	  Unwelcome	  Strangers:	  East	  European	  Jews	  in	  Imperial	  Germany	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  3–4.	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  Department	  and	  the	  War	  Assets	  Administration	  for	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.	  95	  
Du	  Bois	  assured	  Bressler	  that	  he	  was	  “very	  much	  interested”	  in	  the	  stateless	  immigrants	  because	  “after	  all	  they	  have	  no	  consul	  of	  their	  own”	  and	  he	  felt	  as	  if	  he	  were	  their	  consul.96	  Bressler	  sensed	  that	  Du	  Bois	  was	  “unquestionably	  a	  friend	  in	  need.”97	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  his	  visit	  to	  Havana,	  Bressler	  realized	  that	  there	  would	  be	  more	  immigrants	  coming,	  and	  the	  JDC,	  who	  was	  funding	  the	  NCC,	  would	  have	  to	  face	  the	  proposition	  of	  providing	  additional	  funds	  to	  take	  care	  of	  them	  until	  they	  could	  be	  admitted	  to	  the	  United	  States.98	  He	  wrote	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  in	  a	  confidential	  communiqué:	  
To	  what	  extent	  JDC	  will	  feel	  justified	  in	  making	  such	  a	  tremendous	  provision	  for	  one	  little	  place,	  I	  do	  not	  know.	  That	  of	  course	  may	  prove	  a	  very	  bothersome	  thing.	  But	  what	  I	  fear	  much	  more	  and	  as	  of	  infinitely	  greater	  importance	  is	  that	  the	  Government	  [of	  Cuba]	  may	  not	  be	  led	  in	  response	  to	  the	  growing	  antagonism	  to	  legislate	  against	  immigration	  so	  drastically	  as	  to	  virtually	  close	  the	  door.	  That	  would	  be	  a	  calamity	  because	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries	  would	  not	  be	  slow	  to	  take	  note	  with	  its	  inevitable	  consequences.99	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  “Coert	  Du	  Bois,	  78,	  Diplomat,	  Is	  Dead,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  March	  7,	  1960.	  (An	  interesting	  side	  note	  is	  that	  his	  two	  daughters,	  aged	  20	  and	  23,	  chartered	  a	  plane	  and	  jumped	  off	  together,	  “mourning	  the	  death	  of	  their	  sweethearts	  in	  a	  Royal	  Air	  Force	  plane	  crash	  the	  week	  before.”	  “Suicide	  Letters	  of	  Two	  Sisters	  Given	  to	  Public,”	  Spokane	  Daily	  
Chronicle,	  February	  25,	  1935,	  sec.	  Front	  Page.)	  96	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  December	  30,	  1938,	  4.	  97	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  January	  7,	  1939,	  1,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  98	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  January	  12,	  1939,	  4,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  99	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  December	  30,	  1938,	  4.	  
	   	   	   52	  Bressler	  was	  also	  concerned	  when	  he	  saw	  the	  immigrants	  forced	  into	  idleness	  because	  of	  the	  Cuban	  labor	  laws.	  In	  1933,	  the	  government	  of	  Ramón	  Grau	  San	  Martín100	  (1933-­‐1934)	  had	  enacted	  the	  Law	  of	  Nationalization	  of	  Labor,	  requiring	  that	  50%	  of	  salaried	  workers	  in	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  businesses	  be	  Cuban	  by	  birth.101	  Understandably	  this	  created	  a	  hardship	  particularly	  for	  Jews,	  as	  any	  new	  immigrants	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  easily	  obtain	  employment.	  The	  new	  law	  resulted	  in	  an	  immediate	  decrease	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  immigration	  at	  that	  time.102	  To	  overcome	  this	  obstacle,	  those	  Jews	  who	  were	  already	  established	  created	  new	  business	  enterprises	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  jobs	  for	  some	  of	  the	  immigrants,	  and	  in	  the	  process	  created	  jobs	  for	  native	  Cubans	  as	  well.	  However,	  this	  limitation	  to	  entering	  the	  labor	  market	  was	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  hardship	  for	  later	  waves	  of	  Jewish	  immigration.103	  
Bressler	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  refugees	  to	  find	  employment	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  length	  of	  their	  stay	  in	  Cuba:	  
One	  sees	  these	  immigrants	  almost	  everywhere.…	  They	  do	  nothing	  but	  while	  away	  the	  day.…	  I	  am	  asking	  myself…	  what	  happens	  to	  the	  morals	  of	  people,	  young	  men,	  young	  women,	  who	  must	  wait	  and	  wait	  and	  do	  nothing	  but	  wait,	  and	  in	  no	  way	  occupying	  their	  time	  in	  any	  useful	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Ramón	  Grau	  San	  Martín	  (1881-­‐1969)	  was	  a	  physician	  and	  the	  president	  of	  Cuba	  from	  1933-­‐1934	  and	  again	  from	  1944-­‐1948.	  Batista	  forced	  his	  resignation	  in	  1934.	  He	  ran	  against	  Batista	  and	  lost	  in	  1940	  but	  won	  re-­‐election	  in	  1944,	  then	  withdrawing	  from	  	  public	  life	  in	  1948.	  101	  For	  a	  detailed	  treatment	  of	  Cuban	  labor	  law	  during	  this	  period,	  see	  Aldo	  M.	  Leiva,	  “Cuban	  Labor	  Law:	  Issues	  and	  Challenges,”	  Papers	  and	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Tenth	  Annual	  
Meeting	  of	  the	  Association	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Economy	  10	  (August	  5,	  2000):	  481–91;	  See	  also	  Evangelina	  Vidana,	  “Labor	  Legislation	  during	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cuba:	  1902-­‐1958”	  (University	  of	  Miami,	  1970).	  102	  Elkin,	  The	  Jews	  of	  Latin	  America,	  87.	  103	  “La	  Presencia	  Hebrea	  En	  Cuba,”	  2.	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  manner?	  I	  am	  not	  asking	  myself	  this	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  question,	  I	  am	  wondering	  if	  we	  should	  not	  look	  at	  the	  situation	  frankly	  in	  the	  eyes.	  The	  numbers	  are	  growing	  weekly.	  More	  and	  more	  people	  are	  going	  on	  relief.	  How	  long	  can	  this	  continue	  without	  decidedly	  unfavorable	  consequences?104	  Already	  in	  January	  1939,	  David	  Bressler	  raised	  the	  concern	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  immigration	  was	  increasing	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  question	  was	  being	  asked,	  	  
…	  “How	  many	  Jews	  do	  you	  expect	  us	  to	  take	  in	  here?”…If	  this	  were	  merely	  a	  rhetorical	  question,	  I	  would	  not	  be	  so	  much	  concerned	  about	  it,	  but	  more	  of	  this	  when	  I	  return	  and	  possibly	  earlier	  if	  it	  should	  prove	  more	  serious	  than	  I	  believe	  at	  this	  moment.105	  Even	  Batista,	  who	  was	  friendly	  and	  well	  disposed	  towards	  the	  Jews,	  began	  to	  view	  with	  some	  concern	  the	  increasing	  volume	  of	  Jewish	  immigration,	  considering	  the	  lack	  of	  employment	  opportunities	  and	  the	  hazards	  inherent	  in	  idleness,	  and	  the	  want	  of	  assurance	  that	  American	  Jewry	  would	  be	  able	  or	  willing	  to	  assume	  the	  burden	  of	  their	  maintenance	  for	  the	  four	  or	  five	  years	  he	  estimated	  it	  might	  take	  for	  their	  U.S.	  visas	  to	  be	  granted.106	  	  
Bressler	  suggested	  to	  the	  JDC	  on	  January	  7	  that	  the	  volume	  of	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  Cuba	  needed	  to	  be	  controlled,	  but	  he	  was	  “at	  his	  wits’	  end	  to	  do	  very	  much	  about	  it.”	  He	  was	  concerned	  that	  immigration	  had	  increased	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  local	  papers	  “would…be	  able	  to	  play	  the	  thing	  up	  in	  large	  headlines…[as]	  considerable	  agitation	  is	  being	  spread	  because	  of	  the	  relatively	  large	  volume	  that	  has	  come	  to	  Cuba	  in	  so	  short	  a	  time.”107	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  December	  30,	  1938,	  4–5.	  105	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  January	  5,	  1939,	  3,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  106	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  January	  7,	  1939,	  1.	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  January	  10,	  1939,	  2,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  107	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  January	  7,	  1939.	  
	   	   	   54	  Bressler	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  Nazi	  agents	  that	  were	  representing	  the	  German	  government	  in	  high	  places,	  disseminating	  their	  antisemitic	  propaganda.	  He	  felt	  that	  thus	  far	  the	  Nazis	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  do	  much	  damage	  in	  Cuba,	  but	  realized	  that	  they	  were	  persistent	  and	  efficient.108	  	  
While	  Bressler	  recognized	  the	  need	  of	  German	  Jewry	  to	  leave	  Europe	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible,	  he	  nevertheless	  feared	  the	  consequences	  if	  a	  public	  outcry	  arose	  in	  Cuba	  against	  Jewish	  immigration:	  
Not	  only	  has	  it	  been	  the	  consistent	  policy	  and	  effort	  of	  the	  [Jewish]	  organizations	  to	  discourage	  every	  form	  of	  illegal	  immigration,	  but	  we	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  cable	  and	  write	  similar	  organizations	  abroad	  to	  use	  their	  influence	  to	  counteract	  in	  every	  possible	  way	  the	  fake	  handlers	  in	  human	  traffic.	  Unfortunately,	  all	  attempts	  to	  regulate	  the	  forced	  emigration	  from	  Nazified	  areas	  have	  been	  well-­‐nigh	  impossible	  because	  of	  the	  ruthlessness	  and	  unbelievable	  cruelty	  of	  their	  government	  officials,	  resulting,	  as	  it	  has,	  in	  precipitate	  mass	  flight—anywhere	  to	  get	  away	  from	  the	  doom	  threatened	  those	  who	  cannot	  get	  away.109	  The	  victims,	  the	  refugees,	  are	  caught	  between	  the	  devil	  and	  the	  deep	  blue	  sea.	  If	  they	  remain,	  God	  help	  them.	  If	  they	  take	  flight,	  hoping	  to	  get	  somewhere	  where	  life	  at	  least	  will	  be	  safe,	  they	  run	  up	  against	  immigration	  laws.	  They	  really	  have	  no	  alternative	  but	  in	  flight.	  Otherwise	  they	  might	  just	  as	  well	  carry	  out	  the	  death	  sentence	  virtually	  imposed	  upon	  them.	  It	  is	  a	  horrible	  situation	  all	  around,	  one	  which	  must	  be	  judged	  in	  the	  light	  of	  a	  deliberate	  government	  policy	  which	  knows	  no	  mercy.110	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  December	  30,	  1938,	  5.	  109	  David	  Bressler	  to	  S.	  L.	  Maduro,	  March	  24,	  1939,	  1,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  110	  Ibid.	  
	   	   	   55	  Caught	  between	  a	  rock	  and	  a	  hard	  place,	  JDC	  officials	  were	  doing	  everything	  humanly	  possible	  to	  check	  the	  flow	  of	  illegal	  immigration,	  notwithstanding	  their	  realization	  of	  the	  bitter	  price	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  those	  who	  were	  forced	  to	  remain	  behind.111	  
While	  he	  was	  in	  Cuba,	  Bressler	  helped	  to	  form	  an	  Advisory	  Committee	  to	  the	  JRC	  made	  up	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  Jews	  in	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities.112	  The	  committee	  foresaw	  the	  dangers	  of	  immigration	  during	  the	  early	  months	  of	  1939	  and	  requested	  assistance	  from	  JDC,	  specifically	  that	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  be	  sent	  to	  Cuba	  because	  of	  his	  personal	  relationship	  with	  Colonel	  Batista.	  Berenson,	  though,	  did	  not	  actually	  travel	  to	  Cuba	  until	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident	  several	  months	  later.	  	  
The	  Call	  for	  Help	  
When	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  could	  no	  longer	  handle	  the	  demands	  placed	  upon	  them,	  they	  called	  upon	  the	  JDC	  to	  step	  in	  and	  help.	  In	  response,	  the	  JDC,	  working	  together	  with	  the	  NCC,	  sent	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  head	  the	  work	  in	  Havana.	  Margolis,	  by	  working	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Consulate	  and	  applying	  her	  social	  welfare	  training,	  attempted	  to	  heal	  the	  fissures	  in	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities	  and	  was	  able	  to	  sustain	  the	  stranded	  Jews	  of	  Cuba	  until	  they	  could	  emigrate	  successfully	  to	  the	  United	  States.	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  111	  Ibid.	  112	  The	  members	  of	  this	  committee,	  which	  included	  Poliakoff,	  Hartman,	  Kates	  and	  Maduro,	  were	  willing	  to	  help	  the	  JRC	  in	  the	  capacity	  of	  advisors.	  However,	  they	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  they	  viewed	  the	  JRC	  as	  strictly	  an	  American	  organization,	  with	  American	  personnel,	  depending	  on	  American	  financing	  and	  American	  responsibility.	  They	  felt	  it	  was	  not	  created	  in	  Cuba	  through	  local	  initiative,	  and	  they	  all	  stated	  that	  they	  did	  not	  want	  their	  names	  to	  be	  publicly	  connected	  with	  it	  any	  way	  whatsoever.	  (S.	  L.	  Maduro	  to	  David	  Bressler,	  March	  28,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.)	  
	   	   	   56	  It	  was	  during	  Bressler’s	  December	  1938	  trip	  that	  Jack	  Brandon	  finally	  tendered	  his	  resignation,	  and	  Emily	  Perlman	  was	  left	  with	  the	  entire	  responsibility	  as	  of	  January	  1,	  1939.113	  Perlman	  was	  soon	  overwhelmed	  and	  discouraged	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  work	  constantly	  piling	  up	  and	  a	  staff	  that	  was	  “hardly	  up	  to	  par—in	  fact	  way	  below	  it.”114	  
The	  search	  then	  began	  for	  a	  competent	  social	  worker	  to	  replace	  Brandon.	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  was	  called	  upon	  to	  find	  such	  a	  person.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Laura	  Margolis	  was	  growing	  restless	  with	  her	  job	  directing	  the	  Buffalo	  Welfare	  Society.	  At	  the	  recommendation	  of	  friends,	  she	  applied	  for	  a	  job	  with	  the	  NCC	  where	  she	  could	  utilize	  her	  Spanish	  language	  skills	  to	  work	  with	  refugees	  in	  Cuba.	  Joseph	  Hyman	  of	  the	  JDC	  wrote:	  
In	  connection	  with	  Miss	  Perlman’s	  situation,	  Miss	  Razovsky	  tried	  hard	  to	  secure	  a	  very	  competent	  social	  worker,	  familiar	  with	  casework	  and	  preferably	  with	  a	  knowledge	  of	  Spanish.	  This	  is	  not	  easy.	  She	  finally	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Miss	  Laura	  Margolis,	  Executive	  Director	  of	  the	  Buffalo	  Family	  Welfare	  Society,	  would	  be	  the	  right	  person.	  A	  message	  has	  gone	  to	  Mr.	  Warner115	  in	  Mr.	  Baerwald’s	  name	  asking	  him	  to	  take	  up	  the	  matter	  with	  the	  Board	  there.	  From	  the	  talks	  of	  Miss	  Razovsky	  with	  Miss	  Margolis,	  it	  will	  take	  about	  two	  weeks	  before	  she	  can	  wind	  up	  her	  work	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  December	  30,	  1938,	  3.	  114	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  January	  7,	  1939,	  1.	  115	  Harvard	  trained	  attorney	  Eugene	  Warner	  (1877-­‐1943)	  was	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Buffalo	  Jewish	  Federation	  for	  Social	  Service,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Jewish	  Federation	  of	  Buffalo.	  Warner	  also	  served	  as	  Treasurer	  of	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Jewish	  Federations	  and	  Welfare	  Funds;	  president	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Federation	  for	  Social	  Service;	  president	  of	  the	  Buffalo	  Council	  of	  Social	  Agencies;	  president	  of	  the	  New	  York	  State	  Conference	  on	  Social	  Work	  for	  1935;	  member	  of	  the	  Erie	  County	  Emergency	  Relief	  Board;	  and	  member	  of	  the	  board	  of	  trustees	  of	  the	  Buffalo	  Public	  Library	  and	  the	  Museum	  of	  Natural	  Science.	  (“Meet	  Eugene	  Warner,	  Who	  Has	  Buffalo	  in	  the	  ‘Palm	  of	  His	  Hand,’”	  JTA,	  n.d.,	  accessed	  August	  22,	  2014;	  Buffalo	  Foundation	  Directory	  of	  Social	  Welfare	  and	  Allied	  Services	  in	  Erie	  County,	  New	  
York	  (Buffalo	  Foundation,	  1921),	  78;	  “Eugene	  Warner	  Obituary,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  December	  31,	  1943,	  sec.	  OBITUARIES,	  http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/106739189/citation/819B090B25654700PQ/2?accountid=7287.)	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  Buffalo	  and	  go	  down.	  Perhaps	  she	  can	  be	  induced	  to	  go	  sooner,	  assuming	  that	  her	  Committee	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  release	  her	  promptly.116	  Paul	  Baerwald,117	  JDC	  chairman,	  immediately	  cabled	  Margolis’	  Board	  chair	  in	  Buffalo	  asking	  that	  Margolis	  be	  released	  from	  her	  duties	  to	  help	  with	  the	  emergency	  in	  Cuba:	  
DUE	  CONSIDERABLE	  NUMBERS	  REFUGEES	  CONSTANTLY	  INCREASING	  CUBA	  IMPERATIVE	  IMMEDIATELY	  HAVE	  COMPETENT	  WOMAN	  CASEWORKER	  PREFERABLE	  WITH	  KNOWLEDGE	  SPANISH.	  DAVID	  BRESSLER	  NOW	  HAVANA	  URGES	  IMMEDIATE	  ASSIGNMENT	  SUCH	  PERSON.	  IN	  VIEW	  EMERGENCIES	  MANY	  DIRECTIONS	  WE	  ASKING	  OUR	  FRIENDS	  DRAFT	  MOST	  SUITABLE	  PERSONS	  EVEN	  IF	  TAKEN	  FROM	  NORMAL	  DUTIES.	  THIS	  IS	  ONE	  OF	  THOSE	  SITUATIONS.	  AM	  ADVISED	  LAURA	  MARGOLIS	  EXECUTIVE	  DIRECTOR	  YOUR	  FAMILY	  WELFARE	  SOCIETY	  WOULD	  BE	  ESPECIALLY	  HELPFUL	  THIS	  SITUATION.	  NATIONAL	  COORDINATING	  COMMITTEE	  AND	  JOINT	  DISTRIBUTION	  COMMITTEE	  WOULD	  BE	  MOST	  GRATEFUL	  TO	  YOU	  AS	  MEMBER	  OF	  OUR	  BOARD	  IF	  YOU	  DISCUSSED	  THIS	  OFFICERS	  BUFFALO	  WELFARE	  SOCIETY.	  WE	  HOPE	  SHE	  CAN	  BE	  SPARED	  IMMEDIATELY	  AS	  DELAYS	  AGGRAVATE	  SITUATION	  GREATLY.118	  Bressler	  followed	  this	  up	  with	  a	  cable	  to	  JDC	  headquarters:	  
SITUATION	  FOR	  LONG	  TIME	  WILL	  REQUIRE	  A	  GOOD	  ADMINISTRATOR…AND	  ONCE	  HERE	  SHOULD	  BE	  PREPARED	  REMAIN	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  David	  Bressler,	  January	  12,	  1939,	  1,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  117	  Paul	  Baerwald	  (1871-­‐1961)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  JDC.	  He	  retired	  from	  his	  banking	  job	  in	  1930	  to	  devote	  his	  full	  energies	  to	  philanthropy.	  He	  served	  first	  as	  treasurer	  of	  the	  JDC	  from	  1930-­‐1932,	  then	  as	  chairman	  from	  1932	  and	  as	  honorary	  chairman	  from	  1945	  until	  his	  death.	  Baerwald	  was	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  New	  York	  Governor	  Herbert	  Lehman	  and	  served	  on	  President	  Roosevelt’s	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Political	  Refugees	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  (“Paul	  Baerwald,	  Philanthropist,	  Banker,	  89,	  Dead-­‐-­‐Headed	  Joint	  Distribution	  Group,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  July	  3,	  1961;	  for	  more	  on	  Baerwald,	  see	  “Paul	  Baerwald	  Papers,	  1857-­‐1961”	  (Columbia	  University	  Libraries	  Archival	  Collections	  MS#0059,	  1961).)	  118	  Paul	  Baerwald	  to	  Eugene	  Warner,	  January	  12,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  
	   	   	   58	  INDEFINITELY	  A	  MONTHS	  STAY	  WOULD	  NOT	  IMPROVE	  SITUATION	  HOPE	  MARGOLIS	  COMES	  QUICKLY.119	  Eugene	  Warner	  and	  the	  Buffalo	  Welfare	  Society	  agreed	  to	  release	  Margolis	  from	  her	  duties	  in	  Buffalo	  for	  six	  months,	  and	  she	  began	  work	  as	  director	  of	  the	  JRC	  in	  Cuba	  on	  January	  28,	  1939.	  Her	  salary	  was	  set	  at	  $3,300	  per	  year,	  with	  the	  Buffalo	  committee	  agreeing	  to	  pay	  for	  her	  first	  month	  in	  Cuba.120	  
Emily	  Perlman	  was	  delighted	  to	  hear	  Margolis	  had	  accepted	  the	  position,	  and	  was	  hoping	  that	  Laura	  would	  be	  able	  to	  “stand	  the	  pressure”	  so	  she	  herself	  could	  return	  to	  the	  U.S.121	  Perlman	  was	  worried	  that	  the	  JRC	  office	  would	  make	  a	  bad	  impression	  on	  Margolis	  upon	  her	  arrival:	  	  
The	  clients	  overcrowd	  the	  waiting	  room	  and	  stand	  around	  on	  the	  balcony	  talking	  in	  loud	  voices.	  Then	  too	  the	  superintendent	  of	  the	  building	  does	  not	  care	  to	  have	  our	  clients	  use	  the	  elevator	  and	  the	  men	  are	  forced	  to	  walk	  up	  four	  rather	  steep	  flights.	  We	  have	  been	  looking	  for	  a	  house	  or	  apartment	  because	  we	  feel	  that	  we	  would	  attract	  least	  attention	  to	  the	  place	  and	  we	  would	  have	  plenty	  of	  room	  for	  expansion.	  I	  am	  terribly	  sorry	  that	  we	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  move	  the	  office	  before	  Miss	  Margolis	  arrives	  because	  I	  am	  afraid	  she	  might	  receive	  a	  very	  poor	  impression.122	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Cable,”	  January	  15,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.,	  David	  Bressler,	  “Memorandum,”	  January	  23,	  1939,	  2,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  120	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  to	  Joseph	  Hyman,	  February	  9,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  121	  Emily	  Perlman	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  January	  27,	  1939,	  3,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  122	  Ibid.,	  1.	  The	  offices	  were	  located	  at	  O’Reilly	  No.	  11,	  Room	  307	  in	  Havana.	  
	   	   	   59	  Looking	  over	  the	  finances	  right	  away,	  Margolis	  was	  disturbed	  at	  the	  way	  they	  had	  been	  handled	  before	  her	  arrival.	  She	  estimated	  it	  would	  take	  at	  least	  a	  month	  to	  straighten	  out	  the	  bookkeeping	  in	  order	  even	  to	  begin	  to	  submit	  a	  budget:123	  	  
From	  all	  I	  have	  been	  told,	  plus	  what	  I	  have	  observed,	  to	  date	  thousands	  [of	  dollars]	  were	  sent	  down	  here	  upon	  request	  and	  not	  until	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  had	  been	  spent	  [did	  anyone]	  from	  the	  North	  come	  down	  here	  to	  find	  out	  how	  that	  money	  was	  being	  administered.	  By	  that	  time	  the	  damage	  had	  been	  done.124	  She	  quickly	  learned	  that	  the	  funds	  she	  would	  receive	  would	  not	  be	  nearly	  sufficient	  to	  take	  care	  of	  the	  needs	  involved:	  
I	  was	  only	  here	  a	  few	  days	  when	  I	  realized	  that	  if	  all	  of	  my	  energies	  could	  be	  devoted	  merely	  to	  cleaning	  up	  the	  “back	  mess”,	  which	  had	  gained	  tremendous	  proportions,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  three	  home	  relief	  people,	  it	  would	  take	  at	  least	  several	  months	  to	  bring	  the	  budget	  down	  to	  anything	  approaching	  the	  Two	  Thousand	  Dollars,	  per	  week,	  appropriation	  for	  Cuba.125	  She	  found	  that	  relief	  was	  being	  handed	  to	  applicants	  without	  any	  kind	  of	  a	  home	  investigation	  to	  verify	  their	  claims.	  Margolis	  wrote	  to	  Razovsky,	  who	  was	  now	  her	  supervisor:	  
It	  might	  interest	  you	  to	  know	  that	  the	  Havana	  office	  has	  a	  reputation	  on	  the	  Continent	  already	  as	  being	  the	  one	  office	  which	  gives	  relief	  easily.	  In	  all	  my	  experience,	  I	  have	  never	  seen	  such	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  how	  an	  organization	  was	  being	  “taken	  for	  a	  ride.”126	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Margolis	  to	  Razovsky,	  February	  7,	  1939.	  124	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Joseph	  Hyman,	  March	  27,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  125	  Ibid.	  126	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  March	  24,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  
	   	   	   60	  The	  existing	  files	  and	  records	  were	  not	  in	  any	  condition	  even	  to	  determine	  the	  number	  or	  type	  of	  clients	  in	  her	  caseload.127	  One	  refugee,	  Miss	  Ilse	  Schrier,	  had	  been	  placed	  in	  charge	  of	  all	  relief	  applications	  just	  prior	  to	  Margolis’	  arrival.	  Margolis	  wrote:	  
I	  have	  never	  known	  anyone	  more	  capable	  and	  efficient	  [than	  Miss	  Schrier]	  but	  certainly	  it	  is	  not	  within	  any	  human	  capacity	  to	  interview	  people	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  one	  half	  hour	  apart,	  make	  no	  home	  investigation,	  deal	  with	  hysteria	  and	  threats	  unless	  relief	  were	  given,	  and	  expect	  that	  person	  to	  do	  anything	  approaching	  an	  intelligent	  job.128	  One	  gets	  an	  impression	  of	  chaos	  and	  disunity	  among	  the	  refugees	  as	  each	  vied	  for	  more	  resources.	  In	  another	  letter,	  Margolis	  noted:	  
If	  I	  had	  nothing	  else	  to	  worry	  about,	  just	  cleaning	  up	  the	  internal	  relief	  situation,	  would	  be	  a	  forty-­‐eight	  hour	  job	  in	  itself.	  Please	  remember,	  all	  of	  this	  is	  being	  done	  with	  inadequate	  staff.	  The	  staff	  is	  not	  only	  inadequate	  but	  jittery.	  The	  person	  who	  is	  carrying	  the	  whole	  burden	  of	  the	  relief	  at	  present,	  Miss	  Schrier,	  is	  herself	  insecure	  in	  her	  status	  here.129	  When	  Margolis	  arrived	  in	  Cuba	  in	  February	  1939,130	  she	  had	  found	  an	  understaffed	  and	  disorganized	  relief	  operation	  that	  had	  been	  left	  behind	  by	  Jack	  Brandon.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  she	  found	  things,	  Margolis	  reported	  to	  Razovsky	  that	  Emily	  Perlman,	  who	  had	  stepped	  in	  temporarily,	  had	  “done	  a	  simply	  magnificent	  job”	  that	  Margolis	  could	  appreciate	  fully	  now	  that	  she	  was	  in	  Cuba.131	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Margolis	  to	  Razovsky,	  February	  7,	  1939.	  128	  Margolis	  to	  Hyman,	  March	  27,	  1939.	  129	  Margolis	  to	  Razovsky,	  March	  24,	  1939.	  130	  See	  timeline	  of	  Margolis	  assignments	  in	  Moses	  Leavitt	  to	  Roy	  W.	  McDonald,	  “Letter	  OW-­‐2-­‐3-­‐EMF,”	  October	  14,	  1943,	  2,	  AR	  1933/44:130,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  131	  Margolis	  to	  Razovsky,	  February	  7,	  1939.	  
	   	   	   61	  However,	  Margolis	  had	  come	  expecting	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  man	  in	  charge	  and	  not	  that	  she	  would	  be	  the	  one	  responsible	  for	  the	  entire	  work:	  
When	  I	  was	  originally	  asked	  to	  come	  to	  Havana,	  I	  was	  told	  that	  a	  man	  was	  to	  come	  here	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  entire	  office	  and	  that	  I	  would	  concern	  myself	  with	  the	  relief	  and	  family	  welfare.	  As	  you	  know,	  the	  plans	  have	  now	  changed.	  I	  have	  been	  promised	  a	  relief	  worker	  from	  the	  States	  to	  assist	  me.	  Even	  with	  such	  a	  person	  here,	  the	  problem	  still	  assumes	  tremendous	  proportions.132	  Early	  on,	  Margolis	  showed	  sensitivity	  to	  Cuban	  culture	  and	  gender	  issues.	  She	  immediately	  requested	  that	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  send	  additional	  staff	  appropriate	  to	  the	  culture,	  although	  her	  tongue	  appeared	  to	  be	  firmly	  planted	  in	  her	  cheek	  as	  she	  made	  the	  petition:	  
I	  do	  hope	  you	  are	  working	  on	  the	  plan	  of	  getting	  a	  man	  worker	  down	  here	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  The	  administration	  of	  this	  office	  is	  not	  simply	  one	  of	  getting	  relief.	  It	  is	  all	  tied	  up	  with	  local	  immigration	  problems,	  community	  relationships,	  and	  interpretation	  to	  community	  and	  our	  committee.	  My	  impression	  is	  that	  there	  are	  many	  situations	  where	  a	  man	  be	  [sic]	  much	  more	  effective	  than	  a	  woman	  because	  of	  the	  local	  Cuban	  attitude	  (Cuban	  women	  are	  not	  supposed	  to	  have	  too	  much	  intelligence).133	  David	  Bressler	  had	  made	  the	  same	  suggestion	  to	  Razovsky	  several	  weeks	  earlier:	  
“…Some	  very	  qualified	  man	  should	  be	  put	  in	  charge	  here	  and	  even	  if	  the	  woman	  social	  worker	  knows	  Spanish—which	  would	  be	  a	  great	  help—the	  administrator	  and	  executive	  and	  contactman	  [sic]	  with	  Government	  Departments	  and	  others	  should	  definitely	  be	  a	  he-­‐man.…	  They	  will	  require	  a	  thorough	  acquaintance	  with	  the	  vast	  store	  of	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  accumulated	  here	  by	  Miss	  Perlman,	  Miss	  Schrier,	  and	  others.…	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   62	  I	  want	  to	  repeat	  quite	  definitely	  that	  the	  person	  in	  charge	  should	  be	  the	  male	  worker.”134	  JDC	  headquarters	  did	  indeed	  send	  a	  man,	  New	  York	  City	  social	  worker	  Edward	  Hochhauser,	  who	  arrived	  mid-­‐January	  1939	  and	  stayed	  for	  about	  a	  month.135	  Hochhauser	  specifically	  evaluated	  the	  housing	  situation	  and	  outlined	  several	  housing	  projects	  to	  be	  undertaken	  outside	  of	  Havana;	  but	  pragmatically,	  Margolis	  did	  not	  believe	  they	  had	  the	  personnel	  or	  resources	  to	  take	  on	  such	  plans.	  She	  wrote	  to	  Razovsky:	  
…	  I	  am	  terribly	  sorry	  to	  have	  to	  tell	  you	  that	  at	  this	  point	  it	  is	  absolutely	  impossible	  for	  me	  to	  devote	  my	  time	  to	  work	  with	  any	  member	  of	  our	  Local	  Committee	  on	  any	  of	  these	  housing	  projects.…	  Even	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  refugees,	  who	  are	  to	  go	  into	  this	  place	  is	  a	  tremendous	  responsibility,	  since	  the	  success	  of	  any	  collective	  project	  depends	  on	  the	  people	  who	  are	  going	  to	  live	  together.	  Therefore,	  until	  some	  plan	  is	  made	  to	  send	  additional	  help	  here,	  I	  don’t	  think	  we	  can	  proceed.	  Please	  don’t	  feel	  that	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  not	  wanting	  to	  take	  on	  additional	  work.	  It	  is	  simply	  humanly	  impossible	  to	  do	  any	  more,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  too	  bad	  to	  do	  half	  a	  job	  on	  housing	  which	  would	  cost	  money	  and	  be	  a	  complete	  failure….Would	  it	  be	  at	  all	  practical	  for	  someone	  from	  New	  York	  to	  come	  down	  here	  on	  a	  temporary	  basis	  to	  start	  one	  or	  two	  of	  these	  projects?	  I	  can	  assure	  this	  person	  he	  will	  receive	  from	  our	  office	  all	  the	  assistance	  that	  we	  can	  give.136	  Margolis’	  request	  was	  discussed	  by	  JDC	  committee	  in	  New	  York:	  “Miss	  Margolies	  [sic]	  expects	  a	  man	  to	  come	  down	  to	  take	  over	  housing,	  economic	  aid,	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	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  1,	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  NY	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  135	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  January	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  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	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  Margolis	  to	  Razovsky,	  March	  8,	  1939.	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  the	  refugee	  work.”137	  In	  April,	  they	  sent	  Milton	  Goldsmith,	  also	  a	  trained	  social	  worker,	  to	  assist	  Margolis:	  
Mr.	  Goldsmith	  has	  already	  joined	  you,	  Miss	  Margolis,	  in	  Havana,	  and	  we	  all	  hope	  that	  at	  a	  very	  early	  date	  many	  of	  the	  difficulties	  you	  now	  have	  and	  which	  you	  mention	  in	  your	  letter	  will	  be	  under	  firmer	  control.	  In	  a	  measure,	  therefore,	  your	  suggestion	  as	  to	  increased	  professional	  staff	  by	  a	  trained	  worker	  has	  been	  met.138	  Margolis	  was	  pleased	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  Goldsmith.139	  She	  told	  Razovsky:	  
I	  don’t	  believe	  I	  have	  officially	  registered	  my	  opinion	  of	  Mr.	  Goldsmith.	  You	  have	  certainly	  made	  an	  excellent	  choice	  and	  I	  don’t	  think	  you	  could	  have	  found	  a	  better	  person	  to	  help	  with	  the	  local	  problem.	  He	  is	  working	  splendidly.140	  Within	  a	  week	  of	  her	  arrival,	  Margolis	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  evaluate	  the	  larger	  picture	  beyond	  the	  mere	  granting	  of	  relief.	  She	  felt	  it	  imperative	  that	  the	  local	  committee	  have	  permanent	  legal	  counsel	  at	  all	  times	  to	  advise	  them	  on	  immigration	  technicalities.	  She	  retained	  attorney	  Salo	  Bustamante	  for	  this	  task	  on	  the	  recommendation	  of	  Solomon	  Maduro.141	  She	  also	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  legalizing	  the	  status	  of	  the	  JRC	  in	  Cuba	  and	  pushed	  Razovsky	  to	  act:	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  Milton	  Goldsmith	  was	  able	  to	  take	  over	  the	  work	  once	  Margolis	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  first	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  140	  Laura	  Margolis	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  …please	  take	  into	  consideration	  what	  we	  should	  do	  about	  legalizing	  our	  status	  in	  Cuba.	  We	  are	  continually	  being	  questioned	  about	  this.	  This	  morning	  an	  inspector	  came	  asking	  me	  all	  kinds	  of	  questions	  about	  the	  work	  of	  our	  Committee.	  I	  avoided	  all	  direct	  answers….	  If	  we	  are	  to	  function	  here	  with	  any	  degree	  of	  security,	  this	  should	  be	  given	  immediate	  attention.142	  When	  the	  NCC	  did	  not	  act	  quickly,	  she	  was	  not	  shy	  about	  scolding	  Razovsky,	  and	  was	  also	  not	  above	  a	  little	  dissimulation	  in	  her	  problem-­‐solving:	  
As	  I	  am	  dictating	  this	  letter	  there	  are	  two	  inspectors	  from	  the	  Labor	  Department	  in	  the	  next	  office…	  The	  situation	  here	  since	  about	  4:30	  yesterday	  afternoon	  has	  been	  extremely	  uncomfortable	  and	  even	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  talking	  out	  of	  turn,	  I	  must	  say,	  all	  of	  this	  could	  have	  been	  avoided	  had	  attention	  been	  paid	  to	  my	  repeated	  letters	  and	  cables	  sent	  to	  you	  regarding	  the	  legalization	  of	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee143	  here….	  My	  first	  stall	  was	  that	  I	  pretended	  to	  understand	  no	  Spanish…	  and	  I	  ostensibly	  left	  the	  room	  to	  get	  an	  interpretor	  [sic]…	  [Our	  attorney]	  suggested	  that	  I	  place	  some	  of	  the	  people	  working	  here	  on	  a	  volunteer	  basis.	  In	  the	  list	  which	  I	  prepared	  I	  purposely	  left	  out	  Miss	  Schrier,	  Miss	  Dwoja	  Kohn	  and	  Mrs.	  Margaret	  Koch.	  All	  as	  you	  know,	  are	  here	  with	  incomplete	  bonds	  and	  are	  among	  the	  group	  of	  people	  for	  whom	  the	  Immigration	  Department	  is	  looking	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  Tiscornia…	  It	  certainly	  would	  be	  a	  beautiful	  mess	  here	  to	  have	  them	  all	  picked	  up	  and	  sent	  to	  Tiscornia,	  then	  we	  might	  just	  as	  well	  close	  the	  whole	  outfit.144	  By	  April,	  Razovsky	  and	  the	  NCC	  had	  listened	  to	  her	  and	  begun	  the	  legalization	  process	  as	  she	  requested.	  
Although	  the	  main	  emphasis	  of	  the	  JRC	  work	  was	  on	  relief,	  there	  were	  other	  phases	  to	  their	  work	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  providing	  help	  with	  immigration	  problems,	  efforts	  at	  uniting	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  144	  Laura	  Margolis	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  March	  17,	  1939,	  1–2,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  
	   	   	   65	  the	  local	  Jewish	  community,	  plans	  for	  a	  fundraising	  campaign,	  and	  studies	  of	  constructive	  projects	  to	  raise	  the	  morale	  of	  the	  refugees.145	  As	  noted,	  the	  Cuban	  laws	  did	  not	  permit	  refugees	  to	  work	  and	  Margolis	  was	  concerned,	  just	  as	  Bressler	  had	  been,	  that	  if	  the	  refugees	  remained	  idle	  during	  their	  long	  stay,	  it	  would	  result	  in	  rapid	  demoralization.	  Margolis	  also	  anticipated	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  the	  relief	  rolls	  as	  more	  immigrants	  would	  continue	  to	  arrive	  and	  the	  resources	  of	  those	  refugees	  who	  were	  not	  yet	  on	  relief	  would	  slowly	  be	  exhausted.146	  
Margolis	  saw	  that	  the	  JRC’s	  relief	  allowance	  would	  soon	  become	  inadequate.	  It	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  clothing	  replacements,	  for	  necessary	  items	  such	  as	  soap,	  etc.,	  nor	  for	  recreation.	  Margolis	  sensed	  the	  need	  to	  explore	  the	  possibility	  of	  establishing	  schools	  and	  cultural	  activities	  for	  the	  refugees,147	  as	  well	  as	  small	  projects	  and	  training	  and	  occupational	  centers,	  but	  the	  funds	  to	  do	  so	  were	  not	  available.148	  
Margolis	  was	  forced	  to	  cope	  with	  a	  minimal	  budget	  and	  demands	  from	  ever-­‐increasing	  numbers	  of	  refugees.	  She	  immediately	  utilized	  her	  organizational	  skills	  to	  streamline	  the	  systems	  and	  cut	  expenses,	  putting	  into	  action	  a	  “housecleaning	  plan.”	  She	  recruited	  the	  services	  of	  “several	  superior	  and	  well	  trained	  refugees,”149	  some	  of	  whom	  were	  on	  work	  relief	  and	  some	  who	  volunteered	  their	  services	  full	  time.	  Several	  of	  her	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  Razovsky,	  April	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   66	  recruits	  had	  experience	  with	  immigration	  and	  Hilfsverein	  (benevolent	  society)	  work	  in	  Berlin,	  Vienna	  and	  Palestine,	  so	  she	  utilized	  them	  and	  learned	  from	  their	  experience.150	  
One	  immigrant	  in	  particular,	  Dr.	  Luis	  Planer,	  who	  had	  had	  experience	  in	  immigration	  from	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  into	  Palestine,	  helped	  her	  to	  set	  up	  several	  new	  offices	  and	  departments	  to	  streamline	  relief	  requests,	  which	  was	  overwhelmingly	  her	  first	  priority.151	  Applicants	  for	  relief	  would	  be	  given	  an	  appointment	  with	  the	  Intake	  Department.	  This	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  triage—if	  the	  applicants	  did	  not	  need	  emergency	  relief,	  they	  were	  given	  a	  regular	  appointment	  with	  the	  Intake	  Office.	  If	  they	  needed	  immediate	  assistance,	  they	  received	  emergency	  relief.152	  
In	  the	  Intake	  Office,	  applicants	  would	  fill	  out	  a	  form	  and	  be	  interviewed	  by	  refugee	  volunteers.	  They	  would	  then	  be	  referred	  either	  to	  the	  Investigation	  Office	  or	  the	  Emergency	  Plan	  Office.	  The	  Emergency	  Plan	  Office	  would	  not	  automatically	  dole	  out	  relief,	  but	  would	  provide	  temporary	  room	  and	  board	  pending	  the	  findings	  in	  the	  Investigation	  Office.	  Margolis	  made	  inexpensive	  arrangements	  with	  several	  hotels	  and	  restaurants,	  kosher	  and	  non-­‐kosher,	  so	  that	  immigrants	  could	  receive	  room	  and	  board	  instead	  of	  cash,	  pending	  a	  thorough	  investigation.	  She	  had	  found	  that	  if	  they	  could	  not	  get	  cash,	  refugees	  often	  decided	  that	  their	  case	  was	  not,	  after	  all,	  an	  emergency.153	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   67	  Margolis	  recruited	  several	  young	  men	  from	  the	  refugee	  community	  to	  staff	  the	  Investigation	  Office.	  Their	  job	  included	  making	  home	  visits	  and	  investigating	  relatives	  and	  resources	  in	  other	  countries.	  The	  refugees	  would	  then	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  Disposition	  Office	  where	  Miss	  Schrier	  would	  base	  her	  relief	  plan	  or	  refusal	  on	  the	  results	  of	  the	  investigation.	  
In	  this	  way,	  Margolis	  hoped	  to	  bring	  the	  budget	  under	  control	  and	  weed	  out	  those	  who	  were	  trying	  to	  “work	  the	  system”	  dishonestly.	  This	  new	  structure	  resulted	  in	  an	  entirely	  different	  attitude	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  clients	  as	  well:	  
They	  cannot	  create	  scenes	  or	  scare	  us	  into	  giving	  emergency	  relief	  because	  we	  have	  a	  very	  satisfactory	  alternative	  play	  for	  emergency	  relief	  already	  [sic]	  to	  offer	  them.	  We	  know	  that	  it	  is	  becoming	  generally	  known	  throughout	  the	  community	  that	  a	  “new	  wind	  is	  blowing	  at	  the	  JRC”	  so	  that	  certain	  relief	  requests	  which	  were	  pending	  prior	  to	  the	  present	  setup,	  have	  been	  withdrawn.154	  With	  the	  help	  of	  this	  system,	  Margolis	  was	  able	  to	  cut	  the	  budget	  significantly,	  but	  refugees	  were	  still	  pouring	  into	  Cuba.	  The	  newer	  immigrants	  were	  arriving	  with	  fewer	  and	  fewer	  resources	  and	  were	  making	  tremendous	  demands	  on	  the	  JRC’s	  finances.155	  She	  was	  constantly	  requesting	  more	  money	  from	  JDC	  in	  New	  York,	  complaining	  that	  she	  was	  sending	  yet	  “…another	  tale	  of	  woe	  about	  money.	  It	  seems	  all	  we	  do	  is	  cable	  for	  it	  and	  we’re	  short	  again.”156	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  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	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   68	  In	  light	  of	  the	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  immigration	  and	  its	  demands,	  Margolis	  made	  the	  following	  recommendations	  to	  JDC:	  
	  The	  Joint	  Relief	  Committee	  recommends	  the	  following	  points	  be	  carefully	  considered	  prior	  to	  sending	  people	  to	  Cuba	  for	  a	  change	  of	  status:	  1) No	  one	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  Cuba	  until	  Quota	  numbers	  are	  available.	  2) The	  number	  available	  monthly	  to	  be	  determined	  at	  the	  American	  Consulate	  by	  the	  Joint	  Relief	  Committee.	  3) A	  regular	  flow	  to	  be	  maintained	  to	  take	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  number	  available,	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  numbers	  both	  the	  Joint	  Relief	  Committee	  and	  the	  American	  Consulate	  in	  Havana	  can	  service	  effectively.	  4) A	  careful	  selection	  of	  refugees	  to	  be	  sent	  after	  adequate	  preparation	  of	  their	  papers.	  (Pre-­‐examination	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Justice	  Department	  and	  the	  shipping	  companies	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  American	  Consulate	  in	  Havana	  will	  grant	  visas.)	  5) Informing	  refugees	  of	  the	  dangers	  involved	  so	  that	  they	  will	  be	  prepared	  to	  take	  the	  necessary	  risks	  themselves.	  6) Controls	  set	  up	  so	  that	  the	  program	  may	  be	  stopped	  or	  changed	  radically	  at	  a	  moments	  [sic]	  notice.	  7) Use	  of	  the	  change	  of	  status	  referral	  blanks.	  8) Education	  of	  the	  American	  public	  of	  the	  advisability	  of	  coming	  for	  a	  change	  of	  status	  under	  agency	  auspices.157	  In	  these	  balanced	  recommendations,	  Margolis	  was	  not	  advocating	  for	  a	  total	  restriction	  on	  immigration,	  but	  for	  a	  carefully	  controlled	  set	  of	  procedures	  to	  be	  followed	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  refugees	  to	  immigrate	  successfully	  to	  the	  States.	  
In	  March	  1939	  Margolis	  requested	  a	  budget	  of	  $156,000	  per	  year,	  although	  she	  had	  been	  told	  she	  could	  only	  be	  given	  $100,000.	  The	  matter	  was	  discussed	  by	  the	  JDC	  in	  New	  York,	  where	  they	  determined,	  with	  an	  undertone	  of	  irritation,	  that	  “some	  indication	  should	  be	  given	  to	  Miss	  Margolis	  that	  the	  funds	  available	  for	  work	  in	  Cuba	  are	  not	  boundless.”158	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  of	  Change	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  Status	  Cases	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  January	  1937	  to	  
October	  1940,	  8–11.	  158	  M.	  Jacobsohn	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  July	  13,	  1939,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	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   69	  The	  budget	  remained	  at	  $100,000,159	  which	  was	  David	  Bressler’s	  suggestion,160	  and	  had	  been	  the	  original	  budget	  for	  all	  of	  Latin	  America	  just	  four	  months	  before.161	  This	  was	  meant	  to	  include	  all	  activities,	  and	  not	  only	  relief	  and	  administration	  expenses.	  The	  executives	  further	  noted	  that	  “it	  should	  be	  indicated	  to	  her	  [Margolis]	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  find	  money	  for	  expenditures	  in	  Cuba	  at	  an	  increasing	  rate.”162	  
Margolis	  did	  not	  take	  this	  lightly.	  She	  wrote	  to	  Razovsky,	  “If	  we	  were	  to	  cut	  relief	  any	  more	  drastically	  than	  we	  are	  at	  the	  present	  time,	  we	  might	  just	  as	  well	  close	  the	  office.”163	  
Until	  this	  point,	  Margolis	  had	  been	  communicating	  only	  with	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  who	  was	  still	  her	  immediate	  supervisor,	  but	  now	  she	  escalated	  her	  request	  directly	  to	  Joseph	  Hyman,164	  executive	  director	  of	  the	  JDC.	  In	  her	  first	  communication	  with	  Hyman,	  among	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Laura	  Margolis,	  March	  21,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  160	  David	  Bressler,	  Havana	  Report,	  February	  16,	  1939,	  2,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  161	  Evelyn	  Morrissey	  to	  David	  Bressler,	  December	  22,	  1938,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  162	  Jacobsohn	  to	  Razovsky,	  July	  13,	  1939.	  163	  Margolis	  to	  Razovsky,	  February	  15,	  1939.	  164	  Dr.	  Joseph	  C.	  Hyman	  (1889-­‐1949),	  a	  New	  York	  attorney,	  left	  the	  practice	  of	  law	  in	  1922	  and	  joined	  the	  JDC	  as	  assistant	  to	  Herbert	  Lehman,	  then	  chairman	  of	  its	  Reconstruction	  Committee,	  which	  aided	  Jewish	  people	  in	  Europe	  after	  World	  War	  I.	  He	  became	  secretary	  of	  the	  JDC	  in	  1925	  and	  helped	  form	  the	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee	  for	  Refugees,	  the	  National	  Refugee	  Service	  and	  the	  United	  Service	  for	  New	  Americans.	  He	  took	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  fundraising	  bodies	  of	  the	  JDC,	  the	  Allied	  Jewish	  Appeal	  and	  later	  the	  United	  Jewish	  Appeal.	  He	  also	  served	  as	  vice	  chairman	  of	  the	  American	  Council	  of	  Voluntary	  Agencies	  for	  Foreign	  service,	  which	  included	  groups	  of	  all	  faiths.	  In	  1937	  he	  became	  executive	  director	  of	  the	  JDC	  and	  in	  1939	  executive	  vice	  chairman	  until	  his	  retirement	  in	  1946.	  (“Dr.	  J.C.	  Hyman	  Dies;	  Aided	  Relief	  Work,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  February	  9,	  1949.)	  
	   	   	   70	  other	  things,	  Margolis	  reasoned	  with	  him	  to	  increase	  her	  budget	  and	  her	  staff,	  if	  only	  for	  a	  few	  months	  to	  allow	  her	  to	  bring	  the	  situation	  under	  control:	  
Will	  you	  please	  consider	  the	  alternative.	  [sic]	  If	  you	  feel	  that	  you	  cannot	  afford	  to	  have	  the	  Havana	  Office	  work	  this	  problem	  out	  as	  we	  have	  been,	  then	  the	  only	  alternative	  would	  be	  to	  cut	  all	  our	  relief	  allowances	  50%	  until	  such	  a	  time	  as	  we	  have	  balanced	  our	  budget.	  From	  one	  point	  of	  view	  this	  would	  be	  much	  easier…	  but	  I	  can	  assure	  you	  that	  it	  would	  be	  extremely	  uncomfortable	  working	  in	  this	  office	  and	  I	  cannot	  assure	  you	  that	  we	  would	  not	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  riots	  [by	  the	  refugees]	  which	  would	  give	  the	  JRC	  unfavorable	  publicity	  and	  only	  act	  as	  fuel	  to	  an	  already	  very	  intensive	  antisemitic	  campaign.165	  Margolis	  continued	  to	  request	  additional	  funding	  from	  Razovsky	  week	  after	  week.	  She	  pointed	  out	  the	  delicate	  situation	  that	  would	  arise	  if	  the	  budget	  were	  cut	  suddenly,	  and	  changed	  her	  strategy,	  recommending	  an	  immediate	  increase	  of	  U.S.	  funds,	  but	  with	  a	  gradual	  tapering	  off	  as	  the	  situation	  came	  under	  control.166	  She	  asked	  for	  additional	  funding	  just	  for	  the	  following	  four	  weeks,167	  but	  the	  fact	  remained	  that	  by	  April	  1939,	  she	  had	  twice	  as	  many	  refugees	  as	  when	  she	  started,	  and	  she	  needed	  still	  more	  funds.168	  The	  JRC	  bank	  account	  was	  continually	  overdrawn.169	  	  
The	  obvious	  remedy	  for	  inadequate	  funds	  was	  to	  secure	  financial	  participation	  from	  the	  local	  Jewish	  community,	  but	  this	  was	  unlikely,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  due	  to	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  different	  facets	  of	  the	  community	  to	  cooperate	  with	  each	  other	  and	  their	  lack	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  Margolis	  to	  Hyman,	  March	  27,	  1939.	  The	  state	  of	  antisemitic	  sentiment	  in	  Cuba	  at	  the	  time	  will	  be	  surveyed	  in	  the	  next	  section	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  166	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  April	  15,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  167	  Ibid.	  168	  Adolfo	  Kates	  to	  David	  Bressler,	  April	  15,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  169	  Ibid.	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  willingness	  to	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  providing	  aid	  to	  the	  immigrants.	  Margolis	  assigned	  Milton	  Goldsmith	  in	  May	  1939	  to	  launch	  a	  fundraising	  campaign,	  and	  held	  two	  conferences	  to	  this	  end.	  Those	  efforts,	  however,	  did	  not	  bear	  fruit.	  The	  local	  Advisory	  Board	  was	  no	  longer	  an	  active	  functioning	  body.	  Maduro	  had	  resigned	  as	  chairman,	  and	  neither	  he	  nor	  Kates	  would	  consider	  being	  official	  members	  of	  the	  Board—although	  both	  were	  willing	  to	  be	  of	  assistance	  in	  an	  unofficial	  advisory	  capacity.	  170	  Margolis	  wrote	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,171	  “Unless	  the	  picture	  changes	  radically,	  I	  cannot	  see	  any	  possibilities	  for	  raising	  funds	  locally.”	  
At	  around	  the	  same	  time,	  David	  Bressler	  once	  again	  pointed	  out	  to	  Adolfo	  Kates	  in	  Cuba	  that	  JDC	  was	  already	  spending	  “far	  beyond	  anything	  which	  the	  overwhelming	  demands	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world	  would	  justify,”172	  and	  urged	  Kates	  and	  Maduro	  to	  try	  to	  raise	  local	  funds	  for	  the	  work.	  “The	  welfare	  of	  the	  refugees	  is	  not	  only	  our	  concern,	  but	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,	  June	  3,	  1940,	  1933/44:509,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  The	  St.	  Louis	  affair,	  with	  its	  aftermath	  of	  bitterness	  and	  recriminations	  prevented	  this	  fundraising	  effort	  from	  yielding	  any	  fruit.	  	  171	  Robert	  Pilpel	  (1905-­‐1987)	  a	  New	  York	  attorney	  by	  profession,	  served	  on	  the	  executive	  staff	  of	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  from	  1939	  to	  1944	  as	  secretary	  of	  JDC’s	  Committee	  on	  Refugee	  Rehabilitation	  in	  Latin	  America,	  and	  as	  secretary	  of	  the	  JDC	  Subcommittee	  on	  Refugee	  Aid	  in	  Central	  and	  South	  America.	  Pilpel	  later	  served	  as	  assistant	  to	  Joseph	  Schwartz,	  European	  director	  of	  JDC,	  in	  coordinating	  relief	  and	  emigration	  aid	  to	  refugees	  at	  headquarters.	  From	  1944	  to	  1952	  he	  worked	  in	  refuge	  and	  relief	  with	  the	  JDC	  in	  its	  European	  executive	  offices.	  (“Robert	  Pilpel,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  July	  9,	  1987;	  “Robert	  Pilpel	  Joins	  Staff	  of	  J.D.C.	  in	  Europe;	  Will	  Leave	  for	  Lisbon	  Shortly,”	  JTA,	  February	  23,	  1944;	  “Jewish	  Rescuers	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  (1933-­‐1945):	  Jewish	  Organizations	  Involved	  in	  Rescue	  and	  Relief	  of	  Jews,”	  August	  25,	  2012,	  http://jewishholocaustrescuers.com/Organizations.html.)	  172	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Adolfo	  Kates,	  March	  15,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	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  the	  concern	  of	  every	  community	  in	  the	  world	  where	  they	  may	  find	  themselves.”173	  He	  noted	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Maduro	  that	  “Cuba	  is	  about	  the	  only	  country	  which	  thus	  far	  has	  not	  bestirred	  itself	  to	  raise	  funds	  for	  the	  refugees…”	  and	  encouraged	  him	  to	  use	  his	  influence	  to	  raise	  funds	  locally.174	  	  
Joseph	  Hyman	  again	  noted	  that	  Cuba	  was	  still	  “virtually	  the	  only	  country	  in	  the	  world…in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  appreciable	  contribution	  from	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community.”175	  
Even	  under	  war	  conditions,	  among	  the	  Jews	  in	  Poland	  and	  in	  Central	  Europe,	  and	  practically	  everywhere	  else,	  JDC	  had	  always	  found	  a	  response	  from	  the	  local	  community.	  It	  had	  also	  always	  taken	  the	  position	  that	  there	  was	  a	  social	  responsibility	  of	  local	  leadership,	  and	  that	  that	  social	  responsibility	  must	  be	  evidenced	  by	  a	  financial	  contribution	  commensurate	  with	  the	  means	  of	  the	  community,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  active	  participation	  of	  leaders	  in	  administering	  and	  planning	  the	  work	  of	  emergency	  aid	  and	  relief.176	  Kates	  and	  Maduro	  did	  attempt,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Milton	  Goldsmith,	  to	  raise	  funds	  from	  the	  local	  community.	  They	  worked	  out	  preliminary	  plans	  for	  a	  fundraising	  campaign	  and	  discussed	  various	  methods	  of	  securing	  cooperation	  between	  the	  various	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  Jacobsohn	  to	  Razovsky,	  July	  13,	  1939.	  174	  Bressler	  to	  Maduro,	  March	  1,	  1939.	  175	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Adolfo	  Kates,	  February	  8,	  1940,	  1933/44:509,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  176	  Hyman	  to	  Leipziger,	  October	  1,	  1940.	  Hyman	  explained	  that	  in	  Poland,	  the	  Jews	  were	  bearing	  80%	  of	  the	  total	  assistance	  budget;	  in	  Switzerland,	  even	  more;	  in	  France,	  the	  ratio	  was	  50-­‐50;	  in	  Sweden,	  where	  there	  were	  7,000	  refugees,	  a	  tiny	  population	  raised	  over	  $150,000	  in	  the	  first	  six	  months	  of	  1942	  for	  the	  immigrants.	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  Jewish	  groups,177	  but	  were	  unable	  to	  achieve	  a	  consensus.	  The	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Cuba	  was	  too	  divided,	  and	  the	  funds	  raised	  were	  minimal.178	  	  
In	  April	  1939,	  between	  800	  and	  1,000	  refugees	  arrived	  within	  one	  week,	  the	  majority	  of	  whom	  entered	  on	  the	  Benitez	  landing	  permits.	  Most	  claimed	  they	  had	  no	  other	  money,	  and	  the	  JRC	  office	  was	  flooded	  with	  relief	  requests.179	  Margolis	  asked	  Milton	  Goldsmith	  to	  write	  to	  Hyman	  to	  make	  their	  case,	  possibly	  thinking	  a	  man	  might	  gain	  a	  better	  hearing	  at	  headquarters.	  	  
Goldsmith	  began	  his	  appeal	  to	  Hyman	  by	  empathizing	  with	  the	  financial	  position	  that	  JDC	  found	  itself	  in,	  and	  agreeing	  that	  “Cuba	  was	  not	  the	  only	  sore	  spot	  on	  the	  map	  of	  the	  world”	  and	  thus	  they	  could	  not	  expect	  preferential	  treatment	  to	  the	  point	  that	  it	  would	  hamper	  JDC’s	  work	  in	  other	  needy	  areas.	  He	  pointed	  out,	  however,	  that	  between	  1,200	  and	  2,000	  refugees	  were	  arriving	  in	  Cuba	  each	  month,	  35-­‐50%	  of	  which	  came	  without	  funds.	  In	  addition,	  those	  refugees	  that	  were	  already	  in	  Cuba	  were	  exhausting	  the	  funds	  with	  which	  they	  had	  arrived	  and	  would	  soon	  need	  relief	  as	  well.180	  
Goldsmith	  mentioned	  the	  local	  fundraising	  efforts	  and	  their	  hopes	  that	  they	  would	  yield	  results.	  However,	  under	  Margolis’	  guidance	  and	  knowing	  the	  relief	  budget	  would	  not	  be	  increased,	  he	  did	  not	  ask	  for	  additional	  funds	  for	  relief,	  but	  rather	  made	  the	  case	  for	  money	  to	  fund	  productive	  refugee	  projects:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Milton	  Goldsmith	  to	  Joseph	  Hyman,	  April	  25,	  1939,	  2,	  1933/44:529,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  178	  Ibid.	  179	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  April	  19,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  180	  Goldsmith	  to	  Hyman,	  April	  25,	  1939,	  1.	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  The	  monies	  being	  expended	  for	  relief	  are	  just	  so	  much	  water	  over	  the	  dam.	  We	  get	  no	  real	  return	  for	  them	  since	  it	  seems	  the	  more	  we	  spend	  in	  relief,	  the	  more	  of	  an	  invitation	  it	  becomes	  for	  refugees	  here	  to	  bring	  friends	  and	  relatives	  to	  Havana.	  To	  my	  mind	  it	  is	  quite	  important	  that	  we	  begin	  to	  work	  out	  some	  constructive	  projects	  such	  as	  cooperatives,	  housing,	  training	  projects	  which	  preferably	  should	  be	  outside	  of	  Havana,	  in	  order	  to	  siphon	  off	  the	  large	  number	  of	  refugees	  here,	  as	  it	  is	  becoming	  a	  matter	  for	  adverse	  comment	  and	  adds	  fuel	  to	  various	  campaigns	  being	  conducted	  against	  us.181	  He	  closed	  the	  letter	  on	  a	  positive	  note:	  
The	  work	  down	  here	  keeps	  one	  on	  the	  jump	  every	  minute	  but	  I	  like	  it	  a	  lot.	  Miss	  Margolis	  has	  done	  a	  splendid	  job	  here	  and	  I	  am	  sure	  that	  with	  reasonable	  good	  fortune,	  we	  can	  continue	  to	  improve	  matters	  here.182	  The	  budget	  was	  finally	  increased	  to	  $2,000	  per	  week	  in	  July,	  1939.183	  
Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  presented	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  established	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Cuba	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  context	  for	  the	  situation	  that	  faced	  those	  communities	  when	  flooded	  with	  refugees	  from	  Nazi	  persecution.	  The	  efforts	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  to	  help	  have	  been	  examined,	  with	  the	  conclusion	  that	  their	  inability	  to	  work	  together	  rendered	  them	  unable	  to	  meet	  the	  challenges	  at	  hand.	  They	  could	  not	  raise	  the	  needed	  funds	  locally	  nor	  provide	  the	  services	  that	  the	  refugees	  needed.	  Concerned	  that	  the	  refugees	  would	  become	  public	  charges	  and	  thus	  reflect	  badly	  on	  themselves,	  the	  local	  leaders	  appealed	  to	  international	  Jewry	  to	  stop	  the	  refugee	  migration,	  to	  no	  avail.	  Overrun	  with	  the	  massive	  influx	  of	  refugees,	  they	  requested	  aid	  from	  international	  Jewry.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  Ibid.,	  2.	  182	  Ibid.,	  3.	  183	  Evelyn	  Morrissey	  to	  Paul	  W.	  Low,	  July	  27,	  1939,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	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  United	  States	  Jewish	  communities	  responded	  through	  their	  umbrella	  relief	  organization,	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  who	  sent	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  step	  in.	  	  
Margolis’	  task,	  to	  expedite	  emigration	  of	  the	  refugees,	  soon	  changed	  to	  one	  of	  providing	  relief,	  as	  the	  flow	  of	  emigration	  to	  America	  slowed	  to	  a	  trickle	  and	  6,000	  refugees	  were	  stranded	  on	  the	  island,	  unable	  to	  work	  due	  to	  increasingly	  restrictive	  Cuban	  labor	  regulations.	  Margolis	  tackled	  the	  task	  at	  hand,	  first	  obtaining	  the	  cooperation	  and	  aid	  of	  the	  American	  Consulate	  to	  process	  the	  existing	  visas,	  and	  then	  investigating	  the	  relief	  situation,	  which	  was	  in	  total	  disarray.	  	  
Constantly	  in	  need	  of	  funds,	  Margolis	  streamlined	  systems	  and	  cut	  expenses,	  utilizing	  the	  skills	  of	  the	  refugees	  to	  craft	  together	  a	  smoothly	  running	  machine.	  In	  spite	  of	  her	  best	  efforts,	  though,	  she	  ultimately	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  drawing	  together	  the	  many	  factions	  that	  existed	  in	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities.	  
In	  summary,	  the	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  among	  the	  different	  contingents	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Cuba	  impeded	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  JDC	  workers	  to	  properly	  assist	  the	  refugees.	  To	  worsen	  matters,	  the	  battles	  among	  the	  refugees	  for	  more	  funds	  impeded	  the	  limited	  aid	  from	  being	  fairly	  distributed.	  The	  local	  community	  members	  did	  not	  participate	  in	  organizing	  the	  effort,	  nor	  in	  any	  of	  the	  fundraising	  responsibilities.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  worldwide	  situation,	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  provide	  all	  of	  the	  necessary	  funds	  to	  carry	  on	  the	  work	  in	  Cuba.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  explore	  the	  antisemitic	  tendencies	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  crisis,	  and	  efforts	  by	  the	  local	  refugee	  community	  to	  pull	  together	  and	  supplement	  the	  American	  aid	  by	  providing	  for	  their	  own	  social,	  educational	  and	  cultural	  needs.	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  CHAPTER	  TWO	  
ANTISEMITISM	  IN	  CUBA	  
This	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  antisemitic	  sentiment	  that	  existed	  in	  Cuba	  during	  the	  Holocaust	  era,	  analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  refugee	  migration	  and	  Nazi	  propaganda	  on	  public	  opinion	  toward	  the	  Jews,	  and	  examining	  the	  strategies	  employed	  by	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  to	  counteract	  it.	  Antisemitism	  in	  Cuba	  reached	  its	  climax	  in	  1939	  with	  the	  incident	  of	  the	  M.S.	  St.	  Louis,	  a	  ship	  with	  almost	  a	  thousand	  Jewish	  refugees	  who	  were	  ultimately	  refused	  entry	  into	  Cuba	  (and	  other	  ports	  in	  the	  Americas)	  and	  were	  forced	  to	  return	  to	  Europe	  as	  unwanted	  human	  cargo.	  The	  chapter	  will	  add	  to	  the	  current	  historiography	  that	  portrays	  this	  incident	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  Nazi	  propaganda	  intended	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  world	  that	  Germany	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  rejecting	  its	  Jews.	  	  
This	  incident,	  which	  presented	  an	  undeniably	  urgent	  need	  for	  Jews	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  Cuban	  government	  with	  one	  voice,	  underscored	  their	  lack	  of	  cohesiveness	  and	  coordination,	  and	  inability	  to	  unite.	  In	  spite	  of	  desperate	  attempts	  of	  American	  representatives	  to	  influence	  the	  Cuban	  government,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  secure	  the	  admission	  of	  the	  refugees.	  Antisemitic	  expression	  gradually	  diminished	  following	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident	  as	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  began	  to	  emigrate	  in	  larger	  numbers	  to	  the	  United	  States	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  JDC	  and	  local	  State	  Department	  representatives.	  
The	  Rise	  of	  Antisemitism	  in	  Cuba	  
The	  Cuban	  government’s	  attitude	  toward	  the	  Jews	  had	  been	  relatively	  neutral	  in	  the	  20th	  century,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  part	  by	  their	  open	  immigration	  policy.	  The	  constitutions	  of	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  1902,	  1928	  and	  1940	  had	  established	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  Jewish	  existence	  by	  officially	  separating	  church	  and	  state	  and	  declaring	  freedom	  of	  religion.	  This	  section	  will	  survey	  the	  general	  rise	  of	  antisemitism	  in	  Cuba	  in	  the	  Holocaust	  era	  as	  influenced	  internally	  by	  economic	  factors,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  Nazi	  propaganda,	  and	  explore	  its	  causation	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  both	  the	  established	  and	  the	  refugee	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Havana.	  
❋ In	  spite	  of	  the	  neutral	  attitude	  of	  the	  Cuban	  government,	  Jews	  still	  felt	  they	  were	  considered	  aliens.1	  Many	  of	  the	  early	  immigrants	  from	  Europe	  did	  not	  publicly	  acknowledge	  their	  Jewish	  identity,	  but	  identified	  themselves	  merely	  as	  Germans	  or	  Poles.2	  This	  was	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  a	  show	  of	  good	  will	  for	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  on	  April	  30,	  1919,	  the	  Cuban	  Senate	  adopted	  a	  formal	  resolution	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration,	  which	  was	  publicly	  read	  in	  honor	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community.3	  	  
As	  Jewish	  immigration	  increased,	  however,	  so	  did	  anti-­‐Jewish	  feeling.	  In	  December	  1928	  the	  Havana	  City	  Council	  banned	  peddlers—most	  of	  whom	  were	  Jewish—from	  standing	  at	  street	  intersections,	  and	  arrested	  fifteen	  of	  them.4	  The	  Jewish	  peddlers	  were	  selling	  goods	  at	  lower	  prices	  than	  the	  established	  (mainly	  Spanish)	  retailers	  and	  the	  latter	  sought	  to	  establish	  regulations	  to	  eliminate	  this	  practice.	  The	  economic	  downturn	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “Comunidad	  Hebrea	  de	  Cuba	  -­‐	  HISTORIA.”	  2	  Ibid.	  3	  Ibid.	  David	  Blis	  was	  largely	  responsible	  for	  the	  positive	  attitude	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Senate.	  (“Cuba	  Favors	  British	  Declaration,”	  Chicago	  Sentinel,	  November	  25,	  1918,	  21.)	  4	  There	  were	  over	  500	  Jewish	  peddlers	  in	  Havana	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  Centro	  posted	  bond	  and	  the	  fifteen	  peddlers	  were	  released	  without	  incident	  two	  weeks	  later.	  (Levine,	  
Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  48.)	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  early	  1930s	  and	  the	  decrease	  in	  sugar	  prices	  caused	  further	  financial	  hardship	  throughout	  Cuba.	  A	  sense	  of	  rising	  nationalism,	  particularly	  among	  the	  Cuban	  elite,	  heightened	  antisemitic	  sentiment.5	  In	  1933,	  during	  the	  regime	  of	  Gerardo	  Machado	  Morales	  (1925-­‐1933)	  the	  upsurge	  in	  Jewish	  immigration	  provoked	  a	  backlash	  from	  Spanish	  merchants,	  whose	  retail	  businesses	  were	  being	  undercut	  by	  the	  rising	  numbers	  of	  Jewish	  peddlers,	  which	  were	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  labor	  laws.	  There	  were	  several	  attacks	  upon	  the	  Jews,	  particularly	  upon	  Jewish	  workers,	  who	  could	  do	  little	  in	  response	  since	  they	  were	  not	  Cuban	  citizens.6	  	  
Machado	  was	  ousted	  by	  an	  army	  revolt	  in	  1933	  and	  replaced	  by	  Carlos	  Manuel	  de	  Céspedes	  y	  Quesada	  in	  August	  of	  that	  year.	  In	  September,	  Céspedes	  was	  overthrown	  	  in	  the	  Sergeants’	  Revolt	  by	  then-­‐sergeant	  Fulgencio	  Batista,	  who	  virtually	  controlled	  the	  Executive	  Commission	  of	  the	  Provisional	  Government	  of	  Cuba,	  a	  five-­‐member	  coalition	  that	  took	  over	  the	  government.	  	  This	  Commission	  then	  appointed	  Ramón	  Grau	  San	  Martín,	  one	  of	  its	  members	  and	  a	  Cuban	  physician,	  as	  provisional	  president.	  However,	  in	  1934,	  after	  being	  marginalized	  by	  Batista,	  Grau	  resigned,	  clearing	  the	  way	  for	  Batista,	  who	  was	  now	  a	  colonel	  and	  self-­‐appointed	  chief	  of	  the	  armed	  forces,	  to	  appoint	  puppet	  presidents	  until	  his	  own	  election	  to	  the	  presidency	  in	  1940.7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  “La	  Presencia	  Hebrea	  En	  Cuba,”	  2;	  see	  also	  Levine,	  Tropical	  Diaspora:	  The	  Jewish	  
Experience	  in	  Cuba,	  47.	  6	  “Jews	  in	  Cuba	  Made	  Scapegoat	  in	  Unrest,”	  JTA,	  November	  12,	  1933.	  7	  For	  more	  on	  this	  period	  of	  political	  turmoil	  in	  Cuba,	  see	  Jorge	  I.	  Domínguez,	  Cuba:	  
Order	  and	  Revolution	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1978);	  Jaime	  Suchlicki,	  Cuba:	  From	  Columbus	  to	  Castro.	  (New	  York:	  Scribner,	  1974);	  Wilber	  A	  Chaffee	  and	  Gary	  Prevost,	  Cuba,	  a	  Different	  America	  (Totowa,	  N.J.:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  1989);	  Argote-­‐Freyre,	  “Fulgencio	  Batista”;	  Carl	  Richard	  Fournier,	  “From	  Empire	  to	  
	   	   	   79	  After	  Hitler	  rose	  to	  power,	  a	  Hitlerite	  Fascist	  movement	  began	  to	  stir	  up	  nationalistic	  feelings	  and	  demand	  “Cuba	  for	  Cuba	  and	  for	  the	  Cubans.”	  They	  pressed	  for	  a	  law	  stipulating	  that	  a	  full	  80%	  of	  the	  employees	  in	  any	  establishment	  be	  native	  Cubans.8	  This	  law	  was	  not	  passed,	  but	  in	  1933	  the	  Nationalization	  of	  Labor	  Law	  was	  implemented	  that	  required	  that	  50%	  of	  employees	  be	  Cubans	  (see	  below).	  	  
Nazi	  sympathizers	  met	  in	  the	  German	  Club	  of	  which	  Eric	  Tropel,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  German	  consulate,	  was	  president,	  and	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  carry	  on	  a	  widespread	  campaign	  to	  Nazify	  the	  country.9	  Certain	  sections	  of	  the	  press	  started	  to	  spread	  anti-­‐Jewish	  agitation	  and	  the	  military	  began	  blaming	  Jews	  for	  promulgating	  Communist	  propaganda.10	  The	  newspapers	  La	  Mañana	  (The	  Morning)	  and	  La	  Voz	  (The	  Voice)	  reported	  “on	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  chief	  of	  police	  that	  the	  Jews	  are	  disturbing	  the	  life	  of	  Cuba”	  and	  that	  “the	  Jews	  in	  Cuba	  are	  leading	  immoral	  lives.”11	  An	  editorial	  in	  El	  País	  Libre	  (The	  Free	  Country)	  urged	  the	  deportation	  of	  the	  Jews	  and	  the	  closing	  of	  doors	  to	  all	  who	  might	  be	  suspected	  of	  wanting	  to	  “take	  advantage	  of	  Cuba.”12	  
Jews	  and	  other	  aliens	  began	  to	  be	  attacked.	  Already	  in	  May	  1933	  vandals	  had	  broken	  the	  windows	  and	  looted	  the	  business	  establishments	  owned	  by	  Luis	  Jurick,	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Hegemony:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  United	  States	  Relations	  with	  Cuba	  and	  Mexico,	  1930-­‐-­‐1940”	  (M.A.,	  Concordia	  University	  (Canada),	  2001);	  Clifford	  L.	  Staten,	  The	  History	  of	  Cuba	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2005);	  Chomsky,	  Carr,	  and	  Smorkaloff,	  The	  Cuba	  Reader.	  8	  “Jews	  in	  Cuba	  Made	  Scapegoat	  in	  Unrest.”	  	  9	  “Nazi	  Propagandists	  Decide	  on	  Widespread	  Cuba	  Drive,”	  JTA,	  May	  15,	  1933.	  10	  Bressler	  to	  Razovsky,	  January	  10,	  1939,	  2.	  11	  “Jews	  Arrested,	  Injured,	  Accused	  As	  Communists	  in	  Cuba	  Riots,	  Turmoil,”	  JTA,	  October	  10,	  1933.	  12	  “Jews	  in	  Cuba	  Made	  Scapegoat	  in	  Unrest.”	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  American	  citizen	  and	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Center.13	  During	  a	  labor	  demonstration	  in	  December	  1933,	  a	  Jewish	  worker	  had	  been	  killed	  and	  several	  others	  were	  arrested	  and	  charged	  with	  being	  Communist	  leaders	  due	  to	  their	  Eastern	  European	  origins.	  Later	  in	  December	  of	  that	  year,	  two	  other	  Jews	  had	  been	  killed	  when	  “a	  mob	  of	  soldiers	  and	  Negroes”	  raided	  a	  Jewish	  store	  in	  Havana.14	  
Since	  the	  Jews	  did	  not	  have	  any	  diplomatic	  representation	  in	  Cuba	  to	  defend	  them,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  this	  alarming	  escalation,	  Havana	  Jews	  created	  the	  Comité	  Intersociál	  (Intersocial	  Committee)	  and	  formed	  a	  Comisión	  Jurídica	  (Law	  Commission)	  to	  represent	  themselves.	  The	  communities	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  unite	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  for	  the	  refugees,	  but	  the	  internal	  threat	  of	  antisemitism	  finally	  became	  an	  impetus	  for	  united	  action.	  	  In	  May	  1933	  the	  Committee	  staged	  a	  protest	  rally	  against	  continued	  Nazi	  attacks	  on	  the	  Jews	  in	  Germany,15	  and	  made	  plans	  to	  intercede	  both	  with	  President	  Grau	  San	  Martín	  and	  with	  Batista,	  who	  was	  then	  army	  chief-­‐of-­‐staff.16	  This	  organization	  only	  existed	  until	  1935,	  when	  the	  government	  suppressed	  every	  effort	  by	  Jewish	  people	  to	  organize,	  branding	  all	  such	  efforts	  as	  Communist.17	  	  
In	  September	  1938,	  Cuba	  legalized	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  encouraged	  by	  Batista,	  who	  declared	  that	  as	  long	  as	  it	  did	  not	  practice	  violence,	  it	  should	  have	  the	  same	  rights	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  “Nazi	  Propagandists	  Decide	  on	  Widespread	  Cuba	  Drive.”	  14	  “The	  Week	  in	  Review:	  Cuba,”	  JTA,	  December	  24,	  1933.	  15	  “Havana	  Jews	  Staging	  Protest	  Rally	  Tomorrow,”	  JTA,	  May	  15,	  1933.	  16	  “Jews	  Arrested,	  Injured,	  Accused	  As	  Communists	  in	  Cuba	  Riots,	  Turmoil.”	  17	  “Jews	  in	  Cuba	  Made	  Scapegoat	  in	  Unrest.”	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  any	  other	  party	  in	  Cuba.18	  In	  October	  of	  1938,	  two	  other	  parties,	  the	  right	  wing	  of	  the	  “Joven	  Cuba”	  (Young	  Cuba)	  and	  the	  National	  Fascist	  Party,	  also	  became	  legal,	  their	  members	  emboldened	  by	  General	  Francisco	  Franco’s	  victory	  in	  Spain.	  About	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Cuban	  Nazi	  Party	  was	  also	  legalized,19	  but	  only	  once	  it	  agreed	  to	  the	  government	  request	  to	  delete	  portions	  of	  its	  founding	  literature	  that	  advocated	  racial	  discrimination.20	  
During	  this	  period,	  Nazi	  agents	  sent	  to	  Cuba	  by	  Joseph	  Goebbels	  were	  disseminating	  reams	  of	  printed	  material	  to	  the	  press	  attempting	  to	  curry	  favor	  for	  Nazi	  Germany	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  to	  advance	  antisemitism	  on	  the	  other.21	  The	  antisemitic	  newspapers	  Alerte	  (Alert),	  Avance	  (Advance)	  and	  Diario	  de	  la	  Marina	  (Marine	  Daily),22	  printed	  the	  Nazi	  material	  directly.23	  Nazi	  antisemitic	  propaganda	  was	  also	  being	  broadcast	  over	  the	  radio.	  The	  founder	  and	  president	  of	  the	  recognized	  Cuban	  Nazi	  Party,	  Juan	  Prohías,	  was	  a	  well-­‐known	  commentator	  and	  had	  a	  daily	  “antisemitic	  hour”	  on	  one	  of	  the	  radio	  stations.	  
The	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line	  office	  in	  Cuba	  was	  regarded	  as	  the	  center	  of	  Nazi	  activity.	  Louis	  Clasing,	  the	  HAPAG	  representative	  in	  Havana,	  actually	  worked	  with	  Benitez	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Norman	  Berdichevsky,	  “Communist	  Party	  Support	  for	  Cuban	  Dictator	  Batista,”	  
New	  English	  Review,	  August	  2008.	  19	  “Nazi	  Party	  Wins	  Recognition	  in	  Cuba;	  Fascist	  Group	  Also	  Asks	  Legal	  Status,”	  JTA,	  October	  19,	  1938.	  	  20	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1939-­‐40	  (New	  York:	  American	  Jewish	  Committee,	  1939),	  355.	  21	  Nazi	  propagandists	  learned	  early	  on	  not	  to	  belabor	  the	  Aryan	  issue,	  due	  to	  the	  mixed	  racial	  makeup	  of	  the	  Cuban	  population.	  (Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  5.)	  22	  Pepin	  Rivera,	  a	  vocal	  antisemite,	  owned	  the	  Catholic	  newspaper	  Diario	  de	  la	  
Marina	  and	  the	  newspapers	  Popular	  and	  Información.	  (“Hitler’s	  Hand	  Is	  Seen	  As	  Jews	  Are	  Berated	  by	  Cuba	  Terrorists,”	  JTA,	  July	  1,	  1934.)	  23	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  7.,	  D.J.	  Apte	  to	  Morris	  Waldman,	  May	  20,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	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  to	  issue	  the	  illegal	  documents,	  as	  this	  furthered	  the	  goal	  of	  expelling	  the	  Jews	  from	  Germany.	  His	  assistant,	  Robert	  Hoffman,	  was	  regarded	  as	  the	  leading	  Gestapo	  agent	  in	  Cuba.	  During	  the	  St.	  Louis	  crisis,	  it	  was	  Hoffman	  who	  met	  with	  Otto	  Schiendick,	  and	  gave	  him	  several	  classified	  documents.	  Otto	  Schiendick was the	  Ortsgruppenleiter	  (Local	  Group	  Leader)	  on	  board	  the	  St.	  Louis.	  He	  had	  been	  posing	  as	  a	  steward	  and	  attempting	  to	  harass	  Jewish	  passengers	  throughout	  the	  trip.24	  
A	  second	  source	  of	  antisemitism,	  which	  increased	  as	  the	  flow	  of	  immigration	  mounted,	  came	  from	  Cuban	  merchants	  of	  Spanish	  origin.	  Primarily	  Franco	  and	  Falangist	  sympathizers,	  they	  feared	  Jewish	  competition	  in	  their	  retail	  businesses.	  These	  Spaniards	  were	  the	  force	  behind	  the	  anti-­‐immigration	  push,	  which	  was	  picked	  up	  by	  all	  the	  newspapers	  in	  Havana,	  including	  the	  Communist	  paper,	  Hoy	  (Today).25	  	  
By	  early	  1939,	  antisemitism	  had	  risen	  dramatically.	  Adolfo	  Kates	  turned	  to	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community	  for	  help,	  raising	  the	  alarm	  to	  David	  Bressler	  of	  the	  JDC	  in	  April	  1939:	  
[I	  am	  disturbed]…when	  I	  think	  of	  the	  fine	  and	  noble	  spirited	  resolutions	  that	  were	  made	  at	  Evian,	  of	  the	  principles	  set	  forth	  at	  Lima,	  Peru,	  of	  the	  promises	  and	  assurances	  made	  by	  Batista	  when	  he	  was	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  then	  compare	  these	  with	  the	  chaotic	  and	  alarming	  facts	  that	  Jews	  face	  in	  Cuba	  due	  to	  the	  constant	  and	  fierce	  Nazi	  propaganda	  that	  is	  poisoning	  public	  opinion	  and	  engendering	  hatred	  and	  bigotry	  in	  this	  peaceful	  country.	  At	  least	  for	  our	  people,	  I	  feel	  that	  I	  am	  duty	  bound	  to	  give	  you	  a	  report	  of	  the	  situation	  as	  it	  is	  today,	  which	  is	  unfortunately	  already	  quite	  difficult,	  and	  what	  future	  developments	  may	  yet	  befall	  the	  Jews	  who	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  For	  more	  on	  this,	  see	  Gordon	  Thomas,	  Voyage	  of	  the	  Damned	  (New	  York:	  Stein	  and	  Day,	  1974).	  25	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  7.	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  here	  and	  those	  who	  are	  yet	  to	  arrive	  and	  give	  you	  this	  report	  before	  it	  may	  be	  too	  late.26	  Solomon	  Maduro	  also	  told	  Bressler	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  antisemitism,	  but	  his	  report	  clearly	  shows	  the	  internal	  fractures	  along	  geographic,	  language	  and	  cultural	  lines	  within	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities.	  Maduro	  recognized	  that	  the	  fear	  of	  competition	  by	  industrious	  German	  immigrants	  had	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  problem	  posed	  by	  increasing	  Jewish	  immigration,	  but	  he	  felt	  that	  the	  Polish	  rather	  than	  the	  German	  Jews	  were	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  anti-­‐Jewish	  feelings:	  
The	  effective	  and	  ruthless	  radio	  and	  press	  campaign	  against	  the	  Jews,	  in	  which	  now	  practically	  every	  Cuban	  newspaper	  and	  broadcasting	  station	  participate	  [sic],	  has	  brought	  to	  light	  that	  the	  grudge	  is	  not	  so	  much	  against	  the	  German	  refugees,	  but	  that	  they	  are	  principally	  directed	  against	  the	  Polish	  Jews,	  numbering	  around	  12,000,27	  who,	  as	  a	  general	  rule,	  conduct	  their	  business	  activities	  on	  the	  most	  condemnable,	  unethical	  lines.	  There	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  matter	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  involved,	  for	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  German	  refugees	  would	  also	  start	  businesses	  and	  factories	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  those	  so	  far	  existing,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Poles	  are	  not	  very	  scrupulous	  in	  their	  business	  tactics	  would	  not	  have	  come	  so	  prominently	  to	  the	  fore.	  If	  you	  add	  to	  these	  developments	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  immigration	  problem	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  several	  parlamentary	  [sic]	  sessions,	  that	  a	  drastic	  law-­‐project	  has	  been	  presented,	  and	  that	  Col.	  Benitez,	  notwithstanding	  accusations	  and	  denouncements,	  continues	  issuing	  landing	  permits,	  you	  will	  have	  before	  you	  a	  striking	  picture	  of	  the	  precarious	  conditions	  which	  we	  are	  facing	  here.28	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Kates	  to	  Bressler,	  April	  15,	  1939.	  27	  The	  numbers	  are	  hard	  to	  determine,	  but	  this	  number	  seems	  to	  be	  exaggerated.	  Most	  sources	  agree	  that	  there	  were	  around	  12,000	  refugees	  in	  total	  who	  passed	  through	  Cuba,	  but	  only	  6,000	  who	  were	  stranded	  there	  once	  U.S.	  immigration	  tightened.	  28	  S.	  L.	  Maduro	  to	  David	  Bressler,	  May	  24,	  1939,	  1–2,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  
	   	   	   84	  In	  July	  1939,	  the	  Jewish	  Telegraphic	  Agency29	  (JTA)	  reported	  that	  “the	  authorities	  banned	  all	  Jewish	  radio	  hours	  on	  the	  pretext	  that	  the	  Government	  did	  not	  desire	  Yiddish	  spoken	  over	  the	  radio.”30	  However,	  the	  Communist	  newspaper,	  Hoy,	  immediately	  demanded	  that	  the	  prohibition	  “be	  cancelled	  as	  constituting	  race	  discrimination	  fostered	  by	  native	  and	  Spanish	  Fascists.”31	  
Due	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  antisemitic	  agitation,	  in	  May	  1939	  Maduro	  wrote	  to	  Joseph	  Chamberlain	  of	  the	  NCC	  asking	  him	  to	  warn	  the	  refugee	  agencies	  in	  Europe	  not	  to	  allow	  refugees	  to	  sail	  to	  Cuba,	  since	  the	  concern	  was	  growing	  daily	  among	  government	  officials	  that	  the	  refugees	  would	  become	  a	  public	  charge	  or	  take	  work	  away	  from	  Cubans	  In	  this,	  he	  was	  not	  acting	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  communities,	  but	  individually	  as	  an	  influential	  businessman.	  President	  Federico	  Laredo	  Brú32	  had	  told	  Maduro	  that	  he	  was	  considering	  exacting	  an	  additional	  financial	  guarantee	  from	  JDC	  or	  the	  NCC	  for	  each	  refugee	  entering	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  Jewish	  Telegraphic	  Agency,	  an	  international	  news	  agency	  serving	  Jewish	  media	  outlets,	  was	  founded	  in	  1914	  as	  the	  Jewish	  Correspondence	  Bureau	  in	  The	  Hague	  and	  reestablished	  in	  1917	  in	  London	  as	  the	  Jewish	  Telegraphic	  Agency.	  The	  headquarters	  moved	  to	  New	  York	  in	  1922.	  The	  agency	  continues	  to	  collect	  and	  disseminate	  news	  of	  interest	  to	  Jewish	  communities	  around	  the	  world.	  (Archives	  YIVO,	  Guide	  to	  the	  YIVO	  
Archives	  (M.E.	  Sharpe,	  1998),	  143.)	  30	  “Cuba	  Bans	  All	  Jewish	  Radio	  Programs,”	  JTA,	  July	  10,	  1939.	  31	  Ibid.	  32	  Federico	  Laredo	  Brú	  (1875-­‐1946),	  an	  attorney,	  was	  president	  of	  Cuba	  from	  1936	  to	  1940.	  He	  was	  originally	  vice-­‐president	  under	  Miguel	  Mariano	  Gómez,	  but	  the	  latter	  was	  impeached	  due	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  Batista,	  and	  Brú	  assumed	  the	  presidency.	  Under	  his	  leadership,	  the	  Cuban	  congress	  passed	  social	  welfare	  measures	  such	  as	  a	  minimum	  wage,	  pensions,	  limited	  working	  hours,	  and	  a	  measure	  protecting	  Cuban	  tenant	  farmers	  and	  guaranteeing	  them	  a	  share	  of	  the	  crops.	  He	  also	  issued	  a	  decree	  stipulating	  that	  all	  businesses	  should	  be	  led	  by	  Cuban	  nationals,	  thus	  preventing	  Jewish	  businessmen	  from	  beginning	  businesses.	  (Don	  Mabry,	  “Cuba	  1934-­‐52,”	  Historical	  Text	  	  Archive,	  accessed	  January	  24,	  2014,	  http://www.historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?action=read&artid=694.)	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  Cuba.	  Considering	  the	  numbers	  of	  refugees	  that	  were	  currently	  arriving,	  the	  payment	  of	  additional	  funds	  was	  not	  a	  real	  possibility.33	  
In	  May	  1939,	  Margolis	  and	  Goldsmith	  called	  a	  meeting	  of	  community	  representatives,	  presided	  over	  by	  Solomon	  Maduro,	  to	  discuss	  fundraising	  to	  counteract	  antisemitism.	  The	  meeting	  was	  held	  at	  the	  home	  of	  Andreyeff	  Poliakoff,	  a	  Dutch	  citizen	  who	  had	  been	  in	  Cuba	  for	  about	  seventeen	  years	  at	  this	  time	  and	  was	  a	  well-­‐established	  and	  respected	  businessman	  who	  had	  served	  on	  the	  NRC	  Advisory	  Committee	  and	  had	  been	  director	  of	  Shell	  Oil	  and	  Dutch	  Shell	  in	  Cuba.34	  The	  rising	  threat	  of	  antisemitism	  and	  the	  urge	  to	  self-­‐preservation	  finally	  compelled	  the	  Polish,	  Turkish,	  American	  and	  Portuguese-­‐Dutch	  Jews	  to	  meet	  under	  one	  roof	  as	  the	  Comité	  Central	  with	  the	  common	  goal	  of	  self-­‐protection.	  The	  group	  concluded	  that	  it	  would	  take	  $150,000	  to	  launch	  an	  effective	  radio	  and	  press	  campaign	  against	  antisemitism	  in	  Latin	  America,	  but	  those	  funds	  were	  beyond	  their	  available	  resources.35	  	  
As	  in	  other	  matters,	  there	  was	  no	  agreement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  on	  how	  to	  handle	  the	  crisis.	  Joseph	  Hyman	  wrote:	  
Aside	  from	  the	  devoted	  help	  of	  three	  or	  four	  men	  of	  prominence	  in	  Havana,	  JDC	  had	  no	  help	  whatsoever	  from	  the	  local	  leaders	  or	  from	  the	  great	  mass	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community	  of	  Havana.	  One	  group,	  the	  orthodox	  group,	  felt	  that	  it	  should	  be	  vested	  with	  the	  control	  of	  the	  situation.	  The	  reformed	  [sic]	  group	  objected.	  Organizational	  politics	  began	  to	  play	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Maduro	  to	  Bressler,	  May	  24,	  1939,	  2.	  34	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  Appendix	  I.	  35	  Ibid.,	  15.	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  part.	  Also,	  the	  situation	  was	  affected	  profoundly	  by	  elements	  of	  given	  politics	  and	  corruption.36	  In	  light	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  communities	  to	  put	  together	  a	  plausible	  solution,	  some	  of	  the	  prominent	  Jewish	  men	  stepped	  in	  personally.	  Kates,	  Maduro,	  Hartman	  and	  Poliakoff	  all	  attempted	  individually	  to	  use	  their	  personal	  funds	  and	  influence	  to	  lessen	  and	  refute	  the	  anti-­‐Jewish	  propaganda.37	  Kates,	  who	  did	  large	  amounts	  of	  newspaper	  advertising	  and	  had	  some	  influence	  with	  the	  papers,	  specifically	  arranged	  for	  the	  publication	  of	  articles	  in	  various	  news	  publications,	  and	  persuaded	  the	  editor	  of	  the	  newspaper	  El	  Mundo	  (The	  World),	  one	  of	  the	  conservative	  dailies,	  to	  speak	  out	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  antisemitic	  attacks	  in	  Alerte,	  Avance	  and	  Diario	  de	  la	  Marina.38	  Maduro,	  although	  he	  did	  not	  participate	  in	  countering	  antisemitism	  in	  general,	  did	  pay	  for	  and	  distribute	  a	  pamphlet	  to	  some	  of	  the	  leaders	  in	  Cuban	  society.39	  
In	  a	  letter	  to	  Bressler	  summarizing	  the	  situation,	  Adolfo	  Kates	  expressed	  his	  belief	  that	  some	  of	  the	  rise	  in	  antisemitism	  was	  due	  to	  the	  way	  the	  increased	  immigration	  of	  Jews	  to	  Cuba	  had	  been	  handled	  by	  the	  JRC	  before	  Margolis	  arrived.40	  He	  felt	  that	  due	  to	  the	  disorganized	  way	  in	  which	  relief	  had	  been	  doled	  out,	  many	  immigrants	  had	  spread	  the	  word	  back	  home	  among	  their	  friends	  and	  relatives	  that	  it	  was	  not	  only	  easy	  to	  get	  into	  Cuba,	  but	  that	  once	  there,	  the	  JRC	  would	  “take	  care	  of	  them.”41	  The	  result	  was	  that	  every	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Hyman	  to	  Leipziger,	  October	  1,	  1940,	  3.	  37	  Kates	  to	  Bressler,	  April	  15,	  1939,	  2.	  38	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  14.	  39	  Ibid.,	  15.	  40	  Kates	  to	  Bressler,	  April	  15,	  1939,	  1.	  41	  Ibid.,	  2.	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  boat	  that	  arrived	  from	  Europe	  brought	  constantly	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  refugees	  into	  Cuba—both	  legally	  and	  illegally—which	  caused	  public	  opinion	  to	  rise	  up	  against	  them.	  Nazi-­‐initiated	  antisemitic	  propaganda	  then	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  used	  the	  airwaves	  and	  newspapers	  to	  make	  all	  sorts	  of	  accusations	  against	  the	  Jewish	  immigrants.	  They	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  illegal	  immigration,	  and	  portrayed	  the	  Jewish	  immigrants	  as	  being	  a	  threat	  to	  local	  commerce	  and	  Cuban	  labor.42	  
The	  local	  Jewish	  communities,	  however,	  were	  not	  able	  to	  come	  together,	  even	  under	  an	  increasing	  threat	  to	  their	  own	  wellbeing	  and	  therefore	  were	  unable	  to	  take	  effective	  action	  against	  the	  rising	  antisemitic	  sentiment.	  Their	  efforts	  proved	  fruitless	  as	  personal	  agendas	  and	  religious,	  ethnic	  and	  social	  differences	  interfered	  with	  their	  ability	  to	  develop	  and	  implement	  a	  unified	  strategy	  for	  self-­‐defense.	  
The	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  
One	  of	  the	  best-­‐known	  and	  most	  significant	  incidents	  of	  the	  World	  War	  II	  era	  occurred	  during	  Laura	  Margolis’	  time	  in	  Cuba.	  The	  M.S.	  St.	  Louis	  affair	  served	  to	  underscore	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  to	  function	  together.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  highlighted	  the	  crucial	  role	  played	  by	  representatives	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  this	  pivotal	  international	  incident.	  	  
❋ Arthur	  Morse,	  a	  journalist,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  focus	  attention	  on	  the	  voyage	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis,	  portraying	  the	  United	  States’	  reaction	  as	  coldhearted	  in	  turning	  away	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ibid.,	  2–3.	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  Jewish	  refugees.43	  David	  Wyman	  in	  Paper	  Walls	  covers	  American	  refugee	  policy	  during	  the	  period,	  but	  only	  devotes	  one	  or	  two	  paragraphs	  to	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident.44	  Henry	  Feingold,	  in	  his	  treatment	  of	  refugee	  policy	  in	  the	  Roosevelt	  administration,	  omits	  any	  mention	  of	  JDC’s	  key	  involvement.45	  The	  popular	  treatment	  by	  Thomas	  and	  Morgan-­‐Witts,	  
The	  Voyage	  of	  the	  Damned,	  offers	  a	  mix	  of	  historical	  accuracy	  and	  fiction	  without	  adding	  to	  the	  scholarship.	  Irwin	  Gellman	  does	  provide	  an	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  the	  incident,	  portraying	  negotiator	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  as	  a	  naïve	  American	  who	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  the	  Cuban	  politics	  that	  precipitated	  the	  crisis.46	  C.	  Paul	  Vincent	  agrees	  that	  it	  was	  Berenson’s	  naïve	  optimism,	  believing	  the	  assurances	  of	  the	  Cubans	  that	  the	  matter	  would	  turn	  out	  well,	  that	  handicapped	  him	  and	  prevented	  him	  from	  raising	  a	  sufficient	  alarm	  to	  JDC	  and	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department.	  Had	  he	  done	  so,	  Vincent	  argues,	  the	  U.S.	  authorities	  might	  have	  chosen	  to	  intervene	  more	  aggressively	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers.47	  
Levinson,	  in	  his	  history	  of	  the	  Jews	  of	  Cuba,	  interprets	  the	  entire	  incident	  as	  a	  propaganda	  ploy	  by	  Germany	  to	  hide	  its	  atrocities	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  “Germany	  was	  not	  the	  only	  country	  that	  did	  not	  want	  Jews.”	  He	  notes	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  St.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Arthur	  Morse,	  While	  Six	  Million	  Died:	  A	  Chronicle	  of	  American	  Apathy	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1968).	  44	  Wyman,	  Paper	  Walls:	  America	  and	  the	  Refugee	  Crisis,	  1938-­‐1941.	  45	  Feingold,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Rescue:	  The	  Roosevelt	  Administration	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  
1938-­‐1945.	  46	  Irwin	  F.	  Gellman,	  “The	  St.	  Louis	  Tragedy,”	  American	  Jewish	  Historical	  Quarterly	  60	  (1971):	  144–56.	  47	  C.	  Paul	  (Charles	  Paul)	  Vincent,	  “The	  Voyage	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Revisited,”	  Holocaust	  
and	  Genocide	  Studies	  25,	  no.	  2	  (2011):	  265.	  
	   	   	   89	  Louis	  sailed	  with	  great	  fanfare	  with	  an	  unprecedented	  number	  of	  Jews,	  Nazi	  agents	  were	  stirring	  up	  antisemitic	  sentiments	  in	  Cuba	  in	  anticipation	  of	  the	  ship’s	  arrival.48	  
The	  M.S.	  St.	  Louis,49	  a	  ship	  of	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line,	  sailed	  from	  Hamburg	  to	  Havana	  on	  May	  13,	  1939	  with	  937	  refugees	  aboard	  and	  was	  denied	  admission	  to	  Cuba,	  and	  although	  the	  passengers	  held	  valid	  U.S.	  visas	  (albeit	  with	  quota	  numbers	  that	  had	  not	  yet	  come	  up),	  neither	  the	  U.S.	  nor	  any	  other	  ports	  in	  the	  Americas	  would	  allow	  the	  passengers	  to	  disembark.50	  The	  St.	  Louis	  was	  forced	  to	  sail	  back	  to	  Europe51	  and	  became	  a	  public	  relations	  boon	  to	  the	  Nazis.	  
Although	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  this	  debacle	  were	  many	  and	  complex,	  the	  problem	  was	  brought	  to	  a	  head	  due	  to	  political	  machinations	  in	  the	  Cuban	  government	  regarding	  immigration.	  The	  requirement	  for	  admission	  to	  Cuba	  had	  been	  the	  posting	  of	  a	  $500	  cash	  bond	  with	  the	  Cuban	  authorities	  as	  a	  guarantee	  against	  becoming	  a	  public	  charge	  or	  violating	  labor	  laws.52	  The	  bond	  was	  to	  be	  returned	  when	  the	  refugee	  left	  Cuba.	  However,	  for	  some	  time,	  special	  “landing	  permits”	  had	  been	  sold	  by	  the	  Director	  of	  Immigration,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Levinson,	  Jewish	  Community	  of	  Cuba,	  115–135.	  49	  The	  St.	  Louis	  is	  often	  wrongly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  S.S.	  (Steam	  Ship)	  St.	  Louis.	  It	  was	  actually	  a	  diesel-­‐powered	  ship,	  thus	  the	  proper	  reference	  is	  M.S.	  (Motor	  Ship)	  St.	  Louis.	  50	  This	  study	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  JDC	  in	  Cuba	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  nations	  has	  been	  well	  researched	  and	  lies	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  51	  Joseph	  Hyman,	  Hyman	  Report,	  June	  15,	  1939,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  52	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Joseph	  Chamberlain	  and	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  January	  14,	  1939,	  1,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  
	   	   	   90	  Manuel	  Benitez,	  through	  steamship	  agencies,	  travel	  agencies,	  lawyers,	  and	  directly	  through	  his	  Cuban	  Immigration	  Department,	  for	  a	  fee	  of	  $150	  and	  up.	  	  
It	  is	  believed	  that	  from	  2,500	  to	  5,000	  persons	  in	  Europe,	  particularly	  in	  Germany,	  had	  purchased	  these	  so-­‐called	  “Benitez	  landing	  permits.”53	  Other	  figures	  quote	  as	  many	  as	  23,000	  permits	  having	  been	  sold,	  often	  in	  batches	  with	  no	  names	  on	  them,54	  bought	  up	  by	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line	  and	  others	  and	  sold	  to	  people	  abroad.	  This	  was	  exactly	  what	  the	  civil	  side	  of	  the	  government	  was	  trying	  to	  stop.	  	  
The	  motivation	  and	  morality	  of	  Benitez	  in	  issuing	  false	  immigration	  certificates	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper,	  but	  the	  benefits	  incurred	  by	  both	  Benitez	  as	  well	  as	  by	  those	  Jews	  who	  through	  the	  permits	  were	  able	  to	  escape	  the	  Nazi	  Holocaust	  are	  indisputable.	  Coert	  Du	  Bois,	  the	  American	  Consul	  General,	  estimated	  Benitez’	  fortune	  at	  between	  U.S.	  $500,000	  and	  $1,000,000,	  a	  huge	  sum	  in	  the	  depressed	  Cuban	  economy.55	  President	  Laredo	  Brú	  claimed	  a	  similar	  range	  (from	  $300,000	  to	  $1,000,000)	  when	  speaking	  to	  Lawrence	  Berenson.56	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  “The	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Inc.,	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Executive	  Committee,”	  June	  5,	  1939,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.,	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  and	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  
the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  Confidential),	  June	  15,	  1939,	  3,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  54	  This	  was	  the	  figure	  quoted	  by	  President	  Laredo	  Brú	  to	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  in	  
Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  Confidential),	  3.	  55	  Coert	  Du	  Bois,	  “Jewish	  Refugee	  Situation	  in	  Habana,”	  June	  7,	  1939,	  RG-­‐59,	  837.55/39,	  National	  Archives	  and	  Records	  Administration	  (NARA).	  56	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  3.	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  Internal	  divisions	  arose	  within	  the	  Cuban	  government	  ostensibly	  regarding	  these	  landing	  permits,	  but	  in	  reality	  reflecting	  much	  deeper	  fissures.	  A	  struggle	  had	  been	  going	  on	  for	  some	  time	  in	  the	  government	  between	  the	  so-­‐called	  military	  group	  (represented	  by	  Batista,	  Benitez	  and	  the	  military)	  and	  the	  civil	  group	  (currently	  represented	  by	  President	  Brú	  and	  his	  party).	  Bribery	  was	  a	  way	  of	  life	  in	  Cuba,	  and	  the	  feeling	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  leaders	  was	  that	  some	  of	  the	  money	  gathered	  by	  Benitez’	  landing	  certificates	  was	  not	  being	  divided	  equitably	  among	  those	  who	  held	  official	  office,57	  and	  the	  civil	  group	  were	  annoyed	  because	  they	  were	  not	  getting	  their	  share	  of	  the	  spoils.58	  The	  refugees,	  caught	  in	  the	  middle,	  as	  Joseph	  Hyman	  said	  in	  retrospect,	  “became	  a	  public	  football	  exaggerated	  and	  distorted	  beyond	  any	  reasonable	  appearance.”59	  
The	  JDC	  officers	  in	  New	  York	  City	  were	  aware	  of	  this	  sensitive	  political	  situation	  and	  debated	  whether	  they	  should	  go	  to	  Havana	  and	  intercede.	  They	  decided	  it	  was	  better	  not	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  the	  dispute	  between	  the	  military	  and	  the	  civil	  groups.	  They	  were	  concerned	  that,	  should	  they	  intervene,	  there	  was	  a	  chance	  that	  they	  might	  find	  themselves	  on	  the	  losing	  side.	  They	  agreed	  to	  let	  things	  continue	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  Cuban	  Jews	  would	  find	  their	  own	  solution.60	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Ibid.;	  see	  also	  Ibid.,	  7.	  58	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  4.	  59	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Joseph	  P.	  Loeb,	  July	  19,	  1939,	  2,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  60	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  3–4.	  
	   	   	   92	  As	  late	  as	  April	  24,	  1939,	  in	  response	  to	  requests	  for	  information	  on	  the	  status	  of	  immigration	  in	  Cuba,	  JDC	  in	  New	  York	  sent	  out	  a	  memorandum	  regarding	  the	  possibilities	  of	  temporary	  asylum	  in	  Cuba	  for	  people	  who	  were	  waiting	  their	  turn	  on	  the	  American	  immigration	  quota.	  They	  mentioned	  the	  visas	  available	  through	  a	  $500	  cash	  bond	  plus	  a	  proper	  landing	  permit	  that	  were	  necessary	  for	  “the	  permanent	  immigration	  to	  that	  country.”	  However,	  they	  noted	  that	  such	  landing	  permits	  were	  generally	  not	  available	  at	  that	  time.61	  
They	  did,	  though,	  tell	  prospective	  immigrants	  from	  Germany	  and	  elsewhere	  that	  “temporary	  visas”	  were	  available	  by	  securing	  landing	  permits	  from	  the	  Commissioner	  of	  Immigration	  (i.e.	  Benitez):	  
The	  American	  relatives	  may	  individually	  be	  able	  to	  make	  such	  arrangements	  with	  one	  of	  the	  steamship	  companies	  or	  travel	  agencies.	  We	  understand	  that	  the	  charges	  vary	  anywheres	  [sic]	  from	  $160.00	  to	  $300.00	  per	  person.	  While	  we,	  of	  course,	  have	  no	  control	  over	  individual	  arrangements	  made,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  point	  out	  that	  when	  such	  relatives	  make	  arrangements,	  they	  should	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  they	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  maintenance	  and	  care	  of	  the	  relatives	  during	  their	  stay	  in	  Cuba	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  approximately	  $50.00	  per	  month	  per	  person.62	  They	  ended	  the	  memo,	  though,	  with	  an	  ominous	  statement:	  
Whether	  this	  temporary	  permit	  may	  be	  extended	  indefinitely	  or	  whether	  the	  Cuban	  officials	  may	  later	  require	  a	  deposit	  of	  a	  bond	  or	  even	  the	  departure	  of	  the	  immigrant	  are	  all	  matters	  about	  which	  are	  Committee	  is	  unable	  to	  give	  any	  assurances	  at	  this	  time.63	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  “Memorandum	  on	  Cuba,”	  April	  24,	  1939,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  62	  Ibid.	  63	  Ibid.	  
	   	   	   93	  The	  following	  day,	  April	  25,	  1939,	  was	  when	  Laura	  Margolis	  and	  Milton	  Goldsmith	  sounded	  the	  first	  alarm.	  They	  wrote	  to	  JDC	  headquarters	  telling	  them	  that	  the	  situation	  had	  become	  so	  bad	  that	  “the	  entire	  press	  of	  Havana	  was	  attacking	  the	  Jews	  and	  the	  refugees.”64	  They	  heard	  word	  that	  pogroms	  were	  planned,	  and	  that	  Havana	  was	  being	  canvassed	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Fascist	  group,	  trying	  to	  find	  out	  each	  house	  lodging	  Jews.65	  Margolis	  requested	  that	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  be	  sent	  down	  immediately	  to	  “…take	  care	  of	  the	  immigration	  situation	  here	  which	  is	  becoming	  quite	  explosive,	  due	  to	  various	  campaigns	  underway.”66	  
The	  JDC	  in	  New	  York	  immediately	  brought	  Margolis’	  warning	  to	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department,	  who	  advised	  them	  that	  this	  particular	  story	  was	  exaggerated.	  While	  the	  State	  Department	  knew	  the	  newspapers	  were	  full	  of	  anti-­‐Jewish	  sentiment,	  they	  did	  not	  believe	  there	  was	  any	  reason	  to	  fear	  a	  widespread	  attack.	  Heeding	  their	  word	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  their	  own	  representatives	  in	  Cuba,	  they	  did	  not	  act	  on	  Margolis’	  warning.	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  corruption	  that	  existed	  in	  the	  Immigration	  Department	  soon	  became	  a	  major	  story	  and	  Cuban	  newspapers	  began	  attacking	  Benitez	  and	  his	  immigration	  racket.67	  The	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Cuban	  House	  of	  Representatives’	  immigration	  committee,	  Congressman	  Pedro	  Mendieta,	  met	  with	  Cuban	  president	  Laredo	  Brú	  and	  asked	  him	  for	  a	  presidential	  decree	  completely	  banning	  the	  immigration	  of	  Jews	  from	  Europe	  and	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  2.	  65	  Ibid.	  66	  Goldsmith	  to	  Hyman,	  April	  25,	  1939,	  3.	  67	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  4.	  
	   	   	   94	  invalidate	  the	  permits	  that	  had	  been	  issued	  to	  facilitate	  that	  immigration,	  including	  those	  of	  the	  nearly	  1,000	  German	  Jews	  scheduled	  to	  arrive	  on	  the	  M.S.	  St.	  Louis.	  He	  also	  demanded	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  status	  of	  all	  political	  refugees,	  i.e.,	  Jews	  currently	  living	  in	  Cuba	  under	  these	  permits.68	  Support	  for	  this	  anti-­‐Jewish	  immigration	  push	  came	  from	  the	  liberal	  Havana	  newspaper,	  El	  Pueblo.69	  
On	  May	  5,	  1939,	  to	  put	  a	  halt	  to	  Benitez’	  scheme,	  the	  Cuban	  government	  issued	  a	  new	  decree	  stating	  that	  only	  persons	  who	  had	  deposited	  the	  required	  $500	  bonds	  and	  held	  visas	  approved	  by	  three	  heads	  of	  the	  (civil)	  Cabinet—the	  Cuban	  Secretaries	  of	  State,	  Labor	  and	  Treasury,	  would	  be	  admitted	  into	  Cuba.	  Others	  would	  be	  denied	  entrance;	  in	  other	  words,	  Benitez’	  landing	  certificates	  would	  now	  be	  void.70	  	  
The	  Cuban	  Official	  Gazette	  published	  the	  new	  decree,	  numbered	  937,	  which	  modified	  Decree	  55	  of	  January	  13,	  1939	  (published	  in	  the	  Gazette	  of	  January	  16).	  Decree	  937	  regulated	  immigration	  requirements	  and	  the	  restrictions	  governing	  entry	  of	  foreigners	  other	  than	  Americans.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  important	  changes	  was	  indicated	  in	  the	  following	  paragraphs:	  
Article	  I	  of	  Decree	  55	  provided	  that:	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  “Refugee	  Ship	  Leaves	  Havana,	  Destination	  Indefinite;	  Brú	  Reported	  Seeing	  Berenson,”	  JTA,	  June	  2,	  1939.	  See	  also	  The	  American	  Jewish	  Committee,	  American	  Jewish	  
Yearbook	  1939-­‐1940,	  356.	  69	  “Thousand	  Foreigners	  Will	  Arrive	  on	  the	  San	  Louis;	  Immediate	  Displacement	  of	  Our	  Workers,”	  El	  Pueblo,	  May	  4,	  1938,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  70	  “The	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Inc.,	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Executive	  Committee,”	  June	  5,	  1939.	  For	  more	  on	  this	  decree,	  see	  page	  43.	  
	   	   	   95	  All	  persons	  who	  might	  become	  a	  public	  charge	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  based	  on	  reports	  to	  be	  obtained	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Labor,	  are	  excluded	  from	  admission	  into	  Cuba.71	  Article	  II	  of	  Decree	  55	  stated:	  	  
Foreigners	  not	  included	  in	  the	  prohibition	  established	  by	  the	  preceding	  Article	  and	  in	  any	  other	  article,	  may	  be	  authorized	  to	  disembark	  in	  the	  National	  territory	  provided	  they	  furnish	  a	  bond	  of	  $500.72	  The	  new	  decree	  937	  modified	  Article	  II	  by	  adding	  a	  further	  paragraph:	  
Such	  authorization	  is	  to	  be	  granted,	  personally,	  when	  they	  deem	  convenient,	  by	  the	  Secretaries	  of	  State	  and	  Labor,	  and	  communicated	  directly	  and	  by	  writing,	  by	  said	  officers	  to	  the	  transportation	  companies,	  prior	  to	  the	  embarkation	  of	  the	  authorized	  person	  in	  the	  port	  of	  origin.73	  Article	  IV	  of	  Decree	  55	  stated	  in	  part	  as	  follows:	  
There	  are	  excepted	  from	  the	  obligation	  of	  establishing	  the	  deposit	  to	  which	  Article	  Second	  of	  the	  present	  Decree	  refers:	  (a)	  Tourists,	  or	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  such	  persons	  as	  travel	  for	  pleasure	  and	  do	  not	  dedicate	  themselves	  to	  any	  work	  during	  their	  stay	  in	  the	  National	  territory.74	  The	  new	  Decree	  937	  revised	  subparagraph	  (a)	  to	  read:	  
Only	  tourists	  who	  are	  American	  citizens,	  or	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  such	  persons	  of	  that	  nationality	  as	  travel	  for	  pleasure	  and	  do	  not	  dedicate	  themselves	  to	  any	  work	  during	  their	  stay	  in	  the	  National	  territory.	  Tourists	  of	  other	  nationality	  will	  need	  to	  obtain	  the	  authorization	  to	  which	  paragraph	  Second	  of	  Article	  II	  refers,	  without	  necessity	  of	  furnishing	  any	  bond.75	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  “Presidential	  Decree	  937”	  (Cuban	  Official	  Gazette,	  May	  5,	  1939),	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  72	  Ibid.	  73	  Ibid.	  	  Although	  this	  paragraph	  only	  mentions	  the	  secretaries	  of	  State	  and	  Labor,	  the	  secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury	  was	  responsible	  to	  determine	  that	  the	  immigrant	  would	  not	  become	  a	  public	  charge	  (see	  Decree	  55,	  above).	  74	  Ibid.	  75	  Ibid.	  
	   	   	   96	  The	  visas	  stipulated	  in	  this	  new	  presidential	  decree	  were	  to	  be	  valid	  only	  for	  six	  months.	  If	  the	  immigrants	  remained	  more	  than	  six	  months,	  they	  would	  need	  $5,000	  per	  person	  to	  be	  deposited	  in	  a	  Cuban	  bank	  as	  a	  guarantee.76	  	  
Essentially,	  Decree	  937	  drew	  a	  distinction	  between	  immigrants	  and	  tourists,	  and	  invalidated	  any	  previous	  permits	  granted	  to	  non-­‐U.S.	  “tourists”	  to	  enter	  Cuba.	  The	  requirement	  that	  three	  Secretaries	  approve	  all	  visas	  also	  served	  to	  split	  the	  graft	  more	  evenly.	  In	  the	  opinion	  of	  David	  Bressler,	  “To	  us	  it	  appears	  that	  instead	  of	  removing	  ‘sole	  responsibility	  from	  one	  individual’	  it	  may	  be	  a	  case	  of	  cutting	  the	  pie	  several	  ways.”77	  
The	  information	  contained	  in	  the	  new	  decree	  was	  immediately	  made	  public	  and	  was	  officially	  given	  to	  the	  European	  shipping	  lines,	  including	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika.	  	  
When	  JDC	  international	  leadership	  became	  aware	  of	  this	  in	  early	  May,	  they	  immediately	  cabled	  their	  Paris	  office	  to	  notify	  all	  refugee	  committees	  in	  Europe—the	  
Hilfsverein	  and	  the	  Reichsvereinigung	  der	  Juden	  in	  Deutschland	  (Reich’s	  Association	  of	  the	  Jews	  in	  Germany),	  the	  Israelitische	  Kultusgemeinde	  Wien	  (Vienna	  Israelite	  community),	  and	  all	  organizations	  dealing	  with	  emigration	  and	  immigration	  matters78—that	  passengers	  who	  traveled	  to	  Cuba	  without	  observing	  the	  new	  regulations	  were	  taking	  a	  dangerous	  chance	  and	  should	  be	  dissuaded	  and	  prevented	  from	  embarking	  on	  this	  trip.79	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  This	  amount	  was	  reduced	  to	  $2,500	  by	  the	  time	  the	  law	  was	  passed.	  77	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  January	  19,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  78	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  2.	  79	  “The	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Inc.,	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Executive	  Committee,”	  June	  5,	  1939.	  
	   	   	   97	  However,	  Benitez,	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  permits,	  continued	  to	  assure	  Jewish	  refugees	  through	  his	  agents	  in	  Europe	  that	  his	  certificates	  would	  be	  honored.	  He	  stated	  that	  “as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  ink	  and	  paper”	  he	  would	  continue	  to	  issue	  landing	  permits.80	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  sowed	  rumors	  that	  refugees	  should	  not	  post	  the	  $500	  bonds	  because	  they	  would	  never	  be	  returned.	  When	  previous	  ships	  had	  landed	  in	  Havana,	  Benitez	  himself	  had	  personally	  arranged	  for	  the	  landing	  of	  the	  passengers	  who	  possessed	  his	  landing	  permits.	  Now,	  although	  the	  president	  had	  declared	  these	  permits	  invalid,	  Benitez	  emphatically	  assured	  everyone	  involved	  that	  the	  immigrants	  holding	  them	  would	  be	  allowed	  into	  Cuba.81	  
	  Even	  before	  the	  St.	  Louis	  sailed	  from	  Hamburg,	  the	  would-­‐be	  immigrants	  had	  attracted	  negative	  publicity	  from	  Cuban	  newspapers.	  The	  newspaper	  El	  Pueblo	  carried	  a	  front	  page	  headline:	  
Thousand	  foreigners	  will	  arrive	  on	  the	  San	  Louis;	  immediate	  displacement	  our	  workers.	  Government	  efforts	  to	  alleviate	  unemployment	  will	  be	  frustrated	  if	  the	  immigration	  continues.	  Great	  problem	  for	  the	  government	  and	  the	  nation.82	  The	  article	  went	  on	  to	  talk	  about	  “strangers	  whose	  desire	  is	  only	  to	  enrich	  themselves	  to	  make	  a	  fortune	  and	  then	  to	  take	  their	  money	  with	  them.”83	  It	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  unemployment	  at	  that	  time	  in	  Cuba	  was	  high.	  Cuban	  families	  were	  migrating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  to	  Milton	  Goldsmith,	  “Phone	  Call,”	  May	  9,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  81	  Ibid.	  82	  “Thousand	  Foreigners	  Will	  Arrive	  on	  the	  San	  Louis;	  Immediate	  Displacement	  of	  Our	  Workers.”	  83	  Ibid.	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  to	  Venezuela,	  Peru,	  and	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries	  in	  search	  of	  employment.	  With	  sugar	  prices	  low	  and	  rumors	  that	  the	  U.S.	  Senate	  was	  going	  to	  further	  reduce	  the	  Cuban	  sugar	  quota,	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  the	  German	  refugees	  in	  Cuba—even	  if	  they	  did	  not	  work	  or	  try	  to	  be	  employed—was	  perceived	  as	  a	  problem.	  As	  had	  occurred	  in	  many	  other	  times	  and	  places,	  the	  Jews	  were	  being	  made	  scapegoats	  of	  an	  economic	  crisis.84	  
Public	  opinion	  was	  stirred	  up	  and	  on	  May	  8,	  five	  days	  before	  the	  St.	  Louis	  sailed,	  a	  rally	  sponsored	  by	  Grau	  San	  Martín,	  the	  former	  Cuban	  president,	  was	  held.	  This	  was	  the	  largest	  antisemitic	  demonstration	  in	  Cuban	  history,	  drawing	  a	  crowd	  of	  40,000,	  with	  thousands	  more	  listening	  over	  the	  radio.85	  Primitivo	  Rodriguez,	  executive	  member	  of	  the	  Fascist	  Party,	  incited	  the	  people	  “to	  fight	  the	  Jews	  until	  the	  last	  one	  is	  driven	  out	  of	  the	  country.”86	  
On	  May	  8,	  the	  high	  commissioner	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations’	  Commission	  for	  Refugees	  advised	  the	  authorities	  of	  Germany	  of	  the	  change	  in	  the	  law,	  and	  warned	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line	  in	  a	  cable:	  
I	  AM	  INFORMED	  BY	  HICEM87	  PARIS	  THAT	  IT	  IS	  CONTEMPLATED	  TO	  SEND	  900	  REFUGEES	  TO	  CUBA	  BY	  YOUR	  STEAMER	  SAINT	  LOUIS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Maduro	  to	  Bressler,	  March	  28,	  1939,	  1.	  85	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  Voyage	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  1999).	  86	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1939-­‐40,	  355.	  87	  HICEM	  had	  been	  organized	  in	  Paris	  in	  1926	  to	  more	  efficiently	  help	  European	  Jews	  emigrate	  by	  unifying	  the	  work	  of	  three	  Jewish	  emigration	  organizations:	  HIAS	  in	  New	  York,	  the	  Jewish	  Colonization	  Association	  (JCA	  or	  ICA)	  in	  London,	  and	  the	  United	  Jewish	  Emigration	  Committee	  (EmigDirect)	  in	  Germany.	  The	  name	  HICEM	  is	  an	  acronym	  for	  HIAS,	  ICA	  and	  EmigDirect.	  	  The	  organization	  was	  largely	  funded	  by	  the	  JDC	  and	  most	  of	  its	  personnel	  were	  supplied	  by	  HIAS.	  EmigDirect	  withdrew	  in	  1934	  in	  a	  dispute	  over	  funds.	  After	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  HICEM	  organization	  was	  replaced	  by	  HIAS	  internationally.	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  SAILING	  ON	  MAY	  THIRTEENTH	  stop	  I	  UNDERSTAND	  THAT	  GREAT	  DIFFICULTIES	  ARE	  LIKELY	  TO	  ARISE	  IN	  REGARD	  TO	  THEIR	  ENTRY	  INTO	  CUBA	  AND	  I	  STRONGLY	  ADVISE	  THAT	  THE	  REFUGEES	  SHOULD	  NOT	  BE	  SENT	  THERE	  	  HIGH	  COMMISSIONER	  FOR	  REFUGEES	  REFUCOM88	  On	  May	  9,	  Maduro	  and	  attorney	  Salo	  Bustamante	  met	  with	  President	  Brú,	  who	  asked	  them	  for	  a	  written	  guarantee	  from	  the	  JRC	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  none	  of	  the	  refugees	  then	  
en	  route	  from	  Europe	  to	  Cuba	  would	  become	  public	  charges,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  not	  work	  or	  displace	  Cubans	  in	  business.	  Brú	  then	  asked	  whether	  the	  previous	  similar	  guarantee	  that	  Berenson	  had	  given	  Batista	  could	  be	  made	  in	  writing	  to	  him	  for	  the	  people	  now	  on	  the	  steamers	  headed	  for	  Cuba.89	  Maduro	  and	  Bustamante	  could	  not	  agree	  to	  this	  on	  their	  own	  authority.	  Because	  President	  Brú	  himself	  brought	  up	  Berenson’s	  name,	  both	  men	  felt	  Berenson	  should	  come	  in	  person	  to	  Cuba	  immediately	  to	  hold	  negotiations	  with	  the	  president.90	  
On	  May	  10,	  JDC	  headquarters	  cabled	  Morris	  Troper,91	  JDC’s	  European	  director	  in	  Paris,	  warning	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (“Solution	  to	  Jewish	  Emigration	  Problem	  Is	  Sought	  by	  Hicem,”	  JTA,	  April	  27,	  1927;	  “Hicem	  Unit	  Quit	  over	  Funds	  Tiff,”	  JTA,	  December	  18,	  1934.)	  88	  Lord	  Duncanan	  to	  The	  President,	  HIAS	  Emigration	  Association,	  “Cable,”	  8	  1939,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  89	  Razovsky	  to	  Goldsmith,	  “Phone	  Call.”	  The	  previous	  guarantee	  had	  covered	  only	  those	  people	  who	  had	  been	  vetted	  and	  sponsored	  by	  the	  NCC—the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers	  were	  people	  who	  had	  come	  on	  their	  own.	  90	  Ibid.	  91	  Morris	  C.	  Troper	  (1892-­‐1970),	  an	  attorney	  and	  certified	  public	  accountant,	  was	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  JDC	  European	  executive	  from	  1920	  to	  1942	  and	  spearheaded	  the	  search	  for	  havens	  for	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers.	  In	  1942	  Troper	  joined	  the	  U.S.	  Army	  as	  a	  colonel	  in	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Fiscal	  Director	  and	  Chief	  of	  Finance,	  and	  attained	  the	  rank	  of	  Brigadier	  General	  in	  the	  Finance	  Reserve	  Corps.	  Troper	  received	  the	  French	  Legion	  of	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  ACCORDING	  TO	  NEW	  REGULATIONS	  WHICH	  ARE	  REPORTED	  AS	  BEING	  PROMULGATED	  BY	  CUBAN	  PRESIDENT	  ADMISSION	  WILL	  BE	  REFUSED	  TO	  REFUGEES	  NOW	  HOLDING	  TEMPORARY	  LANDING	  PERMITS	  stop	  WE	  ARE	  NEGOTIATING	  WITH	  REPRESENTATIVES	  IN	  CUBA	  SECURE	  ADMISSION	  EMIGRES	  [sic]	  ALREADY	  ON	  HIGH	  SEAS	  DESTINED	  CUBA	  stop	  CANNOT	  YET	  TELL	  WHETHER	  AND	  ON	  WHAT	  BASIS	  THIS	  CAN	  BE	  ASSURED	  stop	  SUGGEST	  YOU	  ADVISE	  ALL	  EUROPEAN	  COMMITTEES	  NOTIFY	  REFUGEES	  NOT	  TO	  SAIL	  UNTIL	  FURTHER	  ADVICES	  stop	  NEW	  LAW	  WILL	  REQUIRE	  FIVE	  HUNDRED	  DOLLARS	  CASH	  BOND	  WITH	  VISA	  APPROVED	  IN	  ADVANCE	  BY	  SECRETARIES	  DEPARTMENTS	  LABOR	  TREASURY	  AND	  STAY	  VALID	  FOR	  SIX	  MONTHS	  stop	  PERSONS	  REMAINING	  LONGER	  THAN	  SIX	  MONTHS	  WILL	  BE	  REQUIRED	  TO	  DEPOSIT	  FIVE	  THOUSAND	  DOLLARS	  PER	  PERSON.92	  On	  Saturday,	  May	  13,	  1939	  at	  8:00	  p.m.,	  HAPAG	  allowed	  the	  M.S.	  St.	  Louis	  to	  set	  sail	  from	  Hamburg	  with	  937	  passengers	  aboard.93	  The	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line	  had	  been	  notified	  of	  the	  change	  in	  the	  immigration	  law.	  However,	  since	  Cuba	  was	  one	  of	  the	  last	  ports	  open	  to	  Jewish	  immigration,	  its	  closing	  would	  have	  resulted	  in	  a	  significant	  decline	  in	  business	  for	  the	  shipping	  line;	  thus,	  it	  was	  in	  their	  best	  financial	  interest	  to	  ignore	  the	  decree	  as	  long	  as	  possible.	  In	  addition,	  the	  shipping	  line	  had	  the	  assurance	  from	  Benitez	  that	  the	  refugees	  would	  be	  able	  to	  land.94	  Alternately,	  Levinson	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line,	  complicit	  in	  the	  Nazi	  propaganda	  plot	  to	  show	  the	  world	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Honor	  for	  his	  role	  in	  aiding	  Jews	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  Legion	  of	  Merit	  for	  his	  war	  service.	  (“Brig.	  Gen.	  Morris	  C.	  Troper	  Dies;	  Active	  in	  Refugee	  Work	  Since	  1920,”	  JTA,	  November	  19,	  1962;	  “Morris	  C.	  Troper,	  Accountant,	  Dies,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  November	  18,	  1962.)	  92	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  to	  Morris	  Troper,	  “Cable,”	  May	  10,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  93	  On	  the	  ship	  were	  400	  women,	  301	  men,	  and	  236	  children.	  Of	  the	  937	  passengers,	  28	  held	  valid	  visas	  and	  were	  able	  to	  disembark;	  one	  passed	  away	  during	  the	  voyage,	  and	  one	  attempted	  suicide	  and	  remained	  in	  a	  hospital	  in	  Havana,	  leaving	  907	  to	  return	  to	  Europe.	  (American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  6.)	  94	  Ibid.,	  3.	  
	   	   	   101	  Jews	  were	  not	  wanted	  anywhere,	  intentionally	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  St.	  Louis	  from	  sailing	  in	  order	  to	  cause	  precisely	  the	  international	  incident	  that	  ensued.95	  	  
The	  ship	  had	  room	  for	  400	  first-­‐class	  passengers	  who	  had	  paid	  800	  Reichsmarks	  each	  and	  500	  tourist-­‐class	  passengers	  who	  paid	  600	  Reichsmarks.	  The	  passengers	  had	  also	  paid	  an	  additional	  “customary	  contingency	  fee”	  of	  230	  Reichsmarks	  to	  cover	  the	  cost	  of	  an	  unanticipated	  return	  voyage.96	  Because	  this	  was	  a	  significant	  expenditure,	  the	  Jewish	  passengers	  on	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers	  tended	  to	  be	  wealthy,	  and	  made	  a	  “dignified	  appearance.”	  This	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Nazi	  plot	  to	  show	  that	  it	  was	  not	  just	  destitute	  refugees	  that	  were	  being	  rejected	  because	  of	  their	  poverty.	  Not	  even	  “respectable	  Jews”	  were	  wanted	  by	  any	  of	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
On	  the	  week	  of	  May	  14,	  the	  S.S.	  Iberia,	  which	  had	  sailed	  before	  the	  May	  5	  decree,	  arrived	  in	  Havana	  with	  the	  now-­‐illegal	  Benitez	  landing	  permits.	  Benitez	  himself	  boarded	  the	  ship	  and	  took	  the	  passengers	  off	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  president’s	  statement	  that	  they	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  land.	  To	  save	  face,	  Brú	  had	  declared	  that	  because	  the	  ship	  sailed	  before	  May	  5,	  the	  passengers	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  disembark.97	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Levinson,	  Jewish	  Community	  of	  Cuba,	  118.	  96	  The	  Reichsmark	  was	  worth	  U.S.	  $2.49	  in	  1939.	  According	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  consumer	  bundle,	  each	  Reichsmark	  would	  be	  equivalent	  to	  approximately	  U.S.	  $10	  in	  2012.	  (“Measuring	  Worth	  -­‐	  Consumer	  Bundle,”	  accessed	  January	  23,	  2014,	  http://www.measuringworth.com/consumer/.)	  97	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  1.	  
	   	   	   102	  Knowing	  that	  the	  St.	  Louis	  had	  left	  Hamburg	  after	  the	  new	  law	  was	  promulgated	  and	  was	  on	  its	  way	  to	  Havana	  and	  that	  two	  other	  ships	  with	  Jewish	  refugees	  headed	  for	  Cuba98	  (the	  French	  S.S.	  Flandre	  with	  104	  Jewish	  refugees99	  and	  the	  British	  S.S.	  Orduña	  with	  72100),	  Margolis	  on	  May	  22	  urgently	  alerted	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  of	  the	  impending	  emergency:	  
Altho	  [sic]	  the	  SS	  Iberia	  was	  allowed	  to	  unload	  its	  passengers,	  last	  week,	  we	  do	  not	  anticipate	  that	  with	  the	  developments	  as	  they	  are	  taking	  place	  here	  daily,	  that	  the	  next	  three	  boats	  will	  be	  allowed	  to	  do	  the	  same.101	  The	  following	  boats	  are	  due	  this	  month.	  May	  27th,	  “Orduna”	  [sic]	  from	  England;	  May	  28th,	  “Flandres”	  [sic],	  French	  Line;	  May	  29th,	  “St.	  Louis”,	  special	  Hapag	  boat,	  bringing	  800	  people	  and	  due	  to	  return	  to	  Germany	  the	  next	  day.	  The	  “Iberia”	  was	  allowed	  to	  unload	  its	  passengers	  because	  the	  president	  issued	  a	  compromise,	  stating	  that	  all	  boats	  having	  sailed	  before	  May	  5th,	  when	  his	  decree	  was	  issued,	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  land	  their	  passengers.	  The	  above	  three	  boats	  however	  sailed	  after	  May	  5	  so	  that	  we	  now	  anticipate	  difficulty.102	  We	  feel	  the	  following	  is	  also	  significant.	  At	  a	  meeting	  here	  last	  week	  between	  Col.	  Benitez	  and	  the	  steamship	  companies…	  Benitez	  sent	  in	  his	  resignation,	  indicating	  that	  he	  was	  now	  going	  to	  run	  for	  the	  Senate.	  At	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Thomas,	  Voyage	  of	  the	  Damned,	  4.	  99	  The	  Flandre’s	  passengers	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  disembark	  in	  Cuba.	  They	  sailed	  to	  Mexico	  but	  were	  not	  allowed	  off	  the	  ship.	  Eventually,	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  return	  to	  France,	  where	  they	  were	  admitted	  but	  interned	  by	  the	  French	  government.	  (“Cuba	  Bars	  104	  Refugees:	  Jews	  Sail	  On	  to	  Mexico,	  but	  May	  Return	  to	  Try	  Again,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  May	  29,	  1939;	  “Mexico	  Bars	  104	  on	  French	  Ship,”	  JTA,	  June	  4,	  1939;	  “Seeking	  Refuge	  in	  Cuba,	  1939,”	  
Holocaust	  Encyclopedia,	  accessed	  January	  3,	  2014,	  http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007330.)	  100	  Denied	  entrance	  to	  Cuba,	  the	  Orduña	  crossed	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  and	  made	  brief	  stops	  in	  Colombia,	  Ecuador	  and	  Peru.	  The	  JDC	  representative	  in	  Ecuador	  arranged	  refuge	  for	  four	  of	  the	  72	  Jews.	  Seven	  more	  disembarked	  in	  Chile,	  and	  the	  remaining	  55	  stayed	  at	  the	  Canal	  Zone	  Quarantine	  Station	  for	  over	  a	  year	  until	  they	  were	  admitted	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  (“Seeking	  Refuge	  in	  Cuba,	  1939.”)	  101	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  May	  22,	  1939,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  102	  Ibid.	  
	   	   	   103	  meeting	  nothing	  was	  said	  about	  the	  several	  thousand	  landing	  permits	  which	  have	  been	  issued	  and	  for	  which	  he	  already	  has	  been	  paid	  cash.103	  Margolis’	  analysis	  of	  the	  situation,	  like	  Bressler’s,	  was	  that	  the	  president	  and	  some	  members	  of	  his	  Cabinet	  were	  getting	  very	  tired	  of	  having	  Col.	  Benitez	  get	  all	  the	  graft,	  so	  the	  presidential	  decree	  of	  May	  5	  was	  a	  means	  of	  stopping	  the	  immigration	  on	  the	  Benitez	  landing	  permit	  basis	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  hoping	  to	  strike	  a	  bargain	  with	  the	  JRC	  for	  a	  blanket	  guarantee	  for	  all	  persons	  coming	  in	  with	  the	  $500	  bonds	  and	  visas:	  
The	  proposition	  is	  of	  course	  ridiculous	  because	  there	  isn’t	  enuf	  [sic]	  money	  in	  the	  whole	  USA	  to	  take	  care	  of	  any	  such	  proposition.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Col.	  Benitez	  and	  his	  crowd	  were	  trying	  to	  hold	  onto	  the	  graft	  as	  long	  as	  possible	  and	  indirectly	  sending	  messages	  to	  us	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  pure	  love	  for	  the	  Jews,	  in	  order	  to	  get	  us	  to	  help	  them	  fight	  against	  the	  presidential	  decree	  and	  the	  antisemitic	  propaganda.104	  Margolis	  refused,	  however,	  to	  play	  the	  game:	  
Of	  course,	  so	  far…	  we	  have	  not	  played	  ball	  with	  either	  side	  and	  the	  result	  has	  been	  that	  Benitez	  has	  really	  resigned.	  The	  matter	  to	  date	  therefore	  is…	  that	  the	  new	  Immigration	  Commissioner105	  is	  refusing	  to	  allow	  the	  next	  three	  boats	  to	  land	  and	  in	  addition	  a	  new	  immigration	  law	  was	  proposed	  at	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  copy	  of	  which	  I	  am	  attaching106…	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  financing	  of	  this	  campaign	  to	  put	  this	  law	  across	  comes	  from	  a	  “slush”	  fund,	  set	  up	  by	  the	  local	  Spanish	  merchants	  in	  addition	  to	  Fascist	  funds.107	  She	  once	  again	  forcefully	  insisted	  that	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky	  immediately	  become	  involved:	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  Ibid.	  104	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  May	  23,	  1939,	  2,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  105	  Margolis	  was	  referring	  to	  Candida	  Gómez	  Calá.	  106	  There	  was	  no	  attachment	  in	  the	  JDC	  archives.	  It	  is	  possible	  Margolis	  was	  referring	  to	  Decree	  937.	  107	  Margolis	  to	  Razovsky,	  May	  23,	  1939,	  2.	  
	   	   	   104	  At	  the	  present	  time	  we	  are	  in	  a	  complete	  deadlock,	  waiting	  to	  see	  what	  is	  going	  to	  happen.	  I	  feel	  that	  Mr.	  Berenson	  and	  you	  folks	  [i.e.	  Razovsky	  and	  the	  NCC]	  who	  know	  the	  Cuban	  situation	  are	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  know	  whether	  any	  action	  should	  be	  taken	  or	  whether	  we	  should	  maintain	  this	  status	  quo.108	  	  She	  offered	  her	  opinion	  in	  no	  uncertain	  terms	  as	  to	  how	  the	  situation	  should	  be	  handled:	  
Under	  no	  circumstances	  would	  I	  be	  in	  favor	  of	  any	  financial	  bargaining	  with	  any	  part	  of	  the	  government	  to	  land	  these	  boats	  and	  I	  thoroughly	  agree	  that	  immigration	  into	  Cuba	  should	  be	  stopped.	  Still	  it	  would	  be	  a	  very	  bad	  commentary	  upon	  the	  JRC	  if	  we	  stood	  by	  while	  the	  boats	  left	  here,	  either	  to	  return	  to	  Germany	  or	  to	  sail	  to	  parts	  unknown.109	  As	  a	  result	  of	  Margolis’	  warnings,	  the	  JDC	  on	  May	  23	  cabled	  their	  Paris	  office	  to	  notify	  HICEM	  not	  to	  allow	  the	  1,000	  Viennese	  Jews	  who	  were	  about	  to	  travel	  to	  Cuba	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Kultusgemeinde	  to	  set	  sail,	  thus	  averting	  another	  incident	  like	  the	  St.	  Louis.110	  
On	  May	  25,	  Margolis	  alerted	  JDC	  headquarters	  of	  rumors	  that	  district	  pogroms	  were	  being	  organized.	  Maduro	  had	  told	  her	  that	  he	  personally	  knew	  of	  a	  definite	  program	  to	  attack	  Jews	  in	  each	  section	  of	  the	  city.	  It	  had	  been	  worked	  out	  in	  close	  detail—Jewish	  homes	  and	  stores	  had	  been	  marked.	  However,	  even	  though	  Maduro	  did	  not	  identify	  publicly	  with	  the	  Jewish	  community,	  he	  had	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  the	  chief	  of	  police,	  and	  thus	  was	  able	  to	  prevent	  any	  violence.111	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  Ibid.	  109	  Ibid.	  110	  “Timeline	  of	  St.	  Louis	  Incident,”	  June	  8,	  1939,	  2,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  111	  Joseph	  Hyman,	  “Memorandum	  on	  Trip	  to	  Havana,”	  January	  18,	  1940,	  5,	  1933/44:509,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  
	   	   	   105	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  rising	  antisemitism,	  Paul	  Taussig,	  owner	  of	  the	  Taussig	  Travel	  Agency,	  assured	  Margolis	  that	  Benitez	  had	  promised	  to	  honor	  all	  permits	  issued	  before	  May	  5,	  and	  that	  he	  would	  make	  sure	  that	  all	  passengers	  on	  the	  St.	  Louis	  would	  be	  able	  to	  land.	  However,	  Benitez	  now	  could	  not	  be	  found:	  he	  was	  on	  a	  two-­‐month	  leave	  of	  absence,	  with	  the	  immigration	  offices	  practically	  closed.112	  
On	  May	  26,	  the	  day	  before	  the	  St.	  Louis	  was	  scheduled	  to	  arrive,	  Maduro	  had	  dinner	  with	  Acting	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Juan	  Ramos,	  who	  promised	  him	  that	  all	  of	  the	  passengers	  on	  the	  St.	  Louis	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  disembark,	  since	  the	  president	  was	  already	  “half	  convinced”	  that	  it	  would	  be	  feasible	  to	  do	  so.	  However,	  on	  May	  27,	  Ramos	  stated	  that	  Brú	  had	  changed	  his	  mind,	  “being	  afraid	  of	  antisemitic	  campaigns	  and	  internal	  troubles.”113	  
The	  St.	  Louis	  docked	  in	  Havana	  on	  May	  27,	  1939.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  28	  people	  whose	  relatives	  had	  previously	  deposited	  $500	  bonds	  in	  compliance	  with	  Cuban	  immigration	  law,	  the	  passengers,	  the	  rest	  of	  whom	  held	  Benitez	  landing	  permits,	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  land	  and	  the	  ship	  was	  kept	  in	  Havana	  Harbor.	  Meanwhile,	  a	  large	  section	  of	  the	  Cuban	  press	  was	  conducting	  an	  intensive	  campaign	  against	  further	  refugee	  immigration	  into	  Cuba,	  and	  demanding	  that	  the	  papers	  of	  many	  of	  the	  refugees	  already	  in	  Cuba	  be	  re-­‐examined.114	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  “Timeline	  of	  St.	  Louis	  Incident,”	  2.	  113	  Ibid.	  114	  “A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerikan	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  June	  9,	  1939,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  
	   	   	   106	  It	  was	  at	  this	  time	  that	  an	  unfortunate	  incident	  happened,	  highlighting	  some	  of	  the	  many	  problems	  in	  the	  existing	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities.	  The	  Centro	  Israelita	  had	  urged	  relatives	  and	  interested	  parties	  to	  send	  $500	  to	  post	  the	  bonds	  that	  were	  required	  for	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers	  to	  disembark.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  had	  positioned	  itself	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities	  when	  in	  reality	  it	  was	  no	  such	  thing.	  Of	  course,	  the	  funds	  had	  to	  be	  returned	  to	  the	  donors,	  but	  the	  Habaner	  Lebn	  accused	  the	  
Centro	  of	  keeping	  15%	  for	  “costs,”	  which	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  used	  to	  cover	  their	  own	  unrelated	  budget	  deficits.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  forthrightness,	  HIAS	  stopped	  working	  with	  the	  Centro	  and	  instead	  allied	  itself	  with	  the	  JRC.115	  
On	  May	  28,	  conferences	  were	  held	  in	  United	  States	  at	  the	  home	  of	  Prof.	  Joseph	  P.	  Chamberlain,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  NCC,	  with	  Lawrence	  Berenson,	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  and	  Alfred	  Jaretski,	  Jr.,116	  Chairman	  of	  JDC	  Committee	  on	  Central	  and	  South	  America.117	  
On	  Monday,	  May	  29,	  at	  the	  insistence	  of	  Laura	  Margolis	  and	  Milton	  Goldsmith,	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  and	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  flew	  to	  Havana.	  Margolis	  and	  Goldsmith	  met	  them,	  and	  the	  four	  of	  them	  worked	  together	  day	  and	  night	  in	  a	  hotel	  room	  for	  the	  duration	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Habaner	  Lebn	  June	  14,	  1939.	  This	  and	  the	  HIAS	  policy	  change	  are	  noted	  in	  Levinson,	  Jewish	  Community	  of	  Cuba,	  124.	  116	  Alfred	  Jaretski,	  Jr.	  (1893-­‐1976),	  a	  Harvard-­‐trained	  New	  York	  attorney	  and	  expert	  on	  investment	  companies,	  was	  an	  advisor	  to	  the	  U.S.	  delegation	  to	  the	  Evian	  conference	  and	  served	  as	  vice	  chairman	  of	  the	  JDC,	  also	  chairing	  the	  Committee	  on	  Refugee	  Aid	  in	  Central	  and	  South	  America.	  (“Alfred	  Jaretzki	  Jr.,	  83,	  Lawyer	  Who	  Aided	  Investment	  Act,	  Dies,”	  New	  
York	  Times,	  August	  24,	  1976.	  Note	  that	  Jaretski’s	  name	  is	  misspelled	  with	  a	  “z”	  in	  the	  New	  
York	  Times.	  He	  signed	  his	  correspondence	  as	  Jaretski.)	  117	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  16.	  
	   	   	   107	  of	  the	  emergency.118	  The	  team	  reported	  a	  condition	  of	  near	  panic,	  not	  only	  among	  the	  907	  people	  left	  on	  the	  boat,	  but	  also	  among	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  currently	  in	  Cuba,	  who	  feared	  that	  they	  might	  be	  deported.119	  
Berenson	  had	  been	  told	  that	  President	  Brú	  would	  see	  him	  as	  soon	  as	  he	  arrived,	  but	  the	  situation	  was	  so	  tense	  that	  this	  did	  not	  happen.	  Instead,	  Benitez’	  attorneys	  made	  repeated	  efforts	  to	  see	  him,	  possibly	  to	  arrange	  some	  kind	  of	  a	  financial	  deal.	  Reporters	  for	  the	  leading	  newspapers	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  also	  continued	  to	  approach	  him.	  Berenson	  declined	  these	  meetings,	  taking	  the	  position	  that	  he	  was	  there	  to	  speak	  only	  with	  the	  president	  himself.	  He	  then	  received	  word	  that	  the	  president	  had	  delegated	  negotiations	  to	  Major	  Garcia,	  the	  Chief	  of	  the	  Havana	  Secret	  Police,	  who	  was	  currently	  the	  Acting	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  but	  Berenson	  did	  not	  believe	  this.	  The	  following	  day,	  he	  received	  a	  threatening	  message	  saying	  he	  would	  be	  shot	  if	  he	  refused	  to	  see	  Garcia.	  On	  the	  same	  day	  he	  received	  an	  anonymous	  call	  threatening	  him	  with	  death	  if	  he	  did	  not	  leave	  Cuba	  immediately.120	  That	  night,	  there	  were	  four	  husky	  men	  waiting	  outside	  the	  hotel	  where	  Berenson,	  Razovsky,	  Margolis	  and	  Goldsmith	  were	  staying.	  The	  Americans	  directed	  their	  taxi	  through	  side	  streets	  and	  to	  a	  very	  public	  restaurant,	  where	  they	  remained	  until	  2:00	  in	  the	  morning.	  When	  they	  arrived	  back	  at	  the	  hotel,	  Benitez’	  son	  was	  there	  waiting	  for	  them.	  For	  $450,000,	  he	  “guaranteed”	  that	  he	  would	  be	  able	  to	  take	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  Chamberlain	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  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  119	  “A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerikan	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  2.	  120	  “Cuba	  to	  Allow	  Refugees	  on	  St.	  Louis	  to	  Land	  on	  Isle	  of	  Pines;	  to	  Set	  Up	  Camp,”	  
JTA,	  June	  5,	  1939.	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  the	  ship	  to	  the	  Isle	  of	  Pines,	  an	  island	  thirty-­‐one	  miles	  south	  of	  Havana,	  where	  the	  passengers	  could	  disembark.	  When	  Berenson	  refused,	  he	  offered	  to	  arrange	  a	  deal	  with	  Santo	  Domingo	  to	  take	  the	  refugees	  at	  $400	  a	  head.	  Benitez’	  son	  finally	  left,	  empty-­‐handed,	  at	  4:30	  in	  the	  morning.121	  
On	  May	  31,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Agriculture,	  a	  friend	  of	  Berenson’s,	  suggested	  he	  write	  directly	  to	  the	  president	  for	  an	  appointment.122	  Berenson	  then	  met	  with	  the	  mayor	  of	  Havana	  and	  asked	  if	  he	  would	  intercede	  in	  the	  matter.	  He	  promised	  to	  do	  so.	  That	  night,	  the	  former	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury	  and	  Agriculture,	  Dr.	  Lopez	  Castro,	  a	  man	  highly	  regarded	  by	  all	  parties,	  came	  to	  see	  Berenson	  at	  his	  hotel.	  He	  had	  just	  come	  from	  Batista	  with	  assurances	  that	  he	  would	  make	  sure	  the	  St.	  Louis	  affair	  would	  be	  satisfactorily	  straightened	  out.	  At	  5:00	  in	  the	  morning	  Batista’s	  adjutant	  called	  and	  said	  he	  had	  arranged	  an	  appointment	  with	  the	  president	  for	  the	  next	  day,	  and	  that	  everything	  was	  going	  to	  be	  all	  right.123	  
	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  June	  1,	  the	  mayor	  of	  Havana	  went	  to	  see	  the	  president	  to	  intercede	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  affair.	  The	  Secretary	  of	  Agriculture	  also	  saw	  the	  president	  that	  morning,	  and	  both	  men	  assured	  Berenson	  that	  the	  president	  was	  intending	  to	  intercede	  in	  the	  matter.	  However,	  when	  Berenson	  arrived	  for	  his	  appointment	  at	  noon,	  Benitez	  had	  just	  come	  out	  of	  the	  president’s	  office—he	  had	  resigned.124	  He	  was	  replaced	  as	  Director	  General	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  4,	  7–9.	  122	  Ibid.,	  4.	  123	  Ibid.,	  5.	  124	  Ibid.	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  of	  the	  Cuban	  Immigration	  Office	  by	  Dr.	  Candida	  Gómez	  Calá,125	  who	  immediately	  issued	  a	  statement	  saying	  she	  would	  strictly	  enforce	  the	  immigration	  laws.126	  
Meanwhile	  on	  June	  1	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  in	  an	  emergency	  meeting	  of	  JDC	  officers	  and	  Executive	  Committee	  members,	  a	  special	  subcommittee	  was	  formed127	  that	  would	  work	  closely	  with	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky	  and	  could	  act	  quickly	  to	  clear	  up	  the	  situation.128	  From	  that	  moment,	  the	  subcommittee	  members	  were	  continuously	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  Cuban	  representatives,	  including	  Margolis	  and	  Goldsmith,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  other	  officers	  of	  JDC,	  with	  their	  European	  office,	  with	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department,	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  line,	  with	  Cuban	  Jewish	  leaders,	  and	  with	  agencies,	  organizations	  and	  officials	  all	  over	  the	  world.129	  
The	  Executive	  Committee	  held	  extensive	  discussions	  on	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  situation.	  They	  had	  been	  hoping	  until	  the	  last	  moment	  that	  a	  small	  payment	  would	  make	  the	  problem	  go	  away,	  but	  that	  was	  not	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  They	  were	  concerned	  that	  if	  they	  did	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Gómez	  Calá	  was	  the	  niece	  of	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  Cuban	  generals,	  Máximo	  Gómez	  Báez.	   126	  “Cuba	  to	  Allow	  Refugees	  on	  St.	  Louis	  to	  Land	  on	  Isle	  of	  Pines;	  to	  Set	  Up	  Camp.”	  127	  The	  members	  of	  the	  subcommittee	  were	  Alfred	  Jaretski	  (Chairman	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Central	  and	  South	  American	  matters	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  firm	  of	  Sullivan	  and	  Cromwell	  who	  had	  many	  international	  contacts);	  David	  M.	  Bressler	  (Vice-­‐Chairman	  of	  the	  JDC	  and	  Chairman	  of	  its	  Budget	  Committee);	  I.	  Edwin	  Goldwasser	  (Treasurer	  of	  the	  JDC	  and	  a	  prominent	  banker);	  and	  Joseph	  Hyman	  (Executive	  Director	  of	  the	  JDC).	  The	  committee	  was	  supplemented	  by	  other	  officers	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Executive	  Committee,	  including	  Rabbi	  Jonah	  B.	  Wise,	  Edward	  Warburg,	  William	  Rosenwald,	  Henry	  Ittleson	  (President	  of	  the	  Commercial	  Investment	  Trust),	  and	  others.	  (“A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerikan	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  2.,	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  Confidential),	  16–17.)	  128	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  20.	  129	  “A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerikan	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  2.	  
	   	   	   110	  make	  a	  guarantee	  for	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers,	  there	  would	  immediately	  be	  other	  ships	  following	  and	  further	  funds	  would	  be	  required.	  At	  their	  June	  1	  meeting,	  Jaretski	  gave	  his	  opinion	  to	  this	  effect:	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  refusing	  to	  allow	  these	  passengers	  to	  land	  if	  we	  went	  down	  and	  allowed	  some	  kind	  of	  a	  guarantee	  there	  would	  immediately	  be	  some	  other	  ships	  following.	  No	  limit	  to	  what	  you	  let	  yourself	  in	  for.	  Now	  the	  situation	  in	  that	  respect	  has	  materially	  changed	  by	  what	  has	  happened.	  It	  is	  a	  horrible	  thing	  but	  almost	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  continued	  shipment	  of	  what	  we	  must	  characterize	  as	  illegal	  immigrants.130	  However,	  Jaretski	  noted	  that	  with	  the	  departure	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis,	  no	  steamers	  abroad	  were	  taking	  passengers	  any	  more	  unless	  they	  had	  legal	  visas,	  so	  in	  his	  opinion,	  the	  problem	  was	  now	  quite	  different:	  	  
If	  we	  are	  able	  to	  help	  in	  some	  way	  with	  some	  limited	  guarantee	  or	  make	  some	  provision	  of	  some	  kind	  I	  feel	  it	  would	  be	  less	  apt	  to	  have	  harmful	  effects	  in	  the	  future.131	  The	  committee	  did	  fear	  “refugee	  dumping”	  by	  the	  German	  government,	  forcing	  immigration	  where	  it	  was	  not	  permitted,	  and	  this	  fear	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  JDC.	  In	  fact,	  representatives	  of	  leading	  American	  and	  European	  relief	  organizations	  had	  conferred	  in	  Paris	  in	  January	  1939	  with	  the	  Assistant	  League	  of	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees,	  Gustave	  G.	  Kullman,	  on	  how	  to	  combat	  such	  “dumping.”	  The	  Gestapo	  was	  sending	  refugees	  from	  the	  Reich	  on	  German	  steamers	  bound	  for	  overseas	  locations	  to	  which	  entry	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  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  10.	  131	  Ibid.	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  visas	  were	  not	  required	  for	  holders	  of	  German	  passports.132	  Historians	  have	  long	  recognized	  that	  until	  Heinrich	  Himmler	  sealed	  Germany’s	  borders	  to	  Jewish	  emigration	  on	  October	  18,	  1941,	  the	  Nazi	  modus	  operandi	  was	  to	  pressure	  the	  Jews	  to	  emigrate.133	  	  
In	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident,	  JDC	  leadership	  referred	  to	  Nazi	  proliferation	  of	  conflicting	  claims	  based	  on	  speculation	  and	  rumor:	  
…a	  Nazi	  program	  to	  send	  unfortunate	  people	  who	  cant	  [sic]	  support	  themselves	  to	  places	  where	  they	  are	  not	  wanted	  and	  then	  having	  those	  people	  seem	  poor,	  penniless,	  useless	  persons	  (because	  they	  can’t	  work)	  and	  make	  them	  the	  nucleus	  for	  spreading	  antisemitism	  into	  every	  quarter	  of	  the	  world.134	  James	  N.	  Rosenberg,135	  vice-­‐chairman	  of	  JDC,	  reminded	  the	  group	  that	  they	  must	  not	  let	  their	  hearts	  run	  away	  with	  them,	  and	  that	  submitting	  to	  Cuban	  extortion	  by	  bribery	  could	  set	  a	  very	  dangerous	  precedent.136	  They	  also	  had	  to	  be	  mindful	  of	  the	  2,500	  Jewish	  people	  who	  were	  currently	  living	  in	  Cuba	  on	  the	  now-­‐illegal	  Benitez	  landing	  permits.137	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  “Paris	  Parley	  Maps	  Flight	  on	  Refugee-­‐Dumping	  by	  Gestapo,”	  JTA,	  January	  30,	  1939.	   133	  Eric	  Jennings,	  “Last	  Exit	  from	  Vichy	  France:	  The	  Martinique	  Escape	  Route	  and	  the	  Ambiguities	  of	  Emigration,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  History	  74,	  no.	  2	  (June	  1,	  2002):	  294–295.	   134	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  11.	  135	  James	  N.	  Rosenberg	  (1874-­‐1970),	  a	  senior	  partner	  in	  a	  New	  York	  law	  firm,	  left	  his	  law	  practice	  in	  1921	  for	  a	  year	  of	  volunteer	  service	  as	  chairman	  in	  Europe	  of	  the	  JDC.	  He	  retired	  from	  law	  in	  1947	  to	  become	  a	  full-­‐time	  artist.	  (His	  lithograph,	  “Dies	  Irae”	  (Day	  of	  Wrath),	  depicting	  the	  Wall	  Street	  crash	  of	  1929,	  appeared	  on	  the	  cover	  of	  the	  New	  York	  
Times	  Sunday	  magazine,	  and	  his	  works	  now	  are	  on	  display	  in	  more	  than	  25	  museums	  in	  the	  U.S.)	  (“James	  N.	  Rosenberg,	  a	  Lawyer-­‐Painter,	  Is	  Dead,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  July	  22,	  1970.)	  136	  Refugee	  ships	  were	  being	  turned	  away	  throughout	  Latin	  America.	  The	  German	  liner	  Orinoco,	  with	  200	  German	  Jews	  onboard	  heading	  for	  Cuba	  and	  holding	  Cuban	  landing	  permits,	  was	  ordered	  by	  radio	  from	  Germany	  on	  June	  4	  to	  turn	  back.	  The	  Germans	  demanded	  the	  immediate	  re-­‐emigration	  of	  the	  Jewish	  passengers,	  threatening	  to	  send	  them	  
	   	   	   112	  Brú,	  in	  the	  interim,	  had	  appointed	  a	  special	  commission	  to	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers.	  He	  had	  not	  intended	  to	  meet	  with	  Berenson	  until	  the	  ship	  was	  out	  of	  Cuban	  waters,	  but	  they	  did	  meet	  that	  Thursday,	  June	  1,	  and	  Brú	  allowed	  Berenson	  to	  present	  his	  full	  plea.138	  The	  President	  expressed	  his	  deep	  sympathy	  on	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  refugees	  and	  the	  unfortunate	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  passengers	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  found	  themselves.	  He	  reminded	  Berenson	  that	  Cuba	  had	  always	  had	  the	  greatest	  sympathy	  for	  political	  and	  religious	  refugees.139	  However,	  before	  any	  negotiations	  were	  allowed	  to	  begin,	  the	  president	  insisted	  that	  the	  St.	  Louis	  leave	  Havana	  and	  remain	  at	  least	  12	  miles	  outside	  Cuban	  territorial	  waters.140	  Brú	  was	  furious	  that	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line	  had	  listened	  to	  Benitez	  and	  not	  to	  him.	  He	  reminded	  Berenson	  that	  he	  had	  sent	  word	  to	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  line	  before	  the	  ship	  left	  Hamburg	  that	  it	  must	  not	  come	  to	  Cuba,	  and	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  to	  concentration	  camps.	  The	  threat	  was	  then	  withdrawn	  when	  assurances	  were	  obtained	  by	  HIAS	  in	  Paris	  pending	  a	  search	  for	  a	  new	  haven.	  (American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  10;	  “Refugee	  Ship	  Turns	  Back	  to	  Reich,”	  JTA,	  June	  5,	  1939;	  “Concentration	  Camp	  Avoided	  for	  Jews	  Returned	  to	  Reich,”	  JTA,	  June	  5,	  1939.)	  137	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  16.	  138	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  10;	  “Refugee	  Ship	  Turns	  Back	  to	  Reich”;	  “Concentration	  Camp	  Avoided	  for	  Jews	  Returned	  to	  Reich,”	  JTA,	  June	  5,	  1939.	  139	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  5–6.	  140	  “Negotiations	  for	  Admission	  of	  Refugees	  Go	  on	  As	  St.	  Louis	  Waits	  Outside	  Cuban	  Waters,”	  JTA,	  June	  5,	  1939.	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  very	  angered	  by	  their	  action.	  He	  insisted	  that	  they	  knew	  of	  Decree	  937	  and	  deliberately	  flouted	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Republic	  by	  bringing	  the	  immigrants	  against	  the	  law.141	  
Regarding	  President	  Brú’s	  attitude	  towards	  the	  Jewish	  refugees,	  Berenson	  later	  told	  the	  JDC	  in	  New	  York:	  
His	  fury	  was	  against	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line.	  I	  can’t	  say	  that	  he	  was	  antagonistic	  to	  us,	  to	  the	  refugees	  or	  to	  you	  folks	  up	  here.	  I	  think	  he	  was	  sincerely	  in	  sympathy	  with	  the	  refugees.142	  Brú	  was	  receiving	  many	  cables	  from	  individuals	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Cuba	  urging	  that	  he	  allow	  the	  immigrants	  to	  land,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  from	  constituents	  in	  Cuba	  threatening	  serious	  consequences	  if	  they	  did.143	  The	  Cuban	  Jewish	  communities,	  however,	  did	  not	  present	  a	  unified	  plea.	  The	  JTA	  reported	  that	  he	  and	  Batista	  received	  more	  than	  2,500	  telegrams	  from	  Cubans	  appealing	  for	  the	  humanitarian	  treatment	  of	  the	  refugees.144	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  precipitated	  this	  telegram	  campaign.	  Many	  influential	  people	  in	  Havana	  visited	  him	  personally,	  including	  the	  Catholic	  Archbishop,	  who	  did	  this	  at	  the	  insistence	  of	  Solomon	  Maduro.145	  But	  the	  president	  would	  not	  back	  down.	  He	  had	  said	  the	  ship	  must	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  5.	  142	  Ibid.	  143	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1939-­‐1940,	  356.	  	  144	  “Cuba	  Gets	  Appeals	  to	  Admit	  Refugees	  As	  Ship	  Is	  Scheduled	  to	  Return	  to	  Reich,”	  
JTA,	  June	  1,	  1939.	  145	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  5.	  The	  Archbishop	  visited	  the	  president	  at	  the	  insistence	  of	  Solomon	  Maduro	  (Ibid.,	  23.)	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  leave	  and	  refused	  to	  permit	  it	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  harbor.146	  He	  would	  not	  negotiate	  until	  the	  ship	  had	  gone.	  	  At	  11:00	  AM	  on	  June	  2,	  the	  M.S.	  St.	  Louis	  left	  Havana	  and	  idled	  in	  Caribbean	  waters	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Florida,	  awaiting	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  negotiations.147	  The	  boat	  sailed	  so	  close	  to	  Miami	  that	  passengers	  could	  see	  the	  lights	  of	  the	  city.148	  	  The	  JTA	  reported:	  
The	  refugees	  got	  no	  sleep	  all	  night	  as	  floodlights	  lit	  up	  the	  ship	  to	  prevent	  passengers	  from	  jumping	  overboard.	  Most	  of	  the	  refugees	  lined	  the	  railings	  to	  greet	  friends	  and	  relatives	  who	  circled	  the	  ship	  in	  launches,	  but	  they	  saw	  hope	  vanish	  as	  the	  hours	  slipped	  by….More	  than	  a	  score	  of	  police	  and	  marine	  boats	  accompanied	  the	  “floating	  refugee	  camp”	  out	  of	  Cuba’s	  territorial	  waters	  as	  thousands	  of	  Cubans	  and	  Jews	  gathered	  on	  the	  shore	  to	  watch	  what	  many	  termed	  “a	  funeral	  of	  the	  living.”	  Some	  groups	  of	  Cubans	  shouted:	  “Expel	  the	  Jews	  from	  the	  country!”	  Others	  replied:	  “Down	  with	  a	  Government	  which	  supports	  Fascism!”149	  On	  the	  ship	  itself,	  the	  passengers	  were	  gripped	  with	  panic,	  fearing	  they	  would	  be	  sent	  back	  to	  Germany	  and	  to	  concentration	  camps.150	  The	  captain	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis,	  Gustav	  Schröder,151	  formed	  a	  passenger	  committee	  and	  asked	  them	  to	  have	  the	  passengers	  send	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  R.	  Hart	  Phillips,	  “Cuba	  Orders	  Liner	  and	  Refugees	  to	  Go:	  Navy	  to	  Escort	  St.	  Louis,”	  
New	  York	  Times,	  June	  2,	  1939.	  147	  “Refugee	  Ship	  Leaves	  Havana,	  Destination	  Indefinite;	  Brú	  Reported	  Seeing	  Berenson”;	  see	  also	  “A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐American	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  4.	  148	  “Refugee	  Ship,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  8,	  1939.	  149	  “Refugee	  Ship	  Leaves	  Havana,	  Destination	  Indefinite;	  Brú	  Reported	  Seeing	  Berenson.”	  150	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  6.	  151	  Gustav	  Schröder	  (1885-­‐1959),	  captain	  of	  the	  M.S.	  St.	  Louis,	  was	  recognized	  by	  Yad	  Vashem	  in	  1993	  as	  one	  of	  the	  Righteous	  Among	  the	  Nations.	  Although	  his	  ship	  flew	  under	  a	  Nazi	  flag,	  Schröder	  treated	  his	  Jewish	  passengers	  with	  courtesy	  and	  respect	  and	  even	  brought	  down	  the	  portrait	  of	  Hitler	  in	  the	  ship’s	  social	  hall	  in	  sensitivity	  to	  his	  passengers.	  When	  ordered	  to	  return	  to	  Germany,	  Schröder	  stalled	  as	  long	  as	  he	  could	  until	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  cables	  to	  family	  members	  asking	  for	  help.	  Some	  passengers	  cabled	  President	  Roosevelt,	  but	  received	  no	  reply.	  	  
Port	  police	  aboard	  the	  ship	  witnessed	  pathetic	  scenes	  among	  refugees,	  some	  of	  whom	  still	  held	  hopes	  of	  landing;	  others	  of	  whom	  were	  suicidal,	  with	  “women	  and	  children	  tearfully	  huddled	  in	  groups	  on	  the	  deck.”152	  Captain	  Schröder	  said	  he	  wouldn’t	  be	  responsible	  for	  bringing	  the	  ship	  back	  to	  Germany,	  because	  the	  people	  were	  so	  completely	  hysterical	  that	  he	  didn’t	  know	  what	  would	  happen	  to	  the	  boat.153	  	  
Berenson	  asked	  Brú	  if	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  could	  board	  the	  ship	  to	  calm	  the	  passengers,	  but	  the	  request	  was	  denied.154	  Schröder	  feared	  that	  there	  would	  be	  mass	  suicides.	  One	  passenger,	  Max	  Loewe,	  just	  three	  days	  earlier	  had	  slit	  his	  wrists	  and	  jumped	  into	  the	  harbor.	  He	  was	  rescued	  from	  the	  water	  and	  brought	  to	  a	  local	  hospital	  in	  critical	  condition.	  
155	  In	  an	  ironic	  twist,	  Loewe	  was	  the	  only	  one	  of	  the	  refugees	  with	  Benitez	  landing	  permits	  to	  actually	  get	  off	  the	  ship	  and	  remain	  in	  Cuba.	  The	  JTA	  reported	  that	  a	  second	  passenger	  attempted	  suicide	  by	  poison	  but	  was	  stopped	  when	  guards	  broke	  down	  his	  cabin	  door.156	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  safe	  haven	  had	  been	  found	  for	  his	  Jewish	  passengers.	  	  After	  the	  war,	  he	  was	  released	  from	  de-­‐Nazification	  proceedings	  thanks	  to	  the	  testimony	  of	  some	  of	  the	  surviving	  passengers	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis.	  (“Gustav	  Schroeder	  -­‐	  The	  Righteous	  Among	  The	  Nations	  -­‐	  Yad	  Vashem,”	  accessed	  January	  26,	  2014,	  http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/stories/schroeder.asp.)	  152	  “Late	  Havana	  News,”	  JTA,	  June	  2,	  1939.	  153	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  4.	  154	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  6.	  155	  R.	  Hart	  Phillips,	  “907	  Refugees	  Quit	  Cuba	  Aboard	  Liner,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  3,	  1939.	   156	  “Cuba	  Gets	  Appeals	  to	  Admit	  Refugees	  As	  Ship	  Is	  Scheduled	  to	  Return	  to	  Reich.”	  
	   	   	   116	  The	  passenger	  committee	  then	  organized	  thirty-­‐six	  of	  the	  male	  passengers	  into	  “suicide	  patrols”	  to	  prevent	  any	  further	  incidents.157	  	  
The	  international	  press	  picked	  up	  the	  story	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  and	  it	  became	  major	  news	  around	  the	  world.	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  reported	  that	  rumors	  were	  deliberately	  being	  spread	  to	  prevent	  additional	  panic	  among	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers:	  
To	  avert	  collective	  suicide	  attempts	  as	  the	  liner	  left	  Havana	  by	  Presidential	  order,	  word	  was	  spread	  on	  board	  that	  the	  United	  States	  Government	  had	  authorized	  their	  landing	  in	  New	  York	  if	  continuing	  efforts	  for	  their	  entry	  into	  Cuba	  failed.	  Kept	  from	  them	  was	  the	  news	  from	  Washington	  that	  government	  officials	  there	  said	  no	  arrangements	  had	  been	  made	  for	  them	  to	  land	  in	  New	  York	  or	  any	  other	  United	  States	  port.158	  Behind	  the	  scenes,	  as	  Berenson	  negotiated,	  Razovsky,	  Margolis	  and	  Goldsmith	  were	  busy	  dealing	  with	  the	  press	  that	  was	  demanding	  information	  and	  updates,159	  pressure	  from	  the	  passengers’	  relatives	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  their	  relatives	  who	  were	  already	  in	  Cuba,	  and	  the	  Cuban	  refugee	  community	  in	  Havana	  who	  were	  there	  on	  Benitez	  landing	  permits	  and	  felt	  terribly	  insecure	  about	  their	  own	  status.	  They	  were	  faced	  with	  delegations	  of	  200	  people	  coming	  to	  them	  with	  the	  ultimatum	  that	  if	  they	  were	  not	  received,	  they	  would	  riot.	  The	  St.	  Louis	  incident	  finally	  caused	  the	  refugees,	  in	  desperation	  as	  to	  their	  own	  status,	  to	  pull	  together,	  even	  if	  all	  they	  could	  do	  was	  threaten	  to	  disturb	  the	  peace.	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  Phillips,	  “907	  Refugees	  Quit	  Cuba	  Aboard	  Liner.”	  158	  Ibid.	  159	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  17.	  
	   	   	   117	  Besides	  all	  this,	  the	  American	  social	  workers	  maintained	  contact	  with	  the	  ship’s	  passengers	  and	  gave	  them	  reports	  every	  two	  hours	  to	  try	  to	  keep	  up	  their	  morale.	  Razovsky	  later	  told	  JDC	  executives	  in	  a	  debriefing:	  
It	  wasn’t	  very	  easy.	  It	  was	  very	  sad.	  People	  were	  weeping	  all	  the	  time.	  People	  who	  had	  wives	  and	  children	  aboard.	  I	  took	  the	  newspaper	  men	  around	  in	  a	  launch	  and	  they	  wept	  all	  the	  time.	  We	  have	  two	  excellent	  people	  in	  Miss	  Margolis	  and	  Mr.	  Goldsmith…	  Our	  record	  is	  clean…	  We	  are	  very	  fortunate	  in	  our	  staff…	  She[Margolis]	  has	  a	  beautifully	  running	  organization.	  We	  agreed	  for	  the	  next	  month	  or	  two	  to	  do	  nothing	  but	  to	  try	  to	  repair	  the	  financial	  and	  spiritual	  damages.160	  Although	  the	  relatives	  and	  the	  refugee	  communities	  were	  difficult,	  Razovsky	  did	  feel	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Cuban	  people	  themselves	  during	  this	  period:	  	  
I	  must	  say	  that	  the	  Cuban	  people	  were	  really	  kind.	  Everyone	  helped	  us	  except	  the	  politicians.	  There	  was	  one	  evening,	  Thursday,	  which	  was	  so	  bad,	  that	  I	  had	  to	  go	  down	  and	  address	  a	  large	  crowd	  of	  relatives	  and	  refugees.	  That	  was	  when	  they	  said	  that	  we’d	  be	  beaten	  up	  and	  one	  of	  the	  boys	  carried	  a	  billy.161	  Meanwhile,	  at	  JDC	  headquarters	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  met	  and	  approved	  the	  proposal	  that	  Berenson	  would	  be	  presenting	  to	  Brú.162	  They	  felt	  that	  the	  Cuban	  President	  was	  merely	  trying	  to	  save	  face	  and	  that	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  steamship	  left,	  the	  negotiations	  would	  bear	  fruit.163	  
Back	  in	  Havana,	  Berenson	  requested	  another	  interview	  with	  the	  president,	  who	  was	  now	  aware	  that	  the	  world’s	  eyes	  were	  upon	  him.	  Brú	  agreed	  to	  meet	  with	  Berenson	  at	  his	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  Ibid.,	  18.	  161	  Ibid.,	  17.	  162	  The	  Secretary	  of	  Agriculture	  was	  instrumental	  in	  helping	  Berenson	  shape	  the	  proposal.	  In	  Berenson’s	  words,	  he	  was	  “sincerely	  cooperating	  and	  deeply	  moved.”	  (Ibid.,	  6.)	  163	  Ibid.	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  farm	  on	  Sunday,	  June	  4	  at	  noon.	  When	  Berenson	  met	  with	  Brú,	  he	  proposed	  to	  the	  president	  that	  in	  order	  to	  assure	  that	  the	  prospective	  immigrants	  would	  not	  become	  public	  charges	  and	  would	  not	  add	  to	  the	  congestion	  of	  the	  refugees	  in	  Havana,	  they	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  Isle	  of	  Pines	  or	  some	  other	  area	  of	  Cuba	  outside	  of	  Havana.164	  Brú	  demanded	  that	  the	  JDC	  post	  the	  required	  $500	  bond	  and	  guarantee	  the	  maintenance	  and	  complete	  care	  of	  all	  the	  St.	  Louis	  refugees.	  Intermediaries	  between	  the	  president’s	  negotiating	  committee	  and	  Mr.	  Berenson	  had	  told	  him	  that	  the	  Cuban	  authorities	  were	  in	  favor	  of	  accepting	  this	  arrangement.165	  Berenson	  delivered	  this	  news	  to	  the	  JDC	  office,	  although	  cryptically	  because	  he	  was	  aware	  that	  the	  wires	  were	  being	  tapped.166	  
The	  JDC	  subcommittee	  immediately	  met	  in	  New	  York	  City	  on	  Sunday,	  June	  4,	  and	  agreed	  among	  themselves	  that	  they	  would	  provide	  the	  full	  $500	  bond	  per	  passenger	  if	  it	  was	  so	  required.167	  The	  following	  day,	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  ratified	  their	  decision.	  They	  went	  on	  to	  contact	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department,	  who	  conferred	  with	  Cuban	  Ambassador	  Du	  Bois	  and	  advised	  JDC	  that	  “under	  no	  circumstances	  would	  it	  be	  necessary	  to	  put	  up	  this	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  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Minutes	  of	  Informal	  Discussion	  with	  Reference	  to	  Cuba,”	  13.	  	  Although	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  archives	  of	  the	  JDC	  contain	  a	  lengthy	  discussion	  on	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  Isle	  of	  Pines	  being	  used	  as	  a	  haven	  for	  refugee	  Jews.	  165	  “A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerikan	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  5.	  166	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  12–13.	  167	  The	  NCC	  had	  also	  been	  able	  to	  raise	  from	  relatives	  of	  the	  passengers	  over	  $35,000	  in	  cash	  or	  pledges	  to	  cover	  the	  bonds	  for	  their	  family	  members	  (“A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerikan	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  5.).	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  money;	  they	  [the	  Cubans]	  were	  just	  bluffing.”168	  However,	  JDC	  leadership	  was	  prepared	  to	  pay	  if	  necessary.	  
The	  New	  York	  leaders	  naturally	  did	  not	  want	  to	  put	  up	  any	  more	  money	  than	  was	  needed,	  since	  JDC	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  devote	  so	  much	  money	  to	  this	  one	  proposition;	  but	  by	  Sunday	  they	  were	  convinced	  that	  this	  was	  a	  special	  situation	  and	  they	  would	  have	  to	  go	  the	  whole	  way.	  They	  felt	  they	  should	  not	  set	  a	  precedent	  in	  treating	  this	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  “refugee-­‐dumping,”	  but	  rather	  they	  believed	  the	  whole	  debacle	  was	  the	  fault	  of	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerika	  Line	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  Cuban	  government.	  In	  the	  debriefing	  at	  JDC	  headquarters	  after	  the	  incident,	  the	  Committee	  Chairman	  said:	  
It’s	  all	  a	  difficult	  question	  of	  policy.	  We	  can’t	  be	  spending	  these	  sums	  of	  money	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  People	  who	  have	  gone	  places	  without	  proper	  guarantees,	  deposits,	  etc.	  But	  we	  look	  upon	  Cuba	  as	  being	  near	  to	  home	  and	  most	  of	  the	  refugees	  ultimately	  come	  into	  this	  country	  and	  I	  think	  we	  have	  to	  deal	  more	  liberally	  with	  the	  Cuban	  situation	  than	  we	  are	  generally	  in	  a	  position	  to	  do.	  It’s	  just	  a	  question	  of	  making	  the	  funds	  go	  round.169	  On	  Monday,	  June	  5,	  the	  Cuban	  government	  announced	  that	  it	  was	  willing	  to	  permit	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  on	  the	  St.	  Louis	  to	  disembark	  in	  Cuba	  and	  remain	  in	  a	  provisional	  camp	  on	  the	  Isle	  of	  Pines,170	  under	  conditions	  satisfactory	  to	  the	  Cuban	  government.171	  The	  President	  issued	  a	  statement:	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  Efforts	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  170	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  on	  St.	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  York	  Times,	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   120	  I	  have	  no	  words…	  to	  express	  the	  deep	  pity	  and	  sorrow	  produced	  by	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  persons	  upon	  the	  St.	  Louis,	  many	  of	  whom	  are	  aged	  men,	  women	  and	  young	  children.	  But	  my	  position	  has	  difficult	  obligations	  which	  drown	  the	  impulses	  of	  the	  heart	  before	  the	  harsh	  dictates	  of	  duty.172	  Major	  Garcia	  called	  Berenson	  Monday	  night	  and	  assured	  him	  that	  everything	  was	  going	  to	  be	  all	  right.173	  	  
Berenson	  had	  an	  appointment	  with	  the	  president	  for	  the	  following	  day	  at	  10:00	  AM	  to	  conclude	  these	  arrangements.	  He	  arrived	  at	  the	  presidential	  palace	  at	  ten	  o’clock	  but	  was	  kept	  waiting	  until	  one	  o’clock	  in	  the	  afternoon.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  at	  noon	  and	  without	  any	  prior	  word	  or	  notice	  to	  Berenson,	  the	  Cuban	  Acting	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  Joaquin	  Ochotorena,	  announced	  to	  the	  press	  that	  the	  deadline	  to	  accept	  the	  Cuban	  offer	  had	  passed,174	  and	  that	  in	  view	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  American	  Jewish	  organizations	  had	  not	  met	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  president’s	  offer	  up	  to	  that	  time,	  the	  offer	  had	  lapsed:175	  
As	  the	  president	  had	  granted	  a	  48-­‐hour	  term,	  which	  ended	  today	  at	  noon,	  for	  a	  definite	  settlement,	  the	  Government	  rescinds	  the	  agreement	  and	  will	  flatly	  refuse	  the	  landing	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  refugees	  at	  any	  place	  in	  Cuban	  territory.176	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  “Cuba	  to	  Allow	  Refugees	  on	  St.	  Louis	  to	  Land	  on	  Isle	  of	  Pines;	  to	  Set	  Up	  Camp”;	  See	  also	  “A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerikan	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  5.	  172	  “Cuba	  to	  Allow	  Refugees	  on	  St.	  Louis	  to	  Land	  on	  Isle	  of	  Pines;	  to	  Set	  Up	  Camp.”	  173	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  12–13.	  174	  “Cuba	  Recloses	  Door	  to	  Refugees;	  48-­‐Hour	  Limit	  on	  Offer	  Expires,”	  New	  York	  
Times,	  June	  7,	  1939.	  175	  “A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerikan	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  5.	  176	  “Cuban	  Minister	  Announces	  Withdrawal	  of	  Asylum	  Offer,	  but	  Negotiations	  Go	  on,”	  JTA,	  June	  6,	  1939.	  
	   	   	   121	  This	  took	  the	  JDC	  representatives	  completely	  by	  surprise.	  Berenson	  knew	  nothing	  of	  such	  a	  time	  limit,	  and	  was	  still	  being	  kept	  waiting	  for	  his	  appointment,	  but	  with	  an	  increasing	  sense	  that	  something	  was	  very	  wrong.	  He	  did	  not	  learn	  that	  the	  negotiations	  had	  ended	  until	  three	  o’clock	  that	  afternoon,	  when	  Razovsky	  reached	  him	  and	  told	  him.177	  The	  JDC	  representatives	  believed	  they	  were	  deliberately	  misled	  into	  feeling	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  satisfactory	  solution	  so	  that	  the	  president	  could	  announce	  when	  the	  deadline	  was	  reached	  that	  he	  had	  done	  all	  he	  could	  and	  his	  offer	  had	  not	  been	  accepted.178	  They	  later	  learned	  from	  attorney	  Bustamante	  that	  the	  news	  release	  announcing	  the	  end	  of	  negotiations	  had	  been	  prepared	  at	  eleven	  o’clock	  that	  morning.	  They	  apparently	  had	  come	  to	  a	  decision	  that	  morning	  or	  the	  previous	  night	  not	  to	  admit	  the	  refugees.179	  
In	  his	  debriefing	  before	  the	  New	  York	  JDC,	  Berenson	  recalled,	  “I	  feel	  particularly	  sad	  because	  I	  was	  confident	  it	  would	  go	  through.	  I	  must	  state	  that	  this	  was	  the	  first	  time	  they	  had	  ever	  done	  anything	  like	  that	  to	  me.”180	  
In	  spite	  of	  this	  announcement,	  JDC	  made	  one	  last	  attempt	  and	  arranged	  to	  have	  U.S.	  $550,000	  in	  cash	  available	  in	  the	  Havana	  branch	  of	  the	  Chase	  National	  Bank,	  and	  asked	  them	  to	  notify	  the	  president	  that	  the	  money	  was	  there.181	  When	  the	  counsel	  for	  the	  Chase	  Bank	  went	  to	  the	  presidential	  palace	  on	  Thursday	  morning,	  June	  8,	  the	  president	  told	  him	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  179	  Ibid.,	  14–15.	  180	  Ibid.,	  16.	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  Ibid.,	  2–3.	  
	   	   	   122	  that	  he	  never	  intended	  there	  to	  be	  a	  time	  limitation	  to	  the	  offer,	  but	  the	  announcement	  was	  released	  to	  the	  press	  by	  Ochotorena	  and	  he	  had	  to	  stand	  by	  it.182	  
On	  Wednesday	  afternoon,	  June	  7,	  JDC	  vice-­‐chairman	  James	  N.	  Rosenberg	  sent	  the	  following	  urgent	  cable	  to	  Laredo	  Brú:	  
URGENT	  CABLE	  TO	  THE	  HONORABLE	  THE	  PRESIDENT	  OF	  THE	  REPUBLIC	  OF	  CUBA	  	  YESTERDAY	  AFTERNOON	  WHEN	  WE	  WERE	  UNDER	  THE	  IMPRESSION	  THAT	  THE	  NEGOTIATIONS	  AS	  TO	  DETAILS	  OF	  THE	  POSSIBLE	  ADMISSION	  INTO	  CUBA	  OF	  THE	  REFUGEES	  ON	  THE	  STEAMER	  ST.	  LOUIS	  WERE	  PROCEEDING	  IN	  HAVANA	  WITH	  YOUR	  GOVERNMENT	  WE	  RECEIVED	  INFORMATION	  THAT	  YOUR	  GOVERNMENT	  CONSIDERED	  THOSE	  NEGOTIATIONS	  LAPSED	  stop	  WE	  RESPECTFULLY	  HASTEN	  TO	  ASSURE	  YOU	  THAT	  APPRECIATING	  YOUR	  DESIRE	  TO	  REACH	  PROMPTLY	  A	  JUST	  AND	  HUMANE	  SOLUTION	  TO	  THIS	  DIFFICULT	  PROBLEM	  WE	  HAVE	  SPARED	  NO	  EFFORT	  HERE	  TO	  PROVIDE	  THE	  NECESSARY	  FUNDS	  TO	  COMPLY	  WITH	  THE	  GOVERNMENTS	  [sic]	  CONDITIONS	  stop	  WILL	  PROVIDE	  $500	  DEPOSIT	  EACH	  REFUGEE	  ON	  BOARD	  SS	  ST.	  LOUIS	  [sic]	  TO	  PERMIT	  ENTRY	  INTO	  CUBA	  UNDER	  APPROPRIATE	  CUBAN	  REGULATIONS	  ALSO	  LIKE	  AMOUNT	  IN	  RESPECT	  EACH	  REFUGEE	  SS	  FLANDERS	  [sic]	  AND	  SS	  ORDUNA	  [sic]	  SHOULD	  THEY	  ALSO	  BE	  PERMITTED	  ENTRY	  CUBA	  stop	  CHASE	  BANK	  HAS	  RECEIVED	  FUNDS	  FROM	  THE	  U.S.	  AVAILABLE	  FOR	  SUCH	  PURPOSE	  IN	  ADDITION	  THIS	  COMMITTEE	  GUARANTEES	  THAT	  NONE	  OF	  THESE	  REFUGEES	  WILL	  BECOME	  PUBLIC	  CHARGE	  TO	  CUBAN	  GOVERNMENT	  stop	  CONFIDENT	  THAT	  WHILE	  ST.	  LOUIS	  SAID	  TO	  BE	  ON	  WAY	  BACK	  TO	  GERMANY	  IT	  IS	  NOT	  TOO	  LATE	  TO	  RADIO	  TO	  HER	  TO	  RETURN	  TO	  HAVANA	  stop	  THIS	  WE	  BEG	  YOU	  TO	  DO	  stop	  WE	  RESPECTFULLY	  REQUEST	  YOUR	  EXCELLENCY	  TO	  GIVE	  THE	  FOREGOING	  YOUR	  IMMEDIATE	  AND	  FAVORABLE	  CONSIDERATION.	  AMERICAN	  JEWISH	  JOINT	  DISTRIBUTION	  COMMITTEE183	  Brú	  replied:	  	  
I	  REPLY	  TO	  YOUR	  CABLE	  IN	  REFERENCE	  TO	  THE	  REFUGEES	  ON	  BOARD	  THE	  SS	  ST.	  LOUIS	  [sic]	  YOU	  KNOW	  DEAR	  MR	  ROSENBERG	  THAT	  CUBA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  Ibid.,	  14–15.	  183	  “A	  Record	  of	  the	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  Behalf	  of	  907	  Refugees	  Aboard	  the	  Hamburg-­‐Amerikan	  Liner	  St.	  Louis,”	  5–6.	  
	   	   	   123	  HAS	  CONTRIBUTED	  IN	  RELATION	  TO	  ITS	  RESOURCES	  AND	  POPULATION	  WITH	  MORE	  ELEMENTS	  THAN	  ANY	  OTHER	  NATION	  AND	  HAS	  GIVEN	  HOSPITALITY	  TO	  PERSECUTED	  PEOPLE	  NEVERTHELESS	  IT	  IS	  COMPLETELY	  IMPOSSIBLE	  TO	  ACCEDE	  TO	  THE	  IMMIGRATION	  ENTRANCE	  ON	  NATIONAL	  TERRITORY	  OF	  THE	  BOAT	  SUBJECT	  ST.	  LOUIS	  IS	  COMPLETELY	  ENDED	  BY	  THE	  GOVERNMENT	  LAMENTABLE	  FOR	  ME	  IN	  NEGATIVE	  SENSE	  TO	  REITERATE	  IMPOSSIBLE	  TO	  PERMIT	  COMING	  TO	  CUBA	  I	  WISH	  I	  COULD	  BRING	  IT	  ABOUT	  MY	  SINCERE	  WISHES	  	  LAREDO	  BRÚ184	  At	  the	  last	  minute,	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  in	  Washington	  sent	  its	  ambassador	  to	  the	  president	  of	  Cuba,	  but	  Brú	  would	  not	  stand	  down.	  The	  matter	  was	  closed.185	  Brú	  refused	  to	  change	  his	  mind.186	  
After	  the	  matter	  was	  over,	  Berenson	  asked	  Bustamante	  what	  a	  deal	  could	  have	  been	  made	  for.	  Bustamante	  replied:	  “You	  could	  never	  have	  gotten	  a	  deal	  through	  for	  less	  than	  $350,000	  in	  addition	  [emphasis	  mine]	  to	  the	  [$500	  per	  person]	  deposits.”187	  
Joseph	  Hyman	  wrote	  privately	  to	  a	  constituent	  the	  following	  week:	  
It	  is	  not	  true	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Cuban	  government	  were	  not	  met.	  At	  all	  times,	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  was	  willing,	  able	  and	  ready	  to	  meet	  the	  legal	  terms	  of	  the	  Cuban	  government.	  Without	  going	  into	  details,	  the	  matter	  was	  one	  of	  politics	  and	  not	  one	  of	  money.	  	  We	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  up	  to	  the	  very	  last	  minute	  that	  the	  arrangements	  were	  satisfactorily	  concluded	  and	  we	  were	  as	  shocked	  and	  disappointed	  and	  as	  astonished	  as	  any	  group	  of	  human	  beings	  in	  the	  world	  could	  be	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  “The	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Inc.,	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Executive	  Committee,”	  June	  8,	  1939,	  3,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  185	  “Cuba	  Again	  Asked	  to	  Admit	  Émigrés.	  Cuba	  Holds	  Case	  ‘Closed,’”	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  8,	  1939.	  186	  “Record	  of	  Discussions	  Re:	  St.	  Louis,”	  June	  9,	  1939,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  187	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  14–15.	  
	   	   	   124	  the	  change	  of	  attitude	  of	  the	  Cuban	  authorities.	  We	  had	  made	  all	  preparations	  to	  send	  down	  an	  able	  group	  of	  organizers,	  welfare	  workers	  and	  childcare	  workers;	  we	  had	  made	  arrangements	  with	  the	  American	  Quakers	  to	  set	  up	  a	  camp;	  we	  had	  called	  upon	  the	  American	  Red	  Cross	  for	  advice	  and	  assistance;	  and	  then,	  at	  the	  last	  moment,	  the	  government	  virtually	  had	  recourse	  to	  a	  highly	  technical	  interpretation	  of	  previous	  statements	  and	  refused	  to	  admit	  these	  people.188	  In	  a	  personal	  letter	  to	  another	  constituent,	  Hyman	  later	  confided	  what	  could	  not	  be	  put	  in	  the	  Board	  minutes.	  He	  specifically	  wrote	  this	  on	  his	  personal	  stationery	  and	  noted	  that	  it	  was	  his	  personal	  opinion	  and	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  coming	  from	  an	  officer	  of	  JDC:	  
The	  minutes	  will	  not	  say,	  and	  cannot	  say,	  that	  while	  all	  of	  the	  discussions	  were	  going	  on,	  overtures	  were	  being	  made	  to	  our	  representatives	  for	  the	  payment	  of	  a	  very	  large	  sum	  of	  money,	  almost	  one-­‐half	  million	  dollars,	  quite	  apart	  from	  and	  independent	  of	  any	  guarantees	  and	  money	  deposits	  that	  might	  run	  into	  one-­‐half	  million	  dollars	  or	  more.189	  It	  is	  quite	  conceivable	  that	  if	  we	  had	  yielded	  to	  this	  type	  of	  ransom	  or	  extortion	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  passengers	  might	  have	  been	  landed,	  but	  it	  would	  have	  meant	  opening	  ourselves	  up	  and	  many	  of	  the	  refugees	  in	  Cuba	  to	  continuous	  harassing	  and	  demands.	  But	  what	  the	  president	  of	  Cuba	  did	  was	  to	  make	  a	  humane	  gesture	  and	  then	  through	  a	  technicality	  make	  it	  appear	  that	  there	  had	  been	  a	  breach	  of	  agreement	  between	  our	  representative	  and	  the	  government.	  There	  had	  been	  no	  agreement.	  We	  are	  firmly	  convinced	  that	  there	  never	  was	  any	  intention	  of	  the	  Cuban	  authorities	  to	  admit	  those	  unfortunates,	  and	  I	  am	  personally	  quite	  as	  sincerely	  convinced	  that	  only	  by	  the	  payment	  of	  huge	  graft	  would	  there	  have	  been	  any	  real	  possibility	  of	  getting	  into	  Cuba.190	  This	  additional	  request	  for	  graft	  was	  kept	  quiet	  due	  to	  JDC’s	  concern	  for	  those	  refugees	  already	  in	  Cuba	  with	  invalid	  Benitez	  landing	  permits.	  As	  Hyman	  noted,	  “We	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Sam	  H.	  Bober,	  June	  14,	  1939,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  189	  Hyman	  to	  Loeb,	  July	  19,	  1939,	  1.	  190	  Ibid.,	  2.	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  certainly	  do	  not	  want	  to	  do	  anything	  that	  will	  imperil	  their	  position	  or	  subject	  them	  to	  expulsion.”191	  
As	  soon	  as	  it	  was	  definite	  that	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  disembark	  in	  Cuba	  and	  were	  headed	  back	  to	  Hamburg,	  the	  JDC	  initiated	  an	  international	  effort	  to	  find	  a	  home	  for	  the	  refugees.	  They	  approached	  countries	  like	  Haiti,	  Ecuador,	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Mexico	  and	  others,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  found	  feasible	  since	  the	  ship	  was	  too	  far	  out	  and	  could	  no	  longer	  return	  to	  the	  Americas.192	  Through	  the	  intense	  efforts	  of	  Morris	  Troper	  in	  Paris;	  Paul	  Baerwald	  (the	  JDC	  chairman	  was	  on	  temporary	  assignment	  with	  the	  President’s	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Political	  Refugees	  in	  London193)	  and	  Harold	  Linder194	  in	  London;	  and	  James	  N.	  Rosenberg	  in	  New	  York,	  havens	  were	  found	  by	  the	  time	  the	  refugees	  docked	  in	  Antwerp195	  on	  June	  17:	  Belgium	  took	  214	  refugees,	  Britain	  287,	  Holland	  181	  and	  France	  224.	  The	  JDC	  allocated	  $500,000	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  refugees.196	  	  
On	  June	  15,	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers	  sent	  the	  following	  radiogram	  to	  Morris	  Troper:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  Ibid.	  192	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Jack	  Danciger,	  June	  13,	  1939,	  3,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  193	  Vincent,	  “The	  Voyage	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Revisited,”	  265.	  194	  Harold	  Linder	  (1901-­‐1981),	  an	  investment	  banker,	  joined	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  became	  Assistant	  Secretary	  for	  Economic	  Affairs,	  and	  later	  (1968)	  Ambassador	  to	  Canada.	  Just	  before	  World	  War	  II,	  Linder	  worked	  in	  London	  with	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Refugees	  and	  after	  the	  war	  became	  a	  volunteer	  representative	  in	  London	  of	  the	  JDC,	  helping	  to	  resettle	  Jewish	  refugees.	  	  195	  “St.	  Louis	  Exiles	  to	  Be	  Landed	  at	  Antwerp;	  Troper	  Lauds	  Action	  by	  4	  Nations,”	  
JTA,	  June	  15,	  1939;	  See	  also	  “St.	  Louis	  Émigrés	  Head	  for	  Antwerp,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  15,	  1939.	   196	  Ogilvie	  and	  Miller,	  Refuge	  Denied;	  See	  also	  “Return	  to	  Europe	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis,”	  
Holocaust	  Encyclopedia,	  accessed	  January	  3,	  2014,	  http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005393.	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  THE	  907	  PASSENGERS	  OF	  ST.	  LOUIS	  DANGLING	  FOR	  LAST	  THIRTEEN	  DAYS	  BETWEEN	  HOPE	  AND	  DESPAIR	  RECEIVED	  TODAY	  YOUR	  LIBERATING	  MESSAGE	  OF	  THE	  13	  JUNE	  THAT	  FINAL	  ARRANGEMENTS	  FOR	  ALL	  PASSENGERS	  HAVE	  AT	  LAST	  BEEN	  REACHED	  OUR	  GRATITUDE	  IS	  AS	  IMMENSE	  AS	  THE	  OCEAN	  ON	  WHICH	  WE	  ARE	  NOW	  FLOATING	  SINCE	  MAY	  13	  FIRST	  FULL	  OF	  HOPE	  FOR	  A	  GOOD	  FUTURE	  AND	  AFTERWARDS	  IN	  THE	  DEEPEST	  DESPAIR	  stop	  ACCEPT	  MR.	  CHAIRMAN	  FOR	  YOU	  AND	  FOR	  THE	  AMERICAN	  JOINT	  DISTRIBUTION	  COMMITTEE	  AND	  LAST	  BUT	  NOT	  LEAST	  FOR	  THE	  GOVERNMENTS	  OF	  BELGIUM	  HOLLAND	  FRANCE	  AND	  ENGLAND	  THE	  DEEPEST	  AND	  ETERNAL	  THANKS	  OF	  MEN	  WOMEN	  AND	  CHILDREN	  UNITED	  BY	  THE	  SAME	  FATE	  ON	  BOARD	  THE	  ST.	  LOUIS	  	  SIGNED	  COMMITTEE	  OF	  PASSENGERS.197	  Less	  than	  three	  months	  later,	  World	  War	  II	  began	  and	  in	  May	  1940	  Germany	  invaded	  Western	  Europe.	  Many	  of	  these	  refugees	  found	  themselves	  once	  again	  under	  Nazi	  German	  terror:	  many	  were	  murdered	  by	  the	  Germans;	  others	  were	  sent	  to	  concentration	  camps	  and	  survived	  years	  of	  forced	  labor;	  yet	  others	  lived	  in	  hiding	  or	  managed	  to	  escape.198	  
On	  June	  21,	  1939,	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  of	  the	  JDC	  unanimously	  approved	  a	  policy	  to	  be	  pursued	  with	  any	  future	  events	  of	  this	  type:	  
It	  should	  be	  obvious	  to	  all	  that,	  aside	  from	  the	  fundamental	  questions	  of	  policy	  which	  are	  involved,	  the	  financial	  and	  administrative	  burdens	  of	  such	  “dumped”,	  chaotic,	  forced	  and	  disorganized	  immigration	  are	  entirely	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  private	  philanthropic	  resources	  or	  the	  facilities	  of	  existing	  organizations…	  If	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  under	  this	  type	  of	  terrorized	  pressure,	  were	  to	  be	  obliged	  to	  submit	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  program	  of	  enforced	  help,	  its	  entire	  resources	  for	  the	  whole	  year	  1939	  would	  be	  exhausted	  in	  taking	  care	  of	  from	  10,000	  to	  15,000	  emigrants…	  [This]	  would	  virtually	  deplete	  the	  treasury	  of	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  St.	  Louis	  passengers	  to	  Morris	  Troper,	  “Radiogram,”	  June	  15,	  1939,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  198	  “Wartime	  Fate	  of	  the	  Passengers	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis,”	  Holocaust	  Encyclopedia,	  accessed	  January	  3,	  2014,	  http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=1,0005431.	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  Committee	  and	  would	  deprive	  all	  of	  the	  other	  activities	  and	  programs	  of	  the	  committee	  of	  essential	  funds.	  Already	  the	  cost	  of	  providing	  guarantees	  for	  the	  907	  St.	  Louis	  refugees	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  entire	  budgetary	  allotment	  of	  JDC	  for	  all	  of	  the	  work	  of	  relief	  and	  assistance	  to	  Jewish	  communities	  within	  Germany	  during	  the	  first	  six	  months	  of	  the	  year.199	  	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  must	  place	  on	  record	  that	  it	  cannot	  regard	  its	  action	  in	  behalf	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  passengers,	  and	  the	  enormous	  sacrifices	  it	  has	  made	  in	  the	  financial	  commitments	  undertaken	  for	  this	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  persons,	  as	  constituting	  a	  precedent	  for	  any	  similar	  action.200	  It	  was	  to	  be	  understood	  that	  because	  these	  people	  had	  been	  granted	  permits	  which	  were	  later	  not	  honored,	  an	  exception	  had	  been	  made	  for	  them.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  was	  not	  to	  constitute	  a	  precedent	  for	  other	  shiploads.201	  
The	  Aftermath	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  
This	  section	  will	  argue	  that	  rather	  than	  drawing	  the	  communities	  together,	  the	  St.	  Louis	  affair	  caused	  further	  divisions.	  While	  some	  attempts	  were	  made	  by	  the	  established	  Jewish	  leaders	  to	  unite	  and	  fight	  the	  antisemitic	  sentiment,	  these	  efforts	  ultimately	  failed.	  Panic	  overtook	  the	  refugees	  as	  JDC	  contributions	  diminished	  in	  light	  of	  wartime	  demands.	  It	  was	  only	  with	  the	  drastic	  reduction	  of	  U.S.	  aid	  that	  the	  refugees,	  with	  JDC	  guidance,	  began	  to	  draw	  together	  as	  a	  community	  and	  provide	  for	  their	  own	  social	  and	  cultural	  needs.	  	  
❋ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  Joseph	  Hyman,	  “Statement	  of	  Policy,”	  June	  21,	  1939,	  3,	  AR	  1933/44:378,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  200	  Ibid.	  201	  “Refuge	  Is	  Assured	  for	  All	  on	  Liner:	  Belgium,	  Britain,	  France	  and	  Netherlands	  to	  Admit	  907	  on	  a	  Temporary	  Basis,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  14,	  1939.	  
	   	   	   128	  At	  a	  meeting	  to	  debrief	  the	  St.	  Louis	  affair,	  Razovsky	  had	  noted	  about	  Margolis,	  “She	  won’t	  stay.	  She	  finds	  it	  too	  difficult.”202	  Margolis’	  six-­‐month	  term	  ended	  at	  the	  end	  of	  July	  1939	  and	  she	  did	  indeed	  return	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  taking	  up	  work	  at	  the	  National	  Refugee	  Service	  (NRS)203	  in	  Miami.204	  Milton	  Goldsmith	  assumed	  responsibility	  for	  the	  work	  in	  Cuba.205	  	  
In	  January	  1940,	  Joseph	  Hyman	  traveled	  to	  Havana	  and	  reported	  that	  relationships	  within	  the	  resident	  Jewish	  communities	  had	  fractured	  even	  further	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident:	  
…There	  is	  no	  real	  hope	  of	  setting	  up	  an	  effective	  collaboration	  among	  the	  so-­‐called	  Spanish,	  Polish	  and	  American	  colonies.	  They	  simply	  will	  not	  talk	  to	  each	  other	  or	  sit	  at	  the	  same	  table.	  The	  committee	  established	  by	  Mr.	  Bressler	  was	  an	  achievement	  in	  itself	  as	  it	  represented	  the	  first	  time	  the	  discordant	  elements	  talked	  to	  each	  other	  about	  any	  common	  problem,	  but	  it	  broke	  up	  after	  the	  St.	  Louis	  matter	  and	  it	  has	  never	  met	  again	  nor	  has	  Mr.	  Goldsmith	  been	  able	  even	  to	  get	  the	  three	  men	  whom	  he	  calls	  his	  committee,	  Maduro,	  Kates	  and	  Hartman,	  to	  sit	  down	  together	  even	  as	  a	  committee	  of	  three.	  He	  has	  had	  to	  run	  from	  one	  to	  the	  other,	  reconciling	  their	  opposing	  views	  and	  doing	  the	  best	  he	  can.206	  …	  The	  American	  rabbi,	  Lasker,	  I	  am	  told,	  is	  non-­‐cooperative.	  The	  American	  colony…	  are	  quite	  indifferent	  to	  the	  whole	  situation,	  and	  the	  Polish	  group	  are	  too	  poor	  and	  too	  obsessed	  with	  their	  own	  problems	  in	  the	  large	  colony	  in	  Havana	  to	  do	  very	  much	  or	  to	  do	  anything.…	  The	  process	  of	  working	  out	  a	  better	  relationship	  among	  the	  groups	  is	  not	  one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  Berenson	  and	  Razovsky,	  Report	  on	  the	  JDC	  Efforts	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Affair	  (Highly	  
Confidential),	  18.	  203	  Founded	  on	  May	  15,	  1939,	  the	  NRS	  was	  a	  reorganization	  of	  the	  NCC.	  204	  Hyman,	  “Memorandum	  on	  Trip	  to	  Havana,”	  7.	  205	  His	  monthly	  salary	  was	  raised	  from	  $217	  to	  $300	  to	  match	  what	  Margolis	  had	  been	  making.	  (Cecilia	  Razovsky	  to	  Herbert	  Katzki,	  April	  28,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba;	  see	  also	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  to	  Joseph	  Hyman,	  June	  14,	  1939,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.)	  206	  Hyman,	  “Memorandum	  on	  Trip	  to	  Havana,”	  2.	  
	   	   	   129	  for	  an	  organization	  like	  JDC,	  in	  my	  opinion.	  It	  is	  a	  problem	  of	  community	  organization…207	  However,	  when	  it	  came	  to	  fighting	  antisemitism	  after	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident,	  some	  unity	  was	  achieved.	  The	  Central	  Committee	  of	  Jewish	  Societies	  of	  Cuba,	  legalized	  on	  June	  29,	  1939	  and	  consisting	  of	  representatives	  of	  18	  organizations,	  initiated	  a	  program	  to	  combat	  antisemitism	  which	  included	  plans	  for	  radio	  broadcasting,	  publication	  of	  material	  in	  Spanish	  and	  Yiddish,	  the	  distribution	  of	  pamphlets	  and	  a	  monthly	  publication.	  The	  group	  claimed	  to	  have	  raised	  $4,000	  or	  $5,000,	  opened	  an	  office,	  employed	  a	  Cuban	  lawyer,	  and	  distributed	  50,000	  copies	  of	  a	  pro-­‐Jewish	  manifesto	  put	  out	  by	  Dr.	  Fernando	  Ortiz,	  a	  well-­‐known	  representative	  of	  anti-­‐racism	  in	  Cuba.208	  They	  did	  not,	  however,	  have	  the	  confidence	  or	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  leading	  and	  influential	  Jewish	  families;	  and	  while	  Adolfo	  Kates	  did	  provide	  them	  with	  advice,	  neither	  he,	  Maduro	  nor	  Hartman	  wished	  to	  be	  publicly	  associated	  with	  them,	  feeling	  they	  lacked	  the	  experience	  to	  accomplish	  their	  goals.209	  There	  is	  actually	  no	  record	  that	  any	  of	  those	  goals	  were	  accomplished.	  
The	  political	  situation	  at	  the	  time	  was	  full	  of	  uncertainty	  preceding	  the	  calling	  of	  a	  constitutional	  convention	  and	  an	  election	  that	  finally	  took	  place	  in	  July	  1940,210	  and	  this	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  Ibid.,	  4.	  208	  Fernando	  Ortiz	  (1881-­‐1969),	  president	  of	  the	  Cuban	  National	  Association	  Against	  Racial	  Discrimination	  was	  a	  well-­‐respected	  attorney,	  jurist,	  anthropologist	  and	  journalist.	  (“Fernando	  Ortiz,”	  accessed	  January	  26,	  2014,	  http://www.encaribe.org/en/article/fernando-­‐ortiz/138.)	  209	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  11,	  17.	  210	  Batista	  defeated	  Grau	  San	  Martín,	  gathering	  56.6%	  of	  the	  vote.	  
	   	   	   130	  distraction	  served	  to	  bring	  a	  lull	  to	  the	  anti-­‐Jewish	  activities	  which	  had	  increased	  to	  frenzied	  levels	  over	  the	  previous	  months.211	  
As	  previously	  mentioned,	  antisemitism	  in	  Cuba	  had	  been	  promoted	  mainly	  by	  Spanish	  and	  Nazi	  sources,	  and	  had	  been	  aggravated	  by	  the	  problems	  raised	  by	  the	  large-­‐scale	  German	  Jewish	  immigration.	  As	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  reached	  their	  quota	  numbers	  and	  left	  Cuba,	  the	  issue	  of	  competition	  with	  the	  Spanish	  merchants	  diminished.	  On	  June	  23,	  1939,	  Dr.	  Fernando	  Ortiz	  urged	  the	  public	  “not	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  anti-­‐Jewish	  campaign	  being	  conducted	  through	  the	  radio	  and	  the	  press.”212	  In	  May	  1940,	  President	  Laredo	  Brú	  officially	  ordered	  the	  strict	  enforcement	  of	  a	  decree	  forbidding	  Nazi	  and	  Communist	  propaganda,	  and	  after	  Batista	  rose	  to	  power	  in	  October	  1940,	  antisemitic	  influence	  diminished	  as	  well.213	  By	  September	  1941	  the	  climate	  in	  Cuba	  was	  such	  that	  a	  Cuban	  court	  sentenced	  Franz	  Thol,	  a	  local	  Nazi	  leader,	  to	  six	  months	  in	  prison	  for	  distributing	  antisemitic	  propaganda	  and	  conducting	  anti-­‐Jewish	  agitation.214	  
Immediately	  following	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident,	  the	  stringent	  enforcement	  of	  immigration	  laws	  by	  Dr.	  Candida	  Gómez	  Calá,	  who	  replaced	  Benitez	  as	  Director-­‐General	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Immigration	  Office,	  slowed	  immigration	  to	  a	  trickle,215	  and	  a	  general	  despondency	  prevailed	  among	  the	  6,000	  refugees	  who	  remained	  in	  Cuba	  waiting	  for	  their	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  Hyman,	  “Memorandum	  on	  Trip	  to	  Havana,”	  1.	  212	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1939-­‐40,	  356.	  213	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  11.	  	  214	  “Cuba	  Imposes	  Severe	  Punishment	  Upon	  Nazi	  Leader	  for	  Anti-­‐Jewish	  Propaganda,”	  JTA,	  September	  4,	  1941.	  215	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  3.	  
	   	   	   131	  U.S.	  visa	  numbers	  to	  come	  up.216	  Rumors	  were	  flying	  that	  those	  who	  held	  Benitez	  permits	  were	  going	  to	  be	  deported.217	  Other	  rumors	  said	  a	  Cuban	  bill	  was	  being	  considered	  that	  would	  deport	  all	  Jews	  who	  had	  entered	  Cuba	  since	  1937.218	  Whether	  this	  was	  true	  or	  not	  is	  difficult	  to	  substantiate,219	  but	  it	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  in	  mid-­‐June	  1939,	  38	  of	  the	  refugees	  who	  had	  arrived	  on	  the	  S.S.	  Iberia	  with	  Benitez	  permits	  and	  had	  been	  allowed	  to	  disembark	  were	  in	  the	  process	  of	  being	  deported,220	  because	  even	  though	  they	  sailed	  before	  the	  May	  5	  date,	  they	  did	  not	  have	  proper	  visas.221	  Their	  expulsion	  was	  stopped	  at	  the	  last	  minute	  by	  a	  presidential	  decree.222All	  of	  the	  refugees	  arriving	  on	  the	  S.S.	  Flandre	  had	  also	  been	  rejected.223	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  William	  Rosenwald,	  June	  20,	  1939,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  217	  According	  to	  a	  July	  1939	  letter	  from	  a	  Dr.	  M.	  Jacobsohn	  to	  the	  NCC,	  the	  Cuban	  Immigration	  Department	  had	  announced	  and	  partly	  adopted	  measures	  which	  aimed	  at	  deporting	  all	  the	  refugees.	  A	  number	  of	  refugees	  who	  had	  even	  posted	  the	  $500	  bond	  which	  was	  required	  by	  the	  government	  had	  been	  summoned	  to	  the	  Immigration	  Department,	  threatened	  to	  be	  arrested	  unless	  they	  appeared,	  and	  ordered	  to	  leave	  Cuba	  within	  30	  days	  or	  face	  deportation.	  (Jacobsohn	  to	  Razovsky,	  July	  13,	  1939.)	  See	  also	  “Cuba	  Bans	  All	  Jewish	  Radio	  Programs.”	  This	  article	  mentions	  57	  Jews	  who	  were	  about	  to	  be	  deported.	  218	  “Cuban	  Bill	  Would	  Deport	  All	  Jews	  Entering	  Since	  1937,”	  JTA,	  June	  5,	  1939;	  See	  also	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1939-­‐40,	  356.	  219	  David	  Bressler	  to	  Adolfo	  Kates,	  June	  13,	  1939,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  220	  “Cuba	  to	  Deport	  38,”	  JTA,	  June	  16,	  1939.	  221	  Jorge	  Garcia	  Montes	  to	  Alfred	  Jaretski,	  June	  24,	  1939,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.;	  see	  also	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Cecilia	  Razovsky,	  June	  16,	  1939,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  222	  Jorge	  Garcia	  Montes	  to	  L.A.	  Crosby,	  “Phone	  Call,”	  June	  26,	  1939,	  1933/44:507,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  223	  Hyman	  to	  Rosenwald,	  June	  20,	  1939.	  
	   	   	   132	  Those	  remaining	  in	  Cuba	  were	  faced	  with	  an	  uncertain	  future,	  regarding	  themselves	  as	  “temporary	  residents”	  yet	  faced	  with	  possibly	  years	  of	  stagnation.224	  The	  inability	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  them	  to	  work	  (other	  than	  simple	  peddling)	  due	  to	  Cuban	  labor	  laws	  produced	  not	  just	  a	  social	  but	  also	  an	  economic	  problem,	  since	  many	  of	  those	  refugees	  who	  had	  some	  means	  when	  they	  arrived	  were	  beginning	  to	  exhaust	  their	  savings.225	  	  
	  In	  January	  1940,	  Milton	  Goldsmith,	  who	  had	  been	  in	  charge	  of	  Cuba	  since	  Margolis’	  departure	  in	  July	  1939,	  accepted	  the	  job	  of	  South	  American	  director	  for	  HICEM	  and	  JDC,	  and	  JDC	  was	  faced	  with	  replacing	  him.	  Their	  first	  choice	  was	  to	  bring	  back	  Laura	  Margolis,	  since	  “the	  local	  leaders	  think	  well	  of	  her,”226	  and	  she	  had	  consistently	  received	  high	  praise	  from	  those	  who	  worked	  with	  her:	  
Adolfo	  Kates	  said	  about	  her:	  
While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  in	  the	  past	  I	  have	  complained	  to	  you	  about	  my	  experiences	  with	  social	  workers,	  who	  had	  been	  sent	  down	  here	  before,	  I	  am	  really	  happy	  to	  say	  that	  Miss	  Margolis	  is	  an	  exceptional	  person.	  Not	  only	  is	  she	  thoroly	  [sic]	  efficient,	  but	  her	  capability	  is	  coupled	  with	  a	  fine	  understanding	  and	  a	  good	  heart.	  She	  has	  the	  rare	  gift	  of	  feeling	  intensily	  [sic]	  and	  yet	  not	  letting	  her	  feelings	  interfere	  with	  her	  calm	  and	  acute	  reasoning.227	  David	  Bressler,	  responding	  to	  Kates,	  wrote:	  
It	  is	  a	  compliment	  to	  your	  power	  of	  discernment	  and	  excellent	  judgment	  that	  you	  echo	  so	  unreservedly	  our	  own	  estimation	  of	  Miss	  Margolis’	  high	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  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities,	  1.	  225	  Trager,	  Havana	  Report,	  4.	  226	  Hyman,	  “Memorandum	  on	  Trip	  to	  Havana,”	  7.	  227	  Kates	  to	  Bressler,	  April	  15,	  1939.	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  qualities	  of	  mind	  and	  heart.	  We	  know	  exactly	  what	  a	  job	  she	  has	  had	  to	  face	  and	  how	  splendidly	  she	  has	  stood	  up	  to	  her	  task.228	  Milton	  Goldsmith,	  who	  worked	  closely	  with	  her,	  said	  when	  she	  first	  left:	  
Too	  high	  praise	  cannot	  be	  given	  to	  Miss	  Margolis	  for	  the	  very	  splendid	  job	  she	  has	  turned	  in	  here.	  We	  shall	  do	  our	  very	  best	  to	  keep	  the	  work	  at	  the	  same	  high	  standard.229	  Joseph	  Hyman	  was	  hoping	  she	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  return	  to	  Cuba,	  particularly	  if	  the	  job	  was	  limited	  to	  a	  six-­‐	  to	  nine-­‐month	  term.230	  	  
	  On	  January	  31,	  1940,	  Robert	  Pilpel	  notified	  Alfred	  Jaretski	  that	  Margolis	  had	  agreed	  to	  return	  to	  Cuba	  and	  the	  NRS	  was	  willing	  to	  release	  her	  so	  she	  could	  do	  so:	  
Miss	  Laura	  Margolis	  has	  consented	  to	  take	  up	  again	  the	  job	  of	  directing	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Joint	  Relief	  Committee	  in	  Havana.	  The	  possibility	  that	  she	  might	  succeed	  Mr.	  Goldsmith	  had	  earlier	  been	  discussed	  with	  Messrs.	  S.L.	  Maduro,	  Adolfo	  Kates	  and	  Albert	  Hartman,	  all	  of	  whom	  have	  a	  high	  regard	  for	  her.231	  Margolis	  did	  return	  in	  February	  1940,	  and	  immediately	  began	  collecting	  statistics	  about	  the	  JRC’s	  present	  caseload	  and	  the	  refugees	  who	  might	  be	  remaining	  in	  Cuba	  for	  several	  more	  years.	  She	  noted	  in	  a	  March	  1940	  report	  to	  Pilpel:	  
In	  the	  six	  months	  I	  was	  away	  from	  here	  I	  noticed	  a	  great	  change	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  caseload.	  Our	  new	  intake	  consists	  entirely	  of	  those	  persons	  who	  came	  here	  with	  some	  means,	  whose	  means	  are	  exhausted	  and	  find	  relief	  very	  difficult	  to	  take.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  large	  group	  whose	  funds	  are	  not	  yet	  exhausted	  but	  whose	  funds	  will	  be	  at	  an	  end	  if	  they	  have	  to	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  David	  Bressler	  to	  Adolfo	  Kates,	  April	  19,	  1939,	  1933/44:506,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  229	  Milton	  Goldsmith	  to	  Joseph	  Hyman,	  July	  17,	  1939,	  1933/44:518,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  230	  Hyman,	  “Memorandum	  on	  Trip	  to	  Havana,”	  7.	  231	  Robert	  Pilpel	  to	  Alfred	  Jaretski,	  January	  31,	  1940,	  1933/44:130,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	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  remain	  here	  another	  six	  months	  or	  a	  year.	  Whether	  we	  should	  just	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  relief	  or	  the	  possibilities	  of	  a	  more	  constructive	  and	  preventative	  program	  here,	  is	  something	  I	  am	  not	  prepared	  to	  say,	  at	  this	  moment;	  but	  I	  feel	  I	  should	  give	  you	  a	  picture	  of	  trends	  so	  that	  you	  will	  be	  aware	  of	  changes	  and	  developments.232	  As	  the	  war	  progressed,	  JDC	  found	  itself	  with	  great	  fiscal	  burdens	  around	  the	  world.	  The	  major	  Jewish	  organizations	  that	  had	  cooperated	  with	  them	  financially	  in	  Europe	  were	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  make	  any	  contributions	  in	  light	  of	  the	  war.	  The	  JDC	  began	  1940	  with	  appropriations	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  about	  $900,000	  a	  month	  for	  all	  the	  needs	  of	  Jewish	  life	  that	  they	  supported	  worldwide.	  Their	  income	  was	  no	  longer	  sufficient	  and	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  cut	  their	  grants.	  In	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  1939,	  they	  had	  spent	  about	  $250,000	  a	  month	  for	  their	  European	  and	  general	  programs,233	  including	  helping	  with:	  
…starvation	  conditions	  in	  Poland,	  the	  emigration	  needs	  of	  German	  Jews,	  the	  terrible	  plight	  of	  Polish	  refugees	  in	  Lithuania,	  the	  effect	  of	  racial	  laws	  in	  Italy,	  Hungary	  and	  Roumania	  [sic],	  [that]	  have	  added	  enormously	  to	  the	  misery	  of	  our	  people.234	  Despite	  all	  this,	  in	  1940	  they	  tried	  to	  keep	  from	  cutting	  the	  appropriation	  for	  Cuba	  that	  provided	  for	  the	  relief	  needs	  of	  800	  to	  900	  of	  the	  approximately	  2,500	  refugees	  who	  were	  still	  in	  Havana	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year.	  However,	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  funds	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  social	  needs.	  	  
The	  Unión	  de	  Refugiados	  (Refugees’	  Union)	  stepped	  into	  that	  gap,	  and	  it	  is	  at	  this	  point	  that	  we	  see	  the	  beginnings	  of	  cooperation	  in	  the	  refugee	  community.	  The	  Unión	  was	  originally	  organized	  back	  in	  March	  1939	  when	  immigration	  to	  Cuba	  had	  increased	  greatly	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  Margolis	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,	  March	  25,	  1940,	  3,	  1933/44:509,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	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  Cuba.	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  Hyman	  to	  Leipziger,	  October	  1,	  1940,	  3–4.	  234	  Ibid.,	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  and	  the	  JRC	  was	  finding	  it	  necessary	  to	  set	  in	  place	  some	  very	  stringent	  policies.	  Many	  of	  the	  active	  members	  at	  that	  time	  had	  been	  discontented	  persons	  whose	  own	  relief	  had	  been	  discontinued	  for	  valid	  reasons.	  Margolis	  had	  met	  with	  their	  representatives	  several	  times	  but	  finally	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  them	  that	  she	  would	  not	  negotiate	  with	  any	  group	  attempting	  to	  influence	  the	  relief	  policies.235	  
	  The	  Unión	  then	  became	  very	  active	  during	  the	  St.	  Louis	  affair,	  pretending	  to	  represent	  the	  refugee	  community	  but	  actually	  only	  representing	  a	  small	  element	  that	  was	  anxious	  to	  know	  about	  the	  St.	  Louis	  negotiations.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  June	  1939,	  this	  original	  
Unión	  had	  dissolved.236	  
	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  1939	  a	  second	  Unión	  de	  Refugiados	  was	  organized	  with	  new	  leadership.	  This	  time,	  they	  did	  not	  discuss	  issues	  of	  relief	  with	  the	  JRC,	  but	  rather	  agreed	  to	  cooperate	  and	  abide	  by	  JRC	  policies,	  while	  representing	  to	  them	  the	  voice	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  refugee	  group	  in	  Havana.237	  The	  major	  purpose	  of	  the	  new	  group	  was	  to	  concern	  itself	  with	  the	  educational,	  vocational,	  social	  and	  recreational	  activities	  of	  the	  refugee	  colony,	  thus	  relieving	  the	  JRC	  of	  that	  function.	  Membership	  cost	  10	  cents	  per	  month	  and	  by	  March	  1940	  they	  had	  about	  1,000	  members.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  two	  people	  who	  collected	  dues	  and	  were	  paid	  a	  small	  commission,	  all	  in	  the	  leadership	  were	  volunteers.	  They	  legalized	  their	  status	  in	  Cuba	  and	  organized	  an	  Executive	  Committee	  and	  a	  Board	  of	  Directors.238	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  March	  25,	  1940,	  1.	  236	  Ibid.	  237	  Ibid.,	  4.	  238	  Ibid.,	  2.	  
	   	   	   136	  During	  the	  period	  of	  their	  existence,	  they	  organized	  monthly	  concerts	  and	  lectures,	  utilizing	  local	  volunteer	  talent.	  They	  also	  launched	  several	  vocational	  training	  classes	  to	  prevent	  the	  refugees’	  morale	  from	  deteriorating	  and	  to	  help	  prepare	  them	  for	  a	  new	  life	  in	  the	  U.S.	  They	  held	  classes	  in	  “glove	  making,	  tailoring,	  locksmith	  and	  electrical	  work,	  corrective	  gym,	  beauty	  culture,	  bartending,”	  and	  more.	  They	  charged	  a	  small	  fee	  for	  these	  courses,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  held	  in	  the	  homes	  of	  the	  teachers.239	  	  
Rabbi	  Lasker	  and	  the	  American	  congregation	  had	  begun	  a	  small	  American-­‐oriented	  secular	  school	  in	  April	  1939	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  education	  of	  the	  refugee	  children,240	  with	  funding	  help	  from	  B’nai	  B’rith.241	  Because	  of	  their	  ambiguous	  legal	  status,	  these	  children	  had	  been	  excluded	  from	  Cuba’s	  public	  school	  system	  and	  most	  could	  not	  afford	  private	  schools.242	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  budget	  constraints,	  the	  JRC	  did	  begin	  an	  Americanization	  program	  in	  October	  1939	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  Manuel	  Siegel243	  and	  Joseph	  Kleiman,244	  who	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  Ibid.	  240	  Hyman	  to	  Leipziger,	  October	  1,	  1940,	  4.	  241	  B’nai	  B’rith	  appropriated	  $500	  to	  provide	  salaries	  for	  teachers	  and	  obtain	  textbooks	  and	  other	  school	  materials.	  The	  school’s	  100	  students	  were	  grouped	  into	  five	  classes,	  from	  first	  grade	  through	  the	  first	  year	  of	  high	  school.	  (“School	  for	  Refugee	  Children	  in	  Havana	  Gets	  B’nai	  B’rith	  Backing,”	  B’nai	  B’rith	  News	  Service,	  February	  6,	  1941,	  Vol.	  3	  #2	  edition,	  1933/44:511,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.)	  242	  Lasker’s	  school	  closed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  January	  1941	  due	  to	  the	  rapid	  emigration	  from	  Cuba.	  (Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Jane	  Evans,	  National	  Federation	  of	  Temple	  Sisterhoods,	  February	  20,	  1941,	  1,	  1933/44:511,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.)	  243	  Manuel	  “Manny”	  Siegel,	  a	  social	  worker,	  served	  with	  Margolis	  at	  the	  JRC	  in	  Cuba	  from	  1940-­‐1941	  and	  then	  in	  Shanghai	  from	  1941-­‐1945,	  sent	  there	  by	  the	  JDC	  at	  her	  request.	  244	  Kleiman	  served	  in	  Cuba	  from	  1939	  to	  1940;	  he	  and	  Siegel	  worked	  together	  on	  the	  JRC	  Americanization	  program.	  
	   	   	   137	  come	  to	  Cuba	  to	  assist	  Margolis.	  English	  classes	  had	  been	  conducted	  by	  the	  JRC	  early	  in	  1939,	  but	  were	  discontinued	  with	  the	  onrush	  of	  emergencies	  that	  overwhelmed	  the	  constantly	  growing	  refugee	  community.	  In	  October	  1939	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  “English	  teachers”	  in	  Havana,	  ranging	  from	  refugees	  who	  were	  self-­‐taught	  and	  were	  only	  a	  few	  lessons	  ahead	  of	  their	  students,	  to	  those	  who	  taught	  in	  full-­‐fledged	  English	  business	  schools.	  Tuition	  varied	  from	  a	  few	  cents	  per	  hour	  in	  classes	  of	  60	  to	  80,	  to	  over	  a	  dollar	  per	  hour	  privately.	  English	  teaching	  was	  a	  thriving	  and	  competitive	  profession	  in	  Havana.245	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  JRC	  began	  to	  organize	  free	  English	  classes	  with	  free	  books	  in	  what	  they	  viewed	  as	  “a	  first	  and	  essential	  step	  in	  the	  teaching	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  as	  a	  way	  of	  life.”246	  The	  emphasis	  of	  these	  classes	  was	  on	  speech	  and	  conversation	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  study	  of	  grammar,	  rules,	  and	  lists	  of	  vocabulary	  as	  was	  generally	  the	  German	  practice.	  The	  Sephardic	  Club	  Social	  Chevet	  Ahim247	  cooperated	  in	  the	  effort	  by	  allowing	  the	  JRC	  the	  use	  of	  their	  rooms	  for	  the	  nominal	  fee	  of	  $15	  a	  month,	  and	  qualified	  teachers	  were	  selected	  from	  among	  the	  refugees	  and	  trained	  for	  four	  weeks	  in	  how	  to	  prioritize	  Americanization	  in	  the	  teaching	  of	  English.	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  acquaint	  students	  with	  the	  everyday	  life,	  history	  and	  current	  problems	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  JRC	  received	  books	  and	  educational	  materials	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  Joseph	  Kleiman,	  Report	  of	  the	  English	  Classes	  and	  Americanization	  Program	  of	  the	  
Joint	  Relief	  Committee	  in	  Havana,	  Cuba	  October,	  1939	  -­‐	  April	  1940,	  May	  2,	  1940,	  2,	  1933/44:509,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	  246	  Ibid.	  247	  This	  was	  a	  social	  club	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Sephardic	  congregation.	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  from	  the	  U.S.	  after	  consulting	  with	  educational	  councils	  for	  immigrants,	  state	  boards	  of	  education,	  and	  national	  bodies	  for	  information	  and	  advice.248	  
In	  addition,	  there	  were	  discussion	  groups	  that	  provided	  a	  forum	  for	  advanced	  English	  students	  to	  further	  discuss	  American	  life,	  problems,	  and	  refugee	  adjustment:249	  
The	  subjects	  discussed	  included:	  “The	  Roots	  of	  Democracy,”	  “The	  New	  Deal	  and	  its	  Economic	  Program,”	  “Jews	  in	  the	  USA,”	  “Jewish	  Community	  Life,”	  “Refugees	  in	  the	  USA,”	  “Resettlement	  for	  Refugees,”	  and	  “Elections	  in	  1940.”	  There	  was	  keen	  interest	  and	  participation	  in	  all	  subjects,	  with	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  Jewish	  life	  in	  relation	  to	  refugees.	  Fear	  of	  antisemitic	  movements	  in	  the	  U.S.	  was	  repeatedly	  voiced.250	  The	  teachers	  and	  students	  began	  to	  obtain	  their	  visas	  and	  leave	  Cuba	  and	  the	  number	  of	  refugees	  dwindled:	  in	  1941,	  the	  Americanization	  program	  was	  discontinued.	  
Because	  of	  the	  war,	  people	  remaining	  in	  occupied	  territories	  were	  generally	  unable	  to	  travel,	  so	  on	  February	  4,	  1941,	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  re-­‐distributed	  the	  block	  allotments	  of	  quota	  numbers	  of	  Nazi-­‐controlled	  nations	  to	  U.S.	  consulates	  in	  Canada,	  Mexico	  and	  Cuba.	  This	  redistribution	  resulted	  in	  the	  clearing	  up	  of	  the	  bottleneck	  that	  had	  existed	  in	  Cuba,	  Canada	  and	  Mexico.251	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1941,	  no	  more	  than	  200	  of	  the	  6,000	  who	  had	  taken	  refuge	  in	  Cuba	  remained	  on	  the	  island.252	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  248	  Kleiman,	  Report	  of	  the	  English	  Classes	  and	  Americanization	  Program	  of	  the	  Joint	  
Relief	  Committee	  in	  Havana,	  Cuba	  October,	  1939	  -­‐	  April	  1940,	  3.	  249	  Ibid.,	  4–5.	  250	  Ibid.,	  5.	  251	  “U.S.	  Redistributes	  Quota	  Numbers	  to	  Aid	  Refugees,”	  JTA,	  February	  4,	  1940.	  252	  “JDC	  in	  Action:	  Refugee	  Problem	  in	  Cuba,”	  American	  Hebrew,	  February	  21,	  1941,	  1933/44:511,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  Cuba.	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Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  reviewed	  the	  rise	  in	  antisemitism	  in	  Cuba	  from	  the	  time	  the	  Nazis	  came	  to	  power	  in	  Europe.	  Stirring	  Cuban	  nationalistic	  feelings,	  Nazi	  agents	  and	  sympathizers	  in	  Cuba	  disseminated	  propaganda	  targeting	  the	  Jews	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  press	  and	  radio.	  The	  antisemitic	  attacks	  motivated	  the	  fractured	  Jewish	  communities	  to	  attempt	  to	  unify	  to	  devise	  counter	  measures,	  but	  their	  efforts	  were	  futile,	  as	  they	  could	  not	  come	  to	  agreement	  on	  how	  to	  handle	  the	  crisis.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  greater	  communities	  to	  act,	  some	  of	  the	  prominent	  men	  stepped	  up	  personally,	  using	  their	  own	  funds	  and	  influence	  to	  battle	  the	  antisemitic	  blight	  individually.	  
Things	  came	  to	  a	  crisis	  with	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident.	  Margolis	  was	  the	  first	  to	  sound	  the	  alarm,	  warning	  JDC	  headquarters	  that	  the	  ship	  bearing	  almost	  1,000	  Jewish	  refugees	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  turned	  away	  from	  Cuba.	  Although	  her	  initial	  appeals	  were	  not	  heeded,	  Margolis	  persisted,	  and	  eventually	  succeeded	  in	  bringing	  attorney	  Lawrence	  Berenson	  and	  Cecilia	  Razovsky	  to	  Cuba	  to	  intercede	  with	  the	  government.	  Although	  the	  Americans	  were	  unsuccessful,	  Margolis’	  warnings	  served	  to	  prevent	  a	  similar	  incident,	  as	  another	  ship	  of	  1,000	  refugees	  had	  been	  about	  to	  sail	  for	  Cuba.	  The	  local	  communities	  were	  unable	  to	  unite	  to	  cause	  any	  effective	  change	  during	  this	  crisis,	  but	  the	  American	  Jewish	  communities	  stepped	  in	  through	  the	  JDC	  to	  attempt,	  albeit	  unsuccessfully,	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  positive	  conclusion.	  
Immediately	  following	  the	  St.	  Louis	  incident,	  relationships	  between	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  fractured	  even	  further	  and	  influential	  Jewish	  leaders	  refused	  even	  to	  sit	  down	  together	  in	  the	  same	  room.	  A	  general	  despondency	  came	  over	  the	  Jews	  of	  Cuba.	  As	  the	  War	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  progressed	  and	  fewer	  funds	  became	  available,	  the	  refugees	  began	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  needs.	  They	  formed	  self-­‐help	  committees,	  and	  solicited	  the	  advice	  of	  some	  of	  the	  local	  leaders.	  The	  Unión	  de	  Refugiados,	  consisting	  of	  volunteer	  refugees,	  worked	  closely	  with	  Margolis	  to	  provide	  educational,	  vocational,	  social	  and	  recreational	  opportunities	  that	  were	  needed	  to	  boost	  the	  deteriorating	  refugee	  morale.	  The	  Sephardic	  Jews	  offered	  them	  space	  for	  their	  activities.	  Rabbi	  Lasker	  of	  the	  American	  congregation	  contributed	  by	  starting	  a	  school	  for	  refugee	  children.	  Margolis	  began	  an	  Americanization	  program	  to	  teach	  English,	  practical	  skills,	  and	  to	  prepare	  the	  refugees	  to	  function	  in	  a	  democratic	  society.	  By	  1941,	  most	  of	  the	  refugees	  had	  reached	  their	  quota	  numbers	  and	  the	  refugee	  crisis	  was	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past.	  
Looking	  back,	  some	  Jewish	  residents	  of	  Havana	  accused	  JDC	  of	  doing	  the	  local	  community	  a	  disservice:	  had	  they	  not	  come	  to	  Havana	  at	  all,	  had	  they	  not	  given	  funds	  for	  relief	  and	  assistance,	  had	  they	  kept	  out	  and	  let	  the	  refugees	  fend	  for	  themselves,	  they	  claimed,	  the	  Havana	  community	  would	  have	  had	  to	  assume	  that	  burden	  and	  would	  have	  done	  so	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  self-­‐defense.	  Was	  there	  truth	  to	  this	  statement,	  or	  was	  it	  just	  a	  way	  for	  these	  people	  to	  justify	  their	  inaction?	  While	  the	  communities	  did	  come	  together	  once	  the	  JDC	  was	  unable	  to	  provide	  some	  necessary	  social	  services,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  by	  that	  time,	  the	  number	  of	  refugees	  had	  dwindled	  to	  a	  manageable	  number,	  and	  with	  American	  quotas	  increasing,	  there	  was	  a	  visible	  end	  to	  the	  crisis.	  In	  actuality,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  know	  whether	  JDC’s	  action	  prevented	  Jewish	  community	  cohesion.	  JDC	  was	  seriously	  concerned	  that	  if	  Cuba	  closed	  its	  doors	  due	  to	  the	  refugee	  burden,	  it	  would	  affect	  the	  attitude	  of	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries	  like	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Argentina,	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  Brazil	  and	  others.	  They	  could	  not	  take	  that	  chance	  if	  there	  was	  anything	  they	  could	  do	  to	  prevent	  it,	  and	  they	  knowingly	  poured	  disproportionate	  amounts	  of	  funds	  into	  aiding	  the	  Cuban	  refugees	  as	  long	  as	  they	  were	  able,	  with	  the	  larger	  goal	  of	  allowing	  as	  many	  to	  leave	  Hitler’s	  clutches	  as	  was	  humanly	  possible.253	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  253	  Hyman	  to	  Leipziger,	  October	  1,	  1940,	  4–5.	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  PART	  TWO	  
SHANGHAI	  
Shanghai,	  an	  open	  port	  that	  required	  no	  visas,	  was	  a	  city	  flooded	  with	  refugees	  in	  the	  World	  War	  II	  era.	  In	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  Westerners	  had	  begun	  to	  expand	  their	  trade	  into	  China,	  viewing	  the	  coastal	  town	  of	  Shanghai	  as	  an	  ideal	  location	  to	  develop	  into	  a	  port	  city	  for	  international	  trade.	  After	  military	  conflicts	  known	  as	  the	  Opium	  Wars	  (1839-­‐1842,	  1857-­‐1860),	  a	  series	  of	  treaties	  were	  signed1	  that	  opened	  five	  Chinese	  ports	  to	  trade2	  and	  gave	  Western	  powers	  rights	  of	  territoriality.	  These	  rights	  included	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Western	  powers	  to	  function	  under	  their	  own	  legal	  jurisdictions,	  governed	  by	  their	  own	  municipal	  councils	  and	  fielding	  their	  own	  police	  forces.	  France	  established	  a	  French	  Concession	  in	  Shanghai,	  and	  in	  1863,	  Britain	  and	  America	  jointly	  established	  an	  International	  Concession.	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  war	  in	  1904-­‐1905,	  Japan	  gained	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  northern	  Chinese	  area	  known	  as	  Manchuria,	  but	  lost	  it	  after	  the	  Russian	  revolution	  of	  1917.	  In	  1931,	  Japan	  again	  seized	  territory	  in	  Manchuria	  and	  established	  the	  puppet	  state	  of	  Manchukuo.	  Further	  skirmishes	  and	  battles	  followed,	  climaxing	  in	  the	  1937	  Battle	  of	  Shanghai,	  when	  the	  forces	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Army	  invaded	  that	  city.	  This	  battle	  was	  the	  first	  of	  twenty-­‐two	  battles	  now	  known	  as	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Known	  as	  “unequal	  treaties”	  because	  they	  favored	  the	  Western	  powers,	  these	  included	  the	  treaties	  of	  Nanjing	  and	  Bogue	  with	  Britain	  in	  1842	  and	  1843,	  the	  Wangxia	  treaty	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  Whampoa	  treaty	  with	  France	  in	  1844.	  (Marcia	  R.	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort:	  The	  Diaspora	  Communities	  of	  Shanghai	  (Stanford,	  Calif.:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  7.)	  2	  The	  five	  ports	  were	  then	  known	  as	  Canton,	  Amoy,	  Foochow,	  Ningpo	  and	  Shanghai.	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  fiercest.	  Following	  this	  campaign,	  which	  involved	  almost	  a	  million	  troops,	  the	  Japanese	  occupied	  those	  parts	  of	  Shanghai	  that	  were	  administered	  by	  the	  Chinese,	  respecting	  the	  Western	  treaties,	  leaving	  in	  place	  the	  International	  and	  French	  Concessions,	  and	  allowing	  Shanghai	  to	  remain	  an	  open	  port.	  This	  status	  quo	  remained	  until	  World	  War	  II,	  when	  Japan	  joined	  the	  Axis	  powers,	  attacked	  Pearl	  Harbor	  (1941),	  and	  the	  British	  and	  Americans	  became	  enemy	  nationals	  and	  were	  imprisoned	  in	  Japanese	  internment	  camps.3	  	  
Meanwhile,	  among	  the	  many	  groups	  that	  had	  found	  shelter	  in	  the	  city	  were	  Jews	  who	  were	  fleeing	  the	  Nazi	  terror.	  Unlike	  the	  Cuban	  refugees,	  most	  of	  these	  people	  did	  not	  have	  visas	  to	  the	  US	  or	  other	  locations.	  For	  them,	  Shanghai	  became	  a	  temporary	  refuge	  as	  they	  awaited	  permission	  to	  emigrate	  to	  a	  permanent	  destination.	  The	  existing	  Jewish	  communities	  attempted	  to	  assist	  them	  but	  were	  soon	  forced	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  international	  Jewish	  community	  for	  help.	  One	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  will	  be	  on	  the	  American	  response	  to	  that	  request	  for	  help	  through	  the	  JDC	  and	  its	  interaction	  with	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities.	  Another	  focus	  will	  be	  Japanese	  response	  to	  the	  increasing	  Nazi	  pressure	  to	  oppress	  the	  Jews	  who	  had	  sought	  refuge	  in	  Shanghai.	  
This	  study	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  partial	  rebuttal	  to	  the	  historiography	  that	  has	  often	  been	  critical	  of	  American	  Jewry,	  charging	  them	  with	  inaction	  in	  light	  of	  the	  dire	  need	  of	  European	  Jews.	  Through	  funding,	  leadership,	  and	  moral	  support,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  representative	  in	  Shanghai	  was	  the	  key	  element	  that	  enabled	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  more	  on	  the	  Russo-­‐	  and	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  wars,	  see	  John	  W.	  Steinberg	  and	  David	  Wolff,	  The	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  in	  Global	  Perspective:	  World	  War	  Zero	  (Leiden;	  Boston:	  Brill,	  2005);	  and	  Mark	  R.	  Peattie,	  Edward	  J.	  Drea,	  and	  Hans	  J.	  Van	  de	  Ven,	  The	  Battle	  for	  China:	  
Essays	  on	  the	  Military	  History	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  of	  1937-­‐1945	  (Stanford,	  Calif.:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2011).	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  refugees	  to	  survive	  the	  War.	  And	  as	  in	  Cuba,	  it	  will	  become	  apparent	  that	  differences	  among	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  hindered	  the	  relief	  work	  that	  was	  being	  organized	  and	  funded	  by	  the	  JDC.	  However,	  once	  JDC	  support	  was	  cut	  off	  due	  to	  a	  new	  theater	  of	  war	  opening	  in	  the	  Pacific,	  the	  refugees	  did	  manage	  to	  unite	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  own	  social	  and	  cultural	  needs.	  
Much	  of	  the	  documentation	  from	  this	  period	  was	  lost	  or	  destroyed	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  War.	  David	  Kranzler,	  in	  his	  early	  study	  of	  the	  Jewish	  refugee	  community	  of	  Shanghai,	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  new	  and	  more	  detailed	  historical	  scholarship	  by	  painstakingly	  gathering	  documentation	  from	  private	  sources	  and	  personal	  accounts.	  Although	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  his	  analysis	  tends	  to	  be	  biased	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Orthodox	  elements,	  his	  book,	  Japanese,	  
Nazis	  &	  Jews,	  is	  still	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  standard	  histories	  of	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai.4	  	  
Several	  recent	  studies	  have	  focused	  on	  individual	  communities	  in	  Shanghai.	  Chiara	  Betta	  addressed	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  Baghdadi	  Sassoon	  family	  as	  the	  “Rothschilds	  of	  the	  East,”	  refuting	  the	  distorted	  view	  of	  Baghdadi	  Jews	  as	  “wealthy,	  Anglicized,	  and	  thoroughly	  integrated	  in	  British	  social	  circles”	  and	  highlighting	  the	  class	  divisions	  that	  existed	  within	  Baghdadi	  communities.5	  Marcia	  Reynders	  Ristaino	  focused	  her	  extensive	  primary	  research	  on	  the	  complex	  interrelation	  between	  two	  other	  exiled	  communities	  in	  Shanghai:	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  also	  David	  Kranzler’s	  doctoral	  dissertation	  at	  Yeshiva	  University,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945”	  (Bernard	  Revel	  Graduate	  School,	  Yeshiva	  University,	  1971);	  this	  later	  became	  the	  book,	  Japanese,	  Nazis	  &	  Jews:	  The	  
Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945	  (New	  York:	  Yeshiva	  University	  Press,	  1976).	  5	  Chiara	  Betta,	  “From	  Orientals	  to	  Imagined	  Britons:	  Baghdadi	  Jews	  in	  Shanghai,”	  
Modern	  Asian	  Studies	  37,	  no.	  4	  (October	  1,	  2003):	  999–1023.	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  traditionally	  antisemitic	  White	  Russians,	  remnants	  of	  Admiral	  Alexander	  Kolchak’s	  “White	  Army”	  who	  fled	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  the	  1920s,	  and	  the	  Central	  European	  and	  German	  refugees.	  	  
The	  German	  and	  Austrian	  refugees,	  who	  were	  forced	  to	  leave	  their	  possessions	  behind	  and	  who	  arrived	  penniless,	  viewed	  Shanghai	  as	  a	  temporary	  destination	  and	  found	  themselves	  completely	  dependent	  on	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  existing	  Jewish	  communities.6	  The	  local	  communities	  did	  provide	  assistance	  but	  were	  quickly	  unable	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  increasing	  influx	  of	  impoverished	  immigrants	  and	  splintered	  into	  several	  groups	  and	  factions	  organized	  to	  aid	  the	  refugees.	  This	  lack	  of	  cohesiveness	  prevented	  them	  from	  working	  together	  to	  provide	  the	  needed	  support.	  Powerful	  individuals	  in	  each	  faction	  attempted	  to	  wrest	  control,	  behaving	  toward	  the	  refugees	  in	  a	  hard	  and	  dictatorial	  manner.	  The	  absolute	  control	  they	  demanded	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  widespread	  corruption,	  as	  they	  would	  not	  accept	  financial	  or	  leadership	  accountability.	  These	  many	  factions	  in	  the	  established	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  communities	  lacked	  the	  mutual	  trust	  that	  would	  have	  enabled	  them	  to	  work	  together	  effectively.	  
The	  JDC	  responded	  to	  the	  request	  for	  help	  by	  sending	  one	  of	  their	  key	  workers,	  Laura	  Margolis.	  Margolis,	  who	  could	  have	  remained	  in	  America	  as	  the	  Pacific	  War	  loomed,	  instead	  traveled	  to	  East	  Asia	  in	  1941	  to	  expedite	  the	  emigration	  of	  the	  stateless	  refugees.	  She	  established	  contact	  with	  the	  American	  consulate	  and	  developed	  systems	  to	  expedite	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  a	  theoretical	  study	  on	  the	  dynamics	  of	  immigration	  chains,	  see	  Christian	  Helmenstein	  and	  Yury	  Yegorov,	  “The	  Dynamics	  of	  Migration	  in	  the	  Presence	  of	  Chains,”	  
Journal	  of	  Economic	  Dynamics	  and	  Control	  24,	  no.	  2	  (2000):	  307–23.	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  the	  refugee	  emigration	  process.	  Once	  she	  felt	  her	  task	  was	  well	  on	  its	  way,	  seeing	  the	  great	  need	  for	  relief,	  she	  remained	  there	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  refugees.	  	  
Margolis,	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  American	  Jews	  through	  the	  JDC,	  not	  only	  brought	  with	  her	  American	  funds	  and	  efficiency,	  but	  also	  attempted	  to	  infuse	  American	  democratic	  ideals	  into	  the	  refugee	  communities.	  In	  doing	  so,	  she	  acted	  as	  an	  intermediary	  between	  the	  warring	  factions	  and	  a	  force	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  spur	  the	  fractured	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Shanghai	  into	  cohesive	  action.	  	  
The	  following	  chapters	  will	  first	  examine	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Jewish	  settlements	  in	  Shanghai,	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  refugees	  from	  Nazism,	  and	  the	  response	  of	  America’s	  Jews	  through	  the	  JDC	  to	  the	  call	  for	  help.	  After	  this,	  the	  changes	  in	  Shanghai	  after	  the	  Pacific	  War	  broke	  out	  will	  be	  explored.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  American	  workers	  became	  enemy	  nationals	  and	  all	  funds	  and	  contact	  with	  the	  United	  States	  were	  lost.	  The	  final	  chapter	  in	  this	  section	  will	  trace	  the	  encroachment	  of	  antisemitism	  in	  Shanghai	  under	  Nazi	  influence,	  which	  culminated	  in	  the	  “ghettoization”	  of	  the	  German	  and	  Austrian	  refugees.	  
Using	  mainly	  the	  extensive	  materials	  in	  the	  JDC	  archives,	  the	  Shanghai	  Collection	  of	  the	  YIVO	  Institute	  for	  Jewish	  Research,	  and	  the	  archives	  of	  Yad	  Vashem,	  these	  chapters	  will	  examine	  the	  many	  difficulties	  encountered	  by	  the	  disparate	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Shanghai	  during	  the	  Holocaust,	  and	  the	  American	  efforts	  to	  maximize	  aid.	  Context	  will	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  records	  of	  the	  Union	  of	  Sephardic	  congregations,	  HIAS-­‐HICEM	  records,	  newspaper	  articles	  from	  the	  Chushan	  Road	  Chatter	  (a	  newspaper	  published	  by	  the	  refugees),	  contemporary	  issues	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook,	  as	  well	  as	  archives	  of	  the	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  Telegraphic	  Association,	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  personal	  memoirs,	  and	  additional	  periodicals	  and	  archives.	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  CHAPTER	  THREE	  
SHANGHAI	  BEFORE	  PEARL	  HARBOR	  
AN	  UNLIKELY	  HAVEN	  
The	  Jewish	  Communities	  of	  Shanghai	  
This	  section	  will	  set	  the	  context	  to	  understand	  the	  multifaceted	  Jewish	  communities	  that	  resided	  in	  Shanghai	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  refugees	  from	  Nazism.	  Made	  up	  of	  different	  waves	  of	  immigration	  from	  various	  locations,	  the	  Jews	  of	  Shanghai	  were	  not	  one	  community	  but	  many.	  It	  was	  these	  differences	  of	  national	  origin,	  religious	  observance	  and	  ideology	  that	  prevented	  the	  existing	  Jewish	  leadership	  from	  acting	  in	  a	  unified	  manner	  to	  aid	  the	  incoming	  refugees	  from	  Nazi	  Europe.	  
❋ In	  1941,	  Shanghai	  had	  a	  Jewish	  population	  of	  over	  25,000.	  The	  first	  wave	  of	  Jewish	  immigrants	  had	  arrived	  in	  1845,	  when	  Shanghai	  became	  one	  of	  five	  new	  Treaty	  Ports	  opened	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  First	  Opium	  War	  (1839-­‐1842).	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Nanking,	  which	  set	  aside	  ten	  square	  miles	  of	  Shanghai	  for	  foreign	  residence,	  opened	  up	  trade,	  and	  Sephardic	  Jews	  from	  India	  and	  Iraq	  under	  British	  protection	  migrated	  there	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  opium	  trade,1	  the	  sale	  of	  cotton	  yarn,	  paper	  and	  flour	  and	  other	  commercial	  activities.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Opium	  was	  not	  illegal	  in	  England	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  was	  made	  legal	  in	  China	  after	  the	  Second	  Opium	  War	  in	  1860.	  For	  the	  Jewish	  participation	  in	  the	  opium	  trade,	  see	  Maisie	  J.	  Meyer,	  “Baghdadi	  Jewish	  Merchants	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  the	  Opium	  Trade,”	  Jewish	  Culture	  and	  
History	  2,	  no.	  1	  (1999):	  58–71.	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  Sephardic	  community	  was	  small	  in	  numbers—at	  its	  peak	  it	  numbered	  around	  700—but	  was	  influential	  because	  of	  its	  wealth	  and	  international	  connections.	  	  
These	  Sephardic	  Jewish	  immigrants	  came	  to	  play	  a	  large	  part	  in	  the	  development	  of	  trade	  in	  China,	  and	  participated	  in	  civic	  councils.2	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  many	  of	  them	  had	  achieved	  success	  in	  banking,	  public	  utilities,	  the	  stock	  exchange,	  real	  estate	  markets	  and	  industrial	  development.3	  The	  most	  successful	  of	  the	  families	  were	  the	  Sassoons,4	  Kadoories,5	  Hardoons,6	  Ezras	  and	  Hayims,	  who	  were	  able	  to	  establish	  branches	  of	  their	  family	  enterprises	  as	  well	  as	  purchase	  land	  in	  the	  small	  village	  of	  Shanghai	  at	  very	  low	  prices.	  These	  immigrants	  later	  built	  many	  of	  the	  city’s	  major	  buildings,	  such	  as	  the	  Cathay	  Hotel,	  Cathay	  Mansions,	  the	  Metropole	  Hotel,	  Sassoon	  House,	  Grosvenor	  House,	  Hamilton	  House	  and	  the	  Embankment	  Building.	  In	  1887,	  this	  community	  organized	  Congregation	  Beth	  El,	  which	  in	  1920	  became	  the	  Ohel	  Rachel	  Synagogue,	  named	  after	  Lady	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  See	  Betta,	  “From	  Orientals	  to	  Imagined	  Britons.”	  3	  Maisie	  J.	  Meyer,	  “Baghdadi	  Jews	  in	  Early	  Shanghai,”	  The	  Sino-­‐Judaic	  Institute,	  accessed	  September	  9,	  2013,	  http://www.sino-­‐judaic.org/index.php?page=shanghai_history;	  See	  also	  Maisie	  Meyer,	  The	  Sephardi	  Jewish	  
Community	  of	  Shanghai	  1839-­‐1939	  and	  the	  Question	  of	  Identity.,	  1994.	  4	  The	  pioneer	  of	  the	  Sephardic	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Shanghai	  was	  Elias	  Sassoon	  (1820-­‐1880),	  the	  son	  of	  David	  Sassoon	  (1792-­‐1864),	  patriarch	  of	  the	  Baghdadi	  Jews	  in	  Bombay.	  The	  family	  was	  the	  most	  prominent	  in	  Shanghai,	  and	  known	  as	  the	  “Rothschilds	  of	  the	  East.”	  (Péter	  Vámos,	  “‘Home	  Afar’:	  The	  Life	  of	  Central	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  World	  War	  II,”	  Pacific	  Rim	  Report,	  University	  of	  San	  Francisco,	  November	  2001,	  2;	  see	  also	  Cecil	  Roth,	  The	  Sassoon	  Dynasty	  (Arno	  Press,	  1977).)	  5	  For	  more	  on	  the	  Kadoorie	  family	  history	  and	  activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  see	  Gang	  Yuan	  Hu,	  Shanghai,	  Hong	  Kong,	  the	  Kadoorie	  Family	  (Hong	  Kong:	  Hong	  Kong	  Heritage	  Project,	  2010).	  6	  For	  more	  on	  the	  Hardoon	  family,	  see	  Chiara	  Betta,	  “Silas	  Aaron	  Hardoon	  (1815-­‐1931):	  Marginality	  and	  Adaptation	  in	  Shanghai,”	  1997.	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  Rachel	  Sassoon,	  the	  wife	  of	  Sir	  Jacob	  Elias	  Sassoon.	  Ohel	  Rachel	  was	  the	  first	  of	  seven	  synagogues	  to	  be	  built	  in	  Shanghai.7	  
While	  Stanley	  Jackson,	  Cecil	  Roth	  and	  others8	  have	  helped	  to	  perpetuate	  the	  myth	  that	  Baghdadi	  Jews	  were	  wealthy,	  Anglicized	  and	  thoroughly	  integrated	  into	  British	  social	  circles,	  the	  reality	  was	  far	  more	  complex.	  Betta	  argues	  that	  there	  were	  deep	  class	  divisions	  within	  the	  Baghdadi	  Jewish	  community.	  The	  affluent	  Baghdadis	  “…were	  forced	  to	  confront	  painfully	  their	  own	  ‘other’:	  destitute	  vagrant	  co-­‐religionists	  who	  hailed	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  India	  and	  roamed	  between	  the	  various	  nodes	  of	  the	  Baghdadi	  diaspora.”9	  Betta	  argues	  that	  the	  wealthy	  Baghdadi	  families	  were	  loath	  to	  undermine	  their	  imagined	  British	  identity.	  Thus,	  while	  generous	  to	  their	  own	  workers,	  they	  were	  “…not	  always	  inclined	  to	  aid	  poorer	  co-­‐religionists,	  especially	  vagrant	  Jews	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  origin	  who	  sought	  alms	  in	  the	  communities	  of	  the	  Baghdadi	  trade	  diaspora,”	  lest	  they	  be	  identified	  with	  them.10	  When	  it	  came	  to	  aiding	  Russian	  and	  European	  Jewish	  immigrants,	  however,	  the	  wealthy	  Sephardic	  families	  from	  Baghdad	  rose	  to	  the	  occasion.	  	  
The	  second	  wave	  of	  immigration	  began	  as	  Russian	  Jews	  fled	  Czarist	  persecution	  and	  the	  pogroms	  of	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  These	  Russian	  Jews	  came	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  four	  waves:	  1895-­‐1904,	  1905-­‐17,	  1932-­‐34,	  and	  1937-­‐39.11	  The	  pace	  of	  immigration	  increased	  after	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  “Shanghai	  Jewish	  History,”	  The	  Second	  Wave	  of	  Jewish	  Migration	  to	  Shanghai	  (1920-­‐
1937),	  accessed	  July	  24,	  2014,	  http://www.chinajewish.org/SJC/Jhistory.htm.	  8	  See,	  for	  example,	  Stanley	  Jackson,	  The	  Sassoons	  (New	  York:	  Dutton,	  1968);	  see	  also	  Roth,	  The	  Sassoon	  Dynasty;	  and	  Meyer,	  “Baghdadi	  Jews	  in	  Early	  Shanghai.”	  9	  Betta,	  “From	  Orientals	  to	  Imagined	  Britons,”	  999.	  10	  Ibid.,	  1004.	  11	  Meyer,	  “Baghdadi	  Jews	  in	  Early	  Shanghai.”	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  Russian	  Revolution	  of	  1918,	  when	  Jews	  fled	  the	  Communist	  takeover	  via	  the	  Trans-­‐Siberian	  Railway	  and	  Harbin.	  Shanghai,	  by	  then	  a	  relatively	  modern	  city,	  attracted	  the	  immigrants.	  The	  majority	  of	  those	  who	  arrived	  after	  the	  Revolution	  were	  poor,	  Russian-­‐speaking	  immigrants	  who	  had	  suffered	  persecution.	  
Although	  the	  Russian	  immigrants	  were	  culturally	  different	  and	  spoke	  a	  different	  language,	  the	  Sephardic	  community	  extended	  aid	  to	  them,	  and	  in	  time	  they	  were	  able	  to	  establish	  retail	  businesses,	  boarding	  houses,	  and	  bars	  for	  the	  many	  foreign	  soldiers	  who	  were	  stationed	  in	  Shanghai.	  By	  the	  1930s,	  they	  had	  grown	  to	  around	  6,000	  persons—six	  times	  the	  population	  of	  the	  Sephardic	  Jews—and	  established	  several	  synagogues	  of	  their	  own.	  This	  Ashkenazi	  community	  never	  did	  attain	  the	  wealth	  or	  distinction	  of	  the	  Baghdadi	  Jews,12	  but	  because	  they	  arrived	  at	  a	  time	  of	  economic	  growth	  in	  Shanghai,	  they	  eventually	  constituted	  a	  comfortable	  middle	  class,	  largely	  made	  up	  of	  merchants,	  brokers,	  and	  dealers	  in	  the	  import-­‐export	  trade.13	  	  
The	  general	  population	  of	  Shanghai	  increased	  greatly	  between	  the	  wars,	  growing	  to	  4.5	  million	  inhabitants.	  Real	  estate	  in	  Shanghai’s	  International	  Settlement	  and	  French	  Concession14	  went	  up	  in	  value	  tenfold	  as	  Shanghai	  became	  the	  fifth	  greatest	  harbor	  in	  the	  world,	  its	  port	  handling	  a	  major	  portion	  of	  China’s	  imports	  and	  exports.15	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  “The	  Chronology	  of	  the	  Jews	  of	  Shanghai	  from	  1832	  to	  the	  Present,”	  accessed	  June	  25,	  2013,	  http://www.jewsofchina.org/jewsofchina/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=84&FID=890.	  13	  Laura	  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  Survey	  Graphic,	  March	  1944,	  168,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  Israel	  Records,	  Shanghai	  1938-­‐1947.	  14	  Shanghai	  was	  divided	  into	  three	  districts,	  with	  the	  Chinese	  sections	  in	  the	  northern	  and	  southern	  parts	  of	  the	  city	  separated	  by	  foreign	  concessions—the	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  This	  prosperity	  was	  interrupted	  in	  July	  1937,	  when	  the	  “Battle	  of	  Shanghai”	  broke	  out	  between	  China	  and	  Japan,	  resulting	  in	  three	  months	  of	  heavy	  fighting	  and	  fierce	  air	  assaults	  and	  culminating	  with	  the	  Japanese	  occupying	  the	  city.	  Thousands	  of	  civilians	  died	  and	  within	  weeks	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  destitute	  Chinese	  fled	  to	  Shanghai	  from	  the	  surrounding	  areas	  that	  were	  devastated	  by	  Japanese	  attacks.	  Bombed	  out	  homes	  where	  once	  one	  or	  two	  families	  had	  lived	  suddenly	  housed	  hundreds	  of	  homeless	  Chinese.16	  But	  soon,	  committees	  and	  camps	  sprung	  up	  to	  care	  for	  the	  refugees—by	  December	  1937,	  there	  were	  161	  camps	  in	  the	  International	  Settlement	  alone,	  providing	  for	  approximately	  97,000	  refugees.17	  According	  to	  Christian	  Henriot,	  Chinese	  society	  was	  structured	  in	  a	  “dense	  network	  of	  associations,	  especially	  native	  place	  associations,	  that	  bore	  the	  brunt	  of	  supporting	  and	  managing	  the	  refugee	  population.”18	  Because	  of	  the	  strong	  civic	  support	  network	  and	  through	  family	  and	  friends,	  many	  of	  the	  displaced	  Chinese	  were	  able	  to	  find	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  International	  Settlement,	  which	  was	  British	  and	  American	  and	  governed	  administratively	  by	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Council,	  composed	  of	  British,	  Japanese,	  Chinese	  and	  American	  officials;	  and	  the	  French	  Concession,	  governed	  by	  the	  French	  Consul	  General.	  These	  areas	  were	  responsible	  to	  maintain	  their	  own	  courts,	  police,	  and	  armed	  forces	  (Vámos,	  “‘Home	  Afar’:	  The	  Life	  of	  Central	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  World	  War	  II,”	  1–2;	  for	  more	  on	  the	  geographic	  organization	  of	  Shanghai,	  see	  Irene	  Eber,	  “Overland	  and	  By	  Sea:	  Eight	  Centuries	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Presence	  in	  China,”	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  4,	  no.	  1	  (June	  2005):	  235–56).	  15	  “The	  Chronology	  of	  the	  Jews	  of	  Shanghai	  from	  1832	  to	  the	  Present.”	  16	  Christian	  Henriot,	  “Shanghai	  and	  the	  Experience	  of	  War:	  The	  Fate	  of	  Refugees,”	  
European	  Journal	  of	  East	  Asian	  Studies	  5,	  no.	  2	  (January	  1,	  2006):	  225–226.	  17	  Shanghai	  Public	  Health	  Department,	  December	  1937,	  U15-­‐1-­‐1032,	  SMA,	  cited	  in	  ibid.,	  227.	  18	  Ibid.,	  244.	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  solution	  within	  eighteen	  months	  and	  the	  crowded	  conditions	  in	  Shanghai	  were	  somewhat	  eased.19	  
It	  was	  soon	  after	  this	  major	  upheaval,	  in	  1938,	  that	  the	  third	  and	  largest	  wave	  of	  Jewish	  immigration	  began.	  The	  Jews	  of	  Germany	  had	  been	  exposed	  to	  various	  degrees	  of	  antisemitism	  and	  had	  slowly	  experienced	  the	  erosion	  of	  their	  rights	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  citizenship.	  The	  discrimination	  for	  Austrian	  Jews	  occurred	  much	  more	  suddenly	  after	  the	  
Anschluss.	  Under	  this	  increasing	  pressure,	  German	  and	  Austrian	  Jews	  were	  faced	  with	  the	  difficult	  decision	  to	  abandon	  everything	  and	  flee	  their	  homeland,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  most	  of	  the	  world	  was	  shutting	  its	  doors	  to	  Jewish	  immigration.	  However,	  Shanghai	  in	  1938	  did	  not	  require	  visas	  or	  landing	  permits,	  and	  thus	  became	  one	  of	  the	  last	  available	  destinations	  for	  Jews	  seeking	  to	  flee	  the	  Nazi	  menace.	  	  
At	  the	  time,	  the	  thought	  of	  Shanghai	  as	  a	  possible	  refuge	  would	  have	  been	  frighteningly	  alarming	  to	  most	  German	  Jews.	  Stella	  Dong	  describes	  Shanghai’s	  reputation	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s	  as:	  
…the	  most	  pleasure-­‐mad,	  rapacious,	  corrupt,	  strife-­‐ridden,	  licentious,	  squalid	  and	  decadent	  city	  in	  the	  world…	  greed	  was	  its	  driving	  force…	  calamity	  was	  always	  at	  the	  door…	  it	  catered	  to	  every	  depravity	  known	  to	  man…	  misery	  stared	  one	  brazenly	  in	  the	  face…[and]	  morality	  was	  irrelevant.20	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ibid.	  20	  Stella	  Dong,	  Shanghai:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  a	  Decadent	  City	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  William	  Morrow,	  2000),	  1.	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  Many	  Jewish	  leaders	  did	  not	  consider	  Shanghai	  a	  viable	  option	  at	  all,21	  but	  after	  the	  Evian	  Conference	  in	  July	  1938,	  as	  the	  nations	  of	  the	  world	  began	  to	  close	  their	  doors	  to	  further	  immigration,	  Shanghai	  became	  just	  about	  the	  last	  choice	  for	  the	  immigrants.	  	  
Running	  out	  of	  options,	  thousands	  of	  refugees	  seeking	  to	  escape	  from	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  traveled	  by	  train	  to	  Italy,	  and	  the	  majority	  then	  boarded	  ships	  of	  the	  Lloyd-­‐Triestino	  line,	  which	  ran	  a	  luxury	  service	  between	  Italy	  and	  Shanghai.	  The	  most	  common	  route	  was	  a	  thirty-­‐day	  cruise	  from	  Genoa	  to	  Port	  Said	  to	  Suez	  to	  Colombo,	  Ceylon,	  to	  Singapore	  to	  Manila	  and	  then	  to	  Shanghai.22	  	  
The	  refugees,	  however,	  took	  comfort	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  Shanghai	  was	  only	  a	  temporary	  refuge	  for	  their	  eventual	  entry	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  England,	  Australia,	  or	  Palestine.	  They	  never	  imagined	  they	  might	  be	  stranded	  there	  for	  seven	  years	  or	  more.23	  
The	  German	  and	  Austrian	  refugees	  who	  arrived	  in	  China	  were	  not	  a	  homogeneous	  group.	  They	  represented	  a	  variety	  of	  economic,	  religious,	  political,	  class	  and	  cultural	  backgrounds	  and	  rifts	  frequently	  formed	  between	  them.	  But	  no	  matter	  how	  wealthy	  they	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  Avraham	  Altman	  and	  Irene	  Eber,	  “Flight	  to	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1940:	  The	  Larger	  Setting,”	  Yad	  Vashem	  Studies	  28	  (2000):	  53.	  22	  Other	  ship	  lines	  traveled	  to	  Shanghai	  as	  well,	  including	  the	  North	  German	  Lloyd	  line	  and	  the	  Hamburg	  American	  Steamship	  Company,	  as	  well	  as	  various	  Japanese	  lines.	  (See	  Alvin	  Mars,	  “A	  Note	  on	  the	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  Jewish	  Social	  Studies	  31,	  no.	  4	  (October	  1969):	  286;	  see	  also	  David	  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  Jewish	  Social	  Studies	  36,	  no.	  1	  (January	  1,	  1974):	  54;	  see	  also	  Susanne	  Wiedemann,	  “Transnational	  Encounters	  with	  ‘Amerika’:	  German	  Jewish	  Refugees’	  Identity	  Formation	  in	  Berlin	  and	  Shanghai,	  1939-­‐-­‐1949”	  (Ph.D.,	  Brown	  University,	  2006),	  14.)	  23	  Wiedemann,	  “Transnational	  Encounters	  with	  ‘Amerika,’”	  69.	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  had	  been,	  in	  late	  1938	  refugees	  leaving	  Germany	  were	  required	  to	  pay	  heavy	  exit	  taxes	  and	  were	  only	  allowed	  to	  take	  one	  handbag	  and	  ten	  Reichsmarks	  out	  of	  Germany,	  and	  an	  additional	  150	  Reichsmarks	  in	  “on-­‐board”	  money	  to	  spend	  on	  the	  ship.24	  Forward-­‐thinking	  refugees	  used	  these	  funds	  to	  purchase	  as	  many	  luxury	  items	  as	  they	  could	  on	  board,	  in	  order	  to	  resell	  them	  later	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  be	  able	  to	  sustain	  themselves	  or	  establish	  small	  businesses.25	  But	  overall,	  the	  refugees	  who	  arrived	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  this	  period	  had	  very	  few	  resources	  of	  their	  own.	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  February	  1939,	  2,500	  Jewish	  refugees	  had	  come	  to	  Shanghai,	  and	  by	  March	  the	  number	  had	  reached	  4,000	  as	  hysteria	  spread	  in	  Europe.	  By	  April,	  there	  were	  7,000	  Jewish	  refugees,	  and	  by	  May	  9,000	  had	  arrived	  in	  Shanghai.26	  
This	  massive	  German-­‐Austrian	  exodus	  to	  Shanghai	  continued	  until	  August	  1939,	  when	  the	  Japanese	  Authorities	  of	  the	  Army,	  Navy	  and	  Consulate	  General	  took	  up	  the	  matter	  of	  refugee	  immigration.	  Finally,	  on	  August	  21,	  1939,	  the	  Japanese	  placed	  strict	  restrictions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Some	  of	  the	  earliest	  arrivals	  were	  allowed	  to	  bring	  some	  of	  their	  possessions,	  including	  tools	  and	  instruments	  of	  their	  profession	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  personal	  baggage.	  This	  practice	  was	  later	  stopped.	  (Felix	  Gruenberger,	  “The	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  
Jewish	  Social	  Studies	  12,	  no.	  4	  (October	  1,	  1950):	  330;	  see	  also	  Vámos,	  “‘Home	  Afar’:	  The	  Life	  of	  Central	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  World	  War	  II,”	  4.)	  25	  Mars,	  “A	  Note	  on	  the	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  287.	  26	  Ibid.,	  288.	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  upon	  any	  further	  immigration	  to	  Japanese-­‐occupied	  Shanghai.27	  By	  then,	  over	  17,000	  refugees	  had	  made	  their	  way	  to	  the	  port	  of	  Shanghai	  and	  were	  struggling	  to	  survive.28	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  Japanese	  ban,	  in	  1941	  there	  was	  a	  small	  additional	  migration	  of	  900	  to	  1,000	  Polish	  Jews,	  including	  the	  entire	  Mir	  Yeshiva,	  which	  had	  set	  out	  together	  as	  a	  school,	  and	  was	  the	  only	  yeshiva	  in	  which	  all	  its	  members	  survived	  the	  Holocaust.29	  These	  religious	  Jews	  had	  traveled	  by	  train	  from	  Poland	  to	  Lithuania,	  then	  to	  Vladivostok	  via	  the	  Trans-­‐Siberian	  Railroad,	  and	  from	  there	  by	  ship	  to	  Kobe,	  Japan,	  where	  they	  had	  settled	  temporarily	  until	  the	  Japanese	  relocated	  them	  to	  Shanghai.	  The	  refugees	  had	  been	  able	  to	  land	  in	  Kobe	  because	  they	  possessed	  bogus	  landing	  permits	  to	  Curaçao	  issued	  to	  thousands	  by	  the	  Japanese	  Vice-­‐Consul	  in	  Lithuania,	  Chiune	  Sugihara.30	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Koreshige	  Inuzuka	  to	  Captain	  Herzberg,	  September	  17,	  1941,	  1,	  AJDC	  Israel	  Records,	  Shanghai	  1938-­‐1947.	  28	  As	  Ristaino	  and	  others	  have	  observed,	  refugee	  figures	  in	  Shanghai	  were	  inherently	  unreliable,	  since	  there	  was	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  movement	  in	  and	  out	  of	  refugee	  camps	  and	  services.	  (Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  5.)	  29	  For	  more	  on	  the	  Mir	  Yeshiva,	  see	  Marvin	  Tokayer,	  The	  Fugu	  Plan:	  The	  Untold	  Story	  
of	  the	  Japanese	  and	  the	  Jews	  during	  World	  War	  II	  (New	  York:	  Paddington	  Press,	  1979);	  Andrew	  Tewner,	  Miraculous	  Journey:	  The	  Escape	  of	  the	  Mir	  Yeshiva	  from	  the	  Holocaust,	  1987;	  see	  also	  “Religious	  Schools	  and	  Yeshivas,”	  1941,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  Shanghai	  Collection,	  Cultural	  and	  Educational	  Activities,	  1929-­‐1947,	  RG	  243,	  50	  (3/510).	  For	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  Chinese	  and	  Jewish	  memory	  tradition,	  see	  Vera	  Schwarcz,	  Bridge	  Across	  Broken	  
Time:	  Chinese	  and	  Jewish	  Cultural	  Memory	  (Yale	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  30	  Joseph	  Fiszman,	  “The	  Quest	  for	  Status:	  Polish	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,	  1941-­‐1949,”	  The	  Polish	  Review	  XLIII,	  no.	  3	  (1998):	  441.	  See	  “Japan	  Bars	  Further	  Transit	  of	  Polish	  Jewish	  Refugees;	  Cites	  Congestion,”	  JTA,	  March	  18,	  1941;	  see	  also	  Hillel	  Levine,	  In	  Search	  of	  
Sugihara:	  The	  Elusive	  Japanese	  Diplomat	  Who	  Risked	  His	  Life	  to	  Rescue	  10,000	  Jews	  from	  the	  
Holocaust	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1996).	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Community	  Aid	  Efforts	  
Guided	  by	  strong	  traditional	  values,	  each	  of	  the	  preexisting	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Shanghai	  attempted	  to	  the	  best	  of	  their	  abilities	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  incoming	  coreligionists.	  However,	  the	  different	  factions	  of	  the	  established	  communities	  were	  not	  able	  to	  combine	  their	  efforts,	  resulting	  in	  an	  inability	  to	  adequately	  provide	  for	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  refugees	  who	  came	  to	  them	  for	  help.	  
❋ 
Before	  the	  current	  refugee	  crisis,	  the	  Jews	  of	  Shanghai	  had	  reached	  out	  for	  aid	  through	  international	  Jewish	  connections.	  In	  1937,	  they	  had	  appealed	  to	  American	  Jews	  to	  aid	  Jewish	  victims	  of	  Japanese	  attacks	  during	  the	  Battle	  of	  Shanghai,	  and	  the	  Americans	  had	  responded.31	  In	  November	  1937,	  Alfred	  M.	  Colin,	  president	  of	  B’nai	  B’rith,	  announced	  that	  the	  B’nai	  B’rith	  emergency	  relief	  fund	  was	  cabling	  “a	  substantial	  sum”	  to	  the	  Jewish	  Emergency	  Relief	  Committee	  of	  Shanghai.	  This	  was	  in	  response	  to	  a	  story	  carried	  earlier	  that	  month	  by	  the	  Jewish	  Telegraphic	  Agency	  (JTA)	  charging	  American	  Jewry	  with	  “apparent	  indifference”	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  Shanghai’s	  Jews.32	  The	  JTA’s	  reference	  to	  this	  “apparent	  indifference”	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  Shanghai’s	  Jews	  contains	  an	  element	  of	  shaming	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1938-­‐39	  (New	  York:	  American	  Jewish	  Committee,	  1938),	  153.	  B’nai	  B’rith	  continued	  to	  support	  the	  local	  Shanghai	  committees	  at	  least	  until	  1939.	  (“B’nai	  B’rith	  Leader	  Calls	  for	  Greater	  Efforts	  on	  Behalf	  of	  Palestine,”	  JTA,	  January	  30,	  1939.)	  32	  “B’nai	  B’rith	  Acting	  to	  Help	  Shanghai	  Jewry;	  Efforts	  Started	  Early	  in	  Month,”	  JTA,	  November	  17,	  1937.	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  reminiscent	  of	  the	  herem,	  which	  while	  traditionally	  invoking	  the	  threat	  of	  excommunication,	  in	  this	  case	  served	  to	  exert	  social	  pressure	  to	  provide	  the	  needed	  aid.33	  
Shanghai	  had	  no	  organized	  social	  agencies	  in	  the	  Western	  sense	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  huge	  wave	  of	  immigration	  that	  began	  in	  1938.34	  At	  first,	  the	  existing	  Jewish	  communities	  reached	  out	  to	  help.	  The	  Kadoories	  personally	  sponsored	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Sephardic	  Jewish	  leaders	  to	  formulate	  a	  plan	  to	  aid	  the	  refugees.	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon	  (1881-­‐1961),	  scion	  of	  one	  of	  the	  richest	  Jewish	  families	  in	  Shanghai,	  contributed	  large	  sums	  to	  aid	  the	  refugees.	  Sassoon	  turned	  the	  first	  floor	  of	  his	  Embankment	  Building	  into	  an	  intake	  center	  for	  the	  new	  arrivals.	  There	  they	  were	  registered,	  received	  their	  first	  meal	  and	  temporary	  housing.	  He	  personally	  provided	  more	  permanent	  housing	  for	  around	  2,500	  new	  immigrants	  when	  living	  places	  were	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  find.	  He	  also	  purchased	  bombed-­‐out	  houses	  in	  Hongkew,	  where	  the	  refugees	  settled,	  and	  encouraged	  the	  refugees	  to	  rebuild	  them	  in	  exchange	  for	  free	  housing.35	  	  
Sir	  Victor	  also	  established	  a	  $150,000	  loan	  fund	  which	  enabled	  the	  refugees	  to	  begin	  small	  businesses	  such	  as	  bakeries,	  cafés	  and	  other	  services.36	  Some	  refugees	  pooled	  their	  loans	  and	  purchased	  houses	  that	  they	  then	  rented	  to	  others.	  As	  the	  businesses	  became	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  For	  more	  on	  the	  use	  of	  herem	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  control,	  see	  Katz,	  Tradition	  and	  
Crisis;	  Jewish	  Society	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Middle	  Ages.	  34	  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  168.	  35	  Vámos,	  “‘Home	  Afar’:	  The	  Life	  of	  Central	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  World	  War	  II,”	  5.	  	  36	  Meyer,	  “Baghdadi	  Jews	  in	  Early	  Shanghai.”	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  established	  the	  loans	  were	  repaid	  and	  lent	  to	  other	  refugees.	  With	  each	  ship	  bringing	  700	  or	  more	  refugees,	  even	  this	  generous	  offer	  was	  soon	  insufficient.37	  
The	  first	  official	  committee	  set	  up	  to	  aid	  refugees	  was	  the	  International	  Committee	  for	  Granting	  Relief	  to	  European	  Refugees,	  organized	  and	  funded	  by	  Sassoon	  on	  August	  7,	  1938.	  Known	  as	  the	  “International	  Committee”	  [IC],	  38	  or	  the	  “Komor	  Committee,”39	  it	  was	  headed	  by	  Paul	  Komor,	  a	  Hungarian	  businessman	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  Shanghai	  since	  1898,	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  relief	  work	  through	  the	  Komor	  Charity	  Fund	  and	  had	  been	  chairman	  and	  treasurer	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Relief	  Fund	  since	  1924.40	  	  
The	  IC	  provided	  temporary	  housing	  and	  a	  makeshift	  kitchen	  facility	  to	  feed	  the	  new	  arrivals,	  who	  were	  not	  expected	  to	  stay	  long	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  were	  therefore	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  own	  needs.	  Two	  other	  kitchens	  were	  also	  established,	  one	  in	  a	  synagogue	  and	  the	  other	  in	  the	  refugee	  reception	  center	  in	  the	  Embankment	  Building.	  Even	  though	  most	  refugees	  were	  not	  religiously	  observant,	  the	  kitchens	  served	  kosher	  food	  out	  of	  respect	  to	  those	  who	  were.41	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  119.	  38	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  20,”	  August	  11,	  1941,	  3,	  AJDC	  Israel	  Records,	  Shanghai	  1938-­‐1947.	  39	  Vámos,	  “‘Home	  Afar’:	  The	  Life	  of	  Central	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  World	  War	  II,”	  4.	  40	  See	  “International	  Committee	  for	  Granting	  Relief	  to	  European	  Refugees,”	  1938,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  Shanghai	  Collection,	  Relief	  Activities,	  1931-­‐1944,	  RG	  243,	  38	  (2/1011).	  41	  Vámos,	  “‘Home	  Afar’:	  The	  Life	  of	  Central	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  World	  War	  II,”	  5.	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  Michel	  Speelman,	  a	  prominent	  Dutch	  Jewish	  resident	  of	  Shanghai,	  headed	  the	  second	  major	  group,	  the	  Committee	  for	  the	  Assistance	  of	  European	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  [CFA],42	  founded	  in	  1938	  and	  more	  commonly	  known	  as	  simply	  “the	  Committee.”	  Margolis	  noted	  in	  1941	  that	  she	  felt	  Speelman	  was	  beginning	  to	  get	  senile.	  She	  described	  him	  as	  a	  very	  nice	  and	  good-­‐hearted	  person	  who	  had	  been	  involved	  with	  the	  relief	  situation	  since	  the	  beginning	  and	  was	  getting	  worn	  down.	  Because	  of	  this,	  he	  was	  “satisfied	  with	  anything	  as	  long	  as	  the	  refugees	  don’t	  bother	  him.”43	  To	  run	  the	  CFA,	  Speelman	  employed	  A.	  Herzberg,	  a	  captain	  in	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  Volunteer	  Corps,	  about	  whose	  background	  little	  is	  known	  other	  than	  he	  was	  a	  German	  Jew	  born	  in	  Shanghai.44	  	  
As	  refugees	  began	  streaming	  in,	  the	  CFA	  provided	  aid	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  food,	  shelter,	  and	  medical	  care.	  As	  with	  the	  IC,	  the	  CFA	  intended	  this	  aid	  to	  be	  temporary	  until	  the	  refugees	  were	  able	  to	  emigrate	  to	  their	  final	  destinations.	  The	  Committee	  had	  no	  professional	  staff	  and	  no	  social	  workers;	  caseworkers	  “were	  usually	  professional	  people	  who	  happened	  to	  stop	  by	  looking	  for	  work.”45	  Always	  in	  need	  of	  funding,	  Speelman	  repeatedly	  requested	  help	  from	  JDC	  and	  even	  reached	  out	  internationally	  as	  the	  IC	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  See	  “Committee	  for	  the	  Assistance	  of	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  to	  1944	  1938,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  Shanghai	  Collection,	  Relief	  Activities,	  1931-­‐1944,	  RG	  243,	  38	  (2/1011);	  37	  (2/970).	  43	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  July	  29,	  1941,	  AR	  1933/44:488,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  44	  Ibid.;	  for	  Herzberg’s	  title	  as	  Captain,	  see	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  306.	   45	  Ernest	  G	  Heppner,	  Shanghai	  Refuge :	  A	  Memoir	  of	  the	  World	  War	  II	  Jewish	  Ghetto	  (Lincoln:	  University	  of	  Nebraska	  Press,	  1993),	  90.	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  done,	  traveling	  to	  Europe	  in	  June	  1939	  to	  seek	  additional	  financial	  support.46	  This	  committee	  functioned	  until	  the	  middle	  of	  1942,	  when	  the	  Japanese	  disbanded	  it	  in	  order	  to	  set	  up	  their	  own,	  more	  “cooperative”	  Jewish	  aid	  committee.	  	  
In	  November	  1939,	  the	  German	  and	  Austrian	  refugees	  organized	  themselves	  into	  the	  Jüdische	  Gemeinde	  to	  represent	  their	  own	  interests	  that	  were	  not	  being	  met	  by	  the	  existing	  committees.	  Since	  their	  housing,	  food	  and	  medical	  needs	  were	  provided	  for,	  their	  initial	  function	  was	  to	  provide	  educational	  resources	  and	  mediate	  refugee	  disputes.	  Later	  a	  legal	  department	  was	  established	  that	  formed	  an	  arbitration	  court	  to	  provide	  binding	  rulings	  on	  such	  disputes,	  while	  allowing	  for	  a	  system	  of	  appeals.	  The	  legal	  department	  also	  provided	  birth,	  death,	  and	  marriage	  and	  divorce	  certificates	  to	  the	  refugees,	  as	  well	  as	  conducted	  civil	  wedding	  ceremonies	  according	  to	  Chinese	  law.47	  After	  Jews	  living	  overseas	  lost	  their	  citizenship	  in	  January	  1942,48	  when	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  refused	  to	  renew	  their	  passports,	  the	  IC	  attempted	  to	  issue	  its	  own	  identification	  cards	  for	  the	  now	  stateless	  refugees.49	  
Pan	  Guang,	  director	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  European	  &	  Asian	  Studies	  at	  the	  Shanghai	  Academy	  of	  Social	  Sciences,	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Chinese	  people	  of	  Shanghai	  also	  tried	  their	  best	  to	  help	  the	  Jewish	  refugees,	  opening	  their	  homes	  to	  them	  and	  treating	  them	  in	  Chinese	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  “News	  Brief,”	  JTA,	  August	  13,	  1939.	  47	  Heppner,	  Shanghai	  Refuge,	  92;	  see	  also	  records	  of	  the	  “Jewish	  Community	  of	  Central	  European	  Jews	  (Jüdische	  Gemeinde),”	  1941,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  Shanghai	  Collection,	  General,	  1932-­‐1948,	  RG	  243,	  10	  (1/599);	  42	  (3/3);	  47	  (3/174).	  48	  Germany	  passed	  a	  law	  in	  November	  1941	  stripping	  Jews	  living	  abroad	  of	  their	  citizenship,	  but	  the	  law	  was	  not	  implemented	  until	  the	  following	  January.	  See	  Ristaino,	  Port	  
of	  Last	  Resort,	  190.	  49	  Heppner,	  Shanghai	  Refuge,	  89.	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  hospitals,	  although	  it	  is	  debatable	  how	  much	  the	  Chinese	  were	  actually	  able	  to	  do	  in	  view	  of	  their	  own	  impoverished	  state	  at	  the	  time.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  language	  and	  culture,	  some	  friendships	  did	  develop	  between	  Chinese	  and	  Jews	  living	  side	  by	  side	  in	  such	  close	  quarters.50	  
As	  the	  German	  and	  Austrian	  refugees	  continued	  to	  arrive	  en	  masse,	  the	  JDC,	  along	  with	  the	  British	  Section	  of	  the	  Council	  for	  German	  Jewry51	  (mainly	  at	  the	  insistence	  of	  the	  JDC)	  and	  the	  Jewish	  community	  of	  Cairo	  (for	  a	  time)	  began	  to	  send	  additional	  funds	  to	  the	  local	  relief	  committees	  that	  were	  set	  up	  to	  assist	  the	  newcomers.	  	  
The	  British	  Council	  stopped	  sending	  funds	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  War	  in	  September	  1939,	  and	  JDC	  assumed	  approximately	  90%	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai.	  	  
ORT,52	  an	  international	  Jewish	  organization	  founded	  in	  Poland	  in	  1880	  to	  provide	  education	  and	  training	  in	  agriculture	  and	  practical	  occupations	  to	  the	  Jews	  in	  the	  Pale	  of	  Settlement,	  opened	  their	  first	  vocational	  training	  school	  in	  Shanghai	  in	  September	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Pan,	  “Shanghai:	  a	  Haven	  for	  Holocaust	  Victims”;	  see	  also	  Pan	  Guang,	  The	  Jews	  in	  
Shanghai	  (Shanghai:	  Shanghai	  Pictorial	  Publishing	  House,	  1995).	  51	  	  In	  1939	  the	  British	  Central	  Council	  for	  Jewish	  Refugees	  spent	  close	  to	  U.S.	  $3,000,000	  to	  supplement	  the	  JDC	  refugee	  aid	  programs	  (American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Aiding	  Jews	  Overseas	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  1941),	  6.).	  52	  ORT	  stands	  for	  Obcesowo	  Remeslenogo	  Truda	  (Association	  for	  the	  Promotion	  of	  Skilled	  Trades,	  or	  Organization	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Training).	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  194153	  and	  held	  six-­‐month	  training	  courses	  for	  the	  refugees	  in	  twenty-­‐one	  crafts	  to	  prepare	  them	  for	  eventual	  emigration.	  By	  1947	  they	  had	  trained	  a	  total	  of	  2,375	  students.54	  
Although	  JDC	  was	  the	  major	  backer	  of	  the	  refugee	  program,	  we	  should	  not	  overlook	  the	  other	  organizations	  and	  communities	  that,	  although	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study,	  eventually	  also	  played	  a	  role	  in	  rescuing	  and	  aiding	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai.	  They	  include	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  in	  Jerusalem,	  the	  World	  Jewish	  Congress	  in	  New	  York,	  the	  Va’ad	  
ha-­‐Hazalah	  (Orthodox),	  the	  Hebrew	  Immigrant	  Aid	  Society,	  the	  Polish	  Relief	  Committee	  for	  War	  Victims,	  the	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Kobe,	  the	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Harbin,	  
Arbeitsausschuss	  zur	  Hilfeleistung	  für	  Europäische	  Juden	  in	  Stockholm,	  and	  the	  Comité	  
Comunidade	  Israelita	  de	  Lisboa.55	  	  
The	  Society	  of	  Friends,	  or	  Quakers,	  partnered	  closely	  with	  JDC	  as	  well.	  In	  the	  closing	  of	  Margolis’	  initial	  report	  to	  headquarters,	  sent	  by	  diplomatic	  pouch,56	  she	  noted	  that	  she	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  “ORT	  Opens	  Training	  School	  for	  Refugees	  in	  China,”	  JTA,	  September	  21,	  1941.	  54	  See	  “ORT	  -­‐	  China,	  Correspondence	  and	  Minutes,”	  1941,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  Shanghai	  Collection,	  Cultural	  and	  Educational	  Activities,	  1929-­‐1947,	  RG	  243,	  33	  (2/813);	  see	  also	  “ORT	  and	  the	  DP	  Camps:	  Shanghai	  ORT	  Report,”	  1947,	  2,	  http://dpcamps.ort.org/dp-­‐reports-­‐intro/shanghai-­‐ort-­‐report/.	  55	  These	  groups,	  too	  many	  to	  be	  listed	  in	  their	  entirety,	  are	  mentioned	  in	  Pan,	  “Shanghai:	  A	  Haven	  for	  Holocaust	  Victims.”	  See	  also	  Frans	  Hüsken	  and	  Dick	  van	  der	  Meij,	  
Reading	  Asia:	  New	  Research	  in	  Asian	  Studies	  (Psychology	  Press,	  2001),	  187.	  56	  Communication	  at	  the	  time	  was	  through	  diplomatic	  pouches:	  “With	  security	  of	  U.S.	  diplomatic	  mail	  in	  doubt,	  President	  Roosevelt	  worked	  to	  restart	  the	  Department	  of	  State’s	  courier	  service.	  He	  was	  displeased	  when	  he	  learned	  that	  the	  Department	  had	  cut	  the	  courier	  service,	  and	  he	  told	  Congress	  that	  he	  supported	  renewed	  funding	  for	  couriers.	  In	  1935,	  Congress	  appropriated	  $24,000	  to	  the	  Department,	  permitting	  the	  operation	  of	  three	  couriers	  out	  of	  Paris	  and	  a	  limited	  service	  in	  Asia.	  For	  fiscal	  year	  1939,	  Congress	  raised	  the	  appropriation	  to	  $35,000.	  The	  reinitiating	  of	  the	  courier	  service	  led	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  
	   	   	   164	  had	  availed	  herself	  of	  the	  letters	  of	  introduction	  from	  the	  Friends	  and	  they	  had	  been	  extremely	  helpful,	  particularly	  in	  orienting	  her	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  local	  scene,	  and	  in	  supplementing	  some	  of	  the	  (unspecified)	  unmet	  needs.57	  The	  Friends	  also	  helped	  by	  working	  with	  the	  residents	  at	  the	  Seward	  Road	  Camp,	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  five	  camps	  set	  up	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  refugees,	  that	  housed	  approximately	  1,000	  people.	  They	  taught	  the	  residents	  how	  to	  govern	  themselves	  democratically,	  organized	  classes	  in	  English,	  and	  took	  over	  clothing	  distribution	  from	  the	  JDC.58	  
By	  1939,	  the	  ever-­‐climbing	  number	  of	  German	  Jewish	  refugees	  was	  beginning	  to	  tax	  both	  the	  resources	  and	  the	  good	  will	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  communities.59	  The	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Council,	  the	  governing	  body	  of	  the	  International	  Settlement	  that	  included	  powerful	  commercial	  representatives	  of	  various	  countries,60	  began	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  world	  governments	  to	  halt	  the	  immigration.	  Both	  Alvin	  Mars	  and	  Felix	  Gruenberger	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  major	  fear	  was	  of	  economic	  competition	  by	  the	  refugees,	  as	  many	  believed	  that	  the	  economy	  could	  not	  support	  such	  a	  large	  influx	  of	  people.	  Rumors	  spread	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  routes.	  The	  Department	  created	  a	  new	  route	  in	  northeast	  Asia;	  from	  its	  base	  in	  Peiping	  (now	  Beijing),	  the	  route	  ran	  between	  Peiping,	  Tientsin,	  Nanking,	  and	  Shanghai,	  with	  Tokyo	  added	  later.”	  (Telegram,	  Cordell	  Hull,	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  to	  Phillips,	  U.S.	  Embassy	  Paris,	  April	  27,	  1934,	  Folder—121.67,	  Box	  336,	  DF	  1930-­‐39,	  RG	  59,	  NA.	  Grover,	  “A	  Brief	  History	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Diplomatic	  Service,”	  Foreign	  Service	  Newsletter	  80	  (October	  1953):	  17.)	  57	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  4,”	  May	  28,	  1941,	  3,	  AR	  1933/44:488,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  58	  Laura	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  September	  1943,	  12,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  59	  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  41.	  60	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  11,	  13.	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  Jewish	  refugee	  laborers	  would	  encroach	  on	  the	  job	  market	  and	  replace	  White	  Russian	  workers,	  who	  had	  themselves	  at	  one	  time	  been	  immigrants	  and	  whose	  rate	  of	  unemployment	  was	  already	  50%.61	  Kranzler	  agrees	  and	  adds	  that	  the	  severe	  housing	  shortage	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  the	  antisemitic	  feelings	  among	  the	  White	  Russians	  increased	  this	  pressure	  to	  stop	  immigration.62	  
Michel	  Speelman	  reported	  to	  the	  JDC	  in	  June	  1939:	  
In	  the	  course	  of	  my	  conversation	  with	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Council	  and	  the	  French	  authorities	  in	  December	  last,	  I	  brought	  to	  their	  attention	  the	  danger	  of	  an	  unlimited	  influx	  of	  refugees	  to	  Shanghai,	  which	  is	  now	  in	  a	  state	  of	  war	  and	  completely	  isolated	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  China,	  and	  where	  a	  large	  number	  of	  employment	  seeking	  people	  cannot	  be	  absorbed.63	  Kranzler	  has	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  this	  report	  that	  influenced	  Cornell	  Franklin,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Council,	  to	  appeal	  to	  their	  governing	  authority,	  the	  Shanghai	  Consular	  Body,	  to	  halt	  Jewish	  immigration	  in	  August	  1939:64	  
I	  have	  the	  honour	  of	  bringing	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Consular	  Body	  that	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Council	  is	  gravely	  concerned	  at	  the	  influx	  into	  Shanghai	  of	  Jewish	  refugees	  from	  Europe.	  There	  is	  already	  in	  Shanghai	  an	  acute	  refugee	  problem	  which	  is	  taxing	  to	  a	  great	  degree	  the	  resources	  both	  of	  the	  municipality	  and	  of	  private	  philanthropy.	  There	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  not	  only	  the	  provision	  of	  accommodation	  and	  subsistence,	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Mars,	  “A	  Note	  on	  the	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  289;	  Gruenberger,	  “The	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai”;	  see	  also	  Robert	  W.	  Barnett,	  “Shanghai’s	  German	  Refugees	  Face	  Uncertainties,”	  Far	  Eastern	  Survey	  8,	  no.	  21	  (October	  25,	  1939):	  252;	  John	  Hope	  Simpson,	  “The	  Refugee	  Problem,”	  International	  Affairs	  (Royal	  Institute	  of	  International	  Affairs	  1931-­‐
1939)	  17,	  no.	  5	  (September	  1,	  1938):	  613.	  62	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  111,	  114.	  63	  Michael	  Speelman,	  “Report	  on	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Problem	  in	  Shanghai,”	  June	  21,	  1939,	  1,	  Israel	  JDC	  -­‐	  AJDC	  Israel	  Records,	  Shanghai	  1938-­‐1947.	  64	  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  52.	  
	   	   	   166	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  any	  further	  number	  of	  refugees	  could	  be	  absorbed	  without	  still	  further	  impairing	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  of	  the	  present	  community…	  I	  have	  the	  honour	  to	  request	  that	  the	  interested	  Consuls	  may	  take	  any	  steps	  within	  their	  power	  to	  prevent	  any	  further	  arrival	  of	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai.65	  Was	  this	  a	  veiled	  threat	  that	  the	  established	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Shanghai	  would	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  lowering	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  of	  the	  entire	  population?	  Or	  did	  the	  established	  communities	  sense	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  own	  standard	  of	  living?	  Either	  way,	  the	  alarm	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  refugee	  committees	  was	  picked	  up	  by	  the	  Jewish	  Telegraphic	  Agency	  in	  December	  1938,	  which	  provided	  the	  news	  to	  United	  States	  Jewish	  communities.66	  The	  major	  Jewish	  organizations	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  England	  and	  France	  responded	  positively	  to	  Shanghai’s	  request	  to	  curtail	  immigration.67	  	  
In	  February	  1939	  JDC	  joined	  in	  actively	  discouraging	  further	  immigration:	  
We	  have	  advised	  the	  European	  agencies	  so	  far	  as	  is	  in	  their	  power	  to	  try	  to	  discourage	  further	  emigration	  to	  Shanghai.	  To	  stop	  it	  altogether,	  as	  you	  undoubtedly	  know,	  is	  most	  difficult,	  for	  large	  numbers	  sail	  for	  Shanghai	  without	  consulting	  the	  agencies;	  and,	  then	  again,	  even	  though	  warned,	  these	  people,	  harassed	  as	  they	  are,	  take	  the	  earliest	  boat	  for	  any	  country	  in	  which	  they	  might	  be	  permitted	  to	  land.68	  In	  response	  to	  this	  JDC	  request,	  the	  Hilfsverein	  in	  Germany	  responded:	  
In	  the	  present	  plight	  of	  German	  Jewry	  it	  would	  probably	  [be]	  impossible	  for	  us	  to	  stop	  the	  migration	  to	  Shanghai	  even	  if	  we	  absolutely	  wanted	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Cornell	  Franklin,	  Chairman	  of	  SMC	  to	  A.	  J.	  Alves,	  Consul-­‐General	  for	  Portugal	  and	  Senior	  Consul,	  December	  23,	  1938,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  66	  “Shanghai	  Jews,	  Funds	  Exhausted,	  Fear	  Arrival	  of	  Refugees,”	  JTA,	  December	  9,	  1938.	   67	  See	  also	  Speelman,	  “Report	  on	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Problem	  in	  Shanghai.”	  68	  Herbert	  Katzki	  to	  Roswell	  Barnes,	  February	  17,	  1939,	  Israel	  JDC	  -­‐	  AJDC	  Israel	  Records,	  Shanghai	  1938-­‐1947.	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  do	  this…	  The	  situation	  being	  what	  it	  is,	  no	  Jewish	  organization	  in	  Germany	  is	  able	  to	  prevent	  their	  migration	  to	  any	  place	  they	  can	  get	  to.	  Quite	  apart	  from	  the	  abovementioned	  considerations,	  we	  are	  convinced	  that	  most	  of	  the	  emigrants	  are	  far	  better	  off	  in	  Shanghai—in	  spite	  of	  all	  the	  drawbacks	  of	  the	  situation—than	  they	  would	  be	  in	  Germany.69	  In	  retrospect,	  neither	  the	  international	  nor	  the	  American	  Jewish	  leadership	  really	  grasped	  the	  significance	  of	  Shanghai	  as	  one	  of	  the	  last	  options	  available	  to	  the	  Jewish	  refugees.	  The	  Hilfsverein	  in	  Germany,	  who	  were	  the	  closest	  to	  the	  flash	  point,	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  only	  ones	  who	  truly	  understood	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  Nazi	  war	  machine	  and	  realized	  that,	  no	  matter	  how	  bad	  the	  conditions	  were	  in	  Shanghai,	  they	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  worse	  than	  the	  current	  predicament	  of	  the	  German	  and	  Austrian	  Jews.	  
In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  Japanese,	  who	  had	  controlled	  Shanghai	  since	  1937,	  had	  not	  yet	  imposed	  any	  restrictions	  on	  Jewish	  immigration.	  Marvin	  Tokayer,	  David	  Kranzler	  and	  others	  argue	  that	  the	  Japanese	  did	  not	  want	  to	  alienate	  the	  Jews,	  wishing	  to	  make	  use	  of	  Jewish	  political	  and	  economic	  influence.70	  Péter	  Vámos	  specifically	  argues	  that	  they	  did	  this	  out	  of	  concern	  that	  any	  restrictions	  on	  the	  Jews	  would	  antagonize	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community,	  jeopardize	  Japanese-­‐U.S.	  relations	  and	  thus	  limit	  the	  flow	  of	  American	  funds,	  which	  were	  needed	  for	  economic	  reconstruction	  and	  the	  industrialization	  of	  Manchuria,	  an	  area	  that	  had	  been	  recently	  conquered	  by	  the	  Japanese.71	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Arthur	  Israel	  Frinz,	  Hilfsverein	  to	  American	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  February	  10,	  1939,	  AR	  1933/44,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  70	  For	  more	  on	  Japanese-­‐Jewish	  attitudes,	  see	  Tokayer,	  The	  Fugu	  Plan;	  See	  also	  Kranzler,	  Japanese,	  Nazis	  &	  Jews.	  71	  Vámos,	  “‘Home	  Afar’:	  The	  Life	  of	  Central	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  World	  War	  II,”	  3.	  
	   	   	   168	  The	  final	  impetus	  for	  Japanese	  action	  to	  restrict	  immigration	  came	  on	  May	  25,	  1939,	  when	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon	  and	  Ellis	  Hayim,	  two	  key	  leaders	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community,	  complained	  to	  the	  Japanese	  Investigating	  Committee	  about	  the	  relief	  committees’	  lack	  of	  funds	  and	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  foreign	  governments	  to	  curtail	  immigration.	  Sassoon	  and	  Hayim	  assured	  the	  Japanese	  that	  restrictions	  on	  immigration	  would	  not	  cause	  any	  widespread	  opposition	  on	  the	  part	  of	  world	  Jewry—this	  had	  been	  a	  large	  part	  of	  Japanese	  concern—since	  this	  would	  be	  done	  for	  the	  good	  of	  those	  Jews	  who	  were	  already	  in	  Shanghai.72	  
Although	  this	  was	  perhaps	  done	  partially	  out	  of	  self-­‐interest,	  one	  can	  also	  argue	  that	  they	  were	  hoping	  to	  avert	  a	  further	  crisis,	  which	  could	  result	  in	  an	  antisemitic	  backlash	  from	  Japanese	  and	  other	  Shanghai	  residents.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  interpretation,	  the	  Baghdadi	  leading	  families	  estimated	  that	  the	  peril	  to	  themselves	  and	  the	  Jews	  currently	  in	  Shanghai	  was	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  the	  Jews	  attempting	  to	  flee	  Europe.	  The	  compassion	  for	  the	  incoming	  refugees	  had	  subsided.	  
On	  August	  9,	  1939,	  under	  increasing	  pressure	  from	  the	  SMC	  as	  well	  as	  the	  existing	  Jewish	  communities,	  the	  Japanese	  passed	  the	  first	  serious	  restriction,	  “temporarily”	  forbidding	  new	  immigrants	  from	  taking	  up	  residence	  in	  Hongkew,	  since	  residential	  space	  was	  becoming	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  in	  light	  of	  growing	  Japanese	  settlement	  there.	  This	  was	  tantamount	  to	  stopping	  immigration	  altogether,	  as	  Hongkew	  was	  the	  only	  area	  where	  the	  refugees	  were	  allowed	  to	  settle.	  This	  restriction	  was	  especially	  difficult	  for	  those	  refugees	  who	  were	  expecting	  the	  immediate	  arrival	  of	  family	  members,	  but	  they	  received	  word	  that	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  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  55.	  
	   	   	   169	  four	  boats	  that	  were	  already	  in	  transit	  carrying	  631	  passengers	  would	  be	  permitted	  to	  land.73	  On	  August	  11,	  the	  Japanese	  Naval	  Landing	  Party	  Headquarters	  in	  Shanghai	  ordered	  the	  registration	  of	  all	  refugees	  already	  in	  Japanese-­‐controlled	  areas,74	  and	  placed	  a	  virtual	  ban	  on	  further	  immigration	  after	  August	  21,	  1939.75	  	  
According	  to	  these	  new	  regulations,	  further	  immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  was	  limited	  to	  persons	  able	  to	  show	  a	  deposit	  of	  U.S.	  $400	  as	  “guarantee	  money”;	  a	  resident’s	  immediate	  family;	  someone	  with	  a	  contract	  for	  a	  job	  in	  Shanghai;	  or	  the	  intended	  spouse	  of	  a	  Shanghai	  resident.	  These	  regulations	  addressed	  the	  economic	  issues	  while	  continuing	  to	  allow	  limited	  immigration.	  The	  wealthier,	  more	  influential	  Jews	  could	  still	  come	  to	  Shanghai	  for	  a	  time	  and	  not	  cause	  public	  relations	  harm	  to	  the	  Japanese.	  
Population	  estimates	  are	  difficult	  to	  establish,	  especially	  since	  many	  of	  the	  records	  of	  this	  period	  have	  been	  destroyed.	  Avraham	  Altman	  and	  Irene	  Eber	  estimate	  that	  about	  1,000	  additional	  Jews	  entered	  Shanghai	  since	  the	  implementing	  of	  these	  new	  regulations;76	  but	  according	  to	  Susanne	  Wiedemann,	  between	  4,000	  and	  6,000	  additional	  Jewish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  “Part	  of	  Shanghai	  to	  Exclude	  Jews:	  Japanese-­‐Ruled	  District	  of	  International	  Settlement	  Will	  Bar	  Refugees,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  12,	  1939;	  see	  also	  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  56–57;	  see	  also	  Mars,	  “A	  Note	  on	  the	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  290.	  74	  “Japan	  Orders	  Registration	  of	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  JTA,	  August	  24,	  1941.	  75	  “Shanghai	  Bars	  Refugee	  Entry,”	  JTA,	  September	  12,	  1939;	  see	  also	  Barnett,	  “Shanghai’s	  German	  Refugees	  Face	  Uncertainties,”	  252.	  This	  was	  expected	  to	  create	  legal	  difficulties	  because	  the	  concession	  statute	  did	  not	  provide	  for	  limitation	  of	  immigration,	  but	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  decision	  was	  never	  questioned.	  (“Refugees	  Banned	  from	  Jap-­‐Ruled	  International	  Zone	  in	  Shanghai	  after	  Aug.	  21,”	  JTA,	  August	  13,	  1939.)	  76	  Altman	  and	  Eber,	  “Flight	  to	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1940:	  The	  Larger	  Setting,”	  78.	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  immigrants	  entered	  Shanghai	  after	  these	  restrictions	  were	  passed.77	  By	  April	  of	  1940,	  it	  was	  unofficially	  made	  clear	  to	  the	  refugee	  committees	  that	  very	  few	  additional	  refugees	  would	  be	  permitted	  to	  enter	  Shanghai.	  When	  Italy	  entered	  the	  War	  in	  June	  1940	  as	  Germany’s	  ally,	  that	  popular	  sea	  route	  to	  Shanghai	  closed.78	  From	  that	  moment	  on,	  the	  Japanese	  strictly	  maintained	  a	  “policy	  of	  exclusion,”	  and	  immigration	  was	  effectively	  stopped.79	  In	  1941,	  only	  33	  Jewish	  refugees	  entered	  Shanghai.80	  The	  local	  Jewish	  community	  leadership	  had	  succeeded	  in	  curtailing	  Jewish	  immigration…	  but	  in	  retrospect,	  at	  what	  cost?	  
The	  lack	  of	  humanitarian	  concern	  evinced	  by	  the	  committees	  and	  some	  Jewish	  organizations	  in	  discouraging	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  its	  context.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  distressing	  to	  see	  this	  exclusionist	  attitude	  in	  JDC	  and	  other	  Jewish	  organizations	  in	  light	  of	  the	  intense	  persecution	  that	  German	  Jews	  were	  experiencing,	  their	  cooperation	  can	  be	  understood	  when	  one	  considers	  the	  pressure	  that	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Council	  and	  the	  CFA	  were	  putting	  on	  American	  and	  European	  powers.	  They	  were	  desperate	  to	  stop	  the	  immense	  flow	  of	  destitute	  immigrants	  due	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  Japanese	  response.	  It	  must	  also	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  overwhelming	  need	  of	  Jewish	  people	  worldwide,	  JDC	  continued	  to	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  Wiedemann,	  “Transnational	  Encounters	  with	  ‘Amerika,’”	  70.	  78	  Ibid.	  79	  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  58;	  see	  also	  Mars,	  “A	  Note	  on	  the	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  291.	  80	  Wiedemann,	  “Transnational	  Encounters	  with	  ‘Amerika,’”	  70.	  
	   	   	   171	  increase	  the	  disproportionately	  large	  financial	  support	  that	  they	  provided	  to	  the	  stranded	  Shanghai	  immigrants.81	  
American	  Jewish	  Aid	  Arrives	  
As	  the	  flood	  of	  Jewish	  immigrants	  continued	  to	  increase,	  additional	  funds	  alone	  were	  no	  longer	  enough	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  refugees.	  The	  Shanghai	  Committee	  had	  been	  asking	  JDC	  to	  send	  a	  trained	  social	  worker	  to	  help	  them	  manage	  refugee	  efforts	  to	  emigrate,	  and	  in	  1941	  the	  JDC	  responded	  when	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  became	  involved.	  Laura	  Margolis	  was	  sent	  to	  Shanghai	  to	  represent	  the	  American	  Jewish	  communities	  through	  the	  JDC.	  It	  was	  the	  provision	  of	  U.S.	  funds,	  along	  with	  Margolis’	  leadership	  and	  organizational	  skills,	  that	  enabled	  the	  Jews	  who	  took	  refuge	  in	  Shanghai	  to	  survive	  the	  War.	  
❋ During	  Margolis’	  time	  in	  Cuba,	  Avra	  Warren,	  who	  was	  head	  of	  the	  Visa	  Division	  in	  the	  State	  Department,	  had	  heard	  about	  her	  through	  the	  American	  consulate	  and	  embassy	  in	  Havana.	  Warren	  traveled	  there	  several	  times	  and	  watched	  her	  in	  action.	  Her	  ability	  to	  streamline	  the	  immigration	  process	  in	  Cuba	  and	  work	  with	  the	  American	  Consulate	  impressed	  him,	  and	  he	  requested	  that	  JDC	  send	  her	  to	  Shanghai	  where	  similar	  work	  was	  needed.	  Margolis	  remembered:	  
Avra	  Warren	  said	  to	  JDC,	  “We	  in	  the	  State	  Department	  are	  having	  a	  lot	  of	  trouble	  in	  Shanghai;	  there	  is	  a	  bottleneck	  there.	  The	  consulate	  there	  isn’t	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Throughout	  1940,	  this	  support	  was	  $16,000	  per	  month.	  (See	  “American	  Aid	  Continues	  to	  Pour	  into	  Shanghai	  for	  European	  Refugees,”	  Shanghai	  Evening	  Post	  and	  
Mercury,	  December	  10,	  1940,	  AR	  1933/44:482,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  Publicity.)	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  getting	  people	  out	  and	  there	  are	  20,000	  refugees	  sitting	  in	  Shanghai.	  Would	  you	  send	  Laura	  Margolis	  over?	  She	  did	  the	  job	  in	  Havana.”82	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  who	  had	  been	  secretary	  of	  JDC	  since	  April	  of	  194083	  and	  was	  formulating	  most	  of	  the	  policy	  decisions	  during	  this	  period,	  summoned	  Margolis	  to	  New	  York	  and	  asked	  her	  if	  she	  was	  willing	  to	  relocate	  to	  Shanghai.	  Against	  the	  wishes	  of	  her	  family	  and	  friends,	  who	  were	  concerned	  for	  her	  safety	  in	  light	  of	  a	  possibly	  impending	  war,	  Margolis	  agreed	  to	  go.	  Leavitt	  gave	  her	  specific	  instructions	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  State	  Department:84	  
Look,	  we’re	  sending	  money	  to	  a	  committee	  in	  Shanghai	  to	  feed	  8,000	  on	  relief.	  The	  local	  committee	  is	  handling	  the	  relief	  problem.	  You	  can	  look	  into	  it	  if	  you	  want	  to,	  but	  it’s	  more	  important	  to	  start	  working	  with	  the	  embassy	  and	  getting	  people	  out	  to	  the	  States.85	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that,	  although	  JDC	  was	  contributing	  financially,	  in	  line	  with	  their	  stated	  policy	  they	  expected	  the	  local	  country	  committees	  to	  manage	  the	  task	  of	  providing	  for	  the	  needy.	  It	  was	  only	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  that	  they	  finally	  agreed	  to	  send	  a	  qualified	  staff	  member,	  and	  even	  then	  it	  was	  not	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  relief	  work,	  but	  to	  work	  with	  the	  Consulate	  to	  expedite	  emigration	  from	  Shanghai	  and	  thereby	  ease	  the	  strain	  on	  the	  local	  Committee.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Kaufman,	  “Interview,”	  15.	  83	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Aiding	  Jews	  Overseas,	  12.	  84	  The	  Executive	  Director	  of	  the	  American	  Committee	  for	  Christian	  Refugees	  also	  requested	  that	  Margolis	  look	  into	  the	  problem	  of	  any	  Christian	  refugees	  she	  might	  discover	  in	  Shanghai.	  Joseph	  Hyman	  of	  the	  JDC	  agreed.	  (Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  E.	  Brent	  Woodruff,	  April	  4,	  1941,	  AR	  1933/44:130,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.)	  85	  Kaufman,	  “Interview,”	  15.	  
	   	   	   173	  Margolis,	  who	  was	  by	  now	  experienced	  in	  dealing	  with	  refugee	  immigration	  issues,	  did	  not	  relish	  the	  thought	  of	  going	  to	  China,	  but	  she	  went	  out	  of	  her	  own	  sense	  of	  duty.	  She	  packed	  her	  things,	  traveled	  to	  Cleveland	  for	  one	  last	  visit	  with	  her	  family,	  and	  set	  out	  for	  the	  Far	  East.	  On	  April	  17,	  1941	  she	  sailed	  from	  San	  Francisco	  to	  Hawaii	  and	  on	  April	  30	  flew	  across	  the	  Pacific	  to	  Hong	  Kong	  on	  Pan	  American’s	  China	  Clipper.	  The	  flight	  took	  five	  days,	  stopping	  every	  night	  on	  a	  different	  island	  and	  flying	  during	  the	  days.86	  
Margolis	  reached	  Shanghai	  on	  May	  12,	  1941,	  about	  three	  years	  after	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  refugees	  had	  come.	  She	  wrote	  of	  her	  trip	  to	  the	  Far	  East:	  
It	  was	  a	  great	  adventure.	  When	  I	  landed	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  I	  saw	  a	  sea	  of	  Chinese	  faces	  that	  all	  looked	  alike	  to	  me…	  When	  I	  had	  been	  in	  Buffalo	  there	  had	  been	  a	  lot	  of	  rice	  bowl	  dinners	  for	  Chiang-­‐Kai-­‐Shek’s	  fundraising.	  I	  had	  been	  roped	  into	  some	  of	  those	  dinners	  and	  knew	  about	  the	  overseas	  relief	  program	  for	  Chiang-­‐Kai-­‐Shek’s	  China—so	  as	  I	  was	  walking	  along	  the	  streets	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  I	  saw	  the	  name	  of	  that	  organization:	  The	  Far	  East	  Rice	  Bowl	  Dinner	  Campaign.	  I	  walked	  in	  [and]	  introduced	  myself	  as	  an	  American	  on	  my	  way	  to	  Shanghai….We	  talked,	  and	  when	  I	  got	  back	  to	  the	  hotel	  I	  found	  an	  invitation	  to	  dinner—at	  the	  home	  of	  Mrs.	  Sun	  Yat-­‐sen.	  I	  would	  be	  picked	  up	  in	  the	  evening	  by	  a	  General	  [Morris]	  Cohen,	  Sun	  Yat-­‐sen’s	  former	  bodyguard….It	  was	  a	  delightful	  evening.87	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Pan	  American’s	  China	  Clipper,	  the	  luxurious	  “Flying	  Boat,”	  flew	  passengers	  from	  1936	  to	  1945	  across	  the	  Pacific	  in	  first-­‐class	  comfort	  with	  fine	  food	  served	  on	  fine	  china.	  Originating	  in	  San	  Francisco,	  the	  flight	  stopped	  in	  Honolulu,	  Midway	  Island,	  Wake	  Island,	  Guam,	  Manila,	  Macau	  and	  Hong	  Kong.	  The	  74	  passengers	  would	  have	  each	  paid	  $950,	  the	  equivalent	  of	  $14,650	  today.	  (Rosen	  Travel	  Agency,	  “Itinerary	  No.	  11317	  for	  Miss	  Laura	  L.	  Margolis,”	  April	  9,	  1941,	  AR	  1933/44:130,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Personnel,	  Margolis,	  Laura;	  see	  also	  Carl	  Nolte,	  “China	  Clipper’s	  Flight	  Made	  History	  75	  Years	  Ago	  -­‐	  SFGate,”	  San	  
Francisco	  Chronicle,	  November	  22,	  2010.	  87	  Kaufman,	  “Interview,”	  16–17.	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  General	  Morris	  Cohen,	  known	  as	  “Two-­‐Gun	  Cohen,”	  had	  been	  a	  juvenile	  delinquent	  on	  the	  East	  End	  of	  London.	  Sent	  away	  by	  his	  parents	  to	  Canada	  after	  reform	  school,	  Cohen	  became	  a	  professional	  gambler	  and	  through	  his	  connections	  with	  the	  Chinese	  underworld,	  became	  personal	  bodyguard	  and	  aide-­‐de-­‐camp	  to	  Sun	  Yat-­‐sen.	  According	  to	  biographer	  Daniel	  Levy,	  the	  facts	  of	  his	  life	  are	  difficult	  to	  substantiate:	  Cohen’s	  life	  is	  shrouded	  in	  myth	  thanks	  to	  his	  colorful	  personal	  memoirs	  and	  a	  hagiography	  written	  by	  his	  close	  friend,	  Charles	  Drage.88	  
Margolis	  became	  “very	  good	  friends”	  with	  Cohen,	  who	  escorted	  her	  in	  Hong	  Kong.	  She	  also	  related	  that	  she	  became	  good	  friends	  with	  Mme.	  Sun	  Yat-­‐sen,	  who	  invited	  her	  to	  dinner	  a	  second	  time	  during	  her	  stay	  in	  Hong	  Kong.	  
When	  Margolis	  finally	  arrived	  in	  Shanghai,	  she	  carried	  a	  letter	  of	  introduction	  from	  Paul	  Baerwald,	  chairman	  of	  JDC,	  to	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon.	  Sassoon	  was	  housing	  her	  at	  his	  Cathay	  Hotel,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prestigious	  hotels	  in	  Shanghai.	  She	  recalled	  being	  shocked	  at	  the	  stark	  contrast	  between	  the	  extravagant	  luxury	  of	  the	  “white	  man”	  and	  the	  misery	  and	  poverty	  of	  the	  Chinese—whom	  Margolis	  called	  “coolies”—starving	  to	  death	  and	  lying	  dead	  in	  the	  streets.89	  
Sassoon	  was	  away,	  but	  Margolis	  was	  able	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  aid	  committee.	  A	  reception	  was	  held	  in	  her	  honor	  at	  the	  Jewish	  Club,	  attended	  by	  representatives	  of	  various	  Jewish	  organizations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Jewish	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  For	  more	  on	  Morris	  Cohen,	  see	  Daniel	  S	  Levy,	  Two-­‐Gun	  Cohen:	  A	  Biography	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1997);	  see	  also	  Charles	  Drage,	  Two-­‐Gun	  Cohen	  (London:	  J.	  Cape,	  1954).	  89	  Kaufman,	  “Interview,”	  17.	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  community	  of	  Tientsin,	  China.	  Margolis,	  in	  a	  speech,	  related	  JDC	  relief	  activities	  throughout	  the	  world,	  and	  described	  the	  difficult	  circumstances	  under	  which	  these	  activities	  were	  being	  conducted,	  hoping	  perhaps	  to	  make	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  leaders	  feel	  responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  as	  part	  of	  the	  world	  Jewish	  community.	  
It	  is	  interesting	  that	  the	  U.S.	  representative	  of	  JDC	  was	  welcomed	  in	  such	  a	  manner.	  The	  local	  Jewish	  leaders	  temporarily	  put	  aside	  their	  differences	  to	  host	  a	  reception	  in	  her	  honor,	  and	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Tientsin	  Jewish	  community	  traveled	  almost	  700	  miles	  to	  attend.	  This	  was	  a	  momentous	  event	  that	  demonstrated	  the	  high	  regard	  in	  which	  the	  local	  Jewish	  community	  held	  the	  JDC,	  and	  wanted	  to	  display	  toward	  their	  American	  Jewish	  benefactors.	  The	  fact	  that	  Margolis	  discussed	  the	  worldwide	  needs	  that	  faced	  JDC	  and	  the	  American	  Jewish	  communities	  at	  this	  first	  event	  was	  perhaps	  her	  way	  of	  lowering	  their	  expectations	  for	  JDC	  help	  in	  Shanghai;	  after	  all,	  she	  had	  been	  sent	  to	  ease	  the	  emigration	  bottleneck,	  not	  to	  provide	  additional	  relief.	  
Margolis	  later	  recalled	  that	  she	  felt	  forced	  to	  “play	  the	  game”	  of	  high	  society	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  contacts	  she	  needed	  with	  the	  American	  Embassy:	  	  
Life	  became	  a	  round	  of	  parties,	  one	  after	  the	  other.	  I	  had	  flown	  out	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  luggage	  and	  work	  clothes,	  but	  there	  I	  couldn’t	  function	  unless	  I	  had	  a	  different	  evening	  gown	  every	  night.	  I	  played	  the	  game	  and	  hated	  every	  minute	  of	  it,	  but	  I	  began	  my	  contacts	  with	  the	  American	  Embassy;	  that	  was	  what	  I	  was	  sent	  out	  to	  do.90	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Ibid.	  In	  her	  list	  of	  personal	  losses	  in	  Shanghai	  submitted	  to	  the	  JDC	  upon	  her	  return,	  Margolis	  lists	  four	  “evening	  dresses”	  valued	  at	  U.S.	  $300.	  (Laura	  Margolis,	  “Losses	  in	  Shanghai,”	  December	  21,	  1943,	  AR	  1933/44:130,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.)	  
	   	   	   176	  This	  aversion	  to	  “playing	  the	  game”	  was	  also	  seen	  in	  her	  correspondence	  when	  she	  first	  arrived	  in	  Shanghai.	  In	  a	  handwritten	  note,	  she	  wrote	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,	  who	  was	  again	  her	  supervisor:	  
Please	  remember	  me	  to	  the	  staff.	  For	  all	  the	  “wining	  and	  dining”	  of	  which	  there	  has	  been	  plenty—it’s	  lonesome	  as	  can	  be.	  I	  hate	  Shanghai.	  But	  I’ll	  see	  it	  through…91	  Margolis’	  first	  task	  was	  to	  work	  with	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  to	  move	  as	  many	  people	  out	  of	  Shanghai	  as	  possible.	  Europeans	  could	  never	  compete	  in	  the	  labor	  market	  in	  China.	  Resettlement	  into	  other	  parts	  of	  China	  was	  impossible	  because	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	  In	  Shanghai,	  employment	  possibilities	  were	  practically	  nonexistent,	  as	  a	  good	  proportion	  of	  technicians	  and	  artisans	  had	  already	  been	  absorbed.	  It	  was	  imperative	  that	  the	  refugees	  find	  new,	  permanent	  homes	  elsewhere.92	  
Margolis	  soon	  found	  that	  the	  American	  consulate	  in	  Shanghai	  was	  processing	  few	  visas,	  not	  due	  to	  obstructionism	  on	  their	  part	  as	  David	  Wyman	  and	  others	  have	  claimed	  occurred	  in	  some	  locations,93	  but	  rather	  because	  they	  did	  not	  have	  much	  experience	  with	  the	  problems	  involved	  with	  helping	  refugees	  to	  emigrate.	  To	  them,	  except	  for	  being	  Jews	  and	  persecuted	  by	  Hitler,	  the	  refugees	  were	  just	  a	  mass	  of	  people.	  Margolis	  began	  by	  orienting	  the	  consular	  staff	  and	  helping	  them	  put	  systems	  in	  place	  in	  order	  to	  begin	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,	  “Handwritten	  Letter,”	  June	  18,	  1941,	  AR	  1933/44:461,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  92	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  4,”	  3.	  93	  See,	  for	  example,	  Wyman,	  Paper	  Walls:	  America	  and	  the	  Refugee	  Crisis,	  1938-­‐1941	  and	  ;	  Rafael	  Medoff,	  The	  Deafening	  Silence	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Shapolsky	  Publishers,	  1987).	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  interviewing	  applicants.	  She	  also	  became	  their	  interpreter,	  as	  no	  one	  in	  the	  consulate	  spoke	  German,	  the	  language	  of	  most	  of	  the	  refugees.	  
In	  a	  letter	  written	  to	  JDC	  headquarters	  two	  weeks	  after	  her	  arrival	  in	  Shanghai,	  Margolis	  reported	  on	  the	  situation	  with	  the	  American	  consulate:	  
Not	  one	  local	  committee	  or	  individual	  had	  ever	  established	  any	  working	  relationship	  with	  our	  Consulate…	  Rumor	  is	  rampant	  about	  why	  visas	  are	  not	  being	  issued.	  Every	  rumor	  is	  absolutely	  unfounded.	  I	  went	  directly	  to	  Mr.	  Lockhart	  the	  Consul	  General	  (even	  though	  everyone	  warned	  me	  against	  a	  direct	  approach)	  and	  his	  only	  recrimination	  was	  that	  I	  hadn’t	  come	  in	  immediately	  upon	  arrival.	  I	  explained	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  be	  at	  least	  slightly	  intelligent	  about	  the	  general	  refugee	  problem	  here	  before	  discussing	  immigration	  to	  America.	  The	  kernel	  of	  the	  situation	  is	  actual	  lack	  of	  staff	  and	  not	  being	  geared	  for	  visa	  work	  because	  of	  the	  heavy	  demand	  on	  this	  Consulate	  in	  other	  very	  important	  areas.94	  From	  Margolis’	  comments	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  the	  local	  committees	  had	  been	  focused	  inwardly—	  they	  had	  not	  attempted	  to	  liaise	  with	  the	  consulate	  in	  order	  to	  expedite	  emigration	  and	  ease	  their	  relief	  burden.	  Their	  attempts	  to	  solve	  their	  refugee	  problem	  had	  resulted	  only	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  stop	  the	  immigration	  altogether.	  	  
One	  wonders	  also	  why	  they	  warned	  Margolis	  against	  approaching	  Frank	  P.	  Lockhart,	  the	  60-­‐year-­‐old	  Texas-­‐born	  Consul	  General,	  who	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  help	  in	  this	  way.	  Their	  apprehensions,	  though,	  did	  not	  stop	  her	  from	  going	  directly	  to	  him.	  As	  it	  turned	  out,	  Lockhart	  was	  ready	  and	  willing	  to	  work	  with	  Margolis,	  but	  the	  American	  Consulate	  in	  Shanghai	  was	  poorly	  staffed.	  The	  visa	  section	  had	  had	  no	  attention	  in	  months.	  Lockhart	  called	  a	  conference	  that	  very	  morning	  with	  his	  two	  visa	  officers	  and	  they	  talked	  through	  the	  entire	  matter	  with	  Margolis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  4,”	  2.	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  The	  two	  men	  assigned	  to	  the	  visa	  section	  were	  sympathetic	  but	  brand	  new	  to	  the	  job	  and	  insecure.	  Margolis	  recalled	  that	  they	  were	  “…bending	  over	  backwards	  on	  technicalities	  which	  Havana	  would	  never	  have	  even	  noticed….	  One	  simply	  cannot	  expect	  people	  who	  don’t	  know	  a	  field	  to	  take	  chances….	  Putting	  it	  bluntly,	  they’re	  new	  and	  scared.”95	  They	  were	  willing	  to	  work	  out	  a	  plan	  whereby	  Margolis	  would	  help	  them	  evaluate	  in	  six	  months’	  time	  the	  6,000	  individuals	  currently	  registered,	  to	  determine	  which	  of	  them	  were	  eligible	  for	  visas.	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  remove	  the	  existing	  uncertainty	  and	  to	  learn	  how	  many	  must	  be	  absorbed	  in	  Shanghai	  or	  elsewhere.	  
After	  several	  months	  of	  working	  together,	  Margolis	  was	  very	  pleased	  with	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  American	  consulate:	  
This	  experience	  has	  been	  completely	  satisfactory,	  and	  gratifying,	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  tangible	  results	  which	  numerically	  are	  negligible,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  what	  can	  be	  done	  where	  people	  are	  sincerely	  interested	  in	  helping,	  but	  are	  simply	  misguided	  or	  misinformed…	  During	  these	  months	  of	  working	  together,	  I’ve	  seen	  an	  entirely	  different	  attitude	  develop.	  What	  existed	  at	  first	  was	  simply	  the	  impression	  that	  “this	  bunch”	  here	  was	  pretty	  much	  the	  “dregs	  of	  humanity”	  and	  not	  many	  of	  them	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  go	  to	  America.	  I	  have	  traced	  this	  attitude	  to	  its	  source,	  namely,	  members	  of	  the	  CFA…[and]	  I	  couldn’t	  help	  but	  contrast	  the	  attitude	  of	  these	  Americans,	  and	  Christians,	  towards	  our	  people,	  with	  the	  attitude	  of	  our	  own	  CFA.96	  Through	  Margolis’	  comment	  we	  can	  perceive	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  toward	  the	  refugees.	  The	  consulate	  officials’	  perception	  of	  the	  refugees	  as	  the	  “dregs	  of	  humanity,”	  which	  she	  labored	  to	  correct,	  had	  been	  in	  fact	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  CFA,	  the	  Jewish	  relief	  committee.	  It	  was	  this	  same	  committee	  that	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Margolis	  to	  Leavitt,	  July	  29,	  1941.	  96	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  20,”	  7–8.	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  lobbied	  to	  curtail	  refugee	  immigration.	  Margolis	  was	  angered	  by	  the	  local	  Jewish	  community’s	  disregard	  for	  the	  dignity	  of	  the	  refugees,	  and	  saw	  the	  Americans	  and	  “Christians”	  (referring	  to	  the	  Consulate	  officials	  and	  perhaps	  to	  the	  Quakers)	  behaving	  more	  in	  accordance	  with	  Jewish	  values	  than	  the	  Jews	  themselves.	  In	  portraying	  the	  refugees	  in	  such	  a	  negative	  manner,	  the	  local	  leaders	  were	  boosting	  their	  own	  self-­‐image	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  thousands	  who	  came	  to	  them	  for	  help.	  
In	  order	  to	  counteract	  this	  negative	  impression	  fostered	  by	  the	  CFA,	  Margolis	  began	  to	  handpick	  the	  cases	  to	  present	  to	  the	  consulate,	  presenting	  first	  the	  “most	  desirable,”	  and	  thinking,	  “Why	  not	  give	  those	  people	  [the	  best	  qualified]	  at	  least	  a	  chance	  to	  get	  out?”97	  
Margolis	  had	  been	  working	  from	  her	  room	  at	  the	  Cathay	  Hotel,	  but	  she	  felt	  that	  her	  ability	  to	  continue	  to	  work	  there	  would	  be	  short-­‐lived:	  
Regarding	  office.	  There	  just	  isn’t	  any	  to	  be	  had,	  so	  I’m	  continuing	  to	  use	  my	  room	  [at	  the	  Cathay	  Hotel].	  The	  desk	  has	  complained	  because	  of	  the	  number	  of	  callers,	  etc.;	  but	  I’ve	  convinced	  them	  for	  another	  few	  weeks,	  I	  hope.	  I’ve	  employed	  a	  secretary;	  a	  man	  who	  can	  be	  trusted	  to	  handle	  all	  the	  Consulate	  material	  and	  will	  be	  here	  to	  take	  messages	  etc.	  when	  I’m	  out.	  For	  this	  service	  am	  paying	  $45	  a	  month.98	  She	  soon	  cabled	  headquarters	  asking	  for	  (and	  obtaining)	  approval	  to	  open	  an	  office	  in	  Shanghai	  to	  “set	  up	  this	  entire	  scheme	  with	  the	  Consulate.”99	  This	  would	  enable	  her	  to	  do	  the	  technical	  work	  involved	  as	  well	  as	  interview	  people:	  “Once	  we	  know	  where	  we	  stand	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  20.”	  98	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  11,”	  July	  2,	  1941,	  2,	  AR	  1933/44:461,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  99	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  4,”	  2.	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  immigration;	  we	  shall	  know	  what	  our	  residue	  is.”100	  One	  by	  one,	  she	  began	  to	  interview	  applicants	  for	  emigration	  who	  were	  ready,	  sending	  summaries	  to	  the	  consulate	  and	  awaiting	  responses	  from	  Washington.	  The	  responses,	  however,	  were	  slow	  to	  come.	  
In	  mid-­‐1941,	  Margolis	  began	  to	  hear	  from	  several	  trusted	  sources	  that	  due	  to	  the	  State	  of	  National	  Emergency	  declared	  by	  President	  Roosevelt,	  new	  instructions	  had	  come	  from	  Washington	  that	  would	  affect	  the	  issuing	  of	  visas,	  even	  if	  the	  persons	  should	  qualify.	  President	  Roosevelt	  did	  indeed	  issue	  a	  State	  of	  Unlimited	  National	  Emergency	  on	  May	  27,	  1941	  in	  response	  to	  Germany’s	  increasing	  threats	  of	  world	  domination.	  The	  declaration	  stated,	  in	  part:	  
I	  call	  upon	  loyal	  state	  and	  local	  leaders	  and	  officials	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  civilian	  defense	  agencies	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  assure	  our	  internal	  security	  against	  foreign	  directed	  subversion	  and	  to	  put	  every	  community	  in	  order	  for	  maximum	  productive	  effort	  and	  minimum	  of	  waste	  and	  unnecessary	  frictions.101	  This	  declaration,	  and	  a	  regulation	  issued	  to	  consuls	  in	  June	  1941,	  served	  to	  restrict	  the	  immigration	  of	  persons	  who	  had	  close	  relatives	  in	  German-­‐controlled	  territories	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  national	  security.102	  This,	  of	  course,	  would	  affect	  most	  of	  the	  refugees.	  Moses	  Leavitt	  notified	  Margolis	  of	  the	  new	  visa	  restrictions:	  
…every	  case	  is	  now	  going	  to	  be	  severely	  scrutinized.	  The	  process	  of	  emigration	  will	  now	  become	  a	  highly	  selective	  one,	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  work	  will	  have	  to	  be	  done	  on	  each	  individual	  application	  in	  order	  to	  effect	  a	  favorable	  response.…	  Unfortunately,	  none	  of	  us	  is	  clear	  as	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  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt,	  “Proclamation	  of	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  Emergency”	  (Department	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  regulation	  will	  be	  applied.	  You	  realize	  of	  course	  that	  the	  whole	  purpose	  of	  the	  new	  procedure	  is	  based	  on	  the	  emergency	  and	  that	  the	  United	  States	  must	  take	  every	  precaution	  to	  see	  that	  aliens	  admitted	  to	  this	  country	  are	  desirable	  ones.103	  Nothing	  had	  been	  said	  officially,	  however,	  and	  Margolis	  intentionally	  continued	  to	  work	  as	  if	  nothing	  had	  happened,	  but	  she	  felt	  as	  if	  she	  were	  “sitting	  on	  a	  volcano.”	  The	  pressure	  of	  the	  constant	  demands	  of	  needy	  refugees	  was	  so	  intense	  that	  she	  felt	  the	  local	  efforts	  could	  collapse	  at	  any	  moment.	  “We	  are	  absolutely	  ready	  to	  handle	  the	  job	  here	  if	  Washington	  will	  give	  us	  something	  to	  do,”	  she	  wrote	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Moses	  Leavitt.104	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  tightened	  visa	  restrictions,	  Margolis	  casually	  mentioned	  the	  possibility	  of	  utilizing	  a	  corporate	  affidavit	  for	  those	  people	  who	  had	  no	  hope	  of	  obtaining	  the	  required	  sponsors	  in	  the	  States	  but	  “would	  actually	  make	  excellent	  American	  citizens	  given	  the	  opportunity.”105	  The	  consulate	  officers	  were	  pleased	  to	  hear	  that	  this	  was	  even	  a	  possibility.	  But	  this	  problem	  could	  not	  even	  be	  addressed	  until	  the	  6,000	  individuals	  had	  been	  screened.	  By	  October	  1941,	  Margolis	  reported	  to	  JDC	  headquarters	  that	  the	  Consulate	  was	  working	  beautifully.	  Cases	  were	  beginning	  to	  clear	  regularly	  through	  Washington,	  and	  every	  case	  in	  which	  she	  had	  taken	  a	  personal	  interest	  had	  been	  granted	  a	  visa.106	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  to	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  Margolis,	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  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	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   182	  Once	  a	  plan	  was	  in	  place	  to	  ease	  the	  immigration	  bottleneck,	  Margolis’	  assignment	  was	  completed	  and	  she	  could	  have	  left	  Shanghai.	  Instead,	  in	  spite	  of	  her	  dislike	  for	  the	  city,	  she	  stayed	  and	  turned	  her	  attention	  to	  the	  great	  need	  for	  relief	  work.	  	  
The	  Hongkew	  area,	  where	  the	  refugees	  were	  to	  settle,	  was	  in	  ruins.	  An	  industrial	  section	  of	  the	  International	  Settlement,	  it	  had	  taken	  heavy	  damage	  in	  1932107	  and	  1937108	  during	  Chinese-­‐Japanese	  clashes.109	  To	  provide	  for	  the	  1938	  influx	  of	  German	  and	  Austrian	  refugees,	  five	  camps	  had	  been	  set	  up	  by	  the	  local	  Committee,	  with	  JDC	  aid,	  that	  could	  house	  2,500	  refugees.110	  The	  camps	  had	  been	  improvised	  from	  a	  barracks,	  a	  warehouse,	  two	  schools	  and	  the	  ruins	  of	  five	  bombed	  houses.111	  Since	  the	  refugees’	  stay	  in	  Shanghai	  was	  expected	  to	  be	  temporary,	  no	  efforts	  had	  been	  made,	  either	  by	  the	  existing	  communities	  or	  by	  the	  refugees	  themselves,	  to	  improve	  the	  housing	  conditions.	  Some	  of	  the	  camps	  had	  double-­‐decker	  beds	  lined	  up	  side-­‐by-­‐side,	  with	  150	  men,	  women	  and	  children	  all	  living	  together.	  The	  sanitary	  conditions	  were	  poor:	  in	  the	  barracks,	  for	  example,	  there	  were	  just	  two	  toilets	  to	  serve	  400	  people;	  in	  some	  of	  the	  camps,	  the	  facilities	  were	  outdoors.112	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  Times,	  January	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  Hallett	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  “Death	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Times,	  October	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  1937.	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  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  168.	  110	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  camps	  were	  Alcock,	  Ward,	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  Choufung	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  Marcus,	  “Survival	  in	  Shanghai,”	  Bulletin	  Igud	  Yotzei	  Sin	  -­‐	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  of	  Former	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  2010,	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  Irene	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  Voices	  from	  Shanghai :	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  (Chicago:	  University	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  Chicago	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  Margolis,	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  Time	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   183	  Ernest	  Heppner,	  who	  lived	  in	  Shanghai	  from	  1939	  to	  1947,	  related	  his	  personal	  experience:	  
These	  camps,	  euphemistically	  called	  by	  the	  German	  name	  Heime,	  meaning	  homes,	  eventually	  housed	  and	  supported	  about	  2,500	  destitute	  refugees	  who	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  rent	  even	  a	  little	  room.	  Most	  of	  them	  were	  over	  forty	  years	  of	  age	  and	  without	  marketable	  skills,	  or	  they	  were	  in	  ill	  health…	  The	  Heime	  housed	  up	  to	  150	  men,	  women,	  and	  children	  in	  one	  large	  room,	  divided	  by	  sheets	  strung	  on	  ropes	  and	  furnished	  with	  double	  steel	  bunks.	  Each	  “personal”	  area	  was	  no	  larger	  than	  the	  aisle	  in	  front	  of	  the	  bed.	  Suitcases	  were	  used	  as	  tables,	  and	  some	  families	  had	  a	  stool,	  but	  there	  were	  not	  even	  nails	  in	  the	  walls	  to	  hang	  up	  clothing.	  They	  had	  showers,	  but	  some	  had	  no	  basins	  or	  lavatories.	  Those	  facilities	  were	  outdoors,	  and	  it	  was	  a	  long	  walk	  to	  wash	  or	  use	  the	  latrines.	  The	  atmosphere	  and	  the	  general	  conditions	  were	  depressing.	  Light	  and	  air	  were	  at	  a	  premium;	  there	  were	  no	  facilities	  to	  clean	  or	  repair	  clothing,	  and	  no	  storage	  was	  available	  for	  the	  residents’	  few	  precious	  possessions.	  In	  order	  not	  to	  break	  up	  their	  families,	  men,	  women,	  and	  children	  were	  put	  together	  in	  the	  same	  room.113	  According	  to	  Heppner,	  the	  truly	  destitute	  were	  children	  who	  could	  not	  provide	  for	  themselves,	  those	  whose	  physical	  or	  mental	  health	  was	  failing,	  and	  immigrants	  over	  forty	  who	  did	  not	  possess	  any	  marketable	  skills.	  Once	  they	  had	  sold	  the	  few	  goods	  they	  had	  smuggled	  out	  of	  Germany,	  they	  had	  no	  means	  of	  sustenance.114	  
It	  was	  also	  difficult	  for	  the	  older	  and	  infirm	  refugees	  to	  recuperate	  from	  the	  Nazi	  abuses	  they	  had	  experienced	  and	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  difficulties	  of	  relocation	  with	  no	  resources	  in	  such	  an	  alien	  environment.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  stay	  was	  perceived	  as	  temporary	  further	  served	  to	  discourage	  these	  refugees	  from	  making	  the	  considerable	  effort	  that	  relocation	  required.	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  Margolis,	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  Heppner	  continued:	  
…As	  time	  went	  on,	  the	  three	  Hs—hunger,	  heat	  and	  humidity—took	  their	  toll…Death	  was	  caused	  not	  only	  by	  unsanitary	  conditions	  but	  also	  by	  inadequate	  nutrition.	  The	  inmates	  were	  hungry,	  and	  not	  just	  for	  a	  day	  or	  week	  or	  month;	  since	  their	  arrival	  in	  Shanghai	  they	  had	  not	  received	  sufficient	  nourishment.	  Fathers	  and	  husbands	  became	  desperate	  when	  they	  sold	  the	  last	  item	  of	  their	  personal	  belongings	  and	  realized	  they	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  supplement	  the	  food	  their	  families	  received	  from	  the	  committee.115	  The	  Heime	  population	  did	  not	  remain	  static.	  Some	  inmates	  found	  jobs	  and,	  craving	  privacy	  above	  all	  else,	  left	  the	  camps	  and	  rented	  a	  room.	  Some	  who	  could	  have	  left	  stayed	  on—afraid	  to	  leave	  the	  food	  kitchens	  and	  medical	  care—and	  did	  nothing.	  Others	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  rented	  rooms	  and	  then	  lost	  their	  jobs,	  or	  who	  could	  no	  longer	  afford	  medical	  services,	  moved	  back	  into	  the	  camps.	  Used	  to	  being	  productive	  all	  their	  lives,	  some	  refugees	  became	  sullen	  and	  dehumanized	  by	  the	  process	  of	  trying	  to	  obtain	  help.	  Eventually	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  resign	  themselves	  to	  becoming	  schnorrers,	  a	  Yiddish	  term	  for	  someone	  asking	  for	  a	  handout.116	  Eventually	  there	  were	  inmates	  who	  could	  no	  longer	  leave	  the	  Heime	  because	  they	  had	  neither	  shirts	  nor	  shoes	  to	  wear.	  Cut	  up	  burlap	  bags	  served	  as	  pants.	  During	  the	  summer	  months,	  when	  the	  heat	  would	  melt	  the	  asphalt,	  some	  were	  forced	  to	  stay	  indoors	  because	  they	  did	  not	  own	  even	  straw	  sandals	  like	  those	  worn	  by	  rickshaw	  coolies.	  It	  was	  scandalous	  to	  see	  these	  poor	  people	  in	  tattered	  rags,	  barely	  able	  to	  walk,	  slowly	  moving	  about	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  the	  Heime.	  It	  reflected	  badly	  not	  only	  on	  the	  refugee	  community	  but	  also	  on	  all	  foreigners.117	  Many	  of	  the	  refugees	  had	  come	  from	  comfortable,	  middle-­‐class	  lives	  in	  Germany	  or	  Austria.	  Those	  who	  came	  from	  culture-­‐specific	  professional	  backgrounds,	  including	  professors,	  attorneys,	  engineers,	  and	  others	  whose	  skills	  were	  superfluous	  in	  Shanghai,	  found	  it	  especially	  difficult	  to	  make	  the	  adjustment.	  The	  demoralization	  inherent	  in	  their	  inability	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  loved	  ones,	  and	  the	  wretchedness	  of	  the	  foreign	  living	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Heppner,	  Shanghai	  Refuge,	  87.	  116	  Ibid.,	  88–89.	  117	  Ibid.,	  88.	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  conditions,	  now	  caused	  them	  to	  plummet	  into	  a	  descending	  spiral	  of	  despondency.	  Although	  these	  refugees	  were	  free	  from	  intense	  religious	  and	  political	  persecution,	  their	  very	  struggle	  to	  survive	  each	  day	  was	  a	  challenge.	  
Many	  did	  remain	  long-­‐term	  in	  the	  Heime,	  but	  about	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  17,000	  refugees	  eventually	  were	  able	  to	  somehow	  carve	  out	  a	  living	  for	  themselves	  and	  “escape”	  the	  deplorable	  living	  conditions.	  
Philip	  Lilienthal	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  Pacific	  (Ocean)	  Relations,	  who	  had	  spent	  the	  year	  1940	  in	  Shanghai,	  reported	  on	  the	  labor	  conditions	  of	  the	  self-­‐supporting	  Jewish	  immigrants	  there,	  the	  majority	  of	  whom	  were	  employed	  as	  wageworkers.118	  
He	  noted	  that	  compared	  with	  the	  Chinese	  population,	  the	  immigrants	  in	  general	  earned	  wages	  that	  were	  not	  essentially	  higher,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  were	  even	  lower	  than	  those	  of	  native	  workers.119	  In	  many	  cases,	  Jewish	  artisans	  were	  used	  as	  competitors	  against	  the	  native	  workers,	  yet	  were	  expected	  to	  deliver	  European	  workmanship.120	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  wage-­‐earning	  immigrants	  were	  employed	  by	  enterprises	  owned	  by	  other	  immigrants.	  They	  were	  delivery	  boys,	  launderers,	  messengers,	  drivers,	  etc.	  Their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Robert	  Pilpel,	  “Introduction	  to	  Labor	  Conditions	  Report,”	  September	  4,	  1941,	  AR	  1933/44:462,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  Incidentally,	  Lilienthal	  met	  Laura	  Margolis	  and	  spoke	  very	  highly	  of	  her	  and	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  carried	  on	  in	  an	  extremely	  complicated	  and	  difficult	  situation.	  119	  	  The	  Jewish	  Chronicle,	  May	  6,	  1941,	  quoted	  in	  Philip	  Eugene	  Lilienthal,	  “The	  Labour	  Conditions	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Immigrants	  in	  Shanghai,”	  September	  4,	  1941,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:462,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  120	  The	  Jewish	  Chronicle,	  May	  20,	  1941,	  quoted	  in	  ibid.	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  living	  conditions	  were	  such	  that	  they	  were	  compelled	  to	  accept	  very	  low	  wages.	  A	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  in	  the	  immigrant	  newspaper,	  Die	  Laterne,	  on	  June	  21,	  1941,	  gave	  an	  example:	  
In	  the	  Corso	  Garten	  (a	  Jewish	  owned	  Garden	  restaurant)	  is	  employed	  an	  older	  man	  with	  the	  cleanry	  [sic]	  of	  the	  cups	  and	  dishes.	  His	  wage	  is	  Ch$1.00	  a	  day,	  besides	  this	  dollar	  he	  gets	  a	  cup	  of	  coffee	  and	  a	  roll.	  The	  Chinese	  boy	  gets	  a	  monthly	  salary	  of	  Ch$40.00	  and	  that	  boy	  declared	  himself	  ready	  to	  lay	  down	  his	  work	  if	  the	  immigrant	  didn’t	  want	  to	  work	  for	  this	  “wage.”121	  Lilienthal	  gave	  other	  examples:	  
On	  May	  1941	  a	  chemical	  factory	  has	  been	  established	  by	  immigrants	  in	  Honkew	  [sic],	  East	  Seward	  Road.	  This	  enterprise	  employes	  [sic]	  more	  than	  20	  immigrants	  for	  very	  hard	  work	  [who]	  get	  only	  Ch$70	  a	  month.	  That	  is	  a	  wage	  far	  lower	  than	  the	  Chinese	  workers	  of	  the	  same	  branch	  get.	  Ch$110	  is	  the	  least	  those	  Chinese	  workers	  earn	  in	  the	  foreign	  or	  Chinese	  owned	  chemical	  factories.122	  Some	  immigrants	  are	  employed	  as	  night-­‐watchmen	  by	  a	  Jewish	  owned	  company.	  They	  get	  per	  night	  Ch$1.50-­‐2.	  Indian	  watchmen	  get	  for	  the	  same	  work	  Ch$5	  to	  8.123	  When	  immigrants	  were	  wanted	  as	  strikebreakers,	  however,	  they	  were	  offered	  higher	  wages	  than	  the	  Chinese,	  but	  were	  generally	  dismissed	  once	  the	  strike	  had	  ended.	  In	  fairness,	  occasionally	  immigrants	  were	  employed	  in	  better	  conditions	  than	  the	  Chinese	  workers,	  but	  according	  to	  Lilienthal,	  those	  cases	  were	  the	  exceptions	  that	  only	  confirmed	  the	  rule	  that	  the	  Jewish	  immigrants	  would	  work	  cheaper	  than	  the	  Chinese	  or	  even	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Die	  Laterne,	  June	  21,	  1941,	  quoted	  in	  ibid.	  122	  Ibid.,	  2.	  123	  Ibid.	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  other	  foreigners.	  In	  addition,	  immigrant	  wages	  did	  not	  keep	  pace	  with	  rising	  inflation	  rates.124	  
Those	  immigrants	  who	  were	  employed	  as	  wage	  earners	  nevertheless	  had	  very	  low	  living	  standards.	  They	  were	  able	  to	  survive	  either	  with	  financial	  help	  from	  their	  relatives	  abroad,	  by	  pawning	  or	  selling	  the	  few	  valuables	  they	  had	  brought	  with	  them	  from	  Germany,	  or	  by	  accepting	  partial	  support	  from	  the	  Jewish	  relief	  institutions.125	  
But	  the	  needy	  refugees	  were	  not	  just	  handed	  cash	  by	  JDC.	  Margolis,	  reflecting	  her	  U.S.	  social	  welfare	  training,	  tried	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  meaningful	  work	  so	  they	  could	  “earn	  their	  living”	  rather	  than	  just	  receive	  charity:	  	  
Instead	  of	  being	  given	  relief	  checks,	  they	  [the	  refugees]	  are	  assigned	  to	  certain	  duties—given	  jobs,	  if	  you	  will—and	  paid	  salaries	  for	  their	  efforts.	  Surely,	  this	  type	  of	  procedure	  is	  far	  more	  rehabilitative	  in	  nature	  than	  keeping	  people	  on	  relief	  and	  making	  them	  live	  on	  charity…	  The	  sums	  spent	  for	  their	  salaries	  are	  part	  of	  the	  relief	  budget	  and	  are	  not	  administrative	  costs.126	  Of	  course	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  refugees	  could	  receive	  salaries,	  and	  although	  these	  “salaries”	  were	  small,	  Margolis	  intended	  this	  strategy	  to	  help	  the	  refugees	  retain	  some	  manner	  of	  dignity.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  these	  handicaps,	  some	  of	  the	  refugees	  applied	  themselves	  to	  bettering	  their	  lives,	  and	  indeed	  succeeded	  in	  becoming	  self-­‐supporting.	  They	  reconstructed	  entire	  streets	  with	  material	  from	  the	  ruins	  of	  Hongkew.	  Those	  who	  had	  skills	  set	  up	  shops	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  Ibid.	  125	  Ibid.,	  3.	  126	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “The	  Truth	  about	  Shanghai:	  Refuting	  the	  Mistaken	  Allegations	  of	  Mr.	  Lazar	  Epstein”	  (Unpublished	  Document,	  November	  18,	  1941),	  3–4,	  AR	  1933/44:482,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  Publicity.	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  leather	  and	  metal	  workers,	  designers,	  managers,	  tailors,	  milliners,	  bakers,	  confectioners,	  and	  more,	  and	  were	  able	  to	  eke	  out	  a	  living.127	  Some	  started	  delicatessen	  stores	  serving	  Viennese	  sausages	  and	  opened	  sidewalk	  cafés	  that	  offered	  Viennese	  coffee	  and	  pastries.128	  The	  area	  around	  Chusan	  Road,	  where	  many	  of	  these	  restaurants	  and	  stores	  were	  located,	  once	  a	  “small,	  dingy,	  typically	  Chinese	  lane,”	  became	  known	  as	  “Little	  Vienna,”	  a	  sophisticated	  area	  that	  reflected	  and	  preserved	  German	  and	  Austrian	  culture.129	  Paradoxically,	  “Little	  Vienna”	  became	  an	  area	  where	  German	  nationals	  would	  come	  to	  have	  a	  semblance	  of	  life	  as	  it	  had	  been	  in	  Germany.	  
The	  refugees	  managed	  to	  construct	  a	  rich	  cultural	  life	  as	  well.	  The	  Shanghai	  refugees	  produced	  three	  daily	  newspapers—two	  morning	  and	  one	  evening,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  weeklies,	  journals	  and	  magazines.130	  Refugees	  offered	  lessons	  in	  English,	  the	  sciences,	  and	  professionals	  such	  as	  prominent	  music	  teachers	  offered	  their	  skills	  as	  well.131	  Refugees	  played	  their	  instruments	  at	  cafés,	  formed	  orchestras132	  and	  put	  together	  theater	  and	  opera	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  “17,000	  Refugees	  Admitted	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  JTA,	  February	  13,	  1940.	  128	  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  168.	  129	  Heppner,	  Shanghai	  Refuge,	  84–86;	  see	  also	  Wiedemann,	  “Transnational	  Encounters	  with	  ‘Amerika,’”	  17.	  130	  A	  complete	  list	  of	  refugee	  publications	  in	  Shanghai	  can	  be	  found	  in	  “Shanghai	  Collection,	  1924-­‐1950	  	  (bulk	  1939-­‐1948)	  RG	  243,”	  n.d.,	  Series	  IV,	  accessed	  August	  24,	  2012;	  see	  also	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  212–219.	  The	  first	  Jewish	  daily	  newspaper	  in	  the	  Far	  East	  began	  publication	  as	  the	  
Shanghai	  Jewish	  Chronicle	  in	  August	  1939.	  (“Jewish	  Daily	  Started	  in	  Shanghai;	  Organ	  of	  Refugees,”	  JTA,	  August	  18,	  1939.)	  131	  Wolfgang	  Fraenkel,	  a	  Jewish	  composer	  and	  performer,	  was	  the	  first	  person	  to	  introduce	  the	  “Barless”	  music	  skill	  system	  to	  China.	  Many	  of	  China’s	  current	  composers	  were	  his	  students	  (The	  Jews	  of	  China:	  Volume	  One,	  Historical	  and	  Comparative	  Perspectives	  (Armonk,	  NY:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  1999),	  8.)	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  performances.133	  The	  refugees	  organized	  educational	  lectures	  and	  discussion	  groups	  on	  many	  subjects,134	  schools	  for	  refugee	  children,135	  and	  various	  political	  groups	  that	  were	  active	  in	  the	  different	  refugee	  camps.136	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  some	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  new	  environment,	  there	  still	  remained	  thousands	  of	  refugees	  who	  could	  not	  provide	  for	  themselves.	  Margolis	  submitted	  a	  preliminary	  report	  to	  Pilpel,	  noting	  her	  own	  alarm	  at	  the	  refugee	  situation:	  	  
The	  so-­‐called	  “Heimes”	  were	  a	  terrific	  shock.	  In	  some	  of	  them	  the	  refugees	  are	  so	  crowded;	  the	  atmosphere	  is	  so	  depressing;	  and	  the	  people	  look	  so	  completely	  hopeless	  and	  lost	  that	  one	  visit	  is	  enough	  to	  know	  that	  ultimately	  this	  condition	  must	  be	  alleviated.	  And	  of	  course	  it	  is	  self-­‐evident	  that	  one	  meal	  a	  day	  is	  not	  enough.	  The	  answer,	  however,	  is	  not	  more	  money,	  at	  least	  not	  from	  us.…	  That	  there	  was	  actual	  graft	  [in	  the	  previous	  year]	  is	  admitted	  by	  everyone;	  hence	  the	  refugee	  director	  was	  let	  out	  and	  Captain	  Herzberg	  took	  the	  job.…	  But	  there	  is	  constant	  friction	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  For	  a	  list	  of	  orchestral	  and	  instrumental	  concerts,	  see	  “Shanghai	  Collection,	  1924-­‐1950	  	  (bulk	  1939-­‐1948)	  RG	  243,”	  folder	  58;	  see	  also	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  227–233.	  For	  additional	  information	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  Jewish	  musicians	  in	  Shanghai,	  see	  Yating	  Tang,	  “Reconstructing	  the	  Vanished	  Musical	  Life	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  Diaspora:	  A	  Report,”	  Ethnomusicology	  Forum	  13,	  no.	  1	  (June	  1,	  2004):	  101–18.	  133	  For	  a	  list	  of	  theaters	  and	  theatrical	  productions,	  see	  “Shanghai	  Collection,	  1924-­‐1950	  	  (bulk	  1939-­‐1948)	  RG	  243,”	  folders	  56–57,	  59;	  see	  also	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  219–223.	  134	  “Shanghai	  Collection,	  1924-­‐1950	  	  (bulk	  1939-­‐1948)	  RG	  243,”	  folder	  33.	  135	  Baghdadi	  Jew	  Sir	  Horace	  Kadoorie	  (1902-­‐1995)	  had	  a	  special	  interest	  in	  providing	  education	  to	  refugee	  children.	  The	  Kadoorie	  School,	  which	  opened	  in	  January	  1942,	  had	  17	  teachers	  who	  taught	  600	  refugee	  children.	  The	  language	  of	  instruction	  was	  English,	  but	  Chinese	  and	  French	  were	  also	  taught.	  After	  the	  Japanese	  occupation,	  German	  and	  Japanese	  were	  introduced	  as	  well.	  (See	  Kranzler,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  
Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,	  chapter	  XI;	  see	  also	  Meyer,	  “Baghdadi	  Jews	  in	  Early	  Shanghai”;	  and	  Vámos,	  “‘Home	  Afar’:	  The	  Life	  of	  Central	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  During	  World	  War	  II,”	  5.)	  136	  “Shanghai	  Collection,	  1924-­‐1950	  	  (bulk	  1939-­‐1948)	  RG	  243,”	  Series	  II,	  Subseries	  3.	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  and	  tension,	  and	  a	  terrific	  hatred	  of	  the	  Committee	  and	  its	  leadership	  exists	  throughout	  the	  community;	  not	  only	  among	  the	  refugees;	  but	  on	  the	  part	  of	  everyone.…	  Aside	  from	  being	  an	  excellent	  disciplinarian	  and	  organizer,	  unfortunately,	  the	  Captain	  has	  no	  understanding	  of	  handling	  people.	  He	  is	  fair	  enough,	  I	  think;	  but	  his	  whole	  manner	  is	  one	  which	  leads	  to	  heel	  clicking	  and	  obedience	  and	  fear	  of	  authority.	  One	  has	  the	  constant	  feeling	  of	  being	  in	  the	  German	  army.137	  The	  mutual	  animosity	  between	  Herzberg,	  the	  CFA	  and	  the	  refugees	  was	  inevitable,	  given	  the	  low	  opinion	  the	  CFA	  held	  of	  the	  impoverished	  German	  and	  Austrian	  Jews,	  and	  the	  reputation	  the	  CFA	  had	  for	  financial	  corruption	  and	  showing	  favoritism	  toward	  its	  own	  “employees.”	  The	  refugees	  resented	  having	  to	  live	  in	  such	  deplorable	  conditions	  and	  being	  treated	  as	  sub-­‐human	  by	  Herzberg	  and	  his	  committee.	  Margolis’	  reference	  to	  Herzberg’s	  “heel	  clicking”	  and	  engendering	  fear	  of	  authority	  must	  have	  been	  particularly	  vexing	  to	  the	  refugees	  in	  light	  of	  their	  experiences	  under	  the	  Nazis.	  They	  did	  not	  expect	  to	  be	  treated	  thus	  by	  their	  own.	  
As	  soon	  as	  Margolis	  was	  able	  to	  attack	  the	  relief	  situation,	  she	  made	  some	  immediate	  improvements:	  
…I	  recommended	  an	  additional	  appropriation	  for	  an	  evening	  meal	  for	  the	  people	  in	  our	  homes…because	  the	  food	  is	  so	  poor;	  the	  people	  so	  terribly	  sad	  looking;	  that	  I	  didn’t	  feel	  it	  was	  fair	  to	  them	  to	  let	  them	  wait,	  while	  I	  was	  investigating,	  and	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  decide	  what	  to	  do.	  In	  the	  interim,	  this	  evening	  meal	  has	  helped	  considerably.	  Most	  of	  the	  time	  the	  food	  is	  so	  bad,	  it	  can’t	  be	  eaten.	  At	  least	  with	  two	  meals,	  there	  may	  be	  more	  which	  is	  edible.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  chief	  cook,	  the	  whole	  kitchen	  personnel	  needs	  to	  be	  changed;	  but	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Committee	  is	  that	  …”you	  can’t	  please	  the	  customer.”	  This	  week	  there	  was	  a	  riot	  in	  the	  dining	  hall.	  The	  refugees	  threw	  all	  the	  boiled	  potatoes	  at	  the	  cook.…	  When	  I	  ask	  Captain	  Hertzberg	  [sic]	  how	  everything	  is,	  the	  answer	  is	  “fine.”138	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  4,”	  1.	  138	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  16,”	  July	  17,	  1941,	  2,	  AR	  1933/44:461,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	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  The	  refugees’	  anger	  had	  boiled	  over	  at	  the	  horrendous	  conditions	  and	  the	  self-­‐righteous	  attitude	  of	  Herzberg	  and	  the	  CFA	  workers.	  Herzberg,	  by	  reporting	  to	  Margolis	  after	  this	  incident	  that	  everything	  was	  “fine,”	  either	  accepted	  this	  behavior	  as	  something	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  “ungrateful	  brutes,”	  or	  did	  not	  want	  her	  involvement	  in	  what	  he	  felt	  was	  an	  internal	  matter	  that	  she	  had	  no	  business	  interfering	  with.	  But	  Margolis	  knew	  that	  something	  had	  to	  be	  done.	  In	  a	  handwritten	  note	  to	  Pilpel,	  she	  wrote:	  
Dear	  Bob:	  I	  simply	  had	  to	  get	  this	  off	  my	  chest!	  The	  actual	  “handling”	  of	  the	  people	  by	  the	  joint	  staff	  is	  much	  worse	  than	  I	  want	  to	  put	  into	  an	  official	  report.	  No	  one	  knows	  better	  than	  I	  what	  a	  bunch	  of	  “crooks”	  our	  friends	  can	  be;	  but	  I’m	  getting	  awfully	  set	  up	  on	  hearing	  them	  called	  crooks	  and…	  seeing	  the	  glint	  of	  joy	  when	  someone	  is	  “caught…”	  There’s	  plenty	  “rotten	  in	  Denmark”	  in	  areas	  which	  will	  have	  to	  wait	  for	  the	  telling	  and	  remain	  my	  headache	  for	  the	  moment.	  But	  I’ve	  made	  myself	  one	  promise	  since	  I’ve	  been	  here.	  Never	  never	  will	  I	  say	  “yes”	  again	  in	  such	  a	  hurry.…	  	  She	  perceived	  that	  some	  attention	  needed	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  recreational	  and	  leisure	  time	  of	  the	  large	  group	  of	  unemployed	  refugees,	  so	  that	  the	  deterioration	  that	  already	  had	  set	  in	  would	  not	  continue	  to	  increase.	  	  
Besides	  these	  frictions,	  Margolis	  also	  had	  to	  concern	  herself	  with	  infighting	  between	  the	  two	  committees,	  the	  IC	  and	  the	  CFA.	  Margolis	  communicated	  to	  JDC	  headquarters	  that	  the	  staff	  and	  committee	  members	  of	  both	  relief	  committees	  had	  at	  first	  been	  very	  cordial	  to	  her	  and	  claimed	  to	  be	  ready	  to	  work	  with	  her,	  but	  she	  felt	  that	  the	  traditional	  local	  feuds	  existing	  long	  before	  her	  time	  would	  make	  any	  real	  integration	  impossible.	  
Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon	  was	  willing	  to	  sponsor	  the	  refugee	  program,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  like	  working	  with	  other	  committees	  and	  would	  stand	  for	  no	  interference.	  He	  wanted	  the	  CFA	  (led	  by	  Speelman)	  to	  continue	  to	  receive	  money	  from	  JDC,	  but	  under	  his	  control,	  which	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  Speelman	  refused	  to	  do.	  Sassoon	  was	  not	  living	  in	  Shanghai	  at	  the	  time	  and	  therefore	  would	  control	  the	  program	  through	  the	  IC	  led	  by	  Paul	  Komor.	  Margolis	  had	  great	  respect	  for	  Komor	  but	  saw	  him	  as	  a	  subjective	  and	  emotional	  idealist	  who	  could	  not	  see	  limitations	  when	  it	  came	  to	  helping	  people	  and	  would	  need	  constant	  supervision.	  She	  felt	  that	  he	  was	  “a	  master	  at	  rubbing	  some	  very	  necessary	  people	  the	  wrong	  way.”139	  	  
Margolis	  perceived	  that	  neither	  additional	  money	  nor	  the	  need	  of	  the	  refugees	  would	  heal	  the	  deep	  rifts	  that	  existed	  within	  the	  mutually	  antagonistic	  factions.	  Her	  later	  reminiscences	  show	  that	  her	  training	  and	  her	  expectation	  that	  the	  mere	  need	  for	  charity	  and	  community	  welfare	  would	  pull	  together	  discordant	  factions	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community	  left	  her	  unprepared	  for	  this	  level	  of	  conflict.140	  She	  did	  her	  best,	  however,	  not	  to	  become	  too	  involved	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  committees	  and	  to	  retain	  an	  open	  mind	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  refugees.	  
From	  the	  moment	  of	  her	  arrival,	  Margolis	  had	  been	  besieged	  with	  letters	  and	  phone	  calls	  from	  refugees	  wanting	  her	  to	  listen	  to	  their	  complaints	  and	  volunteering	  to	  give	  her	  “the	  real	  low	  down”	  on	  the	  committees.	  She	  refused	  to	  listen,	  having	  concluded	  that	  the	  greatest	  “irregularities”	  were	  only	  among	  the	  refugees	  working	  in	  the	  kitchens,	  who	  may	  slip	  a	  few	  potatoes	  into	  their	  pockets	  or	  give	  their	  friends	  better	  measure,	  infractions	  which	  she	  considered	  unimportant.	  She	  offered	  to	  listen	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  Captain	  Herzberg,	  but	  if	  they	  refused	  to	  do	  so,	  she	  would	  not	  hear	  them	  out.141	  She	  warned	  JDC	  headquarters	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Laura	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  Robert	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	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  140	  Stein,	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  Social	  Work	  in	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  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	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  they	  may	  get	  letters	  complaining	  about	  her	  unwillingness	  to	  hear	  “the	  truth,”	  but	  in	  her	  strategic	  desire	  to	  be	  fair	  and	  neutral,	  she	  stressed	  that	  she	  was	  willing	  to	  listen	  to	  stories	  from	  disinterested	  refugees	  and	  to	  note	  what	  she	  could	  see	  for	  herself.142	  
Her	  intuition	  proved	  to	  be	  correct.	  She	  determined,	  after	  talking	  with	  many	  refugees	  and	  investigating	  for	  herself,	  that	  the	  criticism	  of	  the	  Committee	  was	  “100%	  accurate,	  whether	  from	  refugees,	  local	  residents,	  or	  mere	  passersby.”143	  She	  wrote	  to	  Pilpel	  in	  a	  confidential	  letter:	  
From	  everyone	  I	  got	  the	  same	  reaction.	  The	  food	  is	  very	  bad;	  the	  refugee	  staff	  employed	  is	  absolutely	  dictatorial	  and	  overbearing	  to	  the	  refugees	  needing	  the	  Committee;	  there	  is	  “squeezing”	  in	  the	  kitchens;	  and	  just	  generally	  the	  attitude	  is	  much	  the	  same	  as	  if	  one	  throws	  a	  crust	  of	  bread	  to	  a	  dog.	  Military	  discipline	  is	  the	  ultimate.	  There	  is	  an	  unnecessary	  amount	  of	  bitter	  feeling	  and	  hatred	  of	  the	  personnel,	  ranging	  from	  the	  very	  top	  to	  the	  bottom.144	  She	  felt	  the	  responsibility	  for	  this	  lay	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  Captain	  Herzberg,	  a	  Shanghai-­‐born	  German	  Jew	  and	  the	  only	  non-­‐refugee	  on	  the	  Committee’s	  payroll.	  She	  had	  originally	  expressed	  doubts	  as	  to	  the	  competency	  and	  even	  the	  honesty	  of	  the	  CFA	  committee	  members,	  writing	  to	  headquarters	  that	  “they	  all	  stood	  by	  while	  money	  was	  being	  taken	  right	  from	  under	  their	  noses.”145	  But	  since	  the	  appointment	  of	  Herzberg,	  she	  felt	  the	  finances	  were	  now	  being	  well	  handled.146	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   194	  In	  Margolis’	  estimation,	  Herzberg	  was	  a	  good,	  honest	  man,	  a	  hard	  worker	  and	  efficient.	  However,	  his	  approach	  to	  the	  refugees	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  “coolie	  and	  German	  dictatorship”:	  
…	  there	  is	  absolutely	  no	  feeling	  and	  understanding	  for	  human	  beings.	  Anything	  he	  [Herzberg]	  controls	  I’m	  sure	  is	  honest;	  which	  is	  definitely	  not	  true	  of	  the	  administration	  he	  took	  over.	  He	  had	  a	  worse	  mess	  on	  his	  hands	  than	  we	  inherited	  in	  Cuba.	  The	  actual	  mechanical	  part	  he	  handles	  well.	  But	  I’m	  frankly	  surprised	  that	  no	  refugee	  has	  struck	  him.147	  Captain	  Herzberg’s	  premise	  was	  that	  the	  refugees—those	  not	  on	  his	  “staff”—were	  “…all	  a	  bunch	  of	  crooks	  and	  thieves	  trying	  to	  ‘take’	  the	  Committee	  for	  everything	  they	  can	  get…”148	  Margolis	  herself	  noted	  that	  Herzberg’s	  appraisal	  was	  not	  totally	  without	  foundation:	  
That	  plenty	  of	  them	  do	  try	  to	  get	  all	  they	  can	  from	  us	  I	  know	  very	  well	  from	  former	  experience	  but	  that	  there	  are	  plenty	  really	  needy	  ones	  among	  them	  I	  am	  also	  sure	  of.	  And	  the	  present	  set-­‐up	  and	  methods	  will	  never	  weed	  them	  out.	  We	  are	  sure	  that	  anyone	  willing	  to	  put	  up	  with	  one	  of	  our	  “Heimes”	  must	  need	  it	  desperately.	  But	  I	  am	  sure	  that	  considerable	  could	  be	  saved	  by	  a	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  the	  6,000	  living	  outside	  who	  come	  and	  get	  their	  noon	  meal	  daily,	  some	  free,	  others	  paying	  varying	  amounts	  depending	  on	  income.	  This	  graded	  scale	  is	  also	  the	  cause	  of	  terrific	  ill-­‐feeling.149	  She	  did	  believe	  that	  if	  she	  could	  personally	  supervise	  the	  re-­‐investigation	  of	  those	  6,000,	  there	  would	  be	  money	  to	  feed	  those	  living	  in	  the	  Heimes—the	  group	  that	  really	  needed	  it—twice	  a	  day.	  But	  any	  such	  investigation	  would	  be	  sure	  to	  rankle	  the	  refugees.	  “If	  and	  when	  it	  is	  ever	  tackled	  there	  will	  be	  plenty	  of	  excitement,”	  she	  wrote.150	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   195	  The	  powerful	  personalities	  in	  the	  established	  community	  were	  the	  ones	  that	  posed	  the	  greatest	  obstacles,	  as	  they	  angled	  to	  retain	  control	  at	  all	  costs.	  Speelman	  had	  already	  shown	  defensiveness	  when	  Margolis	  had	  mentioned	  the	  need	  for	  reevaluation	  of	  the	  program.	  She	  was	  concerned	  that	  he	  would	  resign	  from	  the	  CFA,	  and	  along	  with	  him	  wealthy	  community	  leader	  Ellis	  Hayim	  who	  was	  vice-­‐chairman	  and	  in	  charge	  of	  housing	  and	  disbursement.	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  she	  was	  aware	  that	  Hayim	  was	  known	  to	  sabotage	  anyone	  who	  crossed	  or	  criticized	  him.	  She	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  have	  Hayim	  against	  her,	  since	  the	  losers	  in	  the	  end	  would	  be	  the	  refugees.	  Ellis	  Hayim	  was	  definitely	  a	  problem	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with.151	  
Herzberg,	  she	  felt,	  would	  also	  walk	  out	  if	  it	  became	  necessary	  to	  do	  things	  differently:	  “He	  simply	  hasn’t	  the	  brains	  to	  absorb	  certain	  things.”152	  By	  November	  1941,	  Margolis	  had	  somewhat	  alleviated	  the	  situation,	  not	  by	  firing	  Herzberg,	  but	  by	  confining	  his	  duties	  to	  ordering	  food,	  supervising	  the	  building	  and	  purchasing	  of	  supplies,	  and	  to	  “working	  with	  those	  things	  which	  had	  no	  feelings.”	  
B.	  Kahn,	  the	  chairman	  of	  immigration	  for	  the	  CFA,	  was	  “another	  person	  we	  must	  be	  very	  careful	  of.”	  Margolis	  felt	  that	  eventually	  the	  immigration	  department	  of	  the	  CFA	  could	  be	  done	  away	  with	  and	  the	  work	  turned	  over	  entirely	  to	  HICEM.	  But	  she	  was	  concerned	  that	  Kahn	  could	  make	  things	  extremely	  uncomfortable	  for	  the	  refugees.	  “To	  date	  we’re	  ‘very	  good	  friends’;	  but	  that’s	  because	  I’ve	  kept	  quiet	  about	  the	  CFA.”153	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  Margolis	  realized	  that	  until	  she	  could	  find	  substitute	  leadership	  it	  would	  be	  risky	  to	  lose	  the	  present,	  as	  bad	  as	  she	  felt	  it	  was.	  She	  had	  to	  tread	  lightly	  around	  these	  powerful	  men:	  
I	  cannot	  count	  on	  their	  co-­‐operation;	  in	  fact	  quite	  the	  opposite.	  And	  in	  an	  emergency,	  particularly	  of	  a	  political	  nature,	  there	  isn’t	  one	  person	  who	  would	  stand	  by	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  refugees,	  if	  his	  ego	  had	  been	  hurt.154	  If	  the	  committee	  members	  were	  to	  quit	  and	  the	  responsibilities	  fall	  back	  upon	  her,	  she	  felt	  that	  “…certainly	  it	  would	  be	  a	  sad	  state	  if	  I	  was	  left	  with	  buying,	  building	  and	  equipment	  problems.	  After	  all,	  Cuba	  was	  practically	  like	  working	  in	  the	  States,	  as	  far	  as	  learning	  local	  resources	  is	  concerned.	  But	  this	  is	  the	  Orient,	  and	  very	  very	  different.”155	  However,	  she	  was	  reluctant	  to	  take	  over	  and	  absolve	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  their	  moral	  responsibility:	  
You	  see	  I’m	  terribly	  reluctant	  to	  jump	  in	  at	  this	  point	  and	  “take	  over”	  as	  we	  did	  in	  Cuba;	  because	  it	  will	  be	  the	  last	  excuse	  which	  the	  local	  people	  have	  for	  asking	  JDC	  to	  do	  the	  whole	  job.	  They	  feel	  absolutely	  no	  responsibility	  themselves	  which	  will	  be	  more	  and	  more	  obvious	  as	  you	  hear	  of	  later	  developments	  and	  incidents.…	  Bad	  as	  this	  committee	  is	  I	  want	  them	  to	  continue	  to	  struggle	  with	  the	  problem,	  because	  so	  far	  I’ve	  found	  nothing	  better.156	  Although	  Margolis	  had	  reservations,	  she	  took	  a	  chance	  by	  recommending	  that	  JDC	  in	  New	  York	  let	  the	  CFA	  know	  at	  least	  that	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  monies	  had	  not	  been	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   197	  found	  satisfactory	  in	  terms	  of	  benefit	  to	  the	  refugees	  and	  that	  a	  reorganization	  with	  their	  cooperation	  would	  be	  appreciated.157	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  greatest	  tact	  and	  diplomacy	  which	  can	  be	  used;	  my…suggestion	  that	  the	  program	  needs	  to	  be	  re-­‐organized	  will	  create	  tremendous	  hostility	  among	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Committee.158	  She	  anticipated	  that	  the	  committee	  members	  might	  not	  accept	  graciously	  any	  “American	  interference”	  coming	  directly	  from	  her,	  so	  she	  deflected	  the	  possible	  anger	  from	  herself	  and	  turned	  to	  JDC	  headquarters	  to	  suggest	  it,	  since	  they	  were	  the	  ones	  providing	  the	  funding	  on	  which	  the	  committees	  depended.	  
She	  eventually	  approached	  Ellis	  Hayim	  directly	  about	  the	  need	  for	  reorganization	  in	  the	  Committee,	  and	  even	  though	  she	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  alienate	  him,	  she	  was	  nevertheless	  passionately	  honest:	  	  
I	  let	  him	  [Hayim]	  know,	  that	  the	  relief	  show	  was	  not	  efficiently	  run;	  and	  that	  the	  refugees	  were	  not	  getting	  one	  hundred	  cents	  on	  the	  dollar	  out	  of	  what	  we	  were	  sending.	  He	  asked	  if	  I’d	  be	  willing	  to	  go	  out	  there;	  and	  run	  it	  for	  a	  month	  or	  so.	  I	  said,	  I	  wouldn’t	  run	  it;	  but	  I	  might	  consider,	  teaching	  and	  re-­‐organizing	  the	  staff,	  that	  when	  I	  left	  they’d	  know	  how	  to	  operate	  themselves.	  He	  agreed	  to	  speak	  to	  Hertzberg	  [sic].	  I’ve	  heard	  nothing	  more;	  and	  shall	  of	  course	  take	  no	  more	  aggressive	  steps.159	  The	  refugee	  crisis	  intensified	  greatly	  when	  in	  August	  1941	  the	  Japanese	  transferred	  around	  900	  religious	  East	  European	  Jews	  from	  Kobe	  to	  Shanghai,	  introducing	  yet	  another	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  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  20,”	  7.	  158	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  21,”	  2.	  159	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Robert	  Pilpel,	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  18,”	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  layer	  of	  communal	  complexity	  due	  to	  the	  religiously	  observant	  and	  separatist	  nature	  of	  the	  group.160	  The	  JDC	  reported	  in	  October	  1941:	  
The	  Jewish	  refugee	  committee	  in	  Kobe	  was	  obliged	  at	  short	  notice	  to	  evacuate	  to	  Shanghai	  the	  800	  to	  900	  Polish	  Jewish	  immigrants	  from	  Lithuania	  who	  had	  been	  stranded	  there	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year.	  Although	  this	  virtually	  liquidated	  the	  problem	  in	  Japan…it	  simply	  shifted	  the	  burden	  to	  Shanghai.	  Substantial	  additional	  monthly	  grants	  are	  being	  made	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  these	  transplanted	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai.	  Arrangements	  have	  been	  made	  to	  house	  them	  and	  to	  furnish	  them	  with	  kosher	  food	  which	  many	  of	  the	  refugees	  from	  Kobe,	  being	  rabbis	  or	  yeshivah	  [sic]	  students,	  require.161	  Margolis	  began	  to	  work	  closely	  with	  the	  Polish	  Ambassador,	  Tadeusz	  Romer,	  to	  move	  the	  900	  to	  1,000	  Polish	  refugees	  out	  of	  Shanghai	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  After	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  however,	  the	  Polish	  presence	  was	  no	  longer	  temporary	  and	  therefore	  Margolis	  felt	  that	  relief	  should	  be	  administered	  on	  the	  same	  per	  capita	  basis.162	  
The	  established	  Ashkenazi	  (Russian)	  community	  formed	  a	  committee	  called	  the	  “Committee	  to	  assist	  Jewish	  refugees	  from	  Poland,	  Lithuania,	  Latvia,	  and	  Estonia”	  [Eastjewcom	  or	  EJC]	  with	  Alfred	  Oppenheim	  as	  chairman	  and	  Joseph	  Bitker	  as	  vice-­‐chairman.163	  The	  committee	  aimed	  to	  raise	  funds	  for	  the	  added	  expenses	  that	  the	  Polish	  immigrants’	  religious	  lifestyle	  would	  require,	  and	  this	  created	  friction	  with	  the	  CFA	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  “Japan	  Deports	  Stranded	  Jewish	  Refugees,”	  JTA,	  August	  20,	  1941.	  161	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “The	  Status	  of	  the	  JDC	  as	  of	  October	  10,	  1941”	  (Unpublished	  Document,	  October	  10,	  1941),	  7,	  AR	  1933/44:462,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  162	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  10.	  163	  Yehuda	  Bauer	  lists	  Bitker	  as	  vice-­‐chairman	  and	  treasurer	  of	  Eastjewcom	  in	  
American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  307,	  but	  Bitker	  himself	  says	  he	  was	  vice-­‐chairman	  of	  the	  CFA	  and	  chairman	  of	  the	  finance	  committee	  of	  the	  CFA;	  see	  J.	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  February	  12,	  1951,	  1,	  AJDC	  Israel	  Records,	  Shanghai	  1938-­‐1947.	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  committee	  that	  was	  providing	  for	  the	  German	  immigrants,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  JDC	  monies.164	  Alfred	  Oppenheim,	  chairman	  of	  EJC,	  wrote	  to	  Speelman,	  chairman	  of	  the	  CFA:	  
The	  Committee	  of	  the	  EJC…has	  been	  created	  upon	  the	  initiative	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  Ashkenazi	  Congregation	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  giving	  additional	  support	  and	  aid	  to	  the	  Refugees	  from	  Poland	  and	  Lithuania.	  The	  donors	  to	  the	  EJC	  are	  solely	  Russian,	  Polish	  and	  Lithuanian	  Jews	  of	  Shanghai.…	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  EJC	  is	  only	  ADDITIONAL	  aid	  to	  Polish	  and	  Russian	  Refugees,	  whereby	  the	  main	  care	  of	  the	  Refugees	  is	  to	  be	  with	  your	  Committee,	  who	  are	  taking	  care	  of	  all	  the	  needs	  of	  all	  Refugees	  however	  not	  for	  account	  of	  local	  supporters	  of	  the	  case,	  but	  for	  account	  of	  the	  JOINT	  DISTRIBUTION	  COMMITTEE	  in	  N.Y.,	  who	  are	  supplying	  your	  Committee	  with	  the	  necessary	  funds.165	  Eastjewcom	  was	  different	  from	  the	  other	  committees	  in	  that	  it	  was	  raising	  money	  independently	  to	  supplement	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  Polish	  Jews	  from	  Kobe.	  The	  leaders	  of	  the	  EJC	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  pool	  their	  funds	  with	  the	  other	  refugee	  committees,	  lacking	  trust	  in	  them	  and	  fearing	  that	  if	  their	  money	  were	  put	  into	  a	  general	  treasury,	  their	  own	  communities	  would	  be	  neglected.	  
When	  the	  Kobe	  immigrants	  arrived,	  there	  were	  disputes	  regarding	  the	  housing	  situation,	  which	  naturally	  involved	  finances,	  and	  Eastjewcom	  turned	  to	  international	  sources	  for	  help.	  They	  approached	  the	  Union	  of	  Orthodox	  Rabbis	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada,	  who	  in	  turn	  appealed	  to	  JDC	  in	  1941	  to	  give	  further	  special	  consideration	  to	  these	  900-­‐plus	  religious	  Polish	  Jews:	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  From	  this	  point	  the	  CFA	  was	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “German	  committee,”	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  EJC,	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  provided	  for	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  refugees.	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  Speelman,	  October	  2,	  1941,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:462,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  
	   	   	   200	  To	  throw	  these	  refugees	  in	  the	  existing	  homes	  for	  German	  refugees	  and	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  local	  committee	  will	  physically	  and	  morally	  undermine	  these	  refugees.	  Because	  of	  religious,	  communal	  and	  language	  motives,	  these	  refugees,	  mostly	  Rabbis,	  Yeshiva	  students	  and	  religious	  persons,	  cannot	  sociologically	  be	  established	  with	  the	  others.	  These	  refugees	  need	  especial	  consideration	  and	  assistance…166	  The	  CFA	  did	  not	  accept	  Eastjewcom’s	  argument	  and	  insisted	  that	  the	  Polish	  refugees	  use	  the	  same	  camps	  as	  the	  German	  immigrants,	  which	  they	  refused	  to	  do.	  The	  EJC	  in	  turn	  retorted	  that	  as	  long	  as	  they	  could	  manage	  outside	  the	  homes	  with	  the	  same	  cost	  they	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  do	  so.	  Margolis	  had	  no	  problem	  with	  this,	  since	  the	  Heime	  were	  already	  desperately	  overcrowded.	  She	  wrote	  to	  Pilpel:	  
I	  agreed	  to	  this,	  primarily	  because	  I	  couldn’t	  conscientiously	  feel	  that	  our	  camps	  were	  a	  fit	  place	  to	  live	  in	  and	  I	  was	  hoping	  that	  in	  some	  way	  we	  could	  relieve	  the	  congestion	  rather	  than	  increase	  it;	  and	  since	  the	  EJC	  was	  not	  asking	  for	  anymore	  [sic]	  to	  house	  their	  people	  privately	  I	  had	  no	  objection.167	  As	  well	  as	  receiving	  money	  raised	  by	  the	  EJC,	  the	  Polish	  immigrants	  were	  also	  drawing	  a	  larger	  proportion	  of	  JDC	  contributions	  to	  meet	  their	  special	  needs,	  which	  naturally	  raised	  problems	  of	  fairness.	  JDC	  headquarters	  reported	  that:	  
…this	  is	  hardly	  a	  situation	  of	  which	  we	  are	  proud…the	  newly	  arrived	  Polish	  refugees	  receive	  about	  $5.00	  monthly	  for	  their	  support	  compared	  with	  the	  $1.50	  a	  month	  which	  is	  the	  average	  subvention	  given	  to	  the	  German	  refugees.	  It	  is	  not	  right	  that	  there	  should	  be	  two	  classes	  of	  assistance	  for	  two	  classes	  of	  Jews.	  All	  Jews	  who	  are	  in	  need	  are	  equally	  deserving	  of	  JDC	  assistance	  and	  support	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  our	  funds	  permit	  us	  to	  render	  such	  assistance.	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  Union	  of	  Orthodox	  Rabbis	  of	  United	  States	  and	  Canada,	  “Memorandum	  to	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  in	  the	  Matter	  of	  the	  Polish	  Refugees	  Being	  Evacuated	  from	  Kobe,	  Japan	  to	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  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	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  1.	  
	   	   	   201	  One	  of	  the	  principal	  reasons	  for	  the	  larger	  subvention	  given	  to	  the	  Polish	  Jewish	  refugees	  is	  the	  lesser	  experience	  of	  the	  EJC	  in	  administering	  relief	  funds	  and	  also	  because	  it	  has	  many	  fewer	  people	  to	  care	  for.	  Obviously,	  the	  German	  refugee	  committee,	  which	  does	  business	  on	  a	  wholesale	  basis,	  is	  able	  to	  effect	  certain	  economics	  in	  the	  purchase	  and	  preparation	  of	  food,	  which	  a	  smaller	  committee	  cannot	  do.	  Another	  reason	  is	  that	  most	  of	  the	  German	  refugees	  who	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  committee	  in	  Shanghai	  eat	  at	  large	  community	  kitchens,	  where	  again	  food	  can	  be	  prepared	  in	  great	  masses,	  whereas	  the	  Polish	  Jewish	  refugees	  are	  scattered	  in	  various	  small	  groups.168	  The	  distinction	  between	  religious	  Eastern	  European	  Jews	  and	  German	  and	  Austrian	  Jews,	  and	  the	  demands	  being	  made	  by	  the	  religious,	  rankled	  the	  more	  secular	  JDC	  leadership	  as	  well	  as	  the	  local	  Committee.169	  The	  necessity	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  special	  needs	  was	  reluctantly	  acknowledged	  and	  justified,	  not	  on	  a	  religious	  basis,	  but	  rather	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  efficiency	  of	  economics.	  In	  truth,	  the	  threat	  to	  JDC’s	  fundraising	  monopoly	  by	  the	  Va’ad	  HaHatzalah,	  the	  group	  that	  raised	  funds	  in	  the	  U.S.	  for	  the	  Shanghai	  Orthodox	  Jews,	  was	  a	  driving	  factor	  in	  the	  reaching	  of	  a	  compromise.	  	  
The	  CFA	  nevertheless	  complained	  to	  JDC	  that	  the	  extra	  allotment	  for	  the	  Polish	  Jews	  was	  unreasonable	  and	  unfair:	  
Right	  from	  the	  start,	  they	  demanded	  U.S.	  $6.–	  per	  month	  for	  the	  upkeep	  of	  their	  people,	  whereas	  we	  at	  the	  time	  were	  compelled	  to	  come	  through	  with	  approximately	  U.S.	  $2.50	  per	  month	  per	  capita.	  This,	  of	  course,	  we	  did	  not	  agree	  to,	  as	  you	  yourselves	  intimated	  that	  the	  same	  treatment	  was	  to	  be	  rendered	  to	  all	  Refugees.	  We	  still	  are	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  policy	  of	  allowing	  the	  Polish	  Jews	  U.S.	  $5.–	  per	  month	  per	  capita…	  is	  unfair,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “The	  Truth	  about	  Shanghai:	  Refuting	  the	  Mistaken	  Allegations	  of	  Mr.	  Lazar	  Epstein,”	  4.	  169	  For	  more	  on	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  tensions	  between	  German	  and	  Eastern	  European	  Jews,	  see	  Steven	  E	  Aschheim,	  Brothers	  and	  Strangers:	  The	  East	  European	  Jew	  in	  
German	  and	  German	  Jewish	  Consciousness,	  1800–1923	  (University	  of	  Wisconsin	  Press,	  1982).	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  we	  had	  no	  other	  option	  and	  in	  view	  of	  the	  serious	  consequences	  which	  may	  arise,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  accede	  to	  their	  demands.170	  The	  following	  report	  by	  Margolis	  puts	  a	  human	  face	  on	  the	  internecine	  friction	  between	  the	  CFA	  and	  EJC:	  
The	  CFA	  was	  absolutely	  unprepared	  to	  house	  the	  new	  group.	  For	  the	  Rabbis	  they	  made	  room	  in	  an	  old	  Synagogue.	  Old	  dirty	  mattresses	  were	  placed	  on	  the	  floor,	  etc.	  About	  half	  the	  new	  immigration	  were	  Rabbis;	  and	  half	  of	  this	  group	  were	  Mirrer	  Yeshivah	  students	  and	  their	  teachers.	  Since	  the	  EJC	  refused	  to	  give	  direct	  relief	  as	  they	  were	  no	  longer	  cooperating	  with	  the	  CFA	  on	  the	  old	  basis;	  Rabbi	  Ashkenazi,	  chief	  Rabbi	  of	  the	  local	  Ashkenazi	  community	  approached	  the	  CFA	  directly	  for	  relief	  of	  the	  Rabbinical	  group.	  Excluding	  all	  the	  well-­‐known	  facts	  that	  kosher	  living	  is	  always	  more	  expensive,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  prices	  have	  been	  rising	  daily,	  the	  way	  this	  Rabbinical	  group	  was	  organized,	  it	  was	  absolutely	  impossible	  to	  ask	  them	  to	  manage	  on	  an	  allowance	  given	  the	  German	  refugees.	  But	  more	  in	  order	  not	  to	  be	  annoyed	  with	  Rabbi	  Ashkenazi	  (Speelman	  absolutely	  refused	  to	  see	  him	  at	  all,	  and	  the	  poor	  old	  man	  had	  to	  talk	  to	  Herzberg,	  who	  has	  no	  respect	  for	  age,	  beard	  or	  anything),	  he	  was	  finally	  granted	  a	  direct	  allowance	  of	  Sh.	  2.50	  per	  day,	  for	  food;	  and	  Sh$20.-­‐	  per	  month	  for	  rent.	  This	  is	  the	  equivalent	  of	  about	  U.S.	  $5.-­‐	  per	  month	  per	  person…	  beyond,	  giving	  Rabbi	  Ashkenazi	  this	  allowance	  for	  the	  Rabbis	  in	  order	  to	  “get	  rid	  of	  him”;	  nothing	  more	  was	  done	  by	  our	  committee	  to	  help	  this	  group	  get	  settled.171	  This	  friction	  did	  not	  escape	  the	  notice	  of	  international	  Jewry.	  The	  Jewish	  Morning	  
Journal,	  published	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  reported	  on	  December	  16,	  1941:	  “Although	  the	  Jewish	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  M.	  Speelman	  to	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Letter	  160,”	  October	  4,	  1941,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:462,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  171	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  27,”	  2.	  Rabbi	  Avraham	  Kalmanowitz,	  who	  had	  arrived	  in	  America	  from	  Poland	  in	  1940,	  became	  the	  honorary	  leader	  of	  the	  Mir	  Yeshiva	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  actively	  advocated	  for	  the	  yeshiva	  members	  marooned	  in	  Shanghai.	  He	  helped	  to	  raise	  funds	  for	  the	  Shanghai	  group	  for	  five	  years	  through	  the	  Va’ad	  haHatzalah,	  a	  body	  established	  to	  rescue	  rabbis	  and	  yeshiva	  students	  in	  World	  War	  II	  that	  transmitted	  funds	  through	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross	  in	  Switzerland,	  something	  the	  JDC	  refused	  to	  do	  so	  as	  not	  to	  go	  against	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  Later,	  Kalmanowitz	  was	  instrumental	  in	  the	  emigration	  of	  the	  entire	  Mir	  Yeshiva	  to	  the	  United	  States;	  see	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  
Holocaust,	  308;	  see	  also	  Alex	  Grobman,	  Battling	  for	  Souls:	  The	  Vaad	  Hatzala	  Rescue	  
Committee	  in	  Post-­‐Holocaust	  Europe	  (Jersey	  City,	  NJ:	  KTAV	  Publishing	  House,	  2004).	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  settlement	  in	  Shanghai	  is	  young,	  quarrels	  among	  the	  various	  Jewish	  groups	  have	  already	  started.”172	  
Not	  only	  did	  the	  two	  groups	  not	  get	  along,	  but	  when	  Captain	  Herzberg	  was	  thrown	  into	  the	  mix,	  the	  interpersonal	  relationships	  became	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  deal	  with.	  When	  Margolis	  suggested	  a	  working	  committee	  that	  would	  include	  representatives	  from	  both	  groups,	  they	  refused	  even	  to	  sit	  down	  with	  each	  other	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  impeded	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  relief	  work.	  Margolis	  then	  began	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  with	  each	  group	  separately,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  Mirrer	  Yeshiva.	  This	  small	  yeshiva,	  which	  had	  migrated	  as	  a	  group	  from	  Poland,	  considered	  itself	  a	  separate	  entity,	  refusing	  to	  accept	  the	  authority	  of	  Rabbi	  Meir	  Ashkenazi,173	  a	  Russian	  Jew	  and	  member	  of	  Chabad-­‐Lubavitch	  who	  had	  been	  the	  chief	  rabbi	  of	  the	  Russian	  Ashkenazi	  community	  since	  1925.174	  
As	  an	  outsider	  and	  an	  American,	  Margolis	  was	  able	  somewhat	  to	  mediate;	  and	  as	  the	  provider	  of	  funds	  she	  had	  additional	  leverage.	  Following	  long	  and	  difficult	  meetings	  with	  the	  members	  of	  the	  EJC,	  Margolis	  was	  forced	  into	  a	  compromise	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  1942	  because	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  they	  could	  not	  raise	  money	  without	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community.175	  They	  therefore	  agreed	  to	  maintain	  the	  higher	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  Polish	  refugees.	  Although	  the	  Polish	  Jews	  only	  represented	  one	  eighth	  of	  the	  refugee	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  A.	  Reichman,	  “News	  of	  Jews	  in	  Shanghai,”	  Der	  Morgen	  Zshurnal	  (Jewish	  Morning	  
Journal),	  December	  16,	  1941,	  AR	  1933/44:462,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	   173	  “Shanghai	  Jewish	  History.”	  174	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  27,”	  3.	  175	  The	  “Ashkenazi	  Community”	  represented	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Eastern	  European	  immigrants,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  German	  immigrants.	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  population,	  they	  received	  one	  sixth	  of	  the	  support	  ($5,000	  of	  the	  $30,000	  monthly	  allotment	  from	  JDC	  headquarters).	  Margolis	  felt	  this	  was	  wrong,	  and	  it	  was	  only	  after	  a	  bitter	  struggle	  that	  she	  gave	  in	  and	  compromised.	  Because	  of	  this,	  she	  was	  able	  to	  get	  the	  help	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community	  in	  raising	  money	  for	  all	  the	  refugees,	  and	  kept	  them	  from	  raising	  money	  separately	  for	  the	  Polish	  Jews	  alone.176	  
Through	  her	  strategy	  of	  early	  “shuttle	  diplomacy,”	  Margolis	  was	  also	  able	  to	  convince	  everyone	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  religious	  Eastern	  Europeans	  needed	  a	  place	  to	  study	  and	  pray,	  so	  separate	  housing	  for	  them	  was	  then	  acquired.	  Margolis	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	  was	  extra	  money	  going	  to	  the	  German	  refugees	  from	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon’s	  International	  Committee,	  and	  this	  was	  analogous	  to	  the	  extra	  funds	  the	  EJC	  was	  giving	  to	  the	  East	  European	  immigrants.	  
The	  groups	  also	  agreed	  that	  Rabbi	  Ashkenazi	  would	  no	  longer	  have	  a	  separate	  committee	  but	  would	  work	  with	  the	  EJC,	  which	  would	  become	  a	  subcommittee	  of	  the	  CFA	  responsible	  for	  all	  the	  problems	  confronting	  the	  Eastern	  European	  group.	  They	  would	  give	  basic	  relief,	  after	  investigation,	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  U.S.	  $5	  per	  month	  per	  person,	  for	  which	  CFA	  would	  reimburse	  from	  the	  JDC	  budget	  (upon	  submission	  of	  detailed	  accounts).	  The	  CFA	  auditor	  would	  audit	  their	  books.	  	  
The	  EJC	  did	  not	  trust	  the	  CFA	  and	  refused	  to	  contribute	  to	  them,	  but	  they	  agreed	  that	  they	  would	  provide	  for	  the	  East	  Europeans’	  particular	  needs	  through	  funds	  they	  raised	  independently.	  Margolis	  would	  have	  complete	  supervision	  of	  the	  work	  of	  both	  committees	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  11;	  see	  also	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  27,”	  1.	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  and	  would	  act	  as	  liaison	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  this	  working	  agreement	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  change	  as	  the	  situation	  warranted.177	  
Moses	  Leavitt,	  JDC	  General	  Secretary,	  reported	  the	  outcome	  to	  the	  JDC	  Executive	  Committee:	  
Some	  of	  our	  problems	  in	  Shanghai,	  particularly	  the	  problem	  created	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  influx	  of	  1,000	  East	  European	  Jews	  transferred	  from	  Japan	  recently,	  now	  seem	  on	  their	  way	  to	  solution.	  Miss	  Laura	  Margolis,	  whom	  we	  sent	  to	  the	  Far	  East	  early	  this	  year…	  has	  evolved	  a	  working	  arrangement	  between	  the	  German	  refugee	  committee	  and	  the	  East	  European	  refugee	  committee.	  The	  new	  arrangement	  will	  require	  a	  larger	  monthly	  grant	  for	  Shanghai	  than	  we	  have	  hitherto	  been	  sending,	  namely	  $26,000	  monthly,	  but	  we	  have	  arranged	  to	  send	  this	  sum	  for	  October	  and	  hope	  to	  continue	  it	  in	  future	  months.	  The	  increased	  grant	  is	  needed	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  necessity	  to	  set	  up	  special	  homes	  for	  the	  East	  European	  Jews,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  drastic	  rise	  in	  prices.	  One	  home	  for	  250	  Mir	  yeshiva	  students	  has	  been	  rented	  for	  a	  year,	  and	  Miss	  Margolis	  is	  seeking	  to	  find	  another	  home	  to	  house	  an	  additional	  150	  persons.178	  Having	  overcome	  the	  immediate	  crisis,	  Margolis	  realized	  that	  she	  needed	  additional	  help	  in	  Shanghai:	  
I	  fully	  appreciate	  the	  confidence	  you	  have	  in	  me	  and	  in	  my	  ability	  to	  handle	  the	  Shanghai	  situation.	  I	  have	  never	  been	  known	  for	  my	  modesty	  with	  regard	  to	  my	  abilities;	  but	  I	  am	  also	  fully	  aware	  of	  my	  limitations.	  I	  have	  absolutely	  no	  desire	  to	  tackle	  the	  situation	  which	  is	  definitely	  beyond	  my	  capacity	  to	  resolve.…	  I	  must	  have	  help,	  and	  experienced	  help.	  I	  want	  to	  be	  perfectly	  fair	  about	  this.	  If	  you	  think	  you	  have	  someone,	  who	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  27,”	  3.	  In	  1939	  the	  JDC	  was	  spending	  U.S.	  $1.80	  per	  month	  to	  feed	  each	  refugee	  in	  Shanghai.	  (“8,000	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,	  2,000	  on	  Way,	  Sassoon	  Reveals,”	  JTA,	  May	  15,	  1939.)	  By	  comparison,	  it	  cost	  the	  JDC	  U.S.	  $9	  per	  month	  to	  feed	  one	  refugee	  in	  Belgium,	  $10	  in	  France,	  $12	  in	  Holland,	  $10-­‐12	  in	  England,	  and	  $14	  in	  Switzerland	  (American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “550,000	  Jews	  Now	  Under	  German	  Rule,”	  June	  15,	  1939,	  2.).	  178	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  “Report	  of	  the	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Wednesday,”	  October	  22,	  1941,	  6,	  AR	  1933/44:462,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	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  on	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  findings	  thinks	  he	  or	  she	  can	  handle	  the	  proposition	  alone,	  I	  am	  perfectly	  willing	  to	  turn	  the	  tasks	  over	  to	  this	  person;	  and	  if	  you	  so	  wish,	  stay	  out	  here	  just	  long	  enough	  to	  initiate	  them,	  and	  then	  return.	  This	  is	  just	  beyond	  my	  capacity.	  And	  please	  remember,	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  re-­‐organization	  of	  the	  relief	  show;	  the	  immigration	  work	  will	  continue;	  and	  if	  we	  stay	  out	  of	  war,	  and	  the	  Washington	  machine	  gets	  going;	  this	  work	  may	  be	  heavy.	  Please	  give	  this	  your	  utmost	  considera-­‐tion;	  and	  advise	  accordingly.179	  Margolis	  requested	  that	  JDC	  send	  30-­‐year-­‐old	  Manuel	  “Manny”	  Siegel,	  with	  whom	  she	  had	  worked	  successfully	  in	  Cuba.	  Mr.	  Siegel	  agreed	  to	  come,	  and	  arrived	  in	  Shanghai	  on	  November	  26,	  1941,	  a	  week	  and	  a	  half	  before	  Pearl	  Harbor.180	  
Conclusion	  
The	  multifaceted	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  Shanghai—which	  differed	  in	  religion,	  background,	  socioeconomic	  status	  and	  class—fractured	  under	  the	  added	  stress	  and	  attempted	  separately	  to	  provide	  aid	  to	  the	  refugees	  who	  began	  pouring	  out	  of	  Nazi	  Europe	  in	  the	  late	  1930s.	  This	  chapter	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  incoming	  refugees	  until	  the	  immigrant	  surge	  proved	  to	  be	  too	  large	  for	  their	  resources.	  When	  they	  reached	  out	  to	  the	  international	  Jewish	  communities,	  the	  JDC,	  as	  America’s	  umbrella	  Jewish	  relief	  organization,	  responded	  to	  their	  pleas	  by	  sending	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  help	  the	  refugees	  emigrate	  from	  Shanghai.	  The	  refugees	  themselves	  also	  organized	  to	  provide	  for	  those	  social	  services	  that	  the	  JDC	  funding	  could	  not	  afford.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  21,”	  3.	  180	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  Affidavit,	  April	  1,	  1943,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  See	  also	  Leavitt,	  “Report	  of	  the	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Wednesday,”	  6.	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  The	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  representatives	  did	  indeed	  cooperate	  and	  assist	  the	  refugees	  to	  emigrate	  until	  the	  Pacific	  War	  stopped	  them.	  This	  chapter	  has	  served	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  claims	  American	  Jews	  “did	  not	  do	  enough”	  to	  save	  Jewish	  people	  during	  the	  Holocaust.181	  The	  work	  of	  the	  JDC	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  determined	  and	  concerted	  American	  Jewish	  effort	  to	  provide	  desperately	  needed	  relief	  and	  resources.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  This	  subject	  has	  evoked	  an	  intense	  scholarly	  debate,	  which	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter,	  on	  just	  what	  would	  have	  been	  “enough”	  to	  have	  been	  done	  to	  help	  the	  Jews	  of	  Europe	  under	  the	  circumstances.	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  CHAPTER	  FOUR	  
SHANGHAI	  AFTER	  PEARL	  HARBOR—	  
THE	  STRANDED	  STATELESS	  
The	  Pacific	  War	  began	  in	  Shanghai	  on	  December	  8	  with	  the	  bombing	  of	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  and	  immediately	  JDC	  representatives	  became	  enemy	  nationals	  and	  lost	  their	  access	  to	  American	  funding.	  In	  exploring	  Margolis’	  desperate	  attempt	  to	  raise	  the	  funds	  needed	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  refugees,	  this	  chapter	  will	  affirm	  Yehuda	  Bauer’s	  argument	  that	  JDC’s	  commitment	  to	  working	  exclusively	  in	  accordance	  with	  U.S.	  government	  policy	  hindered	  them	  from	  providing	  the	  desperately	  needed	  aid	  to	  the	  stranded	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai.	  Bauer	  attributed	  this	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  loyalty	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  to	  JDC’s	  perception	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community’s	  vulnerability	  to	  antisemitism.	  He	  postulated	  that	  there	  were	  essentially	  two	  JDCs:	  the	  U.S.	  based	  organization	  that	  adhered	  to	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  policies,	  and	  JDC	  functioning	  on	  the	  field,	  which	  did	  what	  was	  necessary	  to	  aid	  people	  in	  need.1	  
An	  example	  of	  this	  was	  the	  “creative”	  funding	  that	  took	  place	  to	  provide	  needed	  resources	  to	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai.	  Because	  of	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act,	  JDC	  felt	  it	  could	  not	  even	  communicate	  with	  its	  American	  staff	  in	  Shanghai,	  even	  if	  it	  meant	  the	  discontinuation	  of	  essential	  relief	  activities.	  This	  caused	  tremendous	  hardship	  for	  the	  JDC	  representatives	  in	  Shanghai,	  who	  had	  no	  assurance	  that	  the	  funds	  needed	  for	  their	  work	  would	  be	  forthcoming	  once	  the	  U.S.	  entered	  the	  War.	  Laura	  Margolis	  and	  Manuel	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  more	  on	  this,	  see	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust.	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  Siegel	  were	  able	  to	  “creatively”	  secure	  substantial	  loans	  from	  local	  wealthy	  Jews	  in	  exchange	  for	  repayment	  of	  those	  loans	  to	  their	  families	  or	  representatives	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Their	  ingenious	  circumvention	  of	  this	  very	  Act	  enabled	  thousands	  of	  impoverished	  Jewish	  people	  in	  Shanghai	  to	  survive	  the	  War.	  
Fundraising	  
This	  section	  will	  analyze	  how	  Margolis	  used	  the	  implied	  promise	  of	  American	  funds	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  democratic	  methods	  to	  attempt	  to	  heal	  the	  growing	  fissures	  within	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  communities.	  These	  attempts	  to	  unify	  disparate	  communities	  regularly	  failed,	  as	  intra-­‐	  and	  inter-­‐communal	  frictions	  rose	  again	  and	  again	  to	  the	  surface.	  In	  spite	  of	  Margolis’	  repeated	  efforts	  to	  call	  community	  meetings,	  appoint	  representative	  committees,	  provide	  oversight	  and	  instill	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  responsibility,	  it	  was	  only	  when	  the	  Shanghai	  Jews	  were	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  rope,	  with	  no	  means	  of	  obtaining	  funding	  or	  receiving	  any	  outside	  help,	  that	  they	  made	  a	  serious	  effort	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  own	  basic	  needs.	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  German-­‐style	  Patenschaften,	  or	  sponsorships,	  the	  refugees	  themselves	  implemented	  a	  successful	  system	  reminiscent	  of	  medieval	  Jewish	  corporate	  taxation.	  Margolis’	  moral	  exhortations,	  together	  with	  the	  refugees’	  dire	  need,	  helped	  to	  ameliorate	  a	  seemingly	  intractable	  situation.	  
❋ 
On	  Monday,	  December	  8,	  1941,	  everything	  changed	  in	  Shanghai.	  Laura	  Margolis	  and	  Manny	  Siegel	  had	  planned	  to	  begin	  restructuring	  the	  CFA	  that	  morning,	  but	  at	  4	  a.m.	  a	  new	  Battle	  of	  Shanghai	  began	  simultaneously	  with	  the	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  and	  was	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  immediately	  followed	  by	  the	  Japanese	  occupation	  of	  Shanghai.	  America	  had	  joined	  the	  War,	  and	  overnight,	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  lost	  contact	  with	  the	  United	  States.2	  	  
As	  the	  city	  panicked,	  the	  JDC	  workers	  immediately	  began	  to	  shred	  by	  hand	  and	  dispose	  of	  the	  carbon	  copies	  of	  all	  their	  correspondence	  and	  records.	  The	  only	  copies	  of	  documents	  that	  remained	  were	  those	  that	  had	  been	  sent	  to	  America.	  
As	  enemy	  nationals,	  Margolis	  and	  most	  of	  the	  IC	  and	  CFA	  committee	  members	  were	  confined	  to	  their	  quarters	  except	  for	  Captain	  Herzberg,	  who	  was	  German	  and	  had	  been	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  Shanghai.	  Herzberg	  was	  faced	  with	  a	  serious	  financial	  difficulty,	  since	  the	  $30,000	  JDC	  December	  payment	  had	  not	  yet	  arrived.	  He	  immediately	  reduced	  the	  8,000	  refugees	  who	  received	  assistance	  from	  two	  meals	  a	  day	  to	  one,	  and	  reduced	  the	  bread	  rations	  from	  12	  to	  6	  ounces	  per	  person	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  function	  through	  the	  end	  of	  December.	  When	  he	  notified	  the	  staff	  of	  570	  employees3	  that	  the	  Committee	  could	  not	  assume	  responsibility	  after	  January	  1,	  this	  led	  to	  chaos	  and	  panic	  both	  in	  the	  refugee	  community	  and	  among	  the	  staff.4	  
The	  New	  York	  Times	  reported	  that	  post-­‐Pearl	  Harbor,	  Japanese-­‐held	  Shanghai	  became:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  “JDC	  Representatives	  Marooned	  in	  Shanghai;	  Departure	  of	  Rabbis	  for	  Canada	  Prevented,”	  JTA,	  December	  9,	  1941.	  3	  Lazar	  Epstein,	  “Jewish	  refugees,	  multimillionaires	  and	  the	  JDC,”	  Der	  Werker,	  November	  1,	  1941,	  2,	  AR	  1933/44:482,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  Publicity.	  4	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  2.	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  …a	  city	  of	  desperate	  hunger,	  and	  anti-­‐British	  and	  anti-­‐American	  propaganda,	  and	  sharp	  rivalry	  between	  the	  Japanese	  Army	  and	  Navy	  over	  division	  of	  the	  vast	  wealth	  of	  enemy	  property….	  Americans	  and	  Britons	  have	  relative	  freedom	  of	  movement	  within	  the	  city,	  but	  live	  under	  the	  menace	  of	  arrest.5	  Matters	  eased	  up	  a	  week	  later,	  when	  the	  Japanese	  allowed	  enemy	  nationals	  their	  freedom	  “for	  the	  present”6	  as	  long	  as	  they	  obeyed	  military	  regulations.7	  Margolis	  approached	  Michel	  Speelman,	  chairman	  of	  the	  Committee	  for	  Assistance,	  and	  Ellis	  Hayim,	  vice-­‐chairman,8	  and	  suggested	  they	  let	  the	  Japanese	  know	  that	  no	  more	  funds	  would	  be	  available	  to	  refugees	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month,	  since	  under	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act	  of	  1917,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  prohibited	  from	  any	  activities	  that	  might	  be	  viewed	  as	  assisting	  the	  enemy,	  such	  as	  sending	  money	  to	  a	  belligerent	  nation.9	  When	  Speelman	  and	  Hayim	  attempted	  to	  meet	  with	  Captain	  Koreshige	  Inuzuka	  (1890-­‐1965),	  head	  of	  Jewish	  Affairs	  for	  the	  Japanese	  Naval	  Landing	  Party,	  he	  refused	  to	  meet	  with	  them	  since	  he	  felt	  they	  had	  constantly	  defied	  the	  Japanese	  prior	  to	  Pearl	  Harbor.10	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Karl	  Eskelund,	  “Shortage	  of	  Food	  in	  Shanghai	  Grave:	  Threat	  of	  Arrest	  Hangs	  Over	  American-­‐British	  Colony,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  January	  6,	  1942.	  6	  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  169.	  7	  “Shanghai	  Americans	  Are	  Reported	  Well:	  But	  Red	  Cross	  Official’s	  Cable	  Tells	  of	  Lack	  of	  Funds,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  January	  18,	  1942.	  8	  According	  to	  Margolis,	  the	  two	  men	  had	  no	  fondness	  for	  each	  other	  but	  Hayim,	  who	  was	  very	  wealthy,	  would	  contribute	  if	  given	  power,	  so	  Speelman	  would	  defer	  to	  him	  in	  everything	  “even	  when	  he	  knows	  a	  thing	  is	  wrong.”	  (Margolis	  to	  Pilpel,	  “Letter	  20,”	  3.)	  9	  40	  Stat.	  411,	  enacted	  6	  October	  1917,	  codified	  at	  12	  U.S.C.	  §	  95a	  et	  seq.;	  for	  more	  on	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act,	  see	  Martin	  Domke,	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  in	  World	  
War	  II.	  (Central	  Book	  Co.,	  1943);	  see	  also	  Samuel	  Anatole	  Lourie,	  “The	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act,”	  Michigan	  Law	  Review	  42,	  no.	  2	  (October	  1,	  1943):	  205–34;	  for	  the	  text	  of	  the	  law,	  see	  “12	  U.S.	  Code	  §	  95a,”	  n.d.,	  http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/95a.	  10	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  “Interview	  with	  Laura	  Margolis,”	  10.	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  After	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  Inuzuka	  moved	  his	  offices	  into	  the	  Cathay	  Hotel,	  the	  best	  hotel	  in	  Shanghai,	  and	  occupied	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon’s	  penthouse.11	  This	  was	  the	  same	  hotel	  where	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  were	  staying,12	  so	  Margolis	  decided	  to	  approach	  Inuzuka	  herself.	  She	  had	  actually	  met	  him	  at	  various	  dinner	  parties	  and	  horse	  races	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Pearl	  Harbor	  days	  and	  had	  made	  a	  favorable	  impression.	  	  
Margolis	  phoned	  Inuzuka,	  who	  remembered	  her	  and	  invited	  her	  up	  to	  his	  offices.	  He	  received	  her	  “graciously”	  with	  a	  tea	  ceremony	  within	  two	  hours	  of	  her	  request.13	  Also	  present	  at	  that	  meeting	  were	  Manny	  Siegel	  and	  J.	  Bitker,	  who	  was	  at	  that	  time	  Vice-­‐Chairman	  of	  the	  CFA	  and	  the	  Chairman	  of	  their	  subcommittee	  on	  finance.14	  Margolis	  painted	  a	  picture	  for	  Inuzuka	  of	  how	  dire	  the	  refugee	  situation	  would	  become	  if	  funds	  were	  not	  available,	  and	  appealed	  for	  his	  help	  on	  a	  humanitarian	  basis	  as	  well	  as	  a	  political	  one,	  saying,	  “You,	  as	  an	  occupying	  power,	  cannot	  afford	  to	  have	  hungry	  people	  riot.”15	  Reasoning	  with	  him,	  she	  pointed	  out	  that	  they	  were	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  problem	  that	  had	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  regardless	  of	  external	  circumstances.	  This	  was	  the	  approach	  she	  used	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  hotel,	  built	  by	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon	  and	  the	  most	  prestigious	  hotel	  in	  Shanghai,	  was	  at	  the	  entrance	  of	  Nanking	  Road,	  the	  commercial	  center	  of	  Shanghai,	  and	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  Bund	  waterfront	  district.	  It	  was	  also	  close	  to	  the	  war	  front,	  with	  bullets	  often	  whizzing	  by	  and	  walls	  pierced	  by	  shrapnel.	  Now	  called	  the	  Fairmont	  Peace	  Hotel,	  it	  is	  still	  one	  of	  the	  most	  luxurious	  hotels	  in	  all	  of	  Shanghai.	  (“Wartime	  Shanghai:	  A	  Tycoon	  Triumphs	  Over	  the	  Emperor,”	  History	  Net:	  Where	  History	  Comes	  Alive	  -­‐	  World	  &	  U.S.	  History	  
Online,	  accessed	  June	  18,	  2013,	  http://www.historynet.com/wartime-­‐shanghai-­‐a-­‐tycoon-­‐triumphs-­‐over-­‐the-­‐emporer.htm.)	  12	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  “Interview	  with	  Laura	  Margolis,”	  10.	  13	  Ibid.	  14	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  1.	  15	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  “Interview	  with	  Laura	  Margolis,”	  10.	  Note	  that	  Margolis	  had	  used	  the	  same	  threat	  of	  rioting	  while	  in	  Cuba,	  to	  attempt	  to	  get	  more	  funds	  from	  the	  JDC.	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  Captain	  Inuzuka	  throughout	  all	  her	  dealings	  with	  him	  and	  found	  it	  to	  be	  the	  most	  effective.16	  
In	  the	  meantime,	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  had	  immediately	  contacted	  the	  American	  Red	  Cross	  for	  any	  possible	  help,	  and	  were	  able	  to	  get	  a	  promise	  of	  5,000	  sacks	  of	  cracked	  wheat	  that	  were	  already	  in	  Shanghai,	  if	  the	  Japanese	  would	  release	  them	  to	  the	  JDC	  staff.	  
Margolis	  asked	  Inuzuka’s	  permission	  to	  release	  the	  wheat	  and	  borrow	  local	  funds,	  showing	  him	  a	  cable	  she	  had	  received	  from	  JDC	  headquarters	  office	  authorizing	  her	  to	  borrow	  the	  equivalent	  of	  $180,000	  U.S.	  to	  cover	  six	  months	  of	  expenses	  should	  U.S.	  funding	  be	  cut	  off.17	  This	  same	  JDC	  policy	  had	  been	  in	  place	  and	  had	  proven	  effective	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  
Margolis	  also	  requested	  that	  Committee	  funds	  in	  Chinese	  currency	  that	  were	  frozen	  in	  the	  Chase	  Bank	  be	  released	  until	  the	  above	  money	  could	  be	  borrowed.18	  She	  told	  Inuzuka	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  2–3.	  17	  Ibid.,	  2;	  see	  also	  Henrietta	  Buchman	  to	  Isaac	  Seligman,	  January	  5,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  The	  JDC	  had	  given	  the	  same	  authorization	  to	  other	  local	  committees	  in	  areas	  where	  communications	  might	  be	  cut	  off.	  (Moses	  Leavitt,	  “News	  Release:	  the	  JDC	  Pays	  Loan	  for	  Funds	  Aiding	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  October	  3,	  1943,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.)	  In	  Shanghai,	  this	  authorization	  was	  initially	  given	  for	  two	  months	  but	  later	  extended	  to	  six	  months.	  (Leavitt,	  Affidavit,	  4;	  see	  also	  “J.D.C.	  Will	  Continue	  Overseas	  Relief	  Work	  on	  a	  Wartime	  Basis,	  Warburg	  States,”	  JTA,	  December	  16,	  1941;	  and	  “J.D.C.	  Will	  Continue	  to	  Aid	  Jewish	  Refugees	  Stranded	  in	  Shanghai,”	  
JTA,	  December	  11,	  1941.)	  18	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  2–3.	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  she	  was	  prepared	  to	  help	  him,	  taking	  over	  the	  whole	  refugee	  operation	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  continuing	  to	  feed	  the	  people,	  if	  only	  he	  would	  give	  her	  permission	  to	  raise	  the	  money.19	  
Captain	  Inuzuka	  assured	  Margolis	  that	  she	  could	  depend	  upon	  his	  full	  cooperation	  as	  long	  as	  the	  money	  was	  borrowed	  only	  from	  neutrals	  and	  no	  money	  came	  from	  enemy	  countries	  abroad.20	  He	  also	  agreed	  to	  attempt	  to	  release	  the	  frozen	  funds	  and	  the	  wheat	  from	  the	  Red	  Cross,	  which	  was	  more	  than	  he	  had	  done	  for	  any	  other	  charitable	  or	  civic	  group.21	  He	  demanded,	  however,	  that	  the	  existing	  Committee	  for	  Assistance	  (CFA)	  be	  disbanded	  and	  that	  Captain	  Herzberg	  be	  fired.	  He	  was	  also	  antagonistic	  to	  the	  International	  Committee,	  which	  was	  financed	  by	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon,	  but	  was	  willing	  to	  work	  with	  Margolis	  and	  the	  JDC	  because	  of	  the	  deference	  she	  showed	  him.	  He	  also	  allowed	  them	  to	  continue	  to	  work	  with	  Speelman,	  who	  apparently	  had	  not	  displeased	  him	  as	  much	  as	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Committee.22	  
Inuzuka	  quickly	  released	  the	  funds	  from	  Chase	  Bank	  (CRB	  $30,000),23	  which	  enabled	  them	  to	  operate	  until	  the	  first	  six	  days	  of	  January.24	  To	  quell	  the	  panic,	  Margolis	  assured	  the	  staff	  that	  they	  would	  be	  paid	  for	  their	  work	  in	  December.25	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  “Interview	  with	  Laura	  Margolis,”	  10.	  20	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  1.	  21	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  5.	  22	  Ibid.,	  3.	  23	  CRB	  stands	  for	  currency	  of	  the	  Central	  Reserve	  Bank,	  which	  replaced	  the	  Chinese	  
fabi	  currency,	  first	  on	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  ratio	  and	  then	  more	  as	  the	  fabi	  was	  devalued	  over	  time.	  
	   	   	   215	  After	  this	  meeting,	  Margolis	  immediately	  cabled	  JDC	  headquarters	  to	  apprise	  them	  of	  the	  situation:	  
Japanese	  authorities	  cooperating	  fullest	  meeting	  refugee	  problem	  but	  continuation	  impossible	  without	  American	  Jewry	  signify	  slightest	  possibility	  receiving	  help	  via	  Red	  Cross	  cable	  reply	  immediately	  via	  Beckelman.26	  In	  addition	  to	  needing	  to	  raise	  funds	  for	  the	  community,	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  were	  faced	  with	  their	  own	  personal	  crisis—their	  own	  monthly	  stipends	  from	  JDC	  had	  ceased.	  For	  a	  few	  weeks,	  their	  hotel	  allowed	  them	  to	  pay	  their	  bills	  with	  promissory	  notes,	  but	  by	  the	  first	  of	  January	  they	  were	  notified	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  move	  out.	  The	  best	  accommodations	  they	  could	  find	  were	  two	  unheated	  rooms	  in	  the	  home	  of	  a	  White	  Russian	  family,	  so	  far	  from	  Hongkew	  that	  it	  meant	  four	  hours	  of	  travel	  a	  day,	  by	  train,	  rickshaw,	  bus	  and	  on	  foot,	  to	  reach	  the	  refugee	  community.	  Later,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  get	  rooms	  in	  another	  White	  Russian	  home,	  without	  heat	  and	  very	  sparsely	  furnished,	  but	  nearer	  to	  Hongkew.27	  
On	  January	  5,	  Speelman	  called	  a	  meeting	  of	  30	  prominent	  and	  wealthy	  Jews	  and	  included	  members	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	  and	  Sephardic	  communities	  and	  the	  Jüdische	  Gemeinde	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  For	  more	  on	  changes	  in	  Shanghai	  currency,	  see	  Zhaojin	  Ji,	  A	  History	  of	  Modern	  Shanghai	  
Banking:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Decline	  of	  China’s	  Finance	  Capitalism	  (M.E.	  Sharpe,	  2002).	  24	  See	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  JDC,	  “Cable,”	  January	  10,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  25	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  3.	  26	  Beckelman,	  who	  later	  became	  Director	  General	  for	  Overseas	  Operations	  for	  the	  JDC,	  was	  stationed	  in	  South	  America	  from	  1941	  to	  1942.	  (“Moses	  W.	  Beckelman,	  J.	  D.	  C.	  Director-­‐General,	  Dies	  of	  Heart	  Attack,”	  JTA,	  December	  12,	  1955,	  http://www.jta.org/1955/12/12/archive/moses-­‐w-­‐beckelman-­‐j-­‐d-­‐c-­‐director-­‐general-­‐dies-­‐of-­‐heart-­‐attack.)	  27	  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  171.	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  to	  represent	  the	  refugees.	  He	  and	  Margolis	  made	  a	  plea	  to	  them	  to	  help	  raise	  the	  needed	  funds.	  Admittedly	  it	  was	  an	  achievement	  to	  get	  these	  leaders	  to	  meet	  under	  one	  roof,	  but	  the	  appeal	  for	  funds	  received	  little	  or	  no	  response	  at	  the	  meeting.	  	  
Two	  days	  later,	  Margolis	  received	  an	  anonymous	  phone	  call	  to	  be	  at	  a	  given	  address	  at	  a	  set	  time.	  There,	  they	  found	  a	  Siberian	  Jewish	  man	  named	  Zimmerman	  who	  offered	  to	  loan	  them	  CRB	  3.5	  million,	  which	  would	  have	  allowed	  them	  to	  function	  for	  the	  next	  six	  months.	  Zimmerman	  agreed	  to	  give	  the	  funds	  as	  long	  as	  ten	  local	  Jewish	  people	  would	  underwrite	  the	  JDC	  loan.	  Speelman	  himself	  underwrote	  the	  loan	  for	  U.S.	  $10,000,	  but	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  find	  backers	  for	  more	  than	  an	  additional	  U.S.	  $15,000,	  and	  the	  promised	  loan	  never	  came	  through.	  The	  attitude	  of	  Mr.	  Abraham,	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  Sephardic	  community	  and	  the	  most	  religious	  of	  the	  group,	  was,	  “Since	  the	  Japanese	  took	  Shanghai	  they	  could	  also	  worry	  about	  the	  refugees.”28	  
When	  Margolis	  realized	  she	  would	  get	  no	  help	  from	  either	  the	  Sephardic	  community	  or	  the	  wealthy	  Jews	  living	  in	  Shanghai,	  she	  approached	  J.	  Bitker	  and	  a	  Mr.	  Rabinowitz,	  leading	  members	  of	  Ashkenazi	  community,	  and	  asked	  for	  their	  help	  in	  calling	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community	  to	  see	  what	  could	  be	  done	  about	  raising	  the	  needed	  funds.29	  There	  is	  no	  record	  that	  this	  meeting	  ever	  took	  place.	  
When	  they	  recognized	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  situation,	  the	  refugees	  themselves	  organized	  an	  effort	  to	  raise	  funds	  from	  the	  wealthier	  among	  them,	  and	  were	  able	  to	  raise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  4.	  29	  Ibid.,	  5.	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  another	  CRB	  $30,000.	  This	  kept	  the	  relief	  operation	  functioning	  for	  six	  more	  days.30	  The	  Committee	  continued	  to	  operate	  from	  day	  to	  day.	  Without	  the	  financial	  assurance	  necessary	  to	  continue,	  Margolis	  seriously	  considered	  the	  possibility	  of	  closing	  down	  the	  JDC	  work	  and	  turning	  the	  “problem”	  over	  to	  the	  Japanese.	  However,	  the	  Japanese	  had	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  they	  could	  not	  concern	  themselves	  with	  the	  Jewish	  refugee	  problem	  any	  more	  than	  they	  could	  with	  the	  “masses	  of	  poor	  and	  starving	  Russians	  and	  Chinese	  who	  filled	  Shanghai.”31	  
On	  January	  10,	  the	  Committee	  only	  had	  enough	  funds	  to	  feed	  the	  8,000	  people	  on	  relief	  for	  four	  more	  days,	  or	  they	  could	  choose	  to	  feed	  4,000	  people	  for	  eight	  days.	  Rather	  than	  make	  the	  decision	  herself,	  Margolis	  decided	  to	  put	  democracy	  into	  action	  and	  allow	  the	  Jüdische	  Gemeinde	  to	  bring	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  refugee	  community	  to	  decide.	  They	  opted	  to	  cut	  4,000	  refugees	  and	  feed	  the	  other	  4,000—the	  poorest	  of	  the	  poor—for	  eight	  days.	  They	  kept	  on	  relief	  the	  children,	  the	  aged,	  the	  sick,	  and	  those	  whose	  malnutrition	  was	  so	  serious	  that	  their	  lives	  were	  in	  danger.32	  The	  Committee	  was	  also	  able	  to	  continue	  operating	  two	  hospitals	  during	  this	  time.33	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  See	  also	  “Relief	  and	  Charitable	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,”	  1942,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  Shanghai	  Collection,	  Relief	  Activities,	  1931-­‐1944,	  RG	  243,	  43	  (3/45);	  and	  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  171.	  31	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  5.	  32	  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  171.	  33	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  5.	  According	  to	  an	  article	  in	  the	  JTA,	  “…	  the	  Shanghai	  (International	  Settlement)	  municipality	  had	  demanded	  that	  the	  Jewish	  community	  take	  care	  of	  the	  refugee	  ill”	  (“9,000	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  Dependent	  on	  Charity;	  Hospital	  Needs	  Held	  Urgent,”	  JTA,	  September	  12,	  1939.)	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  By	  mid-­‐January,	  funds	  had	  practically	  run	  out	  and	  the	  situation	  had	  reached	  a	  critical	  point.	  It	  was	  at	  this	  time	  that	  a	  reporter	  from	  the	  Shanghai	  Times	  approached	  Margolis.	  Knowing	  that	  the	  Japanese	  did	  not	  want	  publicity,	  Margolis	  and	  her	  team	  had	  avoided	  all	  media.	  However,	  at	  great	  personal	  risk,	  Margolis	  granted	  an	  interview	  to	  the	  newspaper.34	  They	  published	  it	  on	  January	  16	  under	  the	  title,	  “Hungry	  Starving	  Refugees	  in	  Hongkew,”	  and	  various	  other	  newspapers	  picked	  up	  the	  story	  as	  well.	  The	  plight	  of	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  became	  the	  subject	  of	  editorials	  and	  feature	  articles,	  and	  was	  carried	  by	  radio	  stations,	  who	  began	  making	  appeals	  to	  the	  community	  at	  large	  for	  donations.	  Money	  began	  coming	  in	  in	  small	  amounts,	  but	  this	  enabled	  them	  to	  continue	  to	  function	  from	  day	  to	  day.35	  
The	  Japanese	  Gendarmerie,	  however,	  was	  furious	  that	  any	  news	  about	  disorder	  in	  Shanghai	  should	  get	  into	  the	  papers,	  and	  issued	  an	  order	  for	  the	  arrest	  of	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel.	  Inuzuka	  was	  furious	  as	  well.	  Margolis	  received	  a	  call	  from	  the	  Japanese	  Consulate	  asking	  her	  to	  come	  and	  explain	  herself.	  But	  Carl	  Brahn,	  a	  German	  Jew	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  Shanghai	  for	  some	  time,	  knew	  a	  Mrs.	  Nogami,	  who	  worked	  with	  the	  Gendarmerie,	  and	  through	  her	  efforts,	  the	  order	  for	  their	  arrest	  was	  canceled.36	  
Although	  there	  had	  been	  no	  mass	  meeting,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community	  had	  appointed	  a	  Finance	  Committee	  to	  find	  investors	  for	  the	  JDC	  loan.	  On	  January	  20,	  a	  Mr.	  Schumacher,	  head	  of	  the	  Chase	  Bank	  in	  Shanghai,	  spoke	  to	  a	  Mr.	  Kaufman,	  a	  wealthy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  171.	  35	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  6.	  36	  Ibid.	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  German	  Jew	  and	  long-­‐time	  resident	  of	  Shanghai,	  and	  convinced	  him	  to	  lend	  the	  money	  against	  the	  “Immigrants’	  Deposit	  Account,”	  which	  was	  a	  frozen	  account.	  This	  appealed	  more	  to	  Mr.	  Kaufman	  than	  lending	  money	  based	  upon	  the	  promise	  of	  future	  JDC	  repayment,	  and	  resulted	  in	  a	  U.S.	  $10,000	  loan,	  the	  first	  substantial	  sum	  of	  money	  they	  received.37	  
Immediately	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  Margolis	  had	  sent	  a	  message	  to	  JDC	  headquarters	  through	  Moses	  Beckelman	  in	  neutral	  Argentina	  telling	  of	  the	  dire	  situation	  of	  the	  refugees,	  saying	  that	  they	  risked	  starvation	  if	  funds	  could	  not	  be	  raised.	  	  
She	  asked	  if	  the	  JDC	  could	  pay	  $90,000	  to	  an	  American	  citizen	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  so	  that	  an	  equivalent	  amount	  could	  be	  made	  available	  in	  Shanghai	  for	  the	  relief	  needs.	  The	  JDC	  immediately	  took	  up	  the	  matter	  with	  the	  Treasury	  Department	  in	  Washington.38	  B.E.L.	  Timmons	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Funds	  Control	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury	  replied	  that	  he	  would	  be	  prepared	  to	  grant	  a	  license	  for	  this:39	  
Since	  this	  transaction	  would	  enable	  an	  American	  here	  to	  salvage	  some	  of	  his	  funds	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  serve	  a	  humanitarian	  purpose	  by	  keeping	  alive	  thousands	  of	  refugees	  there	  without	  helping	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  aggressor	  states,	  they	  would	  be	  inclined	  to	  license	  such	  a	  transaction.40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Ibid.	  38	  Joe	  Hyman	  to	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  “Memorandum	  RE:	  Letter	  to	  Admiral	  Cooke,”	  January	  19,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	   39	  Moses	  Leavitt	  to	  Lt.	  Commander	  F.H.	  Creech,	  Arlington	  Medical	  Center,	  January	  17,	  1942,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  40	  Joseph	  Hyman	  to	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  “Memorandum,”	  January	  9,	  1942,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	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  Transferring	  funds	  in	  this	  way	  would	  preserve	  the	  adherence	  to	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act	  and	  provide	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  refugees	  without	  being	  viewed	  as	  aiding	  the	  Japanese	  in	  their	  war	  effort.41	  
The	  JDC	  was	  concerned,	  however,	  that	  this	  person	  be	  someone	  who	  would	  fulfill	  his	  commitments	  so	  that	  the	  $90,000	  would	  indeed	  arrive	  in	  Shanghai.	  They	  requested	  the	  name	  and	  address	  of	  the	  American	  citizen	  so	  they	  could	  verify	  his	  ability	  to	  fulfill	  his	  part	  of	  the	  arrangement.	  42	  
The	  “American	  citizen”	  was	  Aron	  Shriro,	  American	  brother	  of	  Joseph	  Shriro,43	  who	  was	  a	  resident	  of	  Shanghai.	  Through	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	  Finance	  Committee,	  Margolis	  had	  met	  Shriro,	  an	  extremely	  wealthy	  Russian	  Jewish	  man.	  Fearful	  that	  the	  Japanese	  would	  confiscate	  his	  money	  and	  property,44	  Shriro	  was	  anxious	  to	  transfer	  his	  wealth	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Because	  of	  his	  unique	  ability	  to	  provide	  large	  sums,	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  For	  a	  legal	  perspective	  on	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act	  of	  1917,	  see	  Joseph	  W.	  Bishop	  Jr.,	  “Judicial	  Construction	  of	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act,”	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  62,	  no.	  5	  (March	  1,	  1949):	  721–59.	  42	  Moses	  Leavitt	  to	  J.W.	  Pehle,	  Assistant	  to	  the	  Secretary,	  Treasury	  Department,	  January	  22,	  1942,	  2,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  43	  The	  Shriro	  Group,	  founded	  by	  the	  Shriro	  family	  in	  1906	  in	  Harbin,	  China,	  began	  trading	  fur	  and	  leather	  and	  grew	  into	  an	  international	  commodities	  firm.	  They	  still	  exist	  today,	  with	  3,500	  employees	  in	  offices	  worldwide.	  (“The	  Shriro	  Story,”	  accessed	  September	  24,	  2013,	  http://www.shriro.com/index.php?option=	  com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=55&lang=en.)	  	  44	  The	  danger	  of	  Japanese	  confiscation	  was	  very	  real.	  Mr.	  Bitker,	  a	  Polish	  national	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community,	  was	  aware	  of	  this	  and	  took	  on	  the	  role	  of	  financial	  advisor	  to	  Margolis.	  He	  kept	  informed	  about	  Japanese	  plans	  to	  devalue	  certain	  currencies	  and	  alerted	  Margolis	  so	  she	  could	  plan	  accordingly,	  purchasing	  food	  and	  supplies	  ahead	  of	  the	  devaluations.	  (Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  
December	  8,	  1941	  to	  September	  1943,	  7.)	  
	   	   	   221	  demanded	  concessions	  in	  interest	  rates,	  and	  Margolis	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  accept	  his	  terms.45	  
Aron	  Shriro,	  the	  American	  brother,	  made	  a	  very	  good	  impression	  on	  Leavitt	  and	  the	  JDC,	  giving	  them	  all	  the	  information	  they	  requested,	  assuring	  the	  JDC	  leaders	  that	  he	  was	  acting	  purely	  as	  a	  depositary	  for	  his	  brother	  and	  that	  the	  funds	  would	  remain	  blocked	  pending	  the	  release	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  the	  funds	  to	  his	  brother	  in	  Shanghai.	  Leavitt	  applied	  to	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  for	  a	  license46	  to	  pay	  Aron	  Shriro	  the	  sum	  of	  $50,000	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  his	  brother	  in	  Shanghai.47	  
This	  amount	  of	  money	  was	  only	  sufficient	  to	  maintain	  the	  refugees	  for	  a	  few	  months.	  Thus	  began	  a	  series	  of	  cables	  from	  Margolis	  to	  JDC.	  Although	  JDC	  was	  very	  careful	  to	  follow	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  policies,	  Margolis	  was	  faced	  with	  a	  severe	  crisis	  on	  the	  field	  and	  found	  it	  necessary	  to	  get	  the	  needed	  funds	  in	  ways	  that	  sometimes	  skirted	  the	  prohibitions	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  She	  ignored	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act	  and	  continued	  to	  channel	  her	  messages	  to	  JDC	  through	  Moses	  Beckelman	  in	  South	  America:	  
April	  7,	  1942	  -­‐	  Margolis	  advises	  amount	  now	  138,500	  same	  payees48	  stop	  requests	  confirmation	  execution49	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Ibid.,	  6–7.	  46	  Application	  #452	  (the	  JDC)	  and	  #NY-­‐372248	  (Treasury	  Department).	  47	  Moses	  Leavitt	  to	  B.E.L.	  Timmons,	  Treasury	  Department,	  January	  25,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944;	  see	  also	  Leavitt,	  Affidavit,	  2.	  48	  Shriro	  made	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  loans,	  and	  of	  the	  $180,000	  raised	  in	  the	  first	  JDC	  loan	  by	  the	  end	  of	  April,	  the	  JDC	  had	  repaid	  $138,500	  to	  Shriro’s	  wife	  in	  America	  (“Treasury	  Department	  Permits	  J.D.C.	  to	  Pay	  Loan	  for	  Relief	  Funds	  in	  Shanghai,”	  JTA,	  October	  5,	  1943.)	  Each	  person	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  $180,000	  loan	  was	  given	  a	  regular	  loan	  contract	  issued	  in	  U.S.	  dollars.	  Due	  to	  Japanese	  restrictions,	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  bring	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  April	  16,	  1942	  -­‐	  Six	  months	  guarantee	  completed	  amount	  raised	  180,000	  stop	  Funds	  only	  through	  May	  stop	  Urgently	  need	  guarantee	  next	  six	  months	  of	  40,000	  monthly50	  But	  JDC	  headquarters	  would	  not	  respond.	  On	  January	  10	  Leavitt	  had	  requested	  permission	  from	  Admiral	  H.D.	  Cooke	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  to	  communicate	  with	  Margolis	  through	  their	  South	  American	  representative,	  Moses	  Beckelman.51	  He	  received	  this	  permission	  from	  the	  Headquarters	  of	  the	  Commandant	  of	  the	  Third	  Naval	  District	  and	  could	  have	  responded	  through	  this	  channel.52	  But	  he	  was	  overly	  cautious.	  Instead,	  he	  called	  his	  contact	  in	  the	  Treasury	  Department,	  M.L.	  Hoffman,	  who	  had	  replaced	  B.E.L.	  Timmons,	  double-­‐checking	  if	  he	  could	  cable	  Margolis	  to	  let	  her	  know	  she	  had	  permission	  to	  make	  this	  guarantee,	  emphasizing	  to	  Hoffman	  that	  this	  would	  in	  no	  way	  bring	  aid	  or	  comfort	  to	  the	  enemy.	  Hoffman	  replied	  that	  the	  matter	  would	  probably	  have	  to	  be	  discussed	  with	  the	  State	  Department,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  have	  to	  explore	  whether	  granting	  JDC	  permission	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  back	  the	  names	  of	  any	  of	  the	  people	  who	  loaned	  money,	  but	  the	  Shanghai	  JDC	  kept	  a	  full	  record	  of	  the	  persons	  and	  amount	  owed,	  and	  they	  were	  repaid	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  rate	  of	  exchange	  varied	  on	  each	  contract	  depending	  upon	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  need	  for	  money	  in	  the	  official	  and	  black	  market	  rates.	  (Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  
China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  September	  1943,	  22.)	  49	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Moses	  Beckelman,	  April	  7,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  50	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Moses	  Beckelman,	  “Cable,”	  April	  16,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  	  51	  Moses	  Leavitt	  to	  Admiral	  H.D.	  Cooke,	  February	  10,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  52	  Admiral	  H.D.	  Cooke	  to	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  January	  15,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	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  send	  such	  a	  cable	  would	  create	  a	  precedent	  that	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  follow	  in	  other	  instances.53	  
Moses	  Leavitt	  wrote,	  memorializing	  this	  conversation,	  
Obviously,	  we	  will	  not	  do	  anything	  that	  is	  contrary	  to	  American	  policy	  and	  it	  was	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  we	  have	  presented	  the	  situation	  to	  him	  in	  all	  frankness.	  We	  put	  the	  matter	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  informal	  exploration	  and	  advised	  him	  that	  we	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  make	  a	  formal	  application	  until	  we	  knew	  what	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Department	  was….	  The	  problems	  which	  we	  raised	  are	  matters	  of	  policy	  and	  will	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  both	  by	  the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  State	  Department54	  Margolis,	  though,	  insisted	  in	  a	  cable	  to	  Beckelman,	  her	  only	  remaining	  JDC	  contact:	  
May	  9,	  1942	  -­‐	  Must	  have	  yes	  or	  no	  answer	  next	  six	  months	  budget…stop	  advises	  personal	  maintenance	  arranged.55	  Leavitt	  later	  requested	  from	  Hoffman	  permission	  to	  respond	  with	  this	  message	  through	  Beckelman:	  “In	  absence	  our	  ability	  to	  communicate	  Margolis	  we	  have	  every	  confidence	  she	  will	  make	  her	  own	  helpful	  decision.”	  Hoffman	  pointed	  out	  that	  all	  communication,	  whether	  direct	  or	  indirect,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  policy	  was	  prohibited	  between	  Americans	  and	  persons	  in	  enemy-­‐occupied	  countries.	  He	  said	  that	  if	  JDC	  wanted	  to	  send	  such	  a	  cable,	  they	  would	  be	  at	  liberty	  to	  do	  so,	  but	  the	  Treasury	  could	  not	  authorize	  the	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  Moses	  Leavitt,	  “Memorandum	  on	  Conversation	  with	  Mr.	  M.L.	  Hoffman	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Funds	  Control	  Office	  of	  the	  Treasury	  Department,	  Washington	  DC—May	  8,	  1942,”	  May	  8,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  54	  Ibid.,	  1;	  see	  also	  Buchman	  to	  Seligman,	  January	  5,	  1942,	  1.	  55	  Laura	  Margolis	  to	  Moses	  Beckelman,	  “Cable,”	  May	  9,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	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  sending	  of	  one.	  He	  repeated	  that	  the	  matter	  was	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  special	  division	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  that	  JDC	  ought	  to	  take	  up	  the	  matter	  directly	  with	  them.56	  	  
Even	  though	  Leavitt	  was	  told	  he	  would	  be	  at	  liberty	  to	  communicate	  with	  Margolis,	  this	  assurance	  was	  not	  sufficient	  for	  him.	  Leavitt	  traveled	  to	  Washington	  on	  Monday,	  May	  18,	  and	  spoke	  with	  a	  Mr.	  Green,	  Chief	  of	  the	  Special	  Division	  of	  the	  State	  Department,	  who	  agreed	  to	  send	  a	  cable	  to	  Margolis	  letting	  her	  know	  that	  JDC	  had	  approved	  a	  commitment	  for	  another	  six-­‐month	  period.	  However,	  Mr.	  Green	  subsequently	  advised	  Mr.	  Leavitt	  by	  telephone	  after	  his	  return	  to	  New	  York	  that	  he	  would	  require	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Treasury	  Department	  to	  send	  the	  cable.57	  
Leavitt	  returned	  to	  Washington	  on	  July	  22	  and	  met	  with	  Sumner	  Welles,	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  one	  of	  Franklin	  Roosevelt’s	  foreign	  policy	  advisors.	  Welles	  reiterated	  that	  it	  was	  the	  general	  policy	  of	  the	  government	  not	  to	  make	  exceptions	  to	  the	  general	  policy—but	  he	  did	  not	  define	  what	  that	  “general	  policy”	  was.	  He	  did	  say	  that	  everyone	  was	  very	  much	  concerned	  with	  the	  situation	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  was	  very	  anxious	  to	  try	  to	  be	  of	  help,	  provided	  the	  method	  used	  would	  not	  be	  an	  exception.	  Leavitt	  also	  informed	  Welles	  that	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross	  had	  agreed	  to	  act	  as	  an	  intermediary	  to	  supervise	  the	  distribution	  of	  JDC	  funds	  in	  Shanghai.58	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  Moses	  Leavitt,	  “Memorandum	  on	  Telephone	  Conversation	  between	  Mr.	  Levitt	  and	  Mr.	  M.	  L.	  Hoffman	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Funds	  Control	  Office	  of	  the	  Treasury—May	  13,	  1942,”	  May	  13,	  1942,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  57	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  “Memorandum	  Regarding	  Meeting	  with	  Sumner	  Welles,”	  July	  22,	  1942,	  3,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	   58	  Ibid.	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  Essentially,	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  government	  officials	  was	  that	  regardless	  of	  the	  method	  employed	  in	  bringing	  aid	  to	  the	  civilian	  population	  in	  occupied	  zones,	  the	  question	  was	  whether	  the	  Allies	  should	  relieve	  the	  burden	  which	  was	  on	  the	  occupying	  powers.	  They	  were	  sympathetic	  with	  the	  suffering	  and	  hardships	  of	  the	  populations	  in	  occupied	  countries,	  but	  they	  would	  not	  make	  an	  exception	  in	  any	  one	  case	  lest	  they	  be	  swamped	  with	  requests	  from	  other	  areas.	  The	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act	  had	  to	  be	  administered	  without	  exception,	  and	  no	  communication	  of	  whatever	  nature	  could	  be	  authorized.	  The	  position	  of	  the	  Treasury	  was	  that	  the	  denial	  of	  such	  applications	  was	  part	  of	  the	  war	  effort.59	  The	  JDC	  refused	  to	  do	  anything	  that	  was	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  regulations	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government:60	  
…we	  have	  undertaken	  to	  assure	  that	  there	  will	  be	  the	  requisite	  funds	  for	  refugee	  aid	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  the	  first	  six	  months	  of	  1942.	  We,	  as	  an	  
American	  organization,	  cannot	  be	  involved	  in	  anything	  that	  has	  the	  
remotest	  color	  of	  trading	  with	  the	  enemy.	  We	  cannot,	  therefore,	  make	  any	  
remittances	  to	  any	  Japanese-­‐occupied	  territory	  [emphasis	  mine].	  Long	  before	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war,	  we	  anticipated	  the	  possible	  interruption	  in	  communication.	  We	  therefore	  arranged	  that	  local	  committees	  in	  the	  various	  overseas	  countries,	  including	  Shanghai,	  should	  themselves	  continue	  their	  activities	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  latest	  appropriation	  prior	  to	  the	  interruption	  in	  communication,	  and	  with	  the	  assurance	  that	  as	  soon	  as	  world	  conditions	  permitted,	  JDC	  would	  make	  reimbursement	  for	  funds	  thus	  borrowed	  locally.	  This	  follows	  the	  old	  pattern	  that	  JDC	  adopted	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  	  In	  countries	  that	  are	  not	  occupied	  by	  enemies,	  of	  course,	  we	  are	  still	  able	  to	  continue	  the	  legitimate	  transfer	  of	  funds	  through	  the	  general	  clearance	  methods	  approved	  by	  our	  Treasury.	  However,	  in	  cases,	  as	  indicated	  above,	  where	  the	  enemy	  is	  in	  possession,	  local	  committees	  were	  told,	  prior	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  hostilities,	  to	  borrow	  locally	  the	  necessary	  sums	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  Ibid.,	  2.	  60	  Moses	  Leavitt	  to	  Peter	  Wehrli,	  August	  24,	  1943,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944;	  see	  also	  “Wartime	  Difficulties	  in	  Fund-­‐Raising	  Outlined	  at	  Conference	  of	  Jewish	  Federations,”	  JTA,	  February	  4,	  1942.	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  to	  an	  amount	  equal	  to	  JDC	  monthly	  budgetary	  appropriations	  at	  the	  time	  of	  break	  in	  communications—this	  to	  continue	  for	  a	  period	  of	  six	  months.	  We	  therefore	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  work	  with	  JDC	  has	  been	  subventioning	  in	  such	  areas	  heretofore,	  is	  being	  continued	  under	  local	  auspices.61	  Leavitt	  went	  to	  great	  ends	  to	  obtain	  permission	  to	  communicate	  with	  Margolis.	  Even	  when	  he	  had	  the	  tacit	  approval	  of	  Admiral	  Cooke	  to	  communicate	  with	  her,	  he	  insisted	  on	  going	  to	  the	  highest	  echelons	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  obtain	  the	  proper	  permission	  merely	  to	  send	  a	  cable.	  Bauer’s	  argument	  that	  JDC	  scrupulously	  observed	  American	  legalities	  is	  clearly	  seen	  in	  Leavitt’s	  actions.	  	  
In	  light	  of	  this	  black	  comedy	  of	  red	  tape,	  Beckelman	  took	  it	  upon	  himself	  to	  ask	  JDC	  in	  La	  Paz,	  Bolivia,	  to	  communicate	  with	  Margolis.	  He	  assumed	  that	  Margolis	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  she	  had	  not	  received	  a	  reply	  to	  her	  last	  telegram,	  and	  thought	  it	  was	  only	  fair	  that	  she	  should	  know	  what	  the	  situation	  was.	  His	  request	  was	  denied.62	  
In	  retrospect,	  it	  is	  tragic	  that	  JDC	  at	  the	  very	  least	  did	  not	  avail	  itself	  of	  the	  existing	  International	  Red	  Cross	  conduit	  for	  messages	  of	  25	  words	  or	  less,63	  or	  of	  the	  offer	  of	  Paul	  Ruland	  with	  the	  Board	  of	  Foreign	  Missions	  of	  the	  Presbyterian	  Church	  to	  transmit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Buchman	  to	  Seligman,	  January	  5,	  1942,	  1.	  Emphasis	  mine.	  See	  alsoAmerican	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  Aiding	  Jews	  Overseas,	  5.:	  “…the	  objective	  of	  the	  JDC	  was	  first	  and	  foremost	  to	  conform	  with	  American	  public	  opinion	  and	  with	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Long	  before	  our	  Government	  had	  crystallized	  such	  policies,	  the	  J.D.C.	  took	  the	  position	  that	  none	  of	  the	  funds	  expended	  for	  humanitarian	  objectives	  should	  be	  placed	  where	  they	  might	  benefit	  the	  forces	  of	  totalitarianism.”	  62	  Moses	  Beckelman	  to	  Joseph	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  “Letter	  225,”	  May	  23,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	   63	  Article	  79	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Convention	  relative	  to	  the	  treatment	  of	  prisoners	  had	  empowered	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross	  in	  Geneva	  to	  transmit	  messages	  of	  25	  words	  or	  less	  to	  obtain	  information	  about	  prisoners	  of	  war	  and	  could	  only	  be	  about	  family	  news.	  (http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/genevacon/blart-­‐79.htm)	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  messages.64	  Rather,	  as	  Bauer	  has	  forcefully	  argued	  and	  this	  interchange	  has	  demonstrated,	  they	  rigidly	  abided	  by	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  State	  Departments	  that	  they	  could	  not	  communicate	  with	  staff	  in	  enemy-­‐occupied	  countries.65	  
Through	  the	  loan	  from	  Shriro,	  Margolis	  had	  obtained	  enough	  funds	  to	  function	  for	  six	  months.	  But	  since	  the	  wealthy	  Jewish	  men	  in	  Shanghai	  were	  considered	  enemy	  nationals	  from	  the	  moment	  their	  countries	  joined	  the	  war	  against	  Japan,	  they	  could	  no	  longer	  contribute	  financially.	  Margolis	  explained	  this	  to	  the	  CFA	  and	  encouraged	  them	  to	  make	  an	  intensive	  effort	  to	  obtain	  as	  much	  money	  as	  possible	  locally.	  Everyone	  would	  have	  to	  contribute	  something.	  	  
Lutz	  Wachsner	  suggested	  a	  Patenschaft	  (sponsorship)	  plan,	  based	  on	  a	  German	  Jewish	  pattern	  of	  community	  responsibility.	  He	  estimated	  that	  CRB	  $50	  per	  month	  would	  feed	  one	  refugee,	  and	  he	  began	  working	  on	  a	  plan	  whereby	  the	  whole	  community	  would	  be	  canvassed	  for	  Patenschaften,	  each	  sponsorship	  being	  CRB	  $50	  per	  month.	  Mr.	  Peretz	  of	  the	  International	  Committee	  was	  enthusiastic	  about	  this	  idea	  and	  began	  working	  on	  a	  campaign	  for	  canvassing	  the	  whole	  community	  to	  contribute	  money.66	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Paul	  Ruland	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Foreign	  Missions	  of	  the	  Presbyterian	  Church	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  offered	  to	  send	  funds	  as	  well.	  Leavitt	  responded:	  “Unfortunately,	  the	  suggested	  transmission	  of	  funds	  to	  Shanghai	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act,	  and	  is	  in	  effect	  illegal.	  I	  am	  sure	  that	  it	  is	  only	  because	  Mr.	  Ruland	  does	  not	  know	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act	  that	  he	  has	  made	  such	  a	  suggestion.”	  Moses	  Leavitt	  to	  Samuel	  Boorstin,	  December	  4,	  1942,	  Israel	  JDC	  -­‐	  AJDC	  Israel	  Records,	  Shanghai	  1938-­‐1947.	  65	  Robert	  Pilpel	  to	  Walter	  Kallman,	  May	  21,	  1942,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  66	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  12–13.	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  But	  even	  the	  dire	  need	  of	  the	  refugees	  could	  not	  bring	  about	  unity.	  Soon,	  a	  split	  arose	  within	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community,	  which	  had	  until	  this	  point	  been	  supporting	  only	  the	  Polish	  refugees.	  Some	  within	  the	  Russian	  community	  felt	  they	  should	  be	  participating	  in	  the	  Patenschaft	  plan,	  while	  others	  refused	  to	  consider	  helping	  the	  German	  refugees	  in	  any	  way.	  According	  to	  Margolis,	  “The	  issue	  became	  so	  vital	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  [Russian]	  Ashkenazi	  community	  that	  it	  split	  the	  community	  in	  half	  and	  at	  one	  time	  became	  so	  violent	  that	  brothers	  were	  not	  talking	  to	  each	  other	  because	  of	  this	  issue.”67	  The	  Russian	  group	  that	  wanted	  to	  support	  the	  Germans	  formed	  itself	  into	  a	  new	  committee,	  called	  the	  Centraljewcom,68	  led	  by	  A.	  Rogovin,	  and	  took	  on	  the	  responsibility	  of	  raising	  funds	  to	  feed	  500	  German	  children.	  	  
Margolis	  felt	  that	  this	  was	  a	  real	  victory—the	  first	  real	  expression	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  established	  Russian	  community	  to	  take	  some	  responsibility	  toward	  their	  German	  brothers	  and	  sisters.	  Naturally,	  there	  was	  some	  friction	  between	  the	  Centraljewcom	  and	  the	  Eastjewcom,	  as	  both	  were	  drawing	  money	  from	  the	  same	  community	  but	  for	  a	  different	  group	  of	  refugees—Eastjewcom	  for	  the	  Polish	  refugees	  and	  Centraljewcom	  for	  the	  German	  needy.69	  
Although	  there	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  Committee	  for	  Assistance	  after	  July	  1942,	  some	  of	  the	  men	  who	  had	  been	  members	  of	  the	  Committee	  agreed	  to	  take	  over	  local	  fundraising	  and	  organized	  an	  active	  body	  of	  wealthier	  refugees	  into	  a	  committee	  called	  the	  “Kitchen	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Ibid.,	  13.	  68	  Some	  sources	  spell	  this	  Centrejewcom.	  69	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  13–14.	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  Fund,”	  which	  incorporated	  the	  Patenschaft	  idea	  of	  community	  responsibility.	  Their	  leader	  was	  a	  Dr.	  Jacob	  Berglas,	  a	  refugee	  Polish	  national,	  whom	  Margolis	  felt	  was	  a	  weak	  leader.	  She	  believed	  he	  was	  being	  used	  as	  a	  figurehead	  and	  was	  controlled	  by	  more	  dominant	  members	  of	  the	  group:	  a	  Mr.	  Silberstein	  and	  a	  Mr.	  Pulvermacher,	  two	  powerful,	  controlling	  refugees	  who	  had	  established	  successful	  businesses	  in	  Shanghai.	  These	  were	  the	  men	  who	  back	  in	  January	  1942,	  when	  the	  Committee	  had	  been	  operating	  from	  day	  to	  day,	  had	  raised	  CRB	  $30,000	  in	  one	  week.	  According	  to	  Margolis,	  “They	  are	  men	  who	  have	  tremendous	  drive	  and	  who	  once	  they	  get	  power	  do	  not	  delegate	  responsibility	  or	  privileges	  to	  anyone	  outside	  their	  own	  small	  intimate	  group	  of	  friends.”70	  
Interestingly,	  in	  1939	  the	  Institute	  of	  Pacific	  Relations’	  Far	  Eastern	  Survey	  covered	  the	  “Berglas	  Plan,”	  a	  “pretentious	  effort	  to	  provide	  a	  permanent	  home	  in	  China	  for	  German	  refugees.”	  The	  Yunnan	  Provincial	  Government	  had	  consented	  to	  allow	  100,000	  refugees	  to	  settle	  in	  their	  province	  and	  become	  Chinese	  citizens	  as	  long	  as	  each	  refugee	  could	  support	  him	  or	  herself	  for	  one	  year	  (£50).	  The	  Berglas	  Plan,	  however,	  seems	  to	  have	  remained	  “pure	  speculation,”	  reaffirming	  Margolis’	  opinion	  of	  him	  as	  a	  weak	  leader.71	  
But	  with	  Silberstein	  and	  Pulvermacher	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund,	  problems	  began	  within	  a	  week	  of	  the	  time	  it	  was	  established.	  Immediately	  upon	  the	  transfer	  of	  all	  bank	  accounts	  to	  themselves,	  they	  decided	  that	  most	  of	  the	  personnel	  of	  the	  Committee,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Ibid.,	  15;	  for	  a	  list	  of	  Kitchen	  Fund	  staff,	  see	  “Kitchen	  Fund:	  List	  of	  189	  Employees,	  with	  Identification	  Cards,”	  1941,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  Shanghai	  Collection,	  RG	  243,	  18/I-­‐VII.	  71	  Barnett,	  “Shanghai’s	  German	  Refugees	  Face	  Uncertainties,”	  252.	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  which	  had	  been	  reduced	  from	  500	  to	  100,	  were	  dishonest.	  They	  were,	  furthermore,	  convinced	  that	  they	  themselves	  could	  run	  the	  office	  more	  efficiently.	  	  
Margolis	  attempted	  to	  convince	  these	  men	  to	  create	  a	  separate	  governing	  board	  and	  executive	  staff,	  but	  she	  soon	  realized	  that	  her	  efforts	  were	  futile.	  When	  she	  tried	  to	  show	  them	  how	  JDC’s	  monthly	  statistical	  reports	  should	  be	  completed,	  they	  balked	  and	  told	  her	  that	  there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  all	  this	  detail	  and	  they	  were	  going	  to	  set	  up	  their	  own	  system	  of	  bookkeeping.	  	  
Within	  a	  few	  weeks,	  the	  remaining	  members	  of	  the	  leadership	  and	  administration	  of	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  all	  resigned.	  They	  realized	  they	  were	  not	  wanted	  and	  were	  working	  with	  a	  dictatorial	  and	  fundamentally	  dishonest	  group	  of	  men.	  The	  situation	  was	  tragic	  but	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  had	  no	  alternative,	  since	  no	  one	  else	  was	  ready	  or	  capable	  of	  stepping	  in.	  They	  begged	  the	  Russian	  Ashkenazi	  community	  to	  take	  ownership,	  but	  they	  flatly	  refused.	  The	  JDC	  representatives	  had	  to	  reconcile	  themselves	  to	  leaving	  the	  new	  leaders	  of	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  in	  charge.72	  
The	  members	  of	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  did	  work	  very	  hard	  and	  raised	  more	  money	  than	  had	  ever	  been	  raised	  locally	  before.	  Their	  attitude	  toward	  the	  refugees,	  however,	  was	  the	  same	  hard	  and	  dictatorial	  one	  that	  the	  old	  Committee	  for	  Assistance	  had	  shown.73	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  Margolis,	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  By	  August	  1942,	  Margolis	  recognized	  that	  all	  potential	  financial	  resources	  had	  been	  tapped,	  yet	  there	  was	  still	  inadequate	  funding	  to	  maintain	  the	  relief	  programs.	  P.M.	  Anderson,	  representative	  of	  the	  American	  Red	  Cross	  in	  Shanghai,	  corroborated	  this:	  
Ms.	  Margolis	  and	  Mr.	  Siegel	  have	  been	  managing	  to	  keep	  the	  refugee	  activities	  going	  and	  have	  borrowed	  both	  from	  local	  Jews	  and	  from	  the	  Chinese.	  However,	  most	  of	  the	  local	  Jews	  are	  British,	  their	  accounts	  are	  entirely	  blocked	  and	  no	  funds	  will	  be	  forthcoming	  from	  that	  source.74	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  Japanese	  had	  frozen	  the	  accounts	  of	  foreigners	  with	  whose	  countries	  they	  were	  at	  war;	  in	  addition,	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Britain,	  under	  their	  respective	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemies	  Acts,	  were	  prohibited	  from	  transferring	  funds	  that	  in	  any	  way	  would	  aid	  the	  enemy’s	  war	  effort,	  even	  indirectly.75	  
Boris	  Topas,	  now	  chairman	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community,	  called	  a	  private	  meeting	  with	  Margolis,	  Siegel	  and	  a	  few	  others,	  and	  asked	  if	  Margolis	  would	  issue	  another	  loan	  in	  the	  name	  of	  JDC	  without	  telling	  the	  community	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  JDC’s	  outright	  permission	  to	  do	  so.	  Margolis	  explained	  that	  JDC	  representatives	  had	  never	  misrepresented	  the	  situation	  and	  could	  not	  personally	  be	  responsible	  for	  receiving	  money	  from	  people	  the	  JDC	  might	  not	  repay.	  She	  suggested	  the	  alternative	  of	  drawing	  up	  a	  contract	  that	  clearly	  explained	  their	  position,	  namely,	  that	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  firmly	  believed	  the	  JDC	  had	  the	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  of	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  more	  on	  wartime	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  policy,	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  Simon	  Bloc	  and	  F.	  Bert,	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  of	  Military	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  Problems	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	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  F.L.	  Block,	  The	  Origins	  of	  International	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  Disorder:	  A	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  of	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  States	  
International	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  Policy	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  War	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  to	  the	  Present,	  Campus	  Series	  (University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1977);	  and	  Gregg	  Huff	  and	  Shinobu	  Majima,	  “Financing	  Japan’s	  World	  War	  II	  Occupation	  of	  Southeast	  Asia,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  History	  73,	  no.	  4	  (2013).	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  money	  to	  help	  and	  wanted	  to	  help	  but	  that	  due	  to	  wartime	  regulations	  was	  unable	  to	  contact	  them.	  Cornell	  Franklin,	  an	  American	  lawyer	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Council,	  drew	  up	  the	  contract,	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  document	  they	  began	  negotiations	  with	  Joseph	  Shriro	  for	  additional	  money.76	  
Although	  Margolis	  was	  sure	  that	  JDC	  wanted	  to	  help	  in	  Shanghai,	  she	  felt	  she	  could	  not	  be	  100%	  convincing,	  because	  she	  did	  not	  know	  what	  the	  situation	  really	  was	  in	  the	  United	  States	  after	  they	  were	  completely	  cut	  off.	  It	  was	  easy	  to	  get	  a	  distorted	  picture	  of	  what	  might	  be	  happening,	  and	  there	  were	  times	  when	  they	  even	  questioned	  whether	  JDC	  was	  functioning	  at	  all.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  it	  was	  necessary	  for	  JDC	  members	  to	  compromise	  and	  accept	  unreasonably	  low	  rates	  on	  this	  second	  loan.77	  
Shriro	  was	  understandably	  hesitant	  to	  loan	  his	  money	  without	  a	  legal	  obligation	  on	  JDC’s	  part	  to	  repay.	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  had	  to	  admit	  that	  if	  JDC	  did	  not	  want	  to	  meet	  this	  obligation,	  they	  did	  not	  have	  to,	  but	  they	  tried	  to	  convince	  him	  that	  to	  the	  best	  of	  their	  knowledge,	  JDC	  would	  repay	  these	  commitments.	  In	  September	  1942,	  Shriro	  agreed	  to	  lend	  the	  sum	  of	  100,000	  Swiss	  francs	  (CHF),	  but	  at	  an	  extremely	  low	  rate	  of	  CRB	  $3.00	  to	  CHF	  1.00	  (Margolis	  recalled	  that	  at	  that	  time	  the	  official	  rate	  of	  the	  CRB	  dollar	  to	  the	  Swiss	  franc	  was	  10.5	  or	  12	  to	  1).	  As	  reluctant	  as	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  were	  to	  accept	  this	  rate,	  there	  was	  no	  other	  person	  who	  had	  as	  much	  free	  cash	  to	  give	  at	  one	  time	  as	  Shriro,	  and	  by	  September	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  1942	  the	  existing	  funds	  were	  dangerously	  low.78	  This	  loan	  bought	  the	  JDC	  a	  few	  more	  months	  to	  support	  the	  refugees.	  At	  great	  difficulty	  and	  without	  much	  help	  from	  the	  fragmented	  Jewish	  communities,	  the	  JDC	  workers	  managed	  to	  raise	  enough	  funds	  to	  keep	  alive	  the	  thousands	  of	  refugees	  who	  depended	  on	  them	  for	  their	  daily	  existence.	  
Reorganization	  
This	  section	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  Margolis	  implemented	  the	  values	  of	  representative	  democracy	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  working	  with	  the	  Japanese	  to	  obtain	  the	  best	  possible	  outcome	  for	  the	  refugees,	  noting	  her	  attempts	  to	  involve	  the	  different	  communities	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  impress	  them	  with	  their	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  for	  those	  less	  fortunate.	  Margolis’	  efforts	  were	  successful	  as	  the	  committees	  began	  to	  function	  under	  newly	  recruited	  and	  capable	  administrators,	  largely	  due	  to	  her	  ability	  to	  deal	  fairly	  with	  all	  the	  different	  factions.	  
❋ 
Once	  Margolis	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  the	  loan	  of	  U.S.	  $180,000—mostly	  from	  Shriro79—and	  the	  immediate	  financial	  pressure	  was	  relieved,	  Margolis	  set	  out	  to	  reorganize	  the	  administrative	  machinery	  and	  the	  Committee	  that	  led	  it,	  as	  she	  had	  planned	  to	  do	  before	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  	  
The	  staff	  of	  570	  employees	  that	  was	  in	  place	  when	  Margolis	  arrived	  was	  cumbersome	  and	  inefficient,	  and	  again	  Margolis	  felt	  that	  the	  existing	  Committee,	  under	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   234	  Herzberg’s	  leadership,	  had	  treated	  the	  refugees	  in	  a	  humiliating	  manner,	  not	  only	  underfeeding	  them	  for	  years,	  but	  also	  depriving	  them	  “of	  every	  remnant	  of	  self-­‐respect	  as	  adult	  human	  beings.”	  
In	  a	  scathing	  article	  in	  the	  Yiddish	  paper,	  Der	  Werker,	  Lazar	  Epstein	  had	  noted	  the	  disproportionately	  large	  staff	  maintained	  by	  the	  CFA	  in	  Shanghai:	  
The	  JDC	  allotted	  (until	  August	  [1941])	  about	  sixteen	  thousand	  dollars	  per	  month.	  This	  would	  amount	  to	  a	  little	  more	  than	  $2.50	  for	  each	  needy	  person,	  if	  a	  part	  of	  this	  money	  were	  not	  spent	  on	  aid	  to	  the	  other	  third,	  partially	  needy,	  and	  if…almost	  half	  of	  the	  sixteen	  thousand	  dollars	  were	  not	  spent	  for	  the	  huge	  apparatus	  consisting	  of	  570	  officers	  ruling	  the	  unfortunate	  refugees.	  Thus,	  every	  refugee	  gets	  a	  subvention	  out	  of	  the	  American	  funds	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  60¢	  per	  month.	  At	  a	  time	  when	  the	  very	  minimum	  cost	  of	  existing	  and	  maintaining	  one’s	  self-­‐respect	  amounts	  to	  at	  least	  $18.00	  per	  month.80	  	  By	  February	  1942,	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  felt	  that	  something	  had	  to	  be	  done	  to	  disband	  the	  CFA	  and	  create	  a	  new	  and	  much	  more	  representative	  community	  committee.	  They	  called	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  existing	  Committee	  and	  told	  them	  frankly	  that	  the	  Committee	  “was	  badly	  organized;	  was	  filled	  with	  corruption,	  and	  that	  the	  refugees	  had	  been	  treated	  worse	  than	  coolies.”	  The	  executive	  whom	  they	  had	  appointed,	  Captain	  Herzberg,	  was	  “a	  man	  not	  worthy	  of	  dealing	  with	  human	  beings,”	  and	  many	  of	  the	  refugee	  staff	  appointed	  by	  him	  “were	  the	  type	  of	  people	  who	  would	  eventually	  have	  to	  be	  dismissed	  because	  they	  were	  people	  of	  his	  caliber	  and	  mentality.”	  All	  of	  the	  committee	  members	  resigned	  except	  for	  Mr.	  Speelman,	  who	  received	  the	  criticism	  graciously	  and	  agreed	  to	  help	  going	  forward.81	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   235	  Margolis	  then	  called	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  570	  staff	  members,	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  depressed	  and	  hopeless,	  badly	  clothed	  and	  badly	  fed.	  She	  spoke	  to	  them	  frankly	  about	  the	  financial	  situation	  and	  about	  the	  hostility	  and	  antagonism	  that	  existed	  toward	  them,	  admitting	  to	  them	  that	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  these	  feelings	  were	  justified.	  She	  warned	  them	  that	  the	  staff	  would	  have	  to	  be	  cut,	  as	  the	  maintenance	  of	  over	  500	  employees	  was	  not	  only	  unnecessary	  but	  also	  financially	  impossible,	  and	  urged	  them	  to	  try	  to	  find	  employment	  elsewhere.	  She	  issued	  IOUs	  for	  their	  January	  pay,	  promising	  to	  compensate	  them	  when	  monies	  once	  again	  arrived	  from	  America,	  and	  to	  apprise	  them	  of	  the	  financial	  situation	  from	  month	  to	  month.	  After	  this	  meeting,	  only	  one	  staff	  member	  resigned.82	  
Margolis	  also	  called	  separate	  meetings	  of	  the	  residents	  of	  each	  of	  the	  five	  refugee	  camps	  and	  gave	  them	  a	  full	  explanation	  of	  the	  situation,	  attempting	  to	  foster	  community	  spirit	  and	  putting	  into	  play	  her	  agenda	  of	  organizing	  the	  refugees	  democratically.	  She	  encouraged	  the	  residents	  to	  take	  more	  interest	  in	  the	  running	  of	  their	  camps,	  since	  the	  Committee	  no	  longer	  could	  afford	  to	  keep	  paid	  staff.	  She	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  camps	  in	  fact	  belonged	  to	  the	  residents,	  and	  that	  their	  maintenance,	  sanitation	  and	  administration	  should	  be	  their	  responsibility.83	  Each	  camp	  then	  organized	  a	  committee	  of	  five	  people	  to	  discuss	  plans	  with	  Margolis	  regularly.	  She	  also	  organized	  a	  small	  representative	  committee	  of	  those	  refugees	  on	  relief	  who	  were	  living	  outside	  the	  camps.84	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   236	  In	  keeping	  with	  her	  training	  and	  views	  of	  “best	  practice”	  in	  social	  work,85	  Margolis	  felt	  that	  implementing	  a	  democratic	  system	  in	  the	  community	  was	  one	  of	  her	  key	  victories	  in	  Shanghai.	  Although	  there	  were	  often	  clashes,	  she	  felt	  the	  process	  was	  ultimately	  beneficial	  to	  the	  refugees:	  
It	  was	  amazing	  to	  watch	  those	  semi-­‐starved	  people	  suddenly	  roused	  from	  their	  lethargy.	  For	  weeks	  the	  camps	  buzzed	  with	  election	  activities.	  Much	  of	  the	  leadership	  came	  from	  the	  lawyers,	  who	  knew	  how	  to	  talk	  persuasively….	  There	  were	  speeches,	  meetings,	  and	  “electioneering.”	  In	  one	  camp	  election	  activities	  became	  so	  violent	  that	  the	  police	  actually	  had	  to	  be	  called	  in	  to	  settle	  a	  quarrel.	  Camp	  committees	  where	  elected	  and	  reelected.	  The	  people	  were	  at	  first	  very	  clumsy	  in	  using	  the	  techniques	  of	  Democratic	  organization,	  which	  do	  not	  come	  naturally	  to	  those	  of	  German	  background,	  but	  they	  learned,	  and	  learned	  fast.86	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  Margolis	  had	  kept	  in	  constant	  touch	  with	  Captain	  Inuzuka,	  sending	  him	  reports	  and	  updates	  of	  the	  developments	  in	  Hongkew.	  She	  had	  told	  him	  that	  she	  was	  going	  to	  form	  a	  new	  committee,	  and	  he	  asked	  only	  that	  it	  be	  composed	  of	  non-­‐enemy	  nationals,	  and	  that	  he	  be	  given	  every	  name	  for	  approval.	  	  
Margolis	  was	  determined	  that	  this	  time	  the	  new,	  reorganized	  Committee	  would	  be	  governed	  democratically	  and	  consist	  of	  a	  representative	  of	  every	  segment	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  communities.	  She	  personally	  contacted	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Sephardic	  community	  (representing	  the	  Baghdadi	  and	  Near	  Eastern	  Jews),	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community	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  (representing	  predominantly	  white	  Russians),	  and	  the	  Jüdische	  Gemeinde	  (representing	  the	  refugees	  and	  German	  Jews).87	  	  
The	  new	  Committee	  for	  the	  Assistance	  of	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  met	  early	  in	  March	  1942,	  composed	  of	  members	  of	  each	  of	  the	  above	  communities	  as	  well	  as	  a	  few	  members	  at	  large.	  This	  was	  a	  real	  achievement	  in	  light	  of	  the	  previous	  refusal	  of	  the	  different	  community	  representatives	  to	  even	  be	  together	  under	  the	  same	  roof.	  There	  were	  approximately	  25	  men	  present,	  including	  a	  member	  of	  the	  police	  force	  representing	  the	  Japanese	  Municipal	  Council.	  Margolis	  organized	  this	  large	  committee	  into	  subcommittees	  for	  housing,	  feeding,	  fundraising,	  finance	  and	  budget,	  purchasing,	  and	  rehabilitation.	  	  
She	  later	  recalled	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  staff	  committee	  meetings	  took	  place:	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  each	  month	  the	  staff	  committee	  met	  with	  Mr.	  Siegel	  and	  me.	  These	  were	  staff	  conferences	  under	  difficulties,	  with	  the	  committee	  crowded	  into	  our	  cramped	  little	  office	  in	  the	  old	  barracks.	  The	  stove	  always	  smoked.	  The	  air	  always	  was	  fouled	  with	  odors	  from	  unsanitary	  and	  inadequate	  plumbing.	  The	  rain—and	  it	  rained	  practically	  every	  day	  in	  the	  Shanghai	  winter—dripped	  through	  the	  cracked	  ceiling.	  We	  managed	  to	  serve	  afternoon	  coffee	  with	  sandwiches	  or	  cookies,	  because	  otherwise	  the	  staff	  committee	  members	  were	  too	  hungry	  to	  think.88	  She	  explained	  to	  those	  present	  that	  it	  was	  never	  JDC’s	  policy	  to	  take	  over	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  community,	  but	  that	  the	  situation	  in	  Shanghai	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor	  was	  so	  unique	  that	  they	  had	  to	  act	  decisively	  in	  response	  to	  emergency	  conditions.	  She	  impressed	  upon	  the	  Committee	  their	  responsibility	  to	  care	  for	  the	  community,	  and	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   238	  expressed	  JDC’s	  sincere	  desire	  to	  step	  out	  of	  leadership	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  local	  leaders	  were	  able	  to	  take	  over.	  They	  hoped	  to	  replace	  themselves	  with	  a	  full-­‐time	  professional	  executive,	  whether	  paid	  or	  volunteer,	  and	  would	  search	  for	  such	  a	  person	  in	  the	  next	  few	  months.	  Every	  representative	  at	  that	  meeting	  agreed	  to	  work	  on	  one	  or	  more	  subcommittees.89	  
The	  new	  subcommittees	  began	  to	  function,	  and	  in	  April	  1942,	  the	  rehabilitation	  subcommittee	  began	  working	  with	  the	  refugees	  to	  plant	  vegetable	  gardens	  in	  their	  various	  camps.	  This	  helped	  to	  boost	  the	  spirits	  of	  the	  underfed	  refugees.	  They	  also	  asked	  ORT,	  which	  had	  a	  functioning	  school	  in	  Hongkew,	  to	  start	  teaching	  classes	  in	  JDC	  camps,	  with	  JDC	  providing	  the	  space	  and	  paying	  for	  any	  necessary	  equipment.	  However,	  ORT	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  change	  their	  program,	  and	  insisted	  that	  the	  young	  people	  come	  to	  them,	  something	  Margolis	  felt	  she	  could	  not	  ask	  of	  the	  young	  people	  who	  barely	  had	  enough	  to	  eat	  and	  did	  not	  have	  the	  energy	  for	  the	  20-­‐minute	  walk.90	  
Once	  the	  subcommittees	  were	  in	  place,	  Margolis	  turned	  her	  attention	  to	  the	  finances.	  The	  bookkeeping	  system	  was	  in	  disarray	  and	  she	  could	  not	  get	  the	  accurate	  figures	  she	  desperately	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  plan	  ahead.	  She	  dismissed	  the	  old	  personnel	  and	  employed	  Alfred	  Edel,	  a	  refugee	  and	  a	  competent	  public	  accountant	  who	  had	  worked	  at	  a	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  leading	  firm	  in	  Shanghai	  before	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  Edel	  reorganized	  the	  books	  and	  the	  entire	  relief	  and	  statistical	  system.91	  
As	  part	  of	  her	  reorganization,	  Margolis	  recruited	  extensively	  to	  fill	  the	  different	  administrative	  positions.	  She	  hired	  Dr.	  Lang,	  a	  man	  who	  had	  set	  up	  the	  Social	  Security	  and	  Public	  Employment	  Service	  for	  Austria,	  to	  help	  start	  an	  employment	  service	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1942.	  Mr.	  Avraham	  Levenspiel	  was	  in	  Hongkew	  daily,	  directing	  the	  various	  gardening	  projects	  and	  the	  building	  of	  a	  new	  kitchen.92	  Carl	  Brahn,	  through	  his	  contact	  with	  Mrs.	  Nogami	  at	  the	  Gendarmerie,	  helped	  secure	  the	  necessary	  permits	  that	  had	  to	  be	  obtained	  whenever	  anything	  had	  to	  be	  moved	  from	  the	  International	  Settlement	  to	  Hongkew,	  including	  even	  the	  daily	  delivery	  of	  bread.93	  Margolis’	  organizational	  efforts	  were	  beginning	  to	  bear	  fruit.	  
Efficiency	  
Nearing	  the	  end	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  raise	  funds,	  Margolis	  utilized	  her	  organizational	  skills	  to	  heighten	  efficiency	  and	  maximize	  the	  use	  of	  funds.	  She	  provided	  a	  modern	  kitchen	  to	  feed	  the	  refugees	  more	  efficiently,	  although	  with	  tactics	  that	  may	  have	  contravened	  JDC	  policy.	  Facing	  overburdened	  refugee	  camps	  with	  no	  solution	  in	  sight,	  Margolis	  turned	  to	  her	  American	  social	  work	  training	  to	  alleviate	  an	  intractable	  situation.	  She	  immediately	  began	  a	  process	  of	  investigation,	  evaluating	  each	  of	  the	  refugees	  to	  determine	  who	  had	  the	  greatest	  need	  so	  that	  resources	  could	  be	  fairly	  apportioned.	  And	  seeing	  that	  no	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  Ibid.	  92	  See	  page	  58	  below.	  93	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	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  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	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   240	  communication	  would	  be	  forthcoming	  from	  JDC’s	  American	  headquarters,	  she	  then	  reached	  out	  internationally	  for	  help.	  Even	  the	  aid	  that	  did	  come	  in	  from	  overseas	  Jewish	  communities	  was	  not	  sufficient,	  forcing	  her	  to	  make	  even	  more	  drastic	  cuts	  in	  order	  for	  the	  poorest	  of	  the	  refugees	  to	  survive.	  
❋ 
One	  of	  Margolis’	  favorite	  stories	  was	  the	  building	  of	  a	  new,	  more	  efficient	  kitchen.	  Margolis	  had	  met	  Avraham	  Levenspiel,	  a	  Polish	  Jewish	  engineer	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  Far	  East	  for	  many	  years	  and	  was	  familiar	  with	  life	  in	  Shanghai.	  He	  had	  been	  pointing	  out	  to	  the	  Committee	  the	  inefficiency	  of	  the	  current	  kitchen,	  which	  was	  feeding	  8,000	  people	  one	  meal	  a	  day	  that	  consisted	  of	  one	  bowl	  of	  vegetable	  or	  bean	  soup	  and	  a	  three-­‐ounce	  slice	  of	  bread.94	  Levenspiel	  had	  been	  consistently	  ignored	  by	  the	  local	  committees,	  but	  Margolis	  listened	  to	  him.	  His	  argument	  was	  that	  it	  was	  costing	  CRB	  60	  cents	  per	  meal	  per	  person,	  of	  which	  50	  cents	  was	  coal	  consumption	  and	  10	  cents	  was	  actual	  food.	  Levenspiel	  suggested	  a	  plan	  whereby	  for	  CRB	  $100,000	  (U.S.	  $5,000)	  they	  could	  have	  a	  very	  simple,	  modern	  and	  efficient	  steam	  kitchen	  that	  could	  feed	  10,000	  people	  at	  one	  time.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  they	  would	  need	  a	  special	  type	  of	  steam	  boiler	  that	  could	  not	  be	  purchased	  in	  China.	  However,	  the	  Cathay	  Land	  Company	  owned	  by	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon	  possessed	  one	  of	  these	  and	  had	  not	  used	  it	  for	  many	  years.95	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  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  168;	  see	  also	  Gruenberger,	  “The	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  338.	  95	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  8.	  
	   	   	   241	  When	  Margolis	  approached	  the	  Cathay	  Land	  Company	  and	  asked	  them	  to	  lend	  them	  the	  boilers,	  the	  British	  employees	  refused,	  fearing	  that	  if	  they	  even	  mentioned	  that	  the	  boilers	  existed,	  the	  Japanese	  might	  confiscate	  them.96	  Margolis	  felt	  justified	  in	  taking	  possession	  of	  these	  boilers,	  since	  she	  knew	  that	  sooner	  or	  later	  the	  Japanese	  would	  confiscate	  them	  anyway	  and	  they	  would	  not	  be	  of	  use	  either	  to	  the	  Cathay	  Land	  Company	  or	  to	  the	  refugees.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  Mrs.	  Nogami	  and	  her	  connections	  with	  the	  Gendarmerie,	  she	  procured	  a	  permit	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  these	  boilers	  and	  presented	  it	  to	  the	  Cathay	  Land	  Company.	  The	  Japanese	  supervisor	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Cathay	  Land	  Company	  then	  gave	  them	  permission	  to	  use	  the	  boilers	  as	  long	  as	  necessary.	  They	  signed	  a	  statement	  affirming	  that	  it	  was	  only	  a	  loan	  and	  allocated	  the	  CRB	  $100,000	  for	  the	  kitchen	  immediately.	  
June	  1942	  brought	  a	  major	  devaluation	  of	  Chinese	  currency,97	  but	  by	  the	  time	  the	  devaluation	  came,	  all	  the	  materials	  for	  the	  kitchen	  had	  been	  purchased	  and	  building	  had	  begun.98	  
In	  December	  1942,	  the	  new	  kitchen—erected	  with	  JDC	  money—was	  dedicated	  and	  officially	  opened	  in	  a	  ceremony	  at	  which	  many	  Japanese	  officials	  were	  present.	  These	  officials	  expressed	  thankfulness	  to	  the	  Jewish	  organizations	  that	  had	  provided	  for	  the	  refugees.	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  did	  not	  attend,	  since	  by	  that	  time	  all	  enemy	  nationals	  were	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  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  171.	  97	  Ji,	  A	  History	  of	  Modern	  Shanghai	  Banking,	  215.	  98	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	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  Shanghai,	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  from	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  1941	  to	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   242	  required	  to	  wear	  special	  red	  armbands	  and	  anti-­‐American	  and	  anti-­‐British	  feeling	  was	  rising.99	  
By	  May	  and	  June	  1942,	  problems	  had	  begun	  to	  multiply.	  Margolis	  had	  to	  keep	  cutting	  staff	  because	  the	  little	  money	  they	  had	  was	  needed	  to	  purchase	  food.	  The	  camps	  were	  badly	  deteriorated	  and	  in	  constant	  need	  of	  repairs;	  the	  refugees	  were	  living	  in	  terrible	  sanitary	  conditions.	  The	  summer	  of	  1942	  saw	  a	  dramatic	  rise	  in	  cases	  of	  typhus	  and	  the	  Committee	  hospitals	  were	  overcrowded.	  The	  general	  situation	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  the	  insecurity	  of	  the	  refugees	  themselves	  resulted	  in	  a	  state	  of	  panic	  among	  those	  people	  not	  living	  in	  the	  camps,	  and	  hundreds	  of	  persons	  a	  day	  came	  to	  the	  Central	  Administration	  office	  to	  apply	  for	  admission	  to	  the	  already	  overcrowded	  camps.100	  	  
Margolis	  knew	  that	  many	  of	  those	  living	  in	  the	  camps	  had	  been	  admitted	  at	  a	  time	  when	  inefficient	  systems	  were	  in	  place,	  and	  had	  less	  need	  than	  some	  of	  those	  living	  outside.	  She	  instituted	  systems	  to	  reinvestigate	  each	  case	  by	  hiring	  Lutz	  Wachsner,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  the	  Jüdische	  Gemeinde,	  to	  work	  on	  the	  housing	  problem	  full	  time.	  Wachsner	  took	  charge	  of	  admitting	  new	  refugees	  and	  investigating	  those	  residing	  in	  the	  camps,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  receiving	  relief	  outside.101	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  Ibid.,	  18.	  100	  The	  American	  Marines’	  Club	  had	  donated	  their	  building	  to	  the	  Jewish	  community	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  to	  the	  complete	  occupation	  of	  the	  city,	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  much-­‐needed	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  20,	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  101	  Margolis,	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  1941	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   243	  Cut	  off	  from	  the	  support	  of	  JDC	  headquarters,	  Margolis	  realized	  that	  Shanghai	  Jewry	  was	  entirely	  on	  its	  own	  and	  would	  have	  to	  survive	  on	  its	  own	  resources.	  She	  reached	  out	  beyond	  JDC	  and	  enlisted	  the	  cooperation	  of	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Society	  of	  Friends	  and	  ORT.	  She	  appealed	  to	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross	  as	  well,	  but	  their	  Swiss	  delegate,	  Edouard	  Egle,	  who	  was	  sympathetic,	  explained	  that	  his	  organization	  could	  only	  act	  as	  an	  agency	  for	  the	  transmission	  of	  cables.	  He	  agreed	  to	  supervise	  funds	  transmitted	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  refugees,	  but	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross	  could	  not	  provide	  direct	  financial	  help.102	  
Still	  desperate	  for	  funds,	  Margolis	  sent	  cables	  to	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  Sweden,	  Turkey,	  Portugal,	  and	  Switzerland,	  asking	  for	  contributions.	  There	  was	  no	  response	  from	  Turkey	  or	  Switzerland,	  but	  the	  Swedes	  and	  Portuguese	  sent	  the	  following	  aid:	  
Date	   Source	   Amt.	  CRB	  2/12/1943	   Arbeitsausschuss	  zur	  Hilfeleistung	  für	  
Europäische	  Juden	  in	  Stockholm	  
$18,000	  3/23/1943	   Comité	  da	  Comunidade	  Israelita	  de	  
Lisboa103	   $23,088	  6/21/1943	   Comité	  da	  Comunidade	  Israelita	  de	  Lisboa	   $136,150	  8/19/1943	   Comité	  da	  Comunidade	  Israelita	  de	  Lisboa	   $114,354	  9/01/1943	   Comité	  da	  Comunidade	  Israelita	  de	  Lisboa	   $686,124	  	   TOTAL104	   $977,716	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Ibid.,	  12.	  103	  Sephardic	  Jews	  who	  migrated	  to	  Portugal	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  had	  founded	  the	  Comunidade	  Israelita	  de	  Lisboa.	  Originating	  in	  Gibraltar	  and	  Morocco,	  some	  traced	  their	  roots	  back	  to	  pre-­‐expulsion	  Iberia.	  Mostly	  merchants,	  they	  were	  educated	  and	  attained	  wealth	  through	  their	  international	  business	  contacts.	  This	  Portuguese	  Jewish	  community	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  refugee	  relief	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Comissão	  Portuguesa	  de	  Assistência	  aos	  Judeus	  Refugiados	  em	  Portugal	  (COMASSIS),	  which	  was	  directed	  by	  Augusto	  d’Esaguy	  and	  partly	  financed	  by	  the	  JDC.	  104	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	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  in	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  from	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  8,	  1941	  to	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   244	  By	  June	  1942,	  Margolis	  realized	  that	  the	  best	  and	  most	  efficient	  campaign	  for	  raising	  funds	  could	  never	  meet	  the	  budget	  of	  the	  CFA.	  At	  best,	  they	  could	  only	  stretch	  the	  funds	  raised	  on	  JDC	  credit	  through	  the	  middle	  or	  the	  end	  of	  September.	  	  
Margolis	  sought	  every	  possible	  means	  to	  cut	  expenditures.	  The	  two	  hospitals	  were	  costing	  CRB	  $50,000	  monthly	  to	  operate	  and,	  according	  to	  Margolis,	  “the	  staff	  was	  of	  inferior	  quality,	  the	  equipment	  was	  poor	  and	  physical	  conditions	  and	  sanitation	  deplorable.”105	  Margolis	  contacted	  Dr.	  Eric	  Vio,	  superintendent	  of	  hospitals	  at	  the	  public	  health	  department	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Council,106	  and	  made	  arrangements	  for	  the	  Shanghai	  General	  Hospital	  to	  take	  their	  cases.	  On	  July	  1,	  all	  patients	  not	  released	  were	  transferred	  to	  the	  General	  Hospital	  and	  the	  two	  Committee	  hospitals	  closed.107	  
Another	  cost-­‐saving	  measure	  that	  Margolis	  undertook	  was	  to	  approach	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Council	  to	  get	  free	  rental	  of	  the	  camp	  properties,	  which	  were	  on	  municipal	  land.	  The	  previous	  committee	  had	  never	  taken	  advantage	  of	  the	  regulation	  stating	  that	  charitable	  institutions	  housed	  in	  municipal	  property	  did	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  rent.108	  Thanks	  to	  her	  efficiency	  and	  drastic	  cost-­‐saving	  measures,	  Margolis	  was	  able	  to	  stretch	  the	  dwindling	  funds	  significantly	  longer	  to	  support	  the	  needy	  refugees.	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  Ibid.	  106	  Prue	  Torney-­‐Parlicki,	  Behind	  the	  News:	  A	  Biography	  of	  Peter	  Russo	  (UWA	  Publishing,	  2005),	  84.	  107	  Margolis	  had	  always	  been	  convinced	  that	  these	  hospitals	  had	  been	  an	  unnecessary	  and	  costly	  part	  of	  the	  Committee’s	  activities.	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  
Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  September	  1943,	  13.	  108	  Ibid.	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Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  Interned	  
Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  showed	  extraordinary	  foresight	  as	  they	  considered	  the	  likelihood	  of	  their	  own	  impending	  arrest.	  In	  providing	  for	  additional	  loans	  for	  the	  refugees	  and	  establishing	  checks	  and	  balances	  in	  the	  existing	  committees,	  they	  set	  up	  the	  infrastructure	  that	  enabled	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  German	  and	  Austrian	  refugees	  in	  the	  dire	  days	  ahead.	  With	  great	  difficulty,	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  attempted	  to	  remain	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  committees	  they	  had	  established	  and	  provided	  them	  with	  leadership,	  even	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  their	  own	  internment.	  
❋ As	  Japanese	  anti-­‐foreign	  feeling	  escalated	  in	  Shanghai,	  Margolis,	  anticipating	  that	  she	  and	  Manny	  Siegel	  would	  either	  be	  repatriated	  or	  interned	  by	  the	  fall	  of	  1942,	  felt	  it	  was	  time	  for	  them	  to	  step	  down	  from	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  refugee	  program.	  Ristaino’s	  research	  showed	  that	  most	  Americans	  in	  Shanghai	  were	  detained	  and	  confined	  to	  hotels	  until	  the	  Swiss	  consulate	  could	  arrange	  for	  their	  departure,	  to	  be	  exchanged	  for	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  Japanese	  stranded	  in	  America.109	  But	  as	  it	  turned	  out,	  on	  September	  6,	  1942,	  the	  day	  they	  were	  supposed	  to	  sail	  on	  a	  civilian	  exchange	  program,	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel’s	  repatriation	  was	  canceled.	  Margolis	  later	  learned	  that	  the	  Japanese	  felt	  she	  was	  too	  valuable	  to	  the	  refugee	  program	  to	  allow	  her	  to	  depart.110	  	  
But	  not	  knowing	  this	  and	  expecting	  to	  be	  repatriated	  within	  months,	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  officially	  resigned	  from	  the	  Committee	  for	  Assistance	  in	  July	  1942	  and	  the	  Committee	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  188.	  110	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  17.	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  was	  disbanded.	  In	  its	  place,	  Margolis	  set	  up	  a	  new	  JDC	  Committee,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  her	  better	  judgment,	  she	  appointed	  Carl	  Brahn	  as	  chairman.	  She	  later	  reported:	  	  
Mr.	  Brahn	  was	  appointed	  chairman	  of	  the	  JDC	  committee	  simply	  because	  of	  his	  influential	  contact	  with	  the	  Japanese.	  He	  is	  a	  very	  unreliable,	  frustrated,	  sadistic	  person	  with	  a	  strong	  desire	  to	  dominate	  and	  show	  his	  power	  over	  those	  dependent	  on	  him…we	  had	  no	  choice.111	  	  Lutz	  Wachsner,	  who	  had	  been	  working	  under	  Margolis’	  supervision	  for	  six	  months,	  was	  capable	  and	  willing	  to	  take	  over	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  Committee,	  and	  Werner	  Glückmann,	  who	  had	  been	  her	  secretary,	  became	  his	  assistant.	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  agreed	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  background	  to	  advise	  Wachsner	  and	  Glückmann	  and	  to	  continue	  to	  help	  the	  local	  community	  raise	  funds.112	  J.	  Bitker,	  in	  spite	  of	  his	  previous	  arrest,	  was	  also	  willing	  to	  help,	  although	  he	  would	  not	  serve	  on	  the	  committee.113	  
On	  September	  1,	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  were	  suddenly	  notified	  that	  in	  five	  days	  they	  would	  be	  sailing	  from	  Shanghai	  to	  be	  repatriated.	  Aware	  that	  without	  herself	  and	  Siegel	  there	  would	  be	  no	  centralized	  responsibility	  for	  the	  refugees,	  Margolis	  called	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  new	  Kitchen	  Fund’s	  committee	  and	  proposed	  that	  they	  take	  over	  all	  responsibility	  for	  feeding	  and	  the	  Jüdische	  Gemeinde	  take	  over	  the	  responsibility	  for	  housing,	  while	  the	  JDC	  committee	  would	  raise	  money	  on	  conditional	  loans	  and	  would	  disburse	  funds	  according	  to	  need.	  The	  Jüdische	  Gemeinde,	  however,	  refused	  to	  take	  over	  any	  responsibility.	  According	  to	  Margolis:	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  Ibid.,	  15.	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  Ibid.,	  14.	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  Ibid.,	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   247	  The	  leadership	  of	  the	  Jüdische	  Gemeinde	  has	  always	  been	  weak	  and	  although	  it	  was	  the	  only	  organization	  which	  officially	  represented	  the	  refugee	  body,	  it	  has	  never	  really	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  refugees.	  Dr.	  Kardegg,	  the	  president,	  is	  a	  rather	  weak	  and	  vacillating	  person,	  a	  man	  who	  is	  afraid	  of	  everybody.114	  The	  members	  of	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  then	  declared	  that	  they	  were	  ready	  to	  take	  over	  responsibility	  for	  the	  whole	  problem,	  if	  Margolis	  would	  promise	  that	  all	  monies	  raised	  through	  JDC	  loans	  would	  be	  given	  to	  them.	  Margolis	  insisted	  that	  the	  standard	  of	  work	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  meet	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  JDC	  Committee.	  However,	  Margolis	  noted,	  
From	  the	  very	  beginning	  we	  had	  been	  fearful	  of	  the	  type	  of	  leadership	  personified	  in	  Dr.	  Berglass,	  [sic]	  Mr.	  Pulvermacher	  and	  Dr.	  Silberstein,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  choice.	  Everyone	  had	  been	  given	  an	  opportunity	  and	  these	  were	  the	  only	  people	  who	  agreed	  to	  take	  any	  responsibility.115	  But	  Margolis’	  supervision	  of	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  was	  to	  be	  short-­‐lived.	  On	  November	  5,	  the	  American	  and	  British	  communities	  were	  surprised	  to	  wake	  up	  and	  find	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  picking	  up	  enemy	  nationals	  for	  internment.	  Expecting	  to	  be	  detained	  at	  any	  moment,	  Margolis	  quickly	  called	  a	  meeting	  with	  Bitker	  and	  Shriro	  and	  negotiated	  for	  an	  additional	  sum	  of	  CHF	  405,000	  to	  be	  loaned.	  They	  limited	  the	  amount	  that	  that	  the	  Shanghai	  JDC	  could	  borrow	  to	  U.S.	  $210,000	  and	  signed	  the	  necessary	  paperwork	  for	  the	  loan.	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  Much	  to	  their	  surprise,	  they	  learned	  later	  that	  afternoon	  that	  the	  Gendarmerie	  had	  only	  arrested	  a	  selected	  few	  enemy	  nationals116	  and	  that	  Mr.	  Shriro	  had	  been	  one	  of	  them.	  The	  arrest	  of	  Shriro	  meant	  that	  he	  too	  was	  now	  classified	  as	  an	  enemy	  national,	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  agreement	  with	  the	  Japanese,	  JDC	  could	  not	  take	  money	  from	  enemy	  nationals.	  They	  dropped	  the	  matter	  temporarily	  and	  gave	  up	  hope	  of	  ever	  getting	  more	  money	  from	  this	  source.117	  
However,	  in	  January	  1943,	  one	  of	  Shriro’s	  brothers	  approached	  Margolis,	  telling	  her	  that	  Shriro	  still	  wanted	  to	  make	  the	  loan.	  In	  view	  of	  Shriro’s	  arrest,	  Margolis	  refused	  to	  take	  the	  money	  directly	  from	  him—she	  felt	  that	  no	  amount	  of	  money	  was	  worth	  risking	  the	  displeasure	  of	  the	  Japanese	  after	  they	  had	  given	  their	  word	  that	  they	  would	  only	  negotiate	  with	  neutrals.	  However,	  she	  could	  not	  just	  refuse	  the	  loan	  of	  CHF	  405,000,	  so	  she	  found	  another	  way	  around	  it.	  The	  money	  was	  transferred	  to	  a	  Russian	  immigrant	  named	  J.	  Shifrin,	  and	  the	  loan	  was	  negotiated	  with	  him.	  This	  time,	  though,	  Margolis	  refused	  to	  accept	  the	  rate	  of	  CRB	  $3.00.	  She	  knew	  it	  would	  not	  be	  long	  before	  she	  was	  arrested,	  so	  she	  left	  the	  rate	  negotiation	  open	  but	  gave	  her	  word	  that	  JDC	  would	  not	  ask	  for	  more	  than	  CRB	  $6.00.	  	  
They	  also	  agreed	  not	  to	  disclose	  to	  the	  JDC	  Committee	  officially	  nor	  to	  the	  community	  that	  this	  money	  was	  available.	  They	  were	  concerned	  that,	  with	  money	  suddenly	  available,	  the	  local	  communities	  would	  no	  longer	  feel	  the	  responsibility	  to	  support	  themselves	  and	  provide	  for	  their	  own	  needy.	  Instead,	  the	  funds	  would	  be	  invested	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  “Japan	  Seizes	  100	  Jewish	  Refugees	  As	  Hostages	  in	  Shanghai;	  Many	  Others	  Arrested,”	  JTA,	  May	  23,	  1943.	  117	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  17–18.	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  from	  time	  to	  time	  the	  income	  from	  the	  investment	  would	  be	  used	  as	  anonymous	  contributions	  to	  the	  Shanghai	  JDC.	  	  
We	  felt	  that	  the	  local	  community	  had	  by	  this	  time	  been	  stimulated	  to	  raise	  money	  locally,	  and	  we	  did	  not	  want	  them	  to	  revert	  to	  their	  former	  habit	  of	  “Let	  JDC	  do	  it.”	  We	  felt	  it	  was	  much	  better	  psychologically	  for	  them	  not	  to	  know	  that	  we	  had	  obtained	  this	  loan.118	  The	  politics,	  rivalries	  and	  personality	  clashes	  among	  the	  committee	  leaders	  caused	  so	  much	  conflict	  within	  their	  own	  ranks	  that	  the	  Japanese,	  who	  were	  aware	  of	  these	  conflicts,	  took	  advantage.	  The	  Kitchen	  Fund	  group	  refused	  to	  take	  any	  suggestions	  from	  the	  Shanghai	  JDC	  even	  though	  they	  were	  receiving	  money	  from	  them.	  Carl	  Brahn,	  now	  chairman	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  JDC,	  was	  reporting	  the	  misdemeanors	  of	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  to	  the	  Japanese.	  	  
Tsutomu	  Kubota,	  Director	  General	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Bureau	  of	  Stateless	  Refugee	  Affairs,	  decreed	  that	  for	  the	  present	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  should	  continue	  its	  work	  of	  feeding	  and	  housing	  and	  raising	  funds	  locally	  and	  that	  the	  Shanghai	  JDC	  should	  continue	  to	  raise	  money	  on	  credit.	  The	  Japanese,	  however,	  did	  not	  want	  to	  work	  directly	  with	  any	  of	  the	  existing	  committees	  and	  organized	  their	  own:	  the	  Shanghai	  Ashkenazi	  Communal	  Relief	  Association	  (SACRA),119	  which	  was	  subordinate	  to	  the	  Office	  of	  Stateless	  Refugee	  Affairs.120	  Dr.	  Jan	  Abraham	  Jacob	  Cohn,	  a	  physician	  of	  Turkish	  background	  who	  was	  educated	  in	  Japan	  and	  fluent	  in	  Japanese,	  was	  appointed	  chairman	  of	  SACRA	  and	  was	  a	  spokesman	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Ibid.,	  18.	  119	  Some	  sources	  substitute	  the	  word	  “Cooperative”	  for	  “Communal”	  in	  the	  organization’s	  name.	  See	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  198.	  120	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  314;	  see	  also	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  
Resort,	  198.	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  Russian	  Jews	  to	  the	  Japanese	  authorities.121	  He	  was	  very	  pro-­‐Japanese	  and	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  Kubota.	  The	  Japanese	  dealt	  only	  with	  Dr.	  Cohn	  at	  SACRA,	  and	  SACRA	  in	  turn	  dealt	  with	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  and	  the	  Shanghai	  JDC.122	  But	  because	  of	  Cohn’s	  close	  relationship	  with	  the	  Japanese,	  the	  other	  members	  of	  SACRA	  did	  not	  completely	  trust	  him	  and	  “would	  cease	  their	  private	  conversation	  the	  minute	  Dr.	  Cohn	  walked	  in.”123	  
The	  interpersonal	  clashes	  had	  caused	  a	  definite	  split	  between	  SACRA	  and	  the	  Office	  for	  Stateless	  on	  one	  side	  and	  the	  Shanghai	  JDC	  backed	  by	  the	  Gendarmerie	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  Actually	  the	  fight	  was	  the	  old	  traditional	  one	  between	  the	  Japanese	  Gendarmerie	  and	  the	  Office	  for	  Stateless	  that	  was	  under	  the	  Japanese	  Consulate;	  but	  this	  time	  the	  Jewish	  groups	  were	  being	  used	  in	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  political	  quarrel	  between	  these	  two	  Japanese	  factions.124	  
The	  amount	  of	  money	  that	  was	  being	  raised	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  supply	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  impoverished	  refugees.	  H.	  Wasmer	  of	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross,	  wrote:	  
The	  worst	  distress	  exists	  undoubtedly	  among	  the	  German-­‐Jewish	  immigrants,	  of	  whom	  at	  least	  6,000,	  are	  on	  the	  point	  of	  starvation	  and	  about	  9,000	  more	  are	  not	  far	  better	  off.	  The	  local	  Jewish	  Committee…	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  345.	  122	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  23;	  For	  more	  on	  SACRA,	  see	  SACRA,	  “Minutes	  of	  the	  Central	  Board,”	  1943,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  Shanghai	  Collection,	  RG	  243,	  14	  (1/812).	  123	  Herman	  Dicker,	  Wanderers	  and	  Settlers	  in	  the	  Far	  East:	  A	  Century	  of	  Jewish	  Life	  in	  
China	  and	  Japan	  (New	  York:	  Twayne,	  1962),	  136.	  According	  to	  Kranzler,	  Dicker	  based	  this	  on	  an	  interview	  with	  a	  former	  member	  of	  the	  SACRA	  board.	  Quoted	  in	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  346.	  124	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  20.	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  raise	  local	  contributions	  to	  an	  amount	  of	  maximum	  CRB	  $	  10.–	  per	  capita	  per	  month125	  and	  which	  is	  next	  to	  nothing	  when	  you	  take	  into	  account	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  foodstuffs	  at	  Shanghai,	  even	  a	  Chinese	  coolie	  requiring	  CRB	  $150.–	  a	  month	  to	  feed	  himself.	  For	  the	  moment	  the	  Jewish	  Committee	  have	  still	  some	  of	  the	  3,000	  [sic]	  bags	  of	  flour	  left	  which	  were	  donated	  last	  July,	  but	  even	  that	  will	  be	  exausted	  [sic]	  by	  the	  end	  of	  next	  month,	  when	  the	  Committee	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  one	  slice	  of	  bread	  daily	  which	  at	  present	  keeps	  precariously	  body	  and	  soul	  together	  of	  thousands	  of	  these	  poor	  wretches.	  It	  need	  hardly	  be	  mentioned	  that	  medical	  care	  is	  practically	  non-­‐existent…126	  The	  rate	  of	  mortality,	  which	  had	  increased	  from	  139	  in	  1940	  to	  182	  in	  1941	  and	  350	  in	  1942,	  was	  continuing	  to	  rise.127	  The	  Red	  Cross	  representative	  felt	  that	  these	  conditions	  could	  not	  easily	  be	  ameliorated	  in	  light	  of	  the	  “great	  deal	  of	  corruption	  [that]	  prevails	  amongst	  certain	  members	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Administration,”	  referring	  to	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund.	  Because	  of	  this	  corruption	  and	  the	  divisions	  within	  the	  Jewish	  community,	  the	  Red	  Cross	  declined	  to	  assist	  the	  refugees:128	  
Our	  delegates	  would	  therefore	  be	  unable	  to	  undertake	  a	  systematic	  distribution	  unless	  the	  entire	  organization	  can	  be	  altered	  and	  the	  distribution	  placed	  completely	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross,	  preferably	  with	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  Japanese	  or	  Municipal	  Authorities.129	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  This	  CRB	  $10	  provided	  9	  ounces	  of	  bread	  and	  a	  thin	  vegetable	  soup	  per	  person	  per	  day	  for	  one	  month.	  (International	  Red	  Cross,	  “Cable,”	  October	  24,	  1943,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.)	  126	  H.	  Wasmer,	  Note	  for	  the	  Delegation	  of	  the	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  
Cross,	  June	  15,	  1943,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  127	  AJDC	  Lisbon	  to	  Herbert	  Katzki,	  “General	  Letter	  N°540,”	  November	  4,	  1943,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  128	  Wasmer,	  Note	  for	  the	  Delegation	  of	  the	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross,	  2.	   129	  Ibid.,	  1.	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  Wasmer	  felt	  it	  would	  take	  approximately	  CHF	  $100,000	  per	  month	  to	  provide	  the	  necessary	  aid.	  As	  an	  alternative,	  he	  suggested	  that	  CHF	  $10,000	  monthly,	  spent	  carefully,	  could	  save	  hundreds	  of	  lives.	  However,	  according	  to	  Paul	  Baerwald,	  the	  Red	  Cross	  evidently	  did	  not	  have	  these	  funds	  to	  make	  available,	  and	  JDC,	  which	  could	  have	  sent	  funds,	  felt	  their	  hands	  were	  tied	  by	  U.S.	  regulations,	  once	  again	  adding	  to	  Bauer’s	  argument.	  Paul	  Baerwald,	  the	  chairman	  of	  JDC,	  appealed	  to	  Arthur	  Hays	  Sulzberger,	  publisher	  of	  The	  New	  
York	  Times,	  to	  try	  to	  sway	  public	  opinion	  on	  the	  matter,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  record	  of	  anything	  having	  come	  through	  this	  avenue.130	  
In	  early	  January	  1943,	  Britain	  signed	  the	  “Treaty	  Between	  His	  Majesty	  in	  Respect	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  India	  and	  His	  Excellency	  the	  President	  of	  the	  National	  Government	  of	  the	  Republic	  Of	  China	  for	  the	  Relinquishment	  of	  Extra-­‐Territorial	  Rights	  in	  China	  and	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Related	  Matters	  (With	  Exchange	  of	  Notes	  and	  Agreed	  Minute)”	  with	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek's	  Nationalist	  Government	  in	  Chongqing,	  ending	  the	  extraterritorial	  privileges	  of	  these	  nations.131	  By	  extension,	  British	  and	  Americans	  in	  Shanghai,	  including	  the	  two	  JDC	  staff	  members,	  began	  to	  be	  rounded	  up	  by	  the	  Japanese.	  	  
Manny	  Siegel	  was	  interned	  on	  January	  31,	  1943.	  He	  was	  taken	  to	  Pootung	  Camp,	  the	  grounds	  of	  which	  were	  in	  the	  bombed	  out	  ruins	  of	  a	  Chinese	  village	  destroyed	  in	  the	  1937	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Paul	  Baerwald	  to	  Arthur	  Hayes	  Sulzberger,	  November	  7,	  1943,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  A	  search	  of	  The	  New	  
York	  Times	  does	  not	  show	  any	  articles	  on	  Jews	  in	  Shanghai	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  effort.	  131	  For	  the	  text	  of	  this	  treaty,	  see	  China	  and	  Rand	  McNally,	  Treaty	  between	  His	  
Majesty	  in	  Respect	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  India	  and	  His	  Excellency	  the	  President	  of	  the	  
National	  Government	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	  for	  the	  Relinquishment	  of	  Extra-­‐Territorial	  
Rights	  in	  China,	  and	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Related	  Matters	  (with	  Exchange	  of	  Notes	  and	  Agreed	  
Minute),	  Chungking,	  January	  11,	  1943	  (London:	  H.M.S.O.,	  1943).	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  fighting,	  where	  a	  condemned	  warehouse	  of	  the	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  Company	  served	  to	  house	  the	  internees.132	  During	  his	  internment,	  Siegel	  contracted	  malaria,	  dysentery	  and	  “chillblains.”	  He	  described	  his	  time	  there	  as	  “life	  in	  an	  unsanitary,	  unheated	  ware-­‐house	  under	  a	  leaky	  roof,	  plenty	  of	  bugs,	  85	  men	  living	  in	  a	  room,	  where	  one	  lined	  up	  for	  everything,	  from	  water,	  to	  meals,	  to	  wash,	  and	  even	  to	  toilet.”133	  Manny	  Siegel	  was	  not	  released	  until	  Japan	  surrendered	  in	  1945.	  
Laura	  Margolis	  was	  interned	  a	  month	  after	  Siegel	  on	  February	  25,	  1943	  in	  a	  camp	  outside	  Shanghai:	  an	  old,	  broken	  down,	  shelled	  Chinese	  schoolhouse	  in	  the	  country	  surrounded	  by	  barbed	  wire.	  There	  were	  1,500	  people	  in	  that	  camp:	  some	  couples,	  single	  men	  and	  women,	  but	  mostly	  families	  with	  children.	  Many	  of	  the	  internees	  were	  representatives	  of	  big	  business	  in	  America,	  such	  as	  Standard	  Oil	  and	  Chase	  Bank.	  	  	  
Margolis	  was	  assigned	  a	  room	  with	  40	  women,	  a	  conglomeration	  of	  American	  missionaries,	  Shanghai	  prostitutes,	  widows	  of	  diplomatic	  corpsmen	  in	  Beijing	  who	  had	  been	  brought	  to	  Shanghai	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  and	  others.	  The	  housing	  conditions	  were	  primitive—the	  roofs	  leaked,	  the	  floors	  sagged,	  and	  it	  was	  “hellishly	  hot	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  ice	  cold	  in	  the	  winter.”134	  The	  Japanese	  did	  provide	  them	  with	  a	  stove,	  but	  when	  they	  lit	  it,	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  Kaufman,	  “Interview,”	  28;	  see	  also	  Greg	  Leck,	  Captives	  of	  Empire:	  The	  Japanese	  
Internment	  of	  Allied	  Civilians	  in	  China,	  1941-­‐1945	  ([Bangor,	  PA]:	  Shandy	  Press,	  2006),	  466.	  	  133	  Manuel	  Siegel,	  Siegel	  to	  Leavitt,	  Report,	  August	  26,	  1945,	  1,	  AR	  1933/44:464,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  134	  Kaufman,	  “Interview,”	  28–30.	  
	   	   	   254	  “there	  was	  so	  much	  smoke,	  dirt	  and	  soot	  that	  we	  gave	  up	  and	  never	  used	  the	  stove	  the	  whole	  winter.”135	  
Margolis	  later	  recalled	  that	  the	  Japanese	  treated	  them	  well	  since	  they	  were	  civilian,	  not	  military	  prisoners.	  They	  had	  been	  allowed	  to	  bring	  whatever	  they	  wanted—food	  supplies,	  comfortable	  folding	  beds,	  linens,	  clothes,	  etc.	  Margolis	  brought	  a	  folding	  cot,	  books	  and	  cans	  of	  food	  with	  her.	  
Both	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  during	  their	  internment	  were	  able	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  outside	  world	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  extent.	  They	  were	  allowed	  to	  receive	  mail,	  although	  it	  was	  heavily	  censored.	  They	  had	  actually	  worked	  out	  a	  code	  to	  bypass	  the	  censors	  and	  let	  each	  other	  know	  they	  were	  well,	  and	  to	  keep	  in	  minimal	  touch	  with	  the	  refugees	  outside	  and	  provide	  what	  leadership	  they	  could.136	  
Around	  the	  summer	  of	  1943,	  there	  was	  an	  epidemic	  of	  dysentery	  in	  Margolis’	  camp,	  and	  those	  who	  were	  sick	  were	  allowed,	  with	  a	  doctor’s	  permission,	  to	  go	  to	  a	  hospital	  in	  Shanghai.	  Margolis	  made	  a	  conscious	  decision	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  camp.	  Intentionally,	  she	  began	  to	  eat	  less	  in	  order	  to	  make	  herself	  weak,	  sick	  and	  pale,	  and	  as	  she	  says,	  “putting	  on	  a	  Sarah	  Bernhardt	  act.”	  She	  was	  taken	  to	  Shanghai	  General	  Hospital	  in	  July	  1943	  for	  a	  thorough	  checkup.137	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Ibid.	  136	  Ibid.,	  30.	  137	  Ibid.,	  31;	  Kuzmack,	  “Interview,”	  11.	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  The	  medical	  director	  at	  the	  hospital	  was	  the	  Italian	  doctor	  Eric	  Vio,	  whom	  Margolis	  had	  met	  several	  times	  in	  Shanghai	  before	  the	  War.	  Vio	  worked	  under	  Japanese	  supervision	  while	  Italy	  was	  still	  an	  ally	  of	  Japan.	  When	  he	  discovered	  Margolis	  at	  the	  hospital,	  he	  immediately	  understood	  that	  she	  was	  there	  to	  get	  away	  from	  the	  camp.	  He	  winked	  at	  her,	  and	  said,	  “I	  think	  you	  are	  much	  too	  sick	  to	  be	  in	  a	  ward,	  so	  I’ll	  try	  to	  get	  you	  a	  semi-­‐private	  room.”138	  
By	  “coincidence,”	  J.	  Bitker,	  the	  head	  of	  JDC	  committee,	  happened	  to	  be	  visiting	  his	  aunt,	  who	  was	  very	  ill	  in	  the	  bed	  next	  to	  her.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  Dr.	  Vio,	  who	  was	  acquainted	  with	  the	  Shanghai	  refugee	  situation,	  knew	  that	  Bitker	  was	  visiting	  the	  hospital	  regularly	  and	  intentionally	  placed	  Margolis	  in	  a	  semi-­‐private	  room	  with	  his	  aunt.	  Bitker	  and	  Margolis	  signaled	  each	  other	  and	  she	  followed	  him	  “weakly”	  into	  the	  corridor	  as	  he	  was	  on	  his	  way	  out.	  The	  Japanese	  were	  watching	  them	  all	  the	  time,	  but	  they	  made	  an	  appointment	  to	  meet	  on	  the	  roof	  of	  the	  building	  the	  next	  day	  at	  a	  certain	  hour	  so	  they	  could	  communicate.	  Through	  Bitker,	  she	  was	  able	  to	  get	  word	  out	  to	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  leaders	  that	  she	  was	  in	  the	  hospital.	  However,	  she	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  have	  visitors	  until	  the	  German	  Nazi	  boyfriend	  of	  her	  new	  roommate	  helped	  her	  by	  obtaining	  permission	  for	  her	  to	  receive	  visits.	  She	  was	  then	  able	  to	  see	  Werner	  Glückmann	  and	  Bitker	  often	  enough	  that	  she	  could	  keep	  in	  touch	  with	  what	  was	  going	  on.139	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  Kaufman,	  “Interview,”	  27.	  139	  Ibid.,	  28–29;	  see	  also	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  
December	  8,	  1941	  to	  September	  1943,	  20.	  
	   	   	   256	  In	  a	  later	  report	  assessing	  her	  time	  in	  Shanghai,	  Margolis	  felt	  a	  need	  to	  justify	  some	  of	  her	  decisions	  and	  actions	  at	  the	  time:	  
A	  detailed	  chronological	  recording	  is	  also	  necessary	  so	  that	  no	  matter	  who	  the	  person	  might	  be	  will	  tackle	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  future,	  he	  might	  be	  in	  full	  possession	  of	  all	  the	  facts;	  and	  will	  understand	  why	  we	  acted	  as	  we	  did	  at	  the	  time;	  and	  why	  we	  used	  the	  services	  of	  certain	  people	  who	  even	  as	  we	  used	  them,	  we	  knew	  to	  be	  undesirables.	  “Force	  majeur”	  [sic]	  played	  a	  great	  part	  in	  our	  actions	  and	  decisions.140	  
Force	  majeure,	  of	  course,	  is	  a	  clause	  included	  in	  contracts	  to	  remove	  liability	  for	  natural	  and	  unavoidable	  catastrophes	  that	  interrupt	  the	  expected	  course	  of	  events	  and	  restrict	  participants	  from	  fulfilling	  obligations.141	  Margolis	  had	  stepped	  into	  a	  situation	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  conflicts	  and	  personalities	  that	  she	  could	  not	  control,	  and	  had	  to	  function	  as	  best	  she	  could	  in	  those	  conditions.	  According	  to	  her	  report,	  at	  no	  time	  did	  she	  have	  a	  real	  choice	  when	  it	  became	  necessary	  to	  appoint	  leaders	  or	  committees:	  
The	  best	  which	  Shanghai	  had	  to	  offer	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  three	  members	  of	  the	  present	  Shanghai	  J.D.C.,	  Mr.	  J.	  Bitker,	  Dr.	  Lang	  and	  Mr.	  Morris	  Glueckman)	  were	  either	  men	  who	  accepted	  responsibility	  because	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  by	  the	  Japanese	  (Ashkenazi	  community	  composed	  for	  the	  most	  part	  of	  stateless	  Russian	  Jews	  at	  the	  present	  time	  organized	  into	  S.A.C.R.A.),	  Or	  men	  or	  groups	  with	  strong	  power	  drives,	  like	  Mr.	  C.	  Brahn,	  the	  present	  chairman	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  J.D.C.,	  and	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  Committee	  composed	  of	  refugees.142	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  1.	  141	  “Force	  Majeure	  Definition	  |	  Investopedia,”	  accessed	  August	  18,	  2013,	  http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/forcemajeure.asp.	  142	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  1.	  
	   	   	   257	  Margolis	  felt	  that	  the	  biggest	  challenge	  had	  not	  been	  the	  Japanese	  or	  their	  occupation	  of	  Shanghai—that	  was	  a	  reality	  she	  had	  to	  accept.	  Her	  greatest	  difficulties,	  she	  recalled,	  were	  local	  conflicts,	  apathy,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  proper	  leadership.	  
The	  problems	  here	  in	  the	  past	  years	  have	  been	  terrific,	  changes	  in	  currency,	  dealing	  with	  other	  organizations,	  dealing	  with	  the	  Japanese	  authorities	  and	  apologizing	  for	  and	  keeping	  the	  chairman,	  Mr.	  Brahn,	  in	  line,	  have	  been	  no	  easy	  matter.	  The	  unfortunate	  part	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  local	  Joint	  committee	  is	  that	  it	  is	  so	  little	  appreciated	  by	  the	  refugees	  here.	  Have	  already	  had	  numerous	  statements	  concerning	  the	  misappropriation	  of	  funds,	  the	  inefficiency	  of	  the	  members	  and	  disregard	  of	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  refugees.143	  In	  retrospect,	  as	  Margolis	  evaluated	  her	  time	  in	  Shanghai,	  she	  felt	  that	  her	  greatest	  difficulties	  and	  handicaps	  to	  serving	  the	  refugees	  had	  been:	  
1)	  The	  situation	  which	  had	  developed	  prior	  to	  Pearl	  Harbor	  between	  the	  refugees	  and	  then	  existing	  Committee	  for	  the	  Assistance	  of	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai.	  2)	  The	  complete	  apathy	  of	  all	  local	  Jewry	  to	  the	  refugee	  problem.	  3)	  The	  lack	  of	  good	  leadership	  both	  within	  the	  refugee	  group	  itself	  and	  the	  local	  Jews.	  4)	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  real	  Jewish	  community	  in	  the	  Western	  sense.144	  She	  later	  wrote:	  
The	  handicaps	  [in	  Shanghai]	  were	  numerous	  and	  least	  of	  all	  these	  handicaps	  were	  the	  Japanese	  themselves.	  We	  have	  in	  Shanghai,	  and	  have	  always	  had,	  a	  group	  of	  Jews	  who	  have	  no	  social	  consciousness	  and	  no	  feeling	  of	  responsibility	  towards	  the	  community.	  Shanghai	  itself	  is	  not	  a	  community.	  Added	  to	  this,	  we	  have	  a	  group	  of	  refugees	  who	  are	  underfed	  and	  undernourished	  and	  terribly	  discouraged.	  I	  doubt	  that	  fifty	  percent	  of	  this	  group	  will	  be	  material	  for	  rehabilitation	  if	  this	  war	  lasts	  another	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  Siegel,	  Siegel	  to	  Leavitt,	  Report.	  144	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  1.	  
	   	   	   258	  years.	  And	  one	  can	  never	  know	  what	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Japanese	  will	  be	  towards	  this	  defenseless	  element	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  population	  once	  they	  start	  losing	  the	  war.	  Knowing	  the	  Japanese,	  I	  would	  venture	  to	  say	  that	  “anything	  might	  happen	  at	  any	  time.”	  The	  only	  hope	  for	  these	  people,	  as	  for	  all	  peoples,	  lies	  in	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.145	  
Conclusion	  
As	  the	  war	  in	  the	  Pacific	  began,	  the	  American	  representatives	  of	  the	  JDC	  were	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  financial	  resources	  so	  desperately	  needed	  by	  the	  stateless	  refugees.	  This	  chapter	  has	  analyzed	  Margolis’	  attempts	  to	  obtain	  the	  funding	  necessary	  for	  the	  refugees’	  survival,	  affirming	  Yehuda	  Bauer’s	  argument	  and	  showing	  that,	  unlike	  the	  unyielding	  JDC	  leadership	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  Margolis	  pragmatically	  evaded	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act	  and	  continued	  her	  attempts	  to	  communicate	  with	  headquarters	  and	  gain	  the	  needed	  approval	  to	  obtain	  substantial	  loans	  on	  the	  field.	  Consistently,	  Margolis	  applied	  the	  values	  of	  representative	  democracy	  in	  her	  attempt	  to	  boost	  morale	  and	  bring	  the	  disparate	  Jewish	  communities	  together.	  Her	  efforts	  to	  lower	  expenses,	  even	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  “bending”	  regulations	  and	  “borrowing”	  materials	  that	  she	  was	  not	  authorized	  to	  use,	  enabled	  their	  meager	  resources	  to	  extend	  to	  many	  more	  needy	  refugees.	  And	  her	  foresight	  and	  planning	  helped	  prepare	  the	  Jewish	  populations	  of	  Shanghai	  to	  continue	  without	  her	  active	  leadership	  as	  she	  and	  Siegel	  were	  seized	  and	  interned	  by	  the	  Japanese.	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  Ibid.,	  23.	  	  President	  Roosevelt	  coined	  the	  term	  “United	  Nations”	  in	  1942	  when	  representatives	  of	  26	  countries	  joined	  together	  to	  fight	  the	  Axis	  powers.	  (“History	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,”	  accessed	  August	  24,	  2014,	  http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/.)	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  CHAPTER	  FIVE	  
ANTISEMITISM	  IN	  SHANGHAI	  
This	  chapter	  will	  specifically	  review	  the	  official	  Japanese	  attitude	  toward	  the	  Jews	  as	  Nazi	  propaganda	  increased,	  arguing	  that	  the	  multicultural	  milieu	  in	  Shanghai	  lessened	  the	  impact	  of	  antisemitic	  tendencies	  that	  might	  have	  existed	  within	  the	  local	  populations	  and	  were	  fanned	  by	  the	  Nazis.	  The	  chapter	  will	  also	  strengthen	  the	  arguments	  of	  David	  Kranzler,	  Marvin	  Tokayer,	  and	  Marcia	  Ristaino,	  all	  of	  whom	  concluded	  that	  while	  the	  Japanese	  had	  not	  had	  much	  contact	  with	  Jews	  before	  this	  period	  and	  believed	  the	  Nazi	  propaganda	  of	  a	  worldwide	  Jewish	  conspiracy,	  they	  nevertheless	  chose	  to	  remain	  on	  good	  terms	  with	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  order	  to	  use	  the	  imagined	  international	  influence	  of	  the	  Jews	  for	  their	  own	  benefit.	  	  
Local	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  Jews	  
Antisemitism	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  World	  War	  II	  arose	  from	  many	  different	  camps,	  including	  the	  White	  Russians,	  the	  Germans,	  and	  the	  Chinese;	  but	  the	  one	  that	  most	  affected	  Jewish	  life	  was	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Japanese.	  This	  chapter	  will	  argue	  that	  Nazi	  attempts	  to	  influence	  Japanese	  policy	  toward	  the	  Jews	  in	  Shanghai	  failed	  due	  to	  the	  imagined	  value	  of	  the	  Jews	  in	  the	  Japanese	  perception.	  	  
❋	   Marcia	  Reynders	  Ristaino	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  aid	  received	  by	  the	  small	  minority	  of	  Russian	  Jews	  from	  the	  Sephardic	  Jewish	  community	  caused	  resentment	  among	  the	  non-­‐Jewish	  White	  Russians.	  In	  the	  time	  between	  their	  arrival	  in	  the	  1920s,	  and	  the	  late	  1930s,	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  the	  White	  Russian	  population	  in	  Shanghai	  had	  grown	  to	  over	  30,000—6,000	  of	  whom	  were	  Jews.	  While	  the	  Jews	  received	  assistance	  from	  the	  established	  Jewish	  community,	  the	  non-­‐Jewish	  White	  Russians	  were	  left	  to	  fend	  for	  themselves	  as	  they	  attempted	  to	  establish	  new	  lives.	  It	  was	  these	  White	  Russians	  who	  introduced	  antisemitic	  invective	  into	  Shanghai	  through	  their	  own	  press	  and	  the	  Russian	  Fascist	  party.	  However,	  Ristaino	  argues	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  two	  Russian	  communities	  were	  able	  to	  co-­‐exist	  relatively	  peacefully.1	  David	  Kranzler	  also	  notes	  that	  antisemitism	  was	  prevalent	  among	  the	  White	  Russians,	  who	  feared	  the	  refugees	  would	  economically	  dispossess	  them.	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon’s	  public	  remarks	  in	  the	  North	  China	  Daily	  News	  disparaging	  the	  White	  Russians	  contributed	  to	  their	  hostility	  toward	  the	  Jews.2	  	  
While	  most	  memoirs	  written	  by	  Jewish	  refugees	  about	  their	  time	  in	  China	  portray	  their	  relationship	  to	  their	  Chinese	  neighbors	  as	  being	  friendly,3	  Kranzler	  argues	  that	  the	  antisemitic	  atmosphere	  prevalent	  at	  the	  time	  did	  influence	  some	  among	  the	  Chinese	  intelligentsia,	  although	  he	  concedes	  that	  it	  was	  a	  small	  minority.	  He	  explains	  that	  Chinese	  attending	  college	  in	  America	  had	  picked	  up	  some	  antisemitic	  attitudes,	  while	  others	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort.	  2	  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  43,	  see	  also	  footnotes	  13,	  14.	  3	  See,	  for	  example,	  Heppner,	  Shanghai	  Refuge;	  Dan	  Moalem,	  Growing	  up	  in	  Shanghai	  (Sydney:	  Sydney	  Jewish	  Museum,	  2007);	  Deborah	  Strobin,	  Ilie	  Wacs,	  and	  S.	  J	  Hodges,	  An	  
Uncommon	  Journey:	  From	  Vienna	  to	  Shanghai	  to	  America:	  A	  Brother	  and	  Sister	  Escape	  to	  
Freedom	  During	  World	  War	  II	  (Fort	  Lee,	  NJ:	  Barricade	  Books,	  2011);	  Sam	  Moshinsky,	  
Goodbye	  Shanghai:	  A	  Memoir	  (Armadale,	  Vic.:	  Mind	  Film	  and	  Pub.,	  2009);	  Marion	  A	  Kaplan,	  
Between	  Dignity	  and	  Despair :	  Jewish	  Life	  in	  Nazi	  Germany	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998);	  and	  I.	  Betty	  Grebenschikoff,	  Once	  My	  Name	  Was	  Sara:	  A	  Memoir	  (Ventnor,	  N.J.:	  Original	  Seven	  Pub.	  Co.,	  1993).	  These	  are	  just	  a	  few	  of	  the	  many	  memoirs,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  written	  by	  those	  who	  spent	  their	  childhood	  in	  Shanghai.	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  been	  influenced	  by	  Nazi	  propaganda	  due	  to	  their	  positive	  attitude	  toward	  Germany,	  which	  had	  provided	  China	  with	  military	  and	  diplomatic	  assistance.4	  Ristaino	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Chinese	  did	  not	  really	  distinguish	  between	  Jews	  and	  foreigners	  in	  general.	  Chinese	  nationalism	  and	  their	  growing	  adverse	  reaction	  to	  the	  Western	  presence	  in	  China	  was	  what	  most	  influenced	  their	  increasingly	  unfavorable	  opinion	  toward	  the	  Jews.5	  Zhou	  Xun	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Chinese	  accepted	  some	  aspects	  of	  Nazi	  propaganda,	  but	  rather	  than	  engendering	  anger,	  these	  portrayals	  caused	  the	  Chinese	  to	  respect	  and	  admire	  the	  Jews	  as	  being	  powerful	  and	  industrious,	  and	  holding	  strong	  community	  values.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  though,	  the	  Chinese	  ruling	  powers,	  identifying	  with	  Jewish	  suffering,	  portrayed	  them	  as	  oppressed	  by	  the	  Japanese,	  using	  them	  to	  bolster	  their	  anti-­‐Japanese	  propaganda.6	  	  
Gao	  Bei,	  who	  analyzes	  both	  China	  and	  Japan’s	  Jewish	  policies,	  writes	  from	  a	  Chinese	  nationalistic	  perspective.	  She	  argues	  that	  Japan’s	  policy	  was	  rooted	  deeply	  in	  antisemitic	  prejudices,7	  while	  the	  Chinese,	  favorable	  toward	  the	  Jews,	  had	  developed	  a	  plan	  together	  with	  Albert	  Einstein	  to	  allow	  Jewish	  refugees	  to	  settle	  in	  Yunnan	  Province	  and	  Hainan	  Island.8	  Actually,	  neither	  country	  historically	  had	  known	  antisemitism.	  This	  plan,	  which	  never	  materialized,	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  an	  attempt	  to	  curry	  the	  goodwill	  of	  the	  United	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  44,	  see	  especially	  footnote	  16.	  5	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  4.	  6	  Zhou	  Xun,	  Chinese	  Perceptions	  of	  the	  “Jews”	  and	  Judaism:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Youtai	  (Psychology	  Press,	  2001).	  7	  Gao	  Bei,	  China,	  Japan	  and	  the	  Flight	  of	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  to	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐
1945,	  2009,	  8.	  8	  Ibid.,	  41.	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  States	  and	  obtain	  their	  help	  against	  the	  Japanese	  in	  the	  military	  conflict.	  The	  Chinese,	  like	  the	  Japanese,	  accepted	  the	  Nazi	  claim	  that	  the	  Jews	  were	  internationally	  powerful	  and	  influential,	  and	  hoped	  to	  use	  this	  to	  their	  advantage.	  
The	  Japanese	  demeanor	  toward	  the	  Jews	  during	  this	  time	  was	  complex	  and	  often	  contradictory,	  influenced	  by	  Nazi	  propaganda	  but	  not	  necessarily	  resulting	  in	  antisemitic	  actions.	  According	  to	  David	  Goodman,	  Japanese	  antisemitism	  during	  this	  period	  was	  anchored	  in	  historical	  Japanese	  xenophobia	  combined	  with	  centuries-­‐old	  ambivalence	  toward	  foreigners.9	  Goodman	  points	  out	  that	  a	  production	  of	  the	  Merchant	  of	  Venice	  in	  1885	  was	  the	  first	  Shakespearean	  play	  produced	  in	  Japan,	  and	  it	  was	  taught	  in	  most	  Japanese	  public	  schools	  throughout	  the	  20th	  century.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  play	  helped	  to	  form	  a	  Japanese	  image	  of	  Jews	  as	  racial	  aliens	  and	  unscrupulous	  moneylenders.	  	  
When	  Japanese	  troops	  fought	  in	  Siberia	  during	  the	  Russian	  Revolution,	  they	  had	  come	  into	  first-­‐hand	  contact	  with	  European	  antisemitism.	  During	  his	  tour	  of	  duty	  in	  Siberia,	  Colonel	  (then	  Captain)	  Norihiro	  Yasue,	  a	  linguist	  with	  the	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Army,	  had	  been	  stationed	  with	  Russian	  General	  Gregorii	  Semenov,	  a	  vehement	  antisemite.	  Semenov	  exposed	  Yasue	  to	  the	  Protocols	  of	  the	  Elders	  of	  Zion,	  which	  portrayed	  an	  international	  Jewish	  conspiracy	  to	  control	  the	  world,	  and	  which	  Yasue	  later	  translated	  into	  Japanese.	  	  
But	  whereas	  much	  of	  the	  world	  that	  read	  the	  Protocols	  read	  them	  as	  an	  evil	  attempt	  by	  Jewish	  conspirators	  to	  take	  over	  the	  world,	  Yasue	  and	  those	  Japanese	  who	  followed	  his	  lead	  took	  the	  premise	  at	  face	  value,	  and	  decided	  to	  harness	  this	  purported	  “international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  David	  G	  Goodman	  and	  Miyazawa,	  Jews	  in	  the	  Japanese	  Mind:	  The	  History	  and	  
Uses	  of	  a	  Cultural	  Stereotype	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1995).	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  Jewish	  influence”	  for	  the	  good	  of	  Japan.10	  Zhou	  Xun	  has	  argued	  that	  this	  use	  by	  both	  Japanese	  and	  Chinese	  of	  the	  Protocols	  and	  other	  Nazi	  propaganda	  depicting	  the	  Jews	  as	  powerful—even	  admiring	  them	  as	  such—shows	  how	  cultures	  can	  deconstruct	  and	  reconstruct	  almost	  any	  image	  of	  “otherness”	  to	  suit	  multiple	  purposes.	  Zhou	  argues	  that	  the	  complex	  imagery	  of	  Jews	  as	  superior	  and	  yet	  corrupt	  existed	  together	  in	  the	  Japanese	  mentality.11	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  it	  was	  imperative	  to	  keep	  up	  good	  relations	  with	  the	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Japanese-­‐occupied	  Shanghai.	  They	  expected	  that	  through	  Japanese	  hospitality	  to	  the	  Far	  East	  Jews,	  American	  Jews	  would	  in	  turn	  influence	  the	  United	  States	  to	  lift	  their	  boycott	  on	  Japanese	  goods	  and	  contribute	  toward	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  Manchukuo.12	  	  
Yasue	  and	  Inuzuka,	  considered	  experts	  on	  the	  “Jewish	  problem,”	  both	  advocated	  a	  favorable	  disposition	  toward	  the	  Jewish	  people.13	  Yasue	  in	  a	  1938	  lecture	  had	  asked:	  
How	  should	  we	  deal	  with	  them?	  Obviously	  we	  should	  not	  follow	  the	  suit	  of	  Germany.	  From	  our	  principle	  of	  “Universal	  Goodwill”…	  an	  expulsion	  policy	  is	  impossible.	  We	  should	  protect	  them	  and	  let	  them	  enjoy	  the	  blessings	  of	  our	  imperial	  prestige.	  If,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  Jewish	  people	  have	  an	  actual	  influence	  over	  the	  political,	  the	  economic,	  the	  press	  and	  other	  fields	  of	  the	  world,	  I	  do	  not	  see	  any	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See	  Tokayer,	  The	  Fugu	  Plan,	  142;	  see	  also	  Pamela	  Rotner	  Sakamoto,	  Japanese	  
Diplomats	  and	  Jewish	  Refugees:	  A	  World	  War	  II	  Dilemma	  (Praeger,	  1998),	  27;	  and	  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  49–50.	  11	  See	  Zhou,	  Chinese	  Perceptions	  of	  the	  “Jews”	  and	  Judaism.	  12	  Norihiro	  Yasue,	  “Circular	  399-­‐G-­‐VII,”	  December	  27,	  1938,	  7–8,	  Israel	  JDC	  -­‐	  AJDC	  Israel	  Records,	  Shanghai	  1938-­‐1947;	  see	  also	  the	  policy	  formulated	  at	  the	  Conference	  of	  Five	  Ministers	  in	  Tokyo	  on	  December	  6,	  1938,	  per	  Kranzler,	  “Restrictions	  against	  German-­‐Jewish	  Refugee	  Immigration	  to	  Shanghai	  in	  1939,”	  49–50;	  see	  also	  Levine,	  In	  Search	  of	  
Sugihara.	  	  13	  Sakamoto,	  Japanese	  Diplomats	  and	  Jewish	  Refugees,	  27.	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  them	  for	  an	  enemy.…	  We	  should	  build	  up	  their	  community,	  have	  them	  registered	  and	  guide	  them	  under	  our	  control.14	  David	  Goodman	  has	  argued	  that,	  although	  Inuzuka	  had	  recommended	  that	  Japan’s	  policy	  toward	  the	  Jews	  be	  “fair	  and	  equitable,	  comprehensive,	  and	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  universal	  brotherhood	  under	  the	  Emperor,”15	  he	  was	  also	  “an	  officially	  recognized	  antisemite	  who	  lectured	  and	  published	  widely	  on	  ‘The	  Jewish	  Menace.’”16	  His	  positive	  statements	  were	  doubtless	  a	  manifestation	  of	  his	  desire	  to	  harness	  Jewish	  goodwill	  based	  on	  his	  overestimation	  of	  Jewish	  power.17	  Sakamoto,	  however,	  basing	  her	  opinion	  on	  primary	  research	  in	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  archives,	  argues	  that	  the	  Japanese	  did	  not	  have	  a	  “pro-­‐Jewish	  policy,”	  but	  rather,	  the	  tolerance	  toward	  the	  Jews	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  rudimentary	  state	  of	  Japanese	  immigration	  policies,	  the	  overestimation	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Jews,	  and	  lack	  of	  coordination	  among	  the	  various	  branches	  of	  the	  Japanese	  government.18	  
It	  was	  in	  this	  complex	  milieu	  of	  imagined	  Jewishness	  that	  the	  Nazis	  inaugurated	  their	  campaign	  to	  influence	  Asian	  opinion	  toward	  the	  Jews.	  As	  early	  as	  1934,	  Franz	  Hasenöhrl,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  unofficial	  Nazi	  party	  in	  China	  and	  East	  Asia,	  had	  begun	  to	  establish	  a	  rapport	  with	  many	  German	  communities	  in	  China,	  hoping	  to	  “Nazify”	  the	  German	  communities.	  He	  succeeded	  in	  building	  Nazi	  party	  affiliate	  groups	  throughout	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Yasue,	  “Circular	  399-­‐G-­‐VII,”	  5–6.	  15	  Goodman,	  Jews	  in	  the	  Japanese	  Mind,	  129;	  see	  also	  Ben-­‐Ami	  Shillony,	  The	  Jews	  &	  
the	  Japanese:	  The	  Successful	  Outsiders	  (Rutland,	  Vt.:	  C.E.	  Tuttle,	  1992),	  212–213.	  16	  Goodman,	  Jews	  in	  the	  Japanese	  Mind,	  128.	  17	  Ibid.,	  129–133.	  18	  Sakamoto,	  Japanese	  Diplomats	  and	  Jewish	  Refugees,	  4.	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  China.	  The	  largest	  and	  most	  active	  of	  these	  was	  in	  Shanghai,	  where	  he	  resided.	  Hasenöhrl	  was	  later	  transferred	  to	  Germany	  to	  become	  an	  official	  in	  the	  Foreign	  Section	  of	  Goebbels’	  Propaganda	  Ministry,	  but	  by	  then	  he	  had	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  Nazi	  presence	  in	  the	  Far	  East.19	  
Nazi	  influence	  in	  the	  Far	  East	  continued	  to	  increase	  throughout	  the	  1930s.	  According	  to	  Donald	  McKale,	  in	  1936	  and	  1937	  the	  Nazi	  party	  further	  expanded	  its	  influence	  over	  German	  diplomats	  in	  the	  East.	  Japan	  and	  Germany	  signed	  the	  Anti-­‐Comintern	  Pact,20	  uniting	  them	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  immediately	  afterward,	  Germany	  declared	  the	  Japanese	  to	  be	  “honorary	  Aryans.”	  In	  1938,	  the	  two	  countries	  signed	  an	  “Agreement	  for	  Cultural	  Cooperation	  between	  Japan	  and	  Germany.”21	  That	  same	  year,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Nazi	  party	  in	  Shanghai,	  Alfred	  Kroeger,	  succeeded	  in	  removing	  a	  local	  Jew	  from	  the	  Agfa	  Company.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1938	  a	  number	  of	  Jews	  had	  lost	  their	  positions	  in	  German	  schools	  in	  the	  Far	  East,	  including	  in	  Japan	  and	  Shanghai.22	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Donald	  M.	  McKale,	  “The	  Nazi	  Party	  in	  the	  Fast	  East,	  1931-­‐45,”	  Journal	  of	  
Contemporary	  History	  12,	  no.	  2	  (April	  1,	  1977):	  293,	  296.	  20	  For	  more	  on	  the	  Anti-­‐Comintern	  Pact,	  see	  Wolfgang	  Michalka,	  “From	  Anti-­‐Comintern	  Pact	  to	  the	  Euro-­‐Asiatic	  Bloc:	  Ribbentrop’s	  Alternative	  Concept	  to	  Hitler’s	  Foreign	  Policy	  Programme,”	  From	  Aspects	  of	  the	  Third	  Reich	  Edited	  by	  HW	  Koch,	  London:	  
Macmillan,	  1985,	  267–84;	  and	  Esmonde	  Manning	  Robertson,	  Hitler’s	  Pre-­‐War	  Policy	  and	  
Military	  Plans,	  1933-­‐1939	  (Longmans,	  1963).	  21	  This	  agreement	  was	  ratified	  on	  November	  22,	  1938,	  not	  long	  after	  Kristallnacht.	  For	  more	  on	  Japan-­‐Germany	  relations,	  see	  Robert	  Cryer	  and	  Neil	  Boister,	  Documents	  on	  the	  
Tokyo	  International	  Military	  Tribunal:	  Charter,	  Indictment,	  and	  Judgments	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  216.	  22	  McKale,	  “The	  Nazi	  Party	  in	  the	  Fast	  East,	  1931-­‐45,”	  300.	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  Under	  Nazi	  influence,	  antisemitic	  writings	  and	  sentiments	  increased,	  yet	  Nazi	  antisemitic	  policies	  were	  never	  carried	  out	  violently	  as	  they	  were	  in	  Europe.	  Donald	  McKale	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Nazi	  party’s	  work	  in	  Japan	  “had	  a	  far	  more	  negative	  than	  positive	  impact”	  on	  the	  Japanese	  opinion	  of	  Nazi	  ideology	  due	  to	  its	  racial	  orientation	  and	  propaganda.	  The	  Japanese	  could	  not	  accept	  that	  they	  themselves	  were	  an	  “inferior	  race,”	  and	  found	  Germany’s	  continual	  disregard	  for	  diplomatic	  channels	  objectionable.23	  
By	  1940,	  Germany	  had	  conquered	  most	  of	  Europe,	  and	  Japan	  saw	  the	  advantage	  of	  an	  even	  closer	  alliance.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Germany	  was	  counting	  on	  the	  Japanese	  to	  aid	  them	  in	  their	  plans	  to	  advance	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Hitler	  sent	  Joachim	  von	  Ribbentrop	  to	  Japan	  to	  negotiate	  the	  Tripartite	  Pact,	  which	  was	  ratified	  by	  Japan,	  Germany	  and	  Italy	  on	  September	  27,	  1940,	  and	  later	  joined	  by	  other	  nations	  to	  create	  what	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Axis	  Powers.24	  
Along	  with	  this	  increase	  in	  cooperation	  with	  Germany,	  Nazi	  infiltration	  had	  deepened	  in	  Japan	  and	  a	  noticeable	  anti-­‐foreign	  feeling	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Japanese	  began	  escalating	  in	  Shanghai.25	  Rumors	  began	  to	  circulate	  among	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  that	  Japan	  was	  planning	  to	  implement	  Nazi	  anti-­‐Jewish	  measures.	  In	  December	  1941,	  the	  Jewish	  
Telegraphic	  Agency	  reported	  that	  Berlin	  had	  begun	  a	  violent	  campaign	  against	  Shanghai	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ibid.,	  306.	  24	  For	  more	  on	  German-­‐Japanese	  relations	  during	  World	  War	  II,	  see	  Ernst	  Leopold	  Presseisen,	  Germany	  and	  Japan;	  a	  Study	  in	  Totalitarian	  Diplomacy,	  1933-­‐1941	  (Fertig,	  1969);	  Cryer	  and	  Boister,	  Documents	  on	  the	  Tokyo	  International	  Military	  Tribunal;	  Gerhard	  L	  Weinberg,	  The	  Foreign	  Policy	  of	  Hitler’s	  Germany;	  Diplomatic	  Revolution	  in	  Europe,	  1933-­‐
36	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1970).	  25	  Hugh	  Byas,	  “Nazi	  Infiltration	  Deepens	  in	  Japan,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  20,	  1940,	  sec.	  The	  Week	  In	  Review.	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  Jewish	  refugees,	  portraying	  them	  as	  a	  danger	  to	  the	  Japanese	  war	  effort.	  Joseph	  Goebbels,	  the	  Reich	  Minister	  of	  Propaganda	  in	  Nazi	  Germany,	  had	  sent	  anti-­‐Jewish	  films	  to	  Japan,	  “explaining”	  to	  the	  Japanese	  “the	  danger	  of	  the	  Jewish	  menace.”	  Anti-­‐Jewish	  demonstrations	  by	  students	  and	  other	  pro-­‐Nazi	  elements	  occurred	  in	  Harbin,	  in	  Japanese-­‐occupied	  Manchukuo	  near	  the	  Russian	  border.26	  
Even	  Captain	  Inuzuka,	  who	  had	  not	  demonstrated	  hostility	  to	  the	  refugees,	  began	  to	  exhibit	  some	  animosity.	  Around	  1940,	  Inuzuka	  had	  asked	  the	  CFA	  to	  cooperate	  in	  finding	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  refugee	  problem.	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  Jewish	  population	  in	  Hongkew	  had	  grown	  until	  it	  was	  approximately	  20%	  that	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  and	  thousands	  were	  residing	  there	  without	  the	  required	  permits.	  This	  had	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  rents	  and	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  living,	  and	  resulted	  in	  numerous	  protests	  from	  the	  Japanese	  living	  there.	  In	  addition,	  Inuzuka	  mentioned	  that	  there	  had	  been	  street	  fighting	  between	  refugees	  and	  White	  Russians,27	  noting	  that	  all	  of	  these	  violations	  of	  regulations	  had	  “greatly	  impaired	  the	  sympathy	  and	  the	  goodwill	  which	  the	  Japanese	  authorities	  have	  held	  for	  Jewish	  people.”28	  David	  Kranzler	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  increased	  hostility	  of	  the	  Japanese	  residents	  of	  Shanghai	  toward	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  was	  probably	  the	  most	  significant	  factor	  in	  the	  immigration	  restrictions	  that	  had	  been	  imposed	  in	  1939.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  “Funds	  of	  Jewish	  Relief	  Groups	  in	  Shanghai	  Reported	  Taken	  over	  by	  Japanese,”	  
JTA,	  December	  21,	  1941.	  27	  Of	  the	  30,000	  Russians	  who	  resided	  in	  Shanghai	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s,	  6,000	  were	  Jews.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  White	  Russian	  community	  and	  the	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai,	  see	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort.	  28	  Inuzuka	  to	  Herzberg,	  September	  17,	  1941,	  1.	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  Adding	  to	  the	  Japanese	  hostility,	  Inuzuka	  was	  angry	  that	  the	  CFA	  had	  not	  been	  willing	  to	  assume	  responsibility	  or	  cooperate	  with	  the	  Japanese	  authorities	  in	  evicting	  the	  “Jewish	  undesirables	  who	  have	  no	  permits,”	  referring	  to	  Jews	  who	  were	  moving	  into	  Hongkew	  without	  specific	  Japanese	  permission.	  The	  CFA	  had	  claimed	  that	  they	  could	  not	  assume	  responsibility	  and	  did	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  obtain	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  Jüdische	  
Gemeinde,	  the	  refugee	  association,	  to	  evict	  anyone.	  Inuzuka	  interpreted	  this	  unwillingness	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  CFA	  was	  intentionally	  electing	  to	  disregard	  “the	  important	  fact	  that	  the	  only	  solution	  of	  the	  matter	  lies	  in	  the	  unqualified	  and	  active	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Japanese	  authorities.”	  What	  Inuzuka	  perceived	  as	  the	  discourteous	  inaction	  of	  the	  CFA,	  together	  with	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon’s	  anti-­‐Japanese	  statements	  in	  the	  newspapers,	  created	  “a	  very	  bad	  impression	  on	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  local	  Japanese	  residents,”	  and	  neither	  Inuzuka	  nor	  the	  Japanese	  authorities	  could	  understand	  why	  the	  local	  influential	  Jewish	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  would	  permit	  such	  a	  situation	  by	  taking	  no	  action	  against	  it.29	  
Once	  war	  with	  the	  United	  States	  broke	  out,	  the	  Jews	  lost	  much	  of	  their	  perceived	  value	  in	  the	  Japanese	  imagination	  as	  influencers	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  	  Their	  usefulness	  as	  tools	  to	  obtain	  American	  reconstruction	  aid	  was	  no	  longer	  relevant.	  On	  March	  11,	  1942,	  a	  decision	  was	  made	  by	  a	  top	  level	  conference	  canceling	  the	  “friendly”	  policy	  toward	  the	  Jews	  that	  had	  been	  in	  place	  since	  the	  December	  1938	  Five	  Ministers’	  Conference.	  30	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  decision,	  the	  Japanese	  leadership	  in	  Shanghai	  began	  to	  display	  mounting	  hostility	  toward	  the	  Jews.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Ibid.,	  2.	  30	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  191.	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  Increasing	  Nazi	  anti-­‐Jewish	  propaganda,	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  uncertainty,	  sparked	  wild	  rumors	  of	  impending	  anti-­‐Jewish	  actions.	  As	  the	  Jewish	  community	  learned	  of	  these	  possible	  operations,	  their	  leaders’	  first	  reaction,	  rather	  than	  warning	  the	  refugees,	  was	  to	  limit	  information	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  panic.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  refugee	  leadership	  attempted	  to	  influence	  the	  Japanese	  leadership	  and	  was	  able	  to	  secure	  the	  postponement	  of	  the	  “ghettoization.”	  This	  section	  will	  explore	  the	  Japanese	  motivations	  for	  this	  postponement	  and	  examine	  how	  the	  Japanese	  continued	  to	  project	  their	  supposed	  goodwill	  even	  as	  they	  finally	  concentrated	  the	  Jews	  into	  a	  ghetto-­‐like	  restricted	  area,	  thus	  limiting	  their	  freedom	  and	  further	  impairing	  their	  ability	  to	  subsist.	  Margolis’	  and	  Siegel’s	  leadership	  was	  a	  key	  factor	  that	  enabled	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  to	  begin	  to	  cooperate	  with	  each	  other	  in	  managing	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  ghettoized	  Jewish	  refugees	  once	  the	  JDC	  workers	  were	  interned.	  	  	  	  
Captain	  Inuzuka	  left	  Shanghai	  in	  June	  of	  1942	  and	  Captain	  Saneyoshi,	  who	  replaced	  him,	  was	  not	  as	  interested	  in	  the	  “Jewish	  problem.”	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  new	  Gendarmerie	  officers	  began	  coming	  daily	  from	  Japan	  to	  visit	  the	  office	  at	  Hongkew.	  The	  fact	  that	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  were	  enemy	  nationals	  had	  not	  made	  much	  difference	  to	  Inuzuka	  and	  the	  previous	  officials,	  but	  Margolis	  sensed	  that	  the	  new	  officials	  were	  not	  so	  comfortable	  with	  them.31	  
Nazi	  influence	  continued	  to	  grow.	  In	  early	  1942,	  Christian	  Zinsser,	  chief	  of	  the	  Gestapo	  bureau	  in	  Shanghai,	  began	  conducting	  an	  anti-­‐Jewish	  campaign	  in	  the	  city,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  14.	  
	   	   	   270	  removing	  books	  by	  Jewish	  authors	  from	  Shanghai	  libraries32	  and	  accusing	  the	  Jews	  of	  smuggling	  weapons	  to	  the	  Chinese.33	  Particularly	  influential	  was	  the	  commercial	  attaché	  of	  the	  German	  Consulate,	  Adolf	  von	  Puttkamer,	  who	  had	  been	  sent	  to	  the	  Far	  East	  to	  open	  a	  German	  Information	  Bureau,	  which	  appeared	  on	  the	  surface	  to	  be	  a	  news	  and	  information	  service	  but	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  producer	  of	  propaganda	  broadcasts	  and	  leaflets.34	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  Germans	  were	  still	  victorious,	  Stalingrad	  was	  surrounded,	  and	  the	  Japanese	  were	  seeing	  one	  victory	  after	  another	  in	  Asia.	  	  
This	  increase	  in	  Nazi	  influence	  was	  even	  noted	  by	  the	  international	  press.	  On	  February	  23,	  1942,	  S.	  I.	  Dorfson	  reported	  in	  a	  special	  cable	  to	  the	  Jewish	  Morning	  Journal35	  that	  the	  Japanese	  had	  taken	  another	  step	  in	  following	  the	  Nazi	  pattern,	  making	  preparations	  to	  induct	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  the	  Far	  East	  to	  do	  compulsory	  labor.	  They	  reported	  that	  the	  Japanese	  had	  ordered	  the	  refugees	  to	  furnish	  a	  list	  immediately	  of	  all	  engineers,	  technicians	  and	  other	  artisans	  among	  them	  for	  compulsory	  labor.36	  This	  article	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  “Typhus	  Raging	  Among	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,	  Gestapo	  Conducting	  Anti-­‐Jewish	  Crusade,”	  JTA,	  May	  8,	  1942.	  	  The	  JTA	  misspelled	  his	  name	  as	  Zissner	  instead	  of	  Zinsser,	  and	  American	  periodicals	  picked	  it	  up	  this	  way.	  33	  “Japs	  Give	  Gestapo	  Full	  Control	  Over	  20,000	  Jewish	  Refugees,”	  The	  Jewish	  Criterion	  
of	  Pittsburgh,	  accessed	  September	  27,	  2013,	  http://pjn.library.cmu.edu/	  books/CALL1/CRI_1942_100_002_05151942/vol0/part0/copy0/ocr/txt/0019.txt.	  34	  Ristaino,	  in	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  178;	  names	  him	  as	  Baron	  Karl-­‐Jesco	  von	  Puttkamer;	  However,	  Dicker	  in	  Wanderers	  and	  Settlers	  in	  the	  Far	  East:	  A	  Century	  of	  Jewish	  
Life	  in	  China	  and	  Japan,	  114	  says	  this	  was	  his	  son,	  Adolf	  instead.	  It	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  Dicker	  is	  correct,	  since	  Adolf	  was	  a	  journalist	  stationed	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  his	  father,	  Karl-­‐Jesco,	  was	  a	  naval	  adjutant	  to	  Adolf	  Hitler.	  35	  The	  report	  was	  printed	  in	  the	  Jewish	  Morning	  Journal	  (Der	  Morgn	  Zhurnal)	  on	  March	  4,	  1942.	  36	  S.I.	  Dorfson,	  “Special	  Cable	  from	  Mr.	  S.	  I.	  Dorfson	  to	  the	  Jewish	  Morning	  Journal,”	  September	  4,	  1941,	  AR	  1933/44:462,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China.	  
	   	   	   271	  reported	  the	  truth	  only	  partially,	  as	  in	  actuality	  all	  foreign	  nationals—not	  only	  the	  Jews—were	  required	  to	  register	  by	  July	  20	  of	  that	  year.37	  This	  was	  not	  specifically	  an	  antisemitic	  move	  as	  it	  was	  portrayed,	  but	  in	  light	  of	  Nazi	  inroads,	  the	  Jewish	  press	  reported	  it	  as	  such.	  
In	  the	  summer	  of	  1942,	  rumors	  began	  to	  circulate	  among	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  planning	  a	  major	  action	  against	  the	  refugees.	  There	  were	  whispers	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  going	  to	  load	  the	  refugees	  onto	  ships,	  take	  them	  out	  to	  the	  ocean,	  and	  drown	  them.	  The	  rumors	  said	  that	  Josef	  Meisinger,	  the	  Gestapo	  representative	  in	  Tokyo	  known	  as	  the	  “Butcher	  of	  Warsaw,”	  met	  in	  Shanghai	  with	  “representatives	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Consulate,	  the	  military	  police,	  and	  leaders	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Bureau	  of	  Jewish	  Affairs	  to	  discuss	  the	  German	  plan	  for	  the	  final	  solution	  in	  Shanghai.”	  These	  rumors	  spoke	  of	  the	  “Meisinger	  Plan”	  which	  included	  arresting	  all	  the	  Jews	  in	  Shanghai	  in	  a	  surprise	  attack	  on	  the	  Jewish	  New	  Year,	  and	  either	  setting	  them	  adrift	  on	  old	  ships	  to	  die	  at	  sea,	  working	  them	  to	  death	  in	  abandoned	  salt	  mines,	  or	  setting	  up	  a	  concentration	  camp	  where	  medical	  experiments	  could	  be	  performed	  on	  them	  and	  they	  could	  be	  left	  to	  die	  suffering.38	  Members	  of	  the	  International	  Committee	  urged	  Margolis	  to	  cable	  America	  for	  help.	  It	  was	  a	  natural	  reaction	  for	  a	  Jewish	  community	  in	  trouble	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  international	  Jewry,	  but	  receiving	  such	  aid	  was	  physically	  impossible	  in	  light	  of	  the	  War.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  186.	  38	  Vámos,	  “‘Home	  Afar’:	  The	  Life	  of	  Central	  European	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  during	  World	  War	  II,”	  6;	  Pan,	  “Shanghai:	  A	  Haven	  for	  Holocaust	  Victims”;	  see	  also	  Tokayer,	  
The	  Fugu	  Plan,	  223;	  and	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  178.	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  Meanwhile,	  anti-­‐Jewish	  actions	  in	  Shanghai	  continued	  to	  increase.	  In	  November	  1942,	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  reported	  that	  according	  to	  Berlin	  radio,	  Japanese	  authorities	  in	  Shanghai	  had	  ordered	  all	  Jewish	  owners	  of	  automobiles	  to	  display	  a	  special	  marker	  on	  the	  front	  of	  their	  vehicles	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  cars	  belonged	  to	  Jews.39	  Two	  days	  later,	  Berlin	  radio	  reported	  that	  all	  Jews	  in	  Shanghai	  had	  been	  ordered	  by	  the	  Japanese	  authorities	  to	  have	  their	  identification	  papers	  stamped	  with	  the	  letter	  “J”.40	  On	  February	  6,	  1943	  a	  typically	  antisemitic	  article	  appeared	  in	  the	  Shanghai	  Times,	  mentioning	  the	  names	  of	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon	  and	  many	  of	  the	  wealthy	  and	  prominent	  Shanghai	  Jews.	  It	  spoke	  of	  how	  they	  had	  made	  their	  money	  through	  opium	  and	  other	  disreputable	  means,	  using	  these	  Jewish	  men	  as	  an	  example	  of	  dangerous	  “International	  Jewry.”41	  
The	  establishment	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  “Ghetto”	  
As	  the	  war	  progressed	  and	  Nazi	  antisemitic	  influence	  increased,	  the	  Japanese	  instituted	  a	  policy	  of	  segregation	  toward	  the	  Jewish	  refugees.	  In	  1943,	  they	  were	  required	  to	  relocate	  into	  a	  “designated	  area,”	  leaving	  behind	  their	  homes	  and	  sometimes	  their	  livelihoods.	  In	  the	  difficult	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  ghetto,	  the	  refugees	  were	  finally	  able	  to	  unite	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  most	  needy	  among	  them,	  and	  to	  build	  a	  sense	  of	  cohesion	  through	  the	  development	  of	  cultural,	  educational	  and	  communal	  structures.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  “Shanghai	  Jews	  Must	  Mark	  Autos,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  November	  7,	  1942;	  see	  also	  “Japan	  Orders	  Jews	  in	  Shanghai	  to	  Display	  Special	  Marker	  on	  Their	  Automobiles,”	  JTA,	  November	  8,	  1942.	  40	  “Japan	  Stamps	  Passports	  of	  Shanghai	  Jews	  with	  Letter	  ‘J,’”	  JTA,	  November	  9,	  1942.	  These	  many	  “reports”	  were	  unverified.	  41	  Shanghai	  Times,	  February	  6,	  1943;	  quoted	  in	  N.	  A.	  Pelcovits,	  “European	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  Far	  Eastern	  Survey	  15,	  no.	  21	  (October	  23,	  1946):	  323.	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❋ 
Rumors	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  planning	  to	  round	  up	  Shanghai	  Jews	  into	  a	  “designated	  area”	  began	  to	  circulate.	  Back	  in	  July	  1942	  the	  JTA	  had	  reported	  that	  “an	  unnamed	  Japanese	  newspaper”	  quoted	  by	  a	  radio	  station	  in	  Rome	  had	  stated	  that	  interning	  the	  Shanghai	  Jews	  in	  a	  ghetto	  was	  necessary	  “in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  Chinese	  being	  exploited	  by	  the	  Jews.”42	  In	  August	  of	  1942,	  Mitsugu	  Shibata,43	  a	  Japanese	  Vice-­‐Consul	  in	  Shanghai,	  confirmed	  those	  rumors.	  He	  approached	  Michel	  Speelman	  to	  request	  a	  confidential	  meeting	  of	  the	  Jewish	  leadership	  in	  order	  to	  inform	  them	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  Japanese	  authorities	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai.	  The	  group	  that	  gathered	  in	  Speelman’s	  residence	  to	  meet	  with	  Shibata	  included	  two	  representatives	  of	  the	  Sephardic	  Jewish	  community,	  two	  representatives	  of	  the	  German	  Jewish	  community,	  Mr.	  Boris	  Topas,	  then	  chairman	  of	  the	  Russian	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Shanghai,	  Michel	  Speelman	  and	  J.	  Bitker.44	  Kranzler	  believes	  that	  this	  was	  probably	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  committee	  that	  never	  met	  again	  and	  had	  no	  connection	  to	  any	  committees	  that	  were	  later	  formed.45	  Shibata,	  if	  he	  was	  indeed	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Consulate,	  would	  have	  had	  occasion	  to	  attend	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  “Japanese	  Newspaper	  Urges	  Internment	  of	  Shanghai	  Jews	  in	  Ghetto,”	  JTA,	  July	  27,	  1942.	   43	  JDC	  correspondence	  misspells	  his	  name	  as	  “Shibota.”	  The	  proper	  spelling	  is	  attested	  in	  a	  Shanghai	  Times	  article	  of	  March	  7,	  1942	  as	  well	  as	  Inuzuka’s	  own	  list	  of	  guests	  at	  an	  event,	  Yudaya	  mondai	  to	  Nihon	  no	  kosaku,	  p.	  434.	  Ristaino	  comments	  that	  her	  search	  through	  Japanese	  consular	  posts	  did	  not	  find	  his	  name,	  but	  “a	  Japanese	  source	  identifies	  him	  as	  an	  economic	  consultant	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Japanese	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  in	  Shanghai.”	  (See	  footnote	  110,	  p.	  311;	  page	  180;	  and	  footnote	  83,	  p.	  316	  in	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  
Last	  Resort.)	  44	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  1.	  45	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  311.	  
	   	   	   274	  periodic	  meetings	  of	  Japanese	  representatives	  of	  the	  Consulate	  together	  with	  the	  Municipal	  Council,	  Army,	  Navy,	  and	  Air	  Force.	  He	  informed	  the	  group	  of	  Jewish	  leaders	  gathered	  at	  Speelman’s	  residence	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  under	  heavy	  pressure	  from	  the	  Gestapo	  and	  the	  German	  Consulate	  to	  isolate	  Jews.46	  
Shibata	  informed	  the	  Jewish	  leaders	  that	  the	  Germans	  had	  pointed	  out	  to	  the	  Japanese	  that	  Jews,	  as	  enemies	  of	  Hitler	  who	  wanted	  nothing	  more	  than	  to	  defeat	  Germany,	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  similar	  sympathies	  with	  respect	  to	  Germany’s	  ally,	  Japan.47	  In	  response,	  the	  Japanese	  authorities	  were	  considering	  the	  relocation	  of	  Jews,	  particularly	  refugees,	  into	  a	  “designated	  area”	  in	  Hongkew,	  a	  crowded	  space	  less	  than	  one	  square	  mile48	  located	  in	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  the	  city	  where	  8,000	  of	  the	  refugees	  were	  already	  living.49	  Shibata	  implied	  that	  the	  Jewish	  community	  should	  begin	  organizing	  all	  available	  resources	  to	  “soften	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  conditions	  which	  might	  be	  imposed	  in	  the	  near	  future.”50	  
When	  faced	  with	  this	  threat,	  the	  Jewish	  leadership	  agreed	  to	  overcome	  their	  differences	  and	  pull	  together	  to	  confront	  it.	  Those	  present	  at	  the	  meeting	  determined	  to	  contact	  the	  Japanese	  officials	  who	  had	  made	  the	  decision,	  among	  them	  General	  Takuro	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  For	  more	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Nazi	  party	  on	  the	  Japanese,	  see	  McKale,	  “The	  Nazi	  Party	  in	  the	  Fast	  East,	  1931-­‐45.”	  47	  At	  this	  point	  during	  the	  War,	  Bitker	  claims	  that	  German	  influence	  with	  the	  Japanese	  was	  considerable	  and	  various	  ideas	  were	  being	  considered	  by	  the	  Japanese	  leadership,	  including	  sending	  all	  Jewish	  refugees	  to	  one	  of	  the	  islands	  at	  the	  mouth	  of	  the	  Yangtze	  River	  near	  Shanghai.	  (Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  2.)	  48	  The	  area	  was	  actually	  about	  half	  a	  mile	  long	  and	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  a	  mile	  wide,	  encompassing	  roughly	  40	  square	  blocks.	  (Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  192.)	  49	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  322;	  for	  sources	  of	  population	  statistics,	  see	  footnote	  27.	  50	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  2.	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  Matsui	  (1887-­‐1969),	  the	  commander	  of	  the	  Japanese	  5th	  Division.51	  Dr.	  Abraham	  Kaufmann	  of	  the	  Harbin	  Jewish	  community	  was	  asked	  to	  contact	  the	  “high	  official”	  in	  Tokyo,	  who	  was	  possibly	  Premier	  Yosuke	  Matsuoka,	  who	  had	  previously	  aided	  the	  refugees	  in	  Kobe,	  Japan	  in	  1941.52	  In	  spite	  of	  these	  and	  other	  high-­‐level	  attempts,	  the	  Jewish	  community	  was	  not	  in	  a	  sufficiently	  powerful	  position	  to	  influence	  the	  Japanese	  to	  rescind	  their	  order.	  	  
Hoping	  to	  avoid	  panic	  and	  also	  wanting	  to	  protect	  Shibata,	  this	  group	  of	  Jewish	  leaders	  decided	  not	  to	  disclose	  what	  they	  had	  learned	  to	  the	  community	  at	  large.	  This	  was	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  tactics	  employed	  by	  the	  persecuted	  Jewish	  leadership	  in	  Nazi	  Europe	  in	  keeping	  information	  from	  the	  general	  Jewish	  public.	  However,	  the	  information	  leaked	  out	  and	  the	  entire	  community	  soon	  learned	  about	  the	  meeting.	  The	  Foreign	  Division	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Gendarmerie	  heard	  of	  this,	  and	  they	  arrested	  all	  who	  had	  attended	  the	  meeting,	  taking	  them	  to	  the	  notorious	  “Bridge	  House,”	  where	  the	  Japanese	  kept	  prisoners	  charged	  with	  espionage,	  sabotage	  and	  other	  hostile	  acts	  against	  Japan.53	  This	  jail,	  infested	  with	  typhus,	  caused	  the	  death	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  prisoners.	  The	  men	  were	  separated,	  questioned	  for	  several	  days,	  and	  then	  released—some	  sooner	  than	  others.	  Shibata	  himself	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  “Biography	  of	  Lieutenant-­‐General	  Takuro	  Matsui	  (1887-­‐1969),	  Japan,”	  The	  
Generals	  of	  WWII,	  accessed	  July	  25,	  2014,	  http://www.generals.dk/general/Matsui/Takuro/Japan.html.	  52	  Fritz	  Kaufmann,	  “The	  Experience	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  Community	  under	  the	  Japanese	  in	  World	  War	  II”	  (Unpublished	  Manuscript	  of	  a	  speech	  by	  Fritz	  Kaufmann	  before	  the	  Shanghai	  Tiffin	  Club,	  New	  York,	  February	  12,	  1963);	  quoted	  in	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  313,	  footnote	  9.	  53	  For	  more	  on	  the	  infamous	  “Bridge	  House,”	  see	  James	  Ross,	  Escape	  to	  Shanghai :	  A	  
Jewish	  Community	  in	  China	  (New	  York,	  Toronto:	  Free	  Press,	  Maxwell	  Macmillan	  Canada,	  Maxwell	  Macmillan	  International,	  1994),	  192	  ff.	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  was	  arrested	  by	  the	  Japanese,	  stripped	  of	  his	  post	  with	  the	  Consular	  service,	  and	  sent	  back	  to	  Japan,	  never	  to	  be	  heard	  from	  by	  the	  Jews	  of	  Shanghai	  again.54	  
The	  arrest	  of	  these	  leaders	  precipitated	  the	  resignation	  of	  Speelman	  and	  almost	  every	  other	  member	  of	  the	  Committee	  for	  Assistance	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  being	  connected	  with	  the	  refugee	  problem.55	  Dr.	  Cohn,	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  Kubota,	  suggested	  that	  in	  its	  place	  be	  formed	  the	  Shanghai	  United	  Jewish	  Committee	  of	  Communal	  Representatives,	  an	  organization	  intended	  to	  present	  a	  unified	  front	  to	  the	  Japanese	  authorities.	  The	  committee	  would	  consist	  of	  representatives	  of	  the	  three	  major	  Jewish	  communities,	  the	  Sephardic,	  Ashkenazic,	  and	  German	  groups.	  Its	  aims	  would	  be:	  
1. To	  act	  as	  an	  authorized	  representative	  body	  of	  the	  entire	  local	  Jewish	  population	  for	  furthering	  and	  facilitating	  closer	  cooperation	  among	  the	  various	  public	  bodies	  and	  with	  the	  local	  Nipponese	  and	  Chinese	  Authorities.	  2. To	  lead	  and	  advise	  the	  local	  Jewish	  Communal	  Association	  in	  their	  works	  but	  without	  interfering	  with	  their	  inner	  life	  where	  such	  undertakings	  do	  not	  have	  any	  influence	  on	  the	  whole	  population.	  3. To	  create	  and	  develop	  a	  feeling	  of	  mutual	  confidence	  and	  cooperation	  among	  the	  various	  language	  groups	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  population	  and	  to	  further	  closer	  friendships	  between	  Jewish	  and	  non-­‐Jewish	  groups,	  of	  Shanghai.	  4. To	  endeavor,	  to	  clarify	  and	  to	  educate	  the	  Jewish	  population,	  especially	  the	  newcomers,	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  customs	  and	  peoples	  of	  Nippon	  and	  China	  as	  well	  as	  introduce	  the	  true	  status	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  2–3.	  55	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  15.	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  of	  Jewry	  to	  the	  Nipponese	  and	  Chinese,	  thus	  automatically	  better	  understanding	  will	  produce	  better	  relationship	  [sic].56	  From	  these	  desired	  aims	  one	  can	  discern	  the	  perceived	  need	  to	  present	  a	  unified	  voice	  to	  the	  Japanese	  authorities,	  which	  presumably	  did	  not	  exist.	  From	  the	  aspiration	  to	  avoid	  interference	  in	  the	  internal	  matters	  of	  each	  of	  the	  Jewish	  communities,	  one	  can	  see	  that	  such	  interference	  of	  the	  leadership	  upon	  each	  other’s	  communities	  was	  an	  issue	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  addressed.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  for	  the	  need	  for	  mutual	  cooperation,	  not	  only	  among	  the	  Jewish	  communities,	  but	  also	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Chinese	  populations.	  Kranzler	  stated	  that	  this	  effort	  met	  with	  little	  success,	  basing	  his	  conclusion	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  committee	  is	  mentioned	  only	  in	  A.	  J.	  Cohn’s	  own	  memorandum,	  and	  never	  appears	  in	  any	  other	  source.57	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  in	  light	  of	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  communities	  to	  act	  together	  in	  a	  unified	  manner,	  even	  in	  times	  of	  such	  immediate	  danger.	  
To	  quell	  the	  panic	  that	  resulted	  from	  this	  leak	  of	  information	  about	  the	  ghetto,	  the	  Japanese	  assured	  the	  Jewish	  leaders	  that	  the	  rumors	  were	  not	  true,	  since	  “the	  Japanese	  authorities	  are	  always	  fair	  and	  just	  to	  everyone.”58	  Kranzler’s	  research	  revealed	  that	  the	  Japanese	  Foreign	  Ministry	  had	  approved	  a	  form	  of	  “strict	  surveillance”	  of	  the	  refugees	  as	  early	  as	  January	  1942,	  and	  that	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  ghetto	  had	  already	  been	  approved	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Dr.	  A.	  J.	  Cohn,	  “Memo,”	  September	  9,	  1942	  (YIVO	  #19).	  Cited	  by	  Kranzler,	  M.A.,	  pp.	  86-­‐87,	  in	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  316–317,	  see	  also	  footnote	  17.	  57	  Ibid.,	  317.	  58	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  3.	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  November	  1942.59	  In	  actuality,	  the	  restrictions	  imposed	  on	  refugees	  were	  not	  implemented	  until	  the	  following	  year,	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Shibota’s	  leak	  was	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  delay.60	  
In	  evaluating	  the	  statement	  that	  Japanese	  authorities	  were	  “always	  fair	  and	  just,”	  Hazel	  Marcus	  and	  Shinobu	  Kitayama’s	  study	  of	  Asian	  cultures	  becomes	  relevant.	  They	  argue	  that	  “many	  Asian	  cultures	  have	  distinct	  conceptions	  of	  individuality	  that	  insist	  on	  the	  fundamental	  relatedness	  of	  individuals	  to	  each	  other,”	  and	  demonstrate	  that	  in	  these	  cultures	  “the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  attending	  to	  others,	  fitting	  in,	  and	  harmonious	  interdependence	  with	  them.”61	  It	  is	  an	  interesting	  thought	  that	  Japanese	  self-­‐perception	  as	  fair,	  just,	  and	  harmonious	  was	  one	  factor	  that	  helped	  prevent	  the	  kind	  of	  brutality	  that	  the	  Nazis	  exhibited	  toward	  the	  Jews.	  
On	  February	  18,62	  however,	  the	  newspapers	  and	  radio	  officially	  announced	  that	  all	  “stateless	  persons”	  who	  had	  come	  to	  Shanghai	  since	  1937	  would	  have	  to	  move	  into	  a	  “designated	  area”63	  by	  May	  1943.64	  Kranzler	  specifically	  draws	  attention	  the	  intentional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  315,	  footnote	  15.	  60	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  3.	  61	  Hazel	  R	  Markus	  and	  Shinobu	  Kitayama,	  “Culture	  and	  the	  Self:	  Implications	  for	  Cognition,	  Emotion,	  and	  Motivation,”	  Psychological	  Review	  98,	  no.	  2	  (1991):	  224;	  See	  also	  Steven	  D.	  Cousins,	  “Culture	  and	  Self-­‐Perception	  in	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States,”	  Journal	  of	  
Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology	  56,	  no.	  1	  (January	  1989):	  124–31.	  62	  Margolis	  later	  mistakenly	  recalls	  the	  date	  as	  February	  8.	  63	  This	  area	  was	  comprised	  of	  some	  40	  blocks,	  slightly	  less	  than	  one	  square	  mile,	  and	  was	  also	  populated	  by	  100,000	  Chinese	  who	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  leave	  their	  homes.	  64	  “Internment	  of	  Thousands	  of	  Jewish	  Refugees	  by	  Japan	  Reported	  in	  Nazi	  Broadcast,”	  JTA,	  May	  25,	  1943.	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  use	  of	  the	  terms	  “stateless	  person”	  instead	  of	  “Jew”	  and	  “designated	  area”	  instead	  of	  “ghetto,”	  noting	  that	  even	  in	  private,	  only	  these	  euphemisms	  were	  permitted.65	  This	  decree	  was	  clearly	  meant	  for	  the	  17,000	  Central	  European	  immigrants	  who	  had	  fled	  the	  Nazis,	  and	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  established	  Sephardic,	  White	  Russian,	  or	  Russian	  Ashkenazi	  Jewish	  communities.	  This	  effectively	  meant	  that	  most	  of	  the	  Russian	  Jews	  who	  had	  arrived	  in	  the	  previous	  wave	  of	  immigration	  could	  still	  move	  about	  without	  restrictions.66	  	  
Kranzler	  has	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  “Japan’s	  tenuous	  and	  delicate	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  throughout	  World	  War	  II,	  and	  her	  desire	  to	  avoid	  any	  unnecessary	  friction,	  that	  prompted	  her	  policy	  towards	  all	  ‘stateless’	  Russians,	  including	  Russian	  Jews.”	  He	  bases	  his	  argument	  partially	  on	  a	  top-­‐secret	  document	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Foreign	  office	  (February	  9,	  1943)	  that	  specifically	  excluded	  Russians	  (Jews	  and	  non-­‐Jews)	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  danger	  of	  causing	  international	  complications.”67	  
Tsutomu	  Kubota	  was	  the	  Japanese	  official	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  this	  “removal.”	  Kubota	  described	  the	  “designated	  area”	  as	  “neither	  a	  ghetto	  nor	  jail,	  but	  an	  area	  which	  is	  full	  of	  hope	  for	  the	  refugees	  and	  in	  which	  they	  may	  build	  a	  haven	  for	  themselves	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  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  319.	  66	  “Proclamation	  by	  Japanese	  Authorities	  Establishing	  the	  Designated	  Area,”	  1943,	  YIVO	  Archives,	  Shanghai	  Collection,	  RG	  243,	  11	  (1/626).	  This	  designated	  area	  was	  later	  known	  as	  the	  “Shanghai	  Ghetto.”	  67	  Kranzler,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Community	  of	  Shanghai,	  1938-­‐1945,”	  340;	  see	  also	  Arch	  Carey,	  The	  War	  Years	  at	  Shanghai,	  1941-­‐45-­‐48.	  (New	  York:	  Vantage	  Press,	  1967),	  87;	  and	  Dicker,	  Wanderers	  and	  Settlers	  in	  the	  Far	  East:	  A	  Century	  of	  
Jewish	  Life	  in	  China	  and	  Japan,	  118–119.	  
	   	   	   280	  where	  they	  can	  carry	  on	  peacefully	  and	  with	  great	  advantage	  to	  themselves.”68	  According	  to	  Japanese	  authorities,	  this	  was	  being	  done	  “…due	  to	  the	  desire	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Government	  to	  alleviate	  the	  position	  of	  the	  refugees	  and	  enable	  them	  to	  engage	  in	  productive	  work.”69	  	  
Although	  there	  would	  be	  no	  barbed	  wire	  in	  this	  area,	  after	  August	  10,	  1943,	  residents	  could	  only	  leave	  with	  a	  pass	  issued	  with	  special	  permission	  of	  the	  Japanese	  authorities,	  mostly	  for	  students	  or	  for	  those	  who	  worked	  outside	  the	  ghetto.	  The	  infamous	  Kano	  Ghoya,	  a	  cruel	  and	  sadistic	  petty	  tyrant	  who	  called	  himself	  “King	  of	  the	  Jews,”	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  issuing	  these	  passes,	  and	  did	  so	  brutally	  and	  capriciously.70	  J.	  Bitker	  and	  others	  appealed	  to	  Kubota,	  who	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  refugee	  affairs,	  to	  replace	  the	  “beast	  of	  a	  man	  by	  the	  name	  of	  Goya	  [sic]”,	  and	  secured	  a	  promise	  that	  he	  would	  be	  replaced.	  Within	  a	  month,	  this	  was	  done,	  and	  passes	  became	  freely	  available.71	  This	  followed	  the	  traditional	  Jewish	  pattern	  of	  appealing	  to	  the	  authorities	  to	  relieve	  harsh	  treatment.	  It	  was	  to	  the	  credit	  of	  the	  Japanese	  that	  they	  acquiesced.	  
The	  Japanese	  leadership	  emphatically	  advised	  the	  established	  Jewish	  residents	  of	  Shanghai	  who	  were	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  proclamation	  to	  form	  their	  own	  committee	  to	  aid	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Cited	  in	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  199,	  footnote	  56.	  69	  “Japan	  Confirms	  Internment	  of	  15,000	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Ghetto	  in	  Hongkong	  [sic]	  Area,”	  JTA,	  June	  20,	  1943.	  70	  For	  more	  on	  Ghoya,	  see	  Tokayer,	  The	  Fugu	  Plan,	  250–251;	  Gruenberger,	  “The	  Jewish	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,”	  342–343;	  Ristaino,	  Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  199–200.	  He	  is	  also	  mentioned	  in	  many	  memoirs	  such	  as	  Heppner,	  Shanghai	  Refuge;	  and	  Eber,	  Voices	  from	  
Shanghai.	  	  71	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  5.	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  the	  refugees	  and	  their	  resettlement.	  This	  was	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  Nazi	  tactic	  of	  appointing	  malleable	  committees	  to	  supervise	  their	  constituents.	  In	  confidential	  deliberations,	  the	  Jewish	  leaders	  of	  SACRA	  decided	  to	  assist	  the	  refugees	  but	  to	  delay	  the	  move	  as	  long	  as	  possible	  using	  every	  means	  at	  their	  disposal,	  including	  sabotage,	  hoping	  for	  a	  turn	  in	  the	  tide	  of	  the	  war.	  The	  work	  on	  this	  new	  committee	  was	  thankless,	  unpopular,	  and	  misunderstood	  by	  many	  refugees.72	  Margolis	  later	  observed:	  	  
The	  Shanghai	  Jews73	  were	  taken	  by	  complete	  surprise.	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  the	  refugee	  group	  itself	  took	  this	  proclamation	  with	  considerably	  more	  calm	  than	  the	  local	  Russian	  and	  German	  Jews,	  who	  saw	  this	  as	  the	  first	  threat	  to	  themselves	  even	  though	  they	  were	  not	  immediately	  affected	  by	  it.	  To	  the	  refugees,	  who	  had	  taken	  one	  blow	  after	  another,	  this	  was	  just	  another	  blow.	  They	  believed	  the	  Allies	  were	  close	  to	  winning	  the	  war,	  so	  they	  simply	  had	  to	  tighten	  their	  belts	  and	  see	  this	  thing	  through	  until	  the	  day	  of	  victory.	  I	  must	  express	  my	  admiration	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  people	  took	  a	  proclamation	  that	  really	  meant	  the	  end	  of	  their	  livelihood.	  It	  meant	  that	  those	  refugees—and	  there	  were	  thousands—who	  had	  established	  good	  and	  comfortable	  businesses	  in	  the	  French	  Concession	  and	  in	  the	  International	  Settlement	  would	  have	  to	  liquidate	  these	  businesses	  and	  move	  into	  the	  segregated	  area.74	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  established	  Shanghai	  Jews	  were	  completely	  surprised	  by	  the	  declaration	  of	  a	  ghetto	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  way	  the	  Jews	  in	  Germany	  and	  Central	  Europe	  refused	  to	  recognize	  the	  Nazi	  danger	  that	  was	  approaching.	  They	  had	  never	  expected	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  persecution	  that	  was	  going	  on	  in	  Europe	  would	  come	  to	  them.	  Their	  reaction—displaying	  a	  greater	  fear	  than	  did	  the	  refugees,	  also	  shows	  their	  lack	  of	  mental	  or	  emotional	  preparation	  for	  the	  discrimination	  they	  had	  been	  facing.	  Even	  though	  the	  recent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Ibid.,	  3–4.	  73	  i.e.	  The	  long-­‐time	  residents	  74	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  19.	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  declaration	  had	  applied	  only	  to	  the	  refugees,	  the	  Jewish	  leaders	  now	  began	  to	  see	  that	  they	  could	  easily	  be	  next	  and	  were	  filled	  with	  apprehension.	  
The	  Shanghai	  “ghetto”	  was	  soon	  to	  be	  established.	  On	  the	  night	  of	  February	  23,	  Kubota	  called	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community.	  He	  told	  the	  several	  hundred	  men	  present	  that	  this	  proclamation	  had	  been	  issued.	  He	  claimed	  it	  was	  not	  because	  of	  any	  antisemitic	  feeling	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Japanese	  people,	  but	  because	  the	  housing	  and	  feeding	  problem	  in	  Shanghai	  had	  become	  so	  acute	  that	  some	  plan	  had	  to	  be	  developed	  whereby	  thousands	  of	  stateless	  persons	  could	  be	  put	  under	  some	  form	  of	  control.	  Whether	  he	  said	  this	  due	  to	  residual	  Japanese	  perception	  of	  the	  “international	  power”	  of	  the	  Jews	  or	  whether	  he	  hoped	  to	  avoid	  panic	  cannot	  be	  discerned	  from	  his	  statement.	  However,	  he	  appealed	  to	  the	  Jewish	  people	  to	  cooperate	  with	  him	  in	  making	  this	  area	  a	  place	  where	  people	  could	  live.	  In	  reality,	  his	  appeal	  was	  virtually	  an	  ultimatum	  in	  that	  he	  gave	  this	  group	  the	  choice	  of	  cooperating	  with	  him	  and	  helping	  him	  to	  segregate	  the	  stateless	  people,	  or	  having	  the	  Japanese	  take	  matters	  into	  their	  own	  hands	  and	  do	  it	  their	  own	  way—clearly	  a	  veiled	  threat.75	  
Many	  of	  the	  refugees	  were	  forced	  to	  relocate	  and	  give	  up	  their	  homes	  and	  businesses,	  as	  they	  were	  confined	  in	  the	  restricted	  area.	  They	  were	  now	  truly	  on	  their	  own.	  The	  future	  looked	  dim.	  In	  May	  1943	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  who	  had	  arrived	  after	  1937	  were	  relocated	  into	  the	  Hongkew	  area	  of	  Shanghai,	  which	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Shanghai	  Ghetto	  (see	  chapter	  5).	  The	  Red	  Cross	  anticipated	  that	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  August	  1943,	  approximately	  20,000	  Jewish	  people	  would	  be	  living	  in	  this	  segregated	  area.	  Of	  this	  group,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Ibid.	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  some	  6,000	  were	  already	  utterly	  destitute	  and	  just	  managed	  to	  exist	  on	  the	  meals	  provided	  by	  the	  Jewish	  Communal	  kitchens.	  About	  9,000	  were	  in	  only	  slightly	  better	  condition	  and	  were	  likely	  to	  become	  totally	  destitute	  in	  the	  next	  few	  months.	  Another	  2,000	  to	  3,000	  made	  a	  modest	  living	  as	  tailors,	  shoe	  makers,	  hairdressers,	  office	  employees,	  etc.,	  but	  would	  be	  in	  danger	  of	  losing	  their	  income	  once	  they	  moved	  into	  the	  designated	  zone.	  Those	  who	  had	  shops,	  factories,	  or	  professional	  offices	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  town	  would	  have	  to	  try	  to	  liquidate	  their	  present	  positions	  and	  reestablish	  themselves	  in	  the	  new	  area.76	  Their	  clientele,	  of	  course,	  would	  be	  limited	  to	  those	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  area—but	  who	  in	  the	  designated	  area	  would	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  to	  buy	  expensive	  furs,	  for	  example?	  About	  3,000	  others	  would	  have	  their	  own	  means	  of	  support.77	  
SACRA’s	  reports	  differed	  slightly	  from	  those	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross.	  They	  estimated	  that	  at	  least	  10,000	  people	  in	  the	  “designated	  area”	  would	  be	  in	  need	  of	  full	  or	  supplementary	  relief,	  but	  the	  funds	  available	  would	  only	  be	  enough	  to	  provide	  one	  meal	  a	  day	  to	  3,600,	  though	  they	  hoped	  to	  bring	  this	  number	  up	  to	  5,000.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  one	  meal	  a	  day,	  2,870	  people	  were	  living	  in	  the	  five	  JDC	  camps	  and	  4,669	  were	  receiving	  six	  ounces	  of	  bread	  daily.	  Just	  to	  maintain	  this	  minimal	  status	  quo,	  SACRA	  estimated	  that	  it	  would	  require	  a	  budget	  of	  CRB	  $1,000,000	  per	  month.	  SACRA	  planned	  to	  be	  able	  to	  raise	  a	  total	  of	  CRB	  $400,000	  per	  month	  and	  expected	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  budget	  to	  come	  from	  the	  Shanghai	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  Only	  “qualified”	  people	  whose	  livelihoods	  “served	  the	  public”	  (such	  as	  doctors	  or	  engineers)	  could	  easily	  obtain	  renewable	  permits	  to	  leave	  the	  designated	  area	  (Ristaino,	  
Port	  of	  Last	  Resort,	  199.)	  77	  Peter	  Wehrli,	  Notes	  on	  the	  Newly	  Created	  Area	  in	  Shanghai	  in	  Which	  Stateless	  
Refugees	  Will	  Reside,	  June	  24,	  1943,	  1–2,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	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  JDC.	  By	  August	  1943	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  had	  succeeded	  in	  securing	  900	  
Patenschaften,	  each	  of	  which	  had	  been	  increased	  from	  CRB	  $50	  to	  CRB	  $100	  per	  month.78	  
In	  September	  1943,	  Kubota	  ordered	  that	  all	  monies	  being	  used	  for	  the	  refugees	  should	  go	  through	  SACRA’s	  Relief	  Department,	  which	  meant	  that	  the	  disbursements	  of	  both	  the	  Kitchen	  Fund	  and	  the	  Shanghai	  JDC	  would	  have	  to	  go	  through	  SACRA.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community	  had	  imposed	  a	  tax	  upon	  its	  members	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  SACRA	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  refugees,	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	  when	  the	  entire	  community	  was	  held	  responsible	  to	  tax	  itself	  to	  meet	  its	  obligations	  to	  the	  host	  nation.79	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  income	  of	  SACRA	  from	  August	  8,	  1942,	  when	  it	  began	  function,	  to	  June	  30,	  1943,	  shows	  the	  following:	  
Kitchen	  Fund	  (Patenschaften	  and	  one-­‐time	  contributions)	  .....................	  17.00%	  Income	  from	  refugees	  (token	  amount	  paid	  for	  food)	  .................................	  14.75%	  Shanghai	  JDC	  .................................................................................................................	  59.50%	  	  Centraljewcom	  ...............................................................................................................	  8.75%80	  SACRA	  found	  it	  necessary	  to	  raise	  funds	  separately	  from	  the	  Ashkenazi	  community	  in	  order	  to	  build	  barracks	  and	  repair	  houses	  for	  additional	  housing	  facilities	  for	  those	  persons	  moving	  into	  the	  segregated	  area.	  By	  August	  1943,	  SACRA	  had	  raised	  CRB	  $1,500,000.	  The	  houses	  and	  barracks	  put	  up	  by	  SACRA	  initially	  netted	  a	  substantial	  income,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  20–21.	  79	  For	  more	  on	  medieval	  Jewish	  community	  patterns	  of	  taxation,	  see	  David	  Biale,	  
Power	  &	  Powerlessness	  in	  Jewish	  History	  (Knopf	  Doubleday	  Publishing	  Group,	  2010);	  for	  medieval	  community	  taxation	  patterns	  under	  Muslim	  rule,	  see	  Jane	  S.	  Gerber,	  Jewish	  Society	  
in	  Fez	  1450-­‐1700:	  Studies	  in	  Communal	  and	  Economic	  Life,	  Studies	  in	  Judaism	  in	  Modern	  Times	  6	  (Brill,	  1980).	  80	  Margolis,	  Report	  of	  Activities	  in	  Shanghai,	  China,	  from	  December	  8,	  1941	  to	  
September	  1943,	  21.	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  since	  at	  least	  90%	  of	  those	  persons	  who	  moved	  into	  the	  segregated	  area	  could	  pay	  rent.	  However,	  Margolis	  notes	  that	  as	  time	  went	  on,	  the	  income	  from	  these	  properties	  was	  bound	  to	  decrease	  due	  to	  the	  gradual	  impoverishment	  of	  the	  refugees	  living	  in	  that	  area.81	  
Although	  much	  of	  the	  literature—particularly	  the	  memoirs—refers	  to	  the	  “restricted	  area”	  as	  a	  “ghetto,”	  in	  reality	  it	  was	  far	  from	  being	  a	  ghetto	  in	  the	  Nazi	  sense.	  There	  were	  no	  walls	  around	  the	  area,	  and	  passes	  were	  issued	  to	  enter	  and	  leave.	  The	  Japanese	  did	  allow	  schools	  to	  continue,	  as	  well	  as	  theater	  performances	  and	  other	  entertainment.	  These	  relative	  freedoms	  helped	  significantly	  to	  uphold	  morale	  in	  a	  very	  difficult	  situation.	  	  
It	  was	  the	  American	  democratizing	  influence	  through	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  that	  encouraged	  the	  refugees	  to	  organize	  and	  apply	  themselves	  to	  their	  survival.	  The	  
Patenschaft	  sponsorship	  system	  that	  Margolis	  had	  encouraged	  continued	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  neediest;	  the	  kitchen	  she	  established	  was	  able	  to	  feed	  the	  poor	  efficiently;	  the	  contacts	  she	  made	  with	  the	  Polish	  ambassador,	  the	  Quakers,	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross	  and	  ORT	  continued	  to	  aid	  the	  refugees	  in	  the	  ghetto.	  And	  the	  committees	  she	  had	  set	  up	  and	  inspired	  continued	  to	  function	  (albeit	  under	  the	  Japanese-­‐appointed	  governing	  committee).	  It	  was	  largely	  because	  of	  Margolis	  and	  Siegel	  and	  the	  support	  of	  the	  JDC	  and	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  survive.	  
Thankfully,	  from	  January	  1944	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Pacific	  War	  in	  August	  1945,	  life	  in	  the	  restricted	  area	  was	  significantly	  eased	  as	  funds	  from	  JDC	  once	  more	  began	  to	  arrive.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Ibid.,	  20.	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  While	  general	  conditions	  in	  Shanghai	  had	  gone	  from	  bad	  to	  worse,82	  with	  these	  JDC	  funds,	  the	  local	  Committee	  was	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  refugees	  with	  bread	  and	  one	  hot	  meal	  per	  day.	  A	  second	  meal	  was	  given	  to	  the	  aged,	  undernourished	  and	  ill,	  and	  some	  received	  cash	  in	  place	  of	  meals.	  The	  five	  camps	  continued	  to	  be	  managed	  by	  the	  local	  JDC	  Committee,	  which	  with	  the	  additional	  funds	  was	  able	  to	  supply	  soap,	  baths	  and	  reopen	  a	  hospital,	  medical	  and	  dental	  clinics.	  They	  were	  also	  able	  to	  aid	  patients	  in	  isolation,	  those	  in	  mental	  hospitals,	  and	  help	  to	  pay	  for	  funerals.83	  
The	  restoration	  of	  JDC	  funds	  came	  about	  through	  Margolis’	  intercession.	  After	  her	  repatriation,	  Margolis	  immediately	  traveled	  with	  Moses	  Leavitt	  and	  Joseph	  Schwartz	  to	  Washington	  and	  met	  personally	  with	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury	  Henry	  Morgenthau	  (1891-­‐1967).	  Interestingly,	  Morgenthau’s	  father,	  Henry	  Morgenthau,	  Sr.	  (1856-­‐1946),	  had	  been	  a	  partial	  catalyst	  to	  the	  founding	  of	  JDC.	  While	  serving	  as	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  he	  had	  sent	  a	  cable	  to	  American	  philanthropist	  Jacob	  Schiff	  in	  August	  1914	  asking	  for	  a	  $50,000	  contribution	  to	  aid	  the	  Jews	  of	  Palestine,	  who	  were	  cut	  off	  from	  European	  support	  by	  the	  Turks	  and	  were	  in	  danger	  of	  starvation.	  Partially	  in	  response	  to	  Morgenthau	  Sr.’s	  cable,	  representatives	  from	  multiple	  U.S.	  Jewish	  organizations	  met	  that	  November	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  and	  founded	  what	  later	  became	  the	  JDC.84	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Carl	  Brahn	  to	  Laura	  Margolis,	  April	  3,	  1944,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  83	  Joseph	  Schwartz	  to	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  May	  29,	  1944,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  84	  The	  organization	  was	  called	  the	  “American	  Jewish	  Relief	  Committee	  for	  Sufferers	  from	  the	  War.”	  This	  Committee	  later	  merged	  with	  the	  “American	  Jewish	  Committee”	  which	  had	  been	  founded	  a	  decade	  earlier	  by	  Reform	  Jews,	  and	  the	  Orthodox	  “Central	  Relief	  Committee	  for	  the	  Relief	  of	  Jews	  Suffering	  through	  the	  War.”	  Together,	  the	  three	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  Morgenthau	  (Jr.)	  was	  particularly	  anxious	  to	  know	  if	  any	  of	  the	  money	  Margolis	  had	  been	  raising	  in	  Shanghai	  had	  also	  gone	  to	  the	  Japanese.	  She	  assured	  him	  it	  had	  not—that	  it	  had	  all	  gone	  to	  the	  refugees,	  but	  admitted	  that	  indirectly	  it	  could	  have	  been	  considered	  a	  help	  to	  the	  Japanese.85	  She	  appealed	  to	  him	  to	  allow	  funds	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  desperate	  conditions	  of	  the	  refugees.	  	  
Upon	  hearing	  of	  Margolis’	  return,	  Roy	  McDonald,	  Acting	  Chief	  of	  the	  Economic	  Intelligence	  Division	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Warfare	  in	  Washington,	  DC,	  also	  requested	  to	  contact	  her	  to	  learn	  what	  they	  could	  about	  the	  economic	  situation	  in	  Asia.86	  Because	  of	  Margolis’	  influence	  on	  Morgenthau	  and	  McDonald,	  in	  December	  1943,	  JDC	  received	  permission	  to	  re-­‐establish	  communications	  with	  the	  Committee	  in	  Shanghai	  via	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross,	  authorizing	  them	  to	  borrow	  additional	  funds	  during	  1944	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  JDC	  program	  of	  aid.87	  While	  Margolis	  was	  still	  in	  the	  internment	  hospital,	  she	  had	  worked	  out	  a	  code	  with	  J.	  Bitker:	  if	  he	  received	  a	  telegram	  from	  her	  congratulating	  his	  daughter	  on	  her	  birthday,	  that	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  authorities	  had	  given	  their	  approval.	  Such	  a	  telegram	  arrived	  at	  a	  moment	  when	  the	  refugees	  were	  extremely	  desperate.88	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  organizations	  formed	  the	  “Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  of	  Funds	  for	  Jewish	  War	  Sufferers,”	  later	  known	  as	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  or	  the	  JDC.	  (“A	  Joint	  Effort:	  JDC’s	  Beginnings,	  1914-­‐1921.”)	  85	  Kaufman,	  “Interview,”	  37.	  86	  Leavitt	  to	  McDonald,	  “Letter	  OW-­‐2-­‐3-­‐EMF.”	  87	  Jeannette	  Robbins	  to	  Sarah	  Herbst,	  April	  13,	  1944,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944;	  Henrietta	  Buchman	  to	  Sigmund	  Helwing,	  May	  17,	  1944,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944;	  Marc	  Peter	  to	  Moses	  Leavitt,	  February	  1,	  1944,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  88	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  5.	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  When	  the	  loans	  became	  no	  longer	  feasible,	  JDC	  applied	  for	  and	  received	  a	  license	  from	  the	  Treasury	  Department	  to	  remit	  payments	  of	  U.S.	  $20,000	  per	  month	  through	  Saly	  Mayer,	  JDC	  representative	  in	  neutral	  Switzerland,	  for	  transmission	  to	  the	  refugee	  Committee	  in	  Shanghai.89	  Because	  the	  Japanese	  did	  not	  allow	  funds	  to	  come	  from	  enemy	  nations,	  Meyer	  worked	  out	  a	  plan	  whereby	  the	  JDC	  would	  support	  the	  Swiss	  Jewish	  community's	  own	  refugees	  and	  the	  Swiss	  Jewish	  community	  would	  in	  turn	  send	  funds	  to	  China	  through	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Committee	  in	  St.	  Gallen,	  Switzerland.90	  It	  was	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  Margolis’	  efforts	  that	  the	  Treasury	  Department	  in	  January	  1944	  allowed	  the	  renewed	  transfer	  of	  funds	  to	  Shanghai	  and	  enabled	  the	  refugees	  to	  survive	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  War.91	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
Antisemitism	  was	  not	  endemic	  to	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese	  cultures.	  Neither	  had	  distinguished	  significantly	  between	  Jews	  and	  non-­‐Jews	  in	  previous	  contacts	  with	  the	  Western	  world.	  However,	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  Nazi	  ideology	  and	  the	  increase	  of	  German	  influence	  in	  Asia,	  anti-­‐Jewish	  propaganda	  was	  introduced	  into	  both	  cultures,	  and	  thereby	  into	  Shanghai.	  The	  Chinese,	  influenced	  by	  nationalism,	  exhibited	  an	  adverse	  reaction	  to	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Moses	  Leavitt	  to	  War	  Refugee	  Board,	  June	  15,	  1944,	  AR	  1933/44:463,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Countries	  and	  Regions:	  China,	  General,	  1942-­‐1944.	  90	  Bitker,	  “Memorandum,”	  5;	  see	  also	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust.	  91	  For	  a	  study	  of	  American	  Jewish	  fundraising	  during	  this	  period,	  see	  Rachel	  Beth	  Deblinger,	  “‘In	  a	  World	  Still	  Trembling’:	  American	  Jewish	  Philanthropy	  and	  the	  Shaping	  of	  Holocaust	  Survivor	  Narratives	  in	  Postwar	  America	  (1945	  -­‐-­‐	  1953)”	  (Ph.D.,	  University	  of	  California,	  Los	  Angeles,	  2014),	  http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/pqdtft/docview/1537435837/abstract/2B6ADC730CCC4666PQ/1?accountid=7287.	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  things	  Western,	  including	  the	  Jews	  residing	  in	  Shanghai.	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  admired	  the	  Jewish	  culture	  for	  its	  strong	  family	  values	  and	  industriousness.	  	  
The	  Japanese	  reaction,	  based	  on	  the	  Protocols	  of	  the	  Elders	  of	  Zion	  statements	  that	  Jews	  were	  conspiring	  to	  control	  the	  world,	  was	  far	  more	  complex.	  In	  the	  Japanese	  imagination,	  the	  Jews	  were	  a	  valuable	  asset	  that	  could	  be	  influenced	  to	  accomplish	  Japanese	  goals.	  However,	  once	  the	  Pacific	  War	  rendered	  Jewish	  usefulness	  moot,	  an	  increase	  in	  Nazi	  propaganda	  influenced	  Japan	  to	  place	  restrictions	  on	  the	  Jewish	  population	  of	  Shanghai.	  
Forced	  to	  move	  into	  a	  “designated	  area,”	  many	  Jewish	  people	  had	  to	  leave	  homes	  and	  businesses	  and	  find	  new	  ways	  to	  survive	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  international	  funds	  were	  cut	  off.	  This	  was	  the	  most	  difficult	  period	  for	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  refugees.	  Many	  were	  close	  to	  starvation,	  yet	  it	  was	  during	  this	  very	  time	  that	  the	  refugees	  began	  to	  exhibit	  unified	  efforts	  to	  build	  a	  community	  within	  the	  “ghetto”	  based	  on	  common	  cultural	  values.	  The	  Ashkenazi	  Russian	  community,	  by	  means	  of	  the	  structures	  that	  had	  been	  established	  by	  JDC	  workers	  before	  their	  internment,	  worked	  together	  to	  provide	  significant	  aid	  to	  the	  refugees	  from	  outside	  the	  designated	  area.	  	  
In	  examining	  the	  complex	  interactions	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  communities	  before	  and	  during	  World	  War	  II,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  and	  trust	  between	  different	  factions	  of	  the	  established	  Shanghai	  Jewish	  communities	  significantly	  hindered	  their	  ability	  to	  meet	  their	  challenges.	  Under	  any	  circumstances,	  ensuring	  the	  survival	  of	  a	  massive	  influx	  of	  destitute	  people	  with	  little	  to	  no	  sources	  of	  funding	  would	  have	  been	  onerous,	  but	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Shanghai	  to	  work	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  together	  made	  a	  bad	  situation	  even	  worse.	  Powerful	  individuals	  arose	  who	  attempted	  to	  wrest	  control	  for	  themselves.	  Animosities	  deepened	  between	  different	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  social	  classes.	  Mutual	  trust	  evaporated.	  The	  Jewish	  people	  of	  Shanghai,	  rather	  than	  rally	  together	  to	  meet	  the	  desperate	  situation,	  found	  themselves	  hopelessly	  divided	  and	  unable	  to	  act.	  
These	  communities,	  sensing	  their	  inability	  to	  confront	  the	  need	  at	  hand,	  reached	  out	  to	  international	  Jewry	  for	  help,	  and	  it	  was	  the	  American	  Jews,	  through	  the	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  who	  responded.	  Social	  worker	  Laura	  Margolis	  was	  sent	  to	  assuage	  the	  hardship	  of	  the	  stranded	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai.	  While	  in	  Shanghai,	  Margolis	  handled	  a	  tangled	  set	  of	  conflicts.	  She	  alleviated	  tensions	  that	  existed	  between	  refugees	  from	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  and	  the	  established	  communities	  by	  facilitating	  communication	  between	  them.	  She	  helped	  to	  reconcile	  class	  divisions	  as	  well	  as	  economic	  and	  religious	  differences	  and	  prejudices	  among	  the	  refugees.	  Margolis	  was	  able	  to	  secure	  desperately	  needed	  funds,	  cut	  waste,	  and	  organize	  functioning	  and	  fair	  local	  committees	  governed	  by	  democratic	  principles.	  She	  appealed	  to	  the	  communities’	  moral	  sense	  to	  provide	  for	  each	  other,	  and	  equipped	  them	  to	  survive	  the	  “ghetto”	  experience	  when	  they	  would	  be	  completely	  cut	  off	  from	  outside	  aid.	  Looking	  back	  on	  her	  service	  in	  Shanghai,	  Margolis	  mused	  in	  a	  periodical	  for	  U.S.	  audiences:	  	  
How	  different	  all	  this	  was	  from	  anything	  we	  learned	  in	  our	  social	  work	  training	  about	  “agency	  planning”!	  Perhaps	  what	  was	  fundamentally	  different	  was	  the	  reality—there	  was	  no	  real	  agency,	  no	  real	  community,	  absolutely	  no	  real	  basis	  for	  long-­‐range	  planning.	  We	  knew	  only	  that	  each	  day	  passed	  was	  a	  day	  gained	  in	  the	  race	  against	  time.92	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  Margolis,	  “Race	  Against	  Time	  in	  Shanghai,”	  171.	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  Nothing	  seemed	  to	  us	  more	  important	  than	  to	  help	  these	  refugees	  develop	  into	  a	  self-­‐conscious	  group	  who	  could	  direct	  their	  own	  fate.	  Often	  it	  would	  have	  been	  easier	  for	  us	  to	  issue	  orders	  than	  to	  try	  to	  work	  out	  our	  compromises	  with	  the	  various	  committees;	  but	  to	  us	  that	  easiest	  way	  was	  closed	  by	  our	  whole	  tradition	  and	  experience	  as	  Americans.	  And	  it	  was	  like	  watching	  a	  miracle	  to	  see	  the	  people’s	  response.	  In	  the	  most	  serious	  crisis	  which	  they	  had	  faced	  in	  all	  their	  long	  and	  often	  perilous	  immigration,	  they	  learned	  to	  handle	  their	  own	  problems	  with	  intelligence	  and	  realism….	  And	  so	  even	  under	  Axis	  rule,	  these	  refugees	  learned	  to	  live	  in	  a	  democratic	  way,	  a	  lesson	  which	  we	  hope	  will	  stand	  them	  in	  good	  stead	  for	  their	  future.93	  	  In	  many	  years	  among	  refugees,	  I	  have	  worked	  with	  persons	  from	  every	  walk	  of	  life….	  I	  have	  encountered	  lying	  and	  stealing	  among	  refugees.	  I	  have	  seen	  many	  instances	  of	  selfishness	  and	  cruelty,	  lack	  of	  discipline,	  aggressiveness.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  have	  seen	  kindness	  and	  unselfishness,	  fine	  leadership,	  self-­‐control,	  generosity,	  integrity.…	  As	  I	  look	  back	  upon	  the	  21,000	  refugees	  [sic]	  who	  still	  sit	  in	  Shanghai,	  and	  remember	  what	  they	  have	  suffered	  and	  the	  way	  they	  still	  struggle	  for	  life	  and	  opportunity,	  I	  can	  only	  express	  my	  deep	  respect	  and	  humility	  before	  their	  strength	  and	  courage.94	  That	  strength	  and	  courage	  was	  tested	  to	  the	  utmost	  with	  the	  confinement	  of	  the	  refugees	  to	  the	  designated	  area	  popularly	  known	  as	  the	  “Shanghai	  ghetto.”	  Crowded	  into	  an	  area	  less	  than	  a	  square	  mile,	  the	  17,000	  Jewish	  refugees	  faced	  with	  starvation	  finally	  joined	  together	  to	  create	  a	  culturally	  rich	  community.	  
In	  assessing	  the	  past	  three	  chapters,	  it	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  the	  situation	  facing	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Shanghai	  was	  extreme.	  A	  settled	  group	  of	  around	  7,000	  mostly	  middle-­‐class	  Jews	  of	  different	  backgrounds	  and	  ideologies,	  with	  only	  a	  wealthy	  few	  among	  them,	  were	  asked	  to	  absorb	  17,000	  nearly	  penniless	  refugees	  who	  came	  from	  a	  different	  culture,	  spoke	  a	  different	  language,	  and	  had	  been	  largely	  demoralized	  through	  a	  series	  of	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  Ibid.,	  190–191.	  94	  Ibid.,	  191.	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  psychologically	  harrowing	  experiences.	  Under	  the	  circumstances,	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  these	  17,000	  Jewish	  refugees	  were	  able	  to	  survive	  the	  War,	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  local	  communities	  and	  the	  American	  Jewish	  people	  represented	  by	  JDC,	  is	  something	  to	  be	  commended.
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  CONCLUSION	  
In	  this	  study,	  I	  have	  examined	  the	  communal	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Jews	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  during	  the	  Holocaust.	  	  I	  have	  structured	  the	  analysis	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  community	  welfare	  aspect	  of	  Jewish	  life,	  examining	  how	  the	  existing	  communities	  provided	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  refugees,	  how	  they	  reached	  out	  internationally	  to	  their	  fellow	  Jews,	  and	  how	  United	  States	  Jewry	  responded;	  and	  the	  external	  relations	  and	  defense	  aspect,	  observing	  how	  increasing	  antisemitism	  during	  the	  Holocaust	  era	  impacted	  the	  Jews	  residing	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai.	  
According	  to	  Jacob	  Katz’s	  theory,1	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  modernity	  and	  the	  dissolution	  of	  traditional	  communal	  authority,	  the	  small	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  were	  structured	  on	  a	  purely	  voluntary	  basis	  and	  were	  under	  no	  obligation	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  fellow	  Jews—yet	  both	  chose	  to	  do	  so.	  They	  were	  soon	  overwhelmed	  with	  the	  need	  and	  reached	  out	  to	  international	  Jewry	  for	  help.	  Aid	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  American	  Jewish	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  worker,	  Laura	  Margolis,	  who	  brought	  with	  her	  the	  funds	  and	  leadership	  necessary	  to	  sustain	  the	  refugees	  throughout	  their	  ordeal.	  	  
The	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  both	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  had	  no	  formal	  government	  recognition,	  and	  no	  general	  government	  support.”2	  Without	  such	  a	  formal	  binding	  force,	  and	  under	  the	  added	  burden	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  any	  limited	  communal	  cohesion	  that	  existed	  rapidly	  disintegrated.	  Leaders	  vied	  for	  control	  for	  their	  specific	  factions	  and	  refused	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Katz,	  Out	  of	  the	  Ghetto:	  The	  Social	  Background	  of	  Jewish	  Emancipation,	  1770-­‐1870.	  2	  Ibid.,	  120.	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  work	  together	  for	  the	  common	  good.	  As	  finances	  diminished	  and	  external,	  antisemitic	  pressure	  increased,	  the	  fissures	  deepened.	  	  Rather	  than	  forming	  a	  representative	  board	  to	  collaborate	  for	  the	  common	  good,	  competing	  Jewish	  committees	  emerged	  that	  vied	  for	  the	  limited	  resources	  available.	  	  
The	  JDC,	  through	  Laura	  Margolis,	  stepped	  in	  to	  fill	  the	  leadership	  vacuum	  in	  these	  locations	  and	  provide	  those	  services	  that	  would	  normally	  be	  supplied	  by	  healthy	  Jewish	  communal	  structures:	  fund-­‐raising,	  religious,	  health	  and	  welfare	  services,	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  a	  representative	  body	  for	  external	  relations	  to	  confront	  antisemitic	  threats.3	  Margolis	  made	  repeated	  attempts	  to	  open	  channels	  of	  communication	  between	  the	  different	  established	  Jewish	  factions	  and	  encourage	  them	  to	  take	  on	  these	  obligations,	  but	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  doing	  so.	  The	  local	  Jewish	  leaders,	  due	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  unite	  and	  achieve	  communal	  consensus,	  failed	  to	  administer	  essential	  services	  to	  the	  larger	  refugee	  group.	  Margolis	  then	  created	  new	  representative	  bodies	  among	  the	  refugees,	  and	  these	  bodies	  eventually	  were	  instrumental	  in	  supplying	  necessities	  and	  building	  sorely	  needed	  social,	  educational,	  cultural	  and	  recreational	  outlets	  for	  the	  larger	  refugee	  community.	  	  
As	  disparate	  as	  these	  two	  communities	  were,	  from	  this	  study	  have	  emerged	  several	  similarities	  and	  contrasts.	  	  
Neither	  the	  Cuban	  nor	  the	  Shanghai	  established	  Jewish	  communities	  were	  prepared	  to	  handle	  the	  overwhelming	  numbers	  of	  Jewish	  refugees	  arriving	  at	  their	  doors,	  nearly	  destitute	  and	  needing	  food,	  housing	  and	  medical	  care.	  Their	  pre-­‐existing	  lack	  of	  unity	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Elazar,	  “Jewish	  Communal	  Structures	  Around	  the	  World,”	  123.	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  became	  more	  pronounced	  under	  the	  added	  stress.	  While	  the	  wealthy	  members	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  communities	  contributed	  significantly	  to	  the	  refugees’	  need,	  neither	  the	  Shanghai	  nor	  the	  Cuban	  communities	  had	  sufficient	  resources	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  unexpected	  challenges	  of	  such	  massive	  refugee	  immigration.	  Both	  attempted	  to	  influence	  political	  leaders	  and	  pressure	  European	  Jewish	  relief	  agencies	  to	  curtail	  the	  flow	  of	  immigration,	  thus	  placing	  their	  own	  needs	  ahead	  of	  those	  of	  potential	  refugees	  whose	  lives	  might	  have	  been	  saved.	  
In	  Cuba,	  the	  established	  community	  of	  American	  Jews,	  which	  had	  the	  wealth	  to	  help,	  remained	  detached	  and	  uninvolved,	  taking	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  refugees.	  This	  is	  particularly	  ironic,	  since	  the	  aid	  that	  did	  come	  to	  the	  Cuban	  communities	  was	  ultimately	  from	  U.S.	  donors.	  The	  Sephardic	  Jews,	  originally	  from	  Turkey,	  were	  focused	  inward	  and	  also	  isolated	  themselves	  from	  other	  Jews.	  Those	  leaders	  who	  did	  emerge	  from	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Havana	  were	  sometimes	  hesitant	  to	  identify	  as	  Jews	  in	  light	  of	  rising	  Cuban	  antisemitic	  sentiment.	  These	  individuals	  were	  embedded	  in	  the	  general	  Cuban	  community	  as	  businessmen	  and	  professionals	  and	  had	  more	  to	  lose	  by	  being	  openly	  identified	  with	  the	  impoverished	  immigrants.	  In	  the	  end,	  these	  leaders	  proved	  ineffective	  in	  uniting	  the	  communities	  and	  procuring	  any	  significant	  funding	  towards	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  refugees.	  
In	  Shanghai,	  powerful	  and	  wealthy	  leaders	  from	  the	  Sephardic	  community	  did	  contribute	  significantly	  toward	  the	  refugee	  need,	  but	  in	  return	  demanded	  full	  control	  of	  the	  funds	  they	  gave,	  refusing	  to	  cooperate	  with	  Ashkenazi	  leaders.	  Once	  the	  Pacific	  War	  began	  and	  those	  wealthy	  Sephardic	  Jews	  were	  declared	  enemy	  nationals,	  they	  no	  longer	  had	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  access	  to	  their	  funds	  but	  still	  sought	  to	  influence	  the	  relief	  committees	  that	  determined	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources.	  The	  resulting	  internecine	  competition	  deepened	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  communities	  to	  work	  together	  to	  provide	  effective	  aid.	  
A	  complicating	  factor	  was	  added	  in	  Shanghai	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  almost	  1,000	  Orthodox	  Polish	  Jewish	  refugees,	  who	  requested	  special	  financial	  allowances	  to	  meet	  their	  religious	  requirements.	  Because	  of	  their	  particular	  religious	  needs—kosher	  food,	  books	  and	  a	  place	  to	  study,	  these	  Orthodox	  Jews	  wished	  to	  remain	  separate	  from	  the	  generally	  more	  liberal	  Central	  European	  refugees.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  group	  received	  additional	  funding	  from	  Orthodox	  communities	  in	  the	  United	  States	  raised	  resentment	  among	  the	  generally	  non-­‐religious	  German	  and	  Austrian	  elements,	  and	  within	  the	  JDC	  as	  well.	  JDC	  eventually	  realized	  the	  need	  and	  allotted	  the	  extra	  funds	  to	  them,	  but	  this	  further	  fractured	  the	  refugee	  communities	  due	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  inequality	  of	  benefits	  granted.	  	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  contrast	  the	  two	  refugee	  communities	  in	  their	  attitude	  toward	  their	  temporary	  havens.	  In	  neither	  location	  did	  the	  refugees	  attempt	  to	  settle	  and	  become	  integrated	  into	  the	  life	  of	  the	  country,	  as	  they	  did	  in	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries	  where	  they	  also	  fled.4	  The	  refugees	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  never	  planned	  to	  stay	  permanently.	  This	  is	  understandable	  for	  those	  in	  Havana	  especially,	  as	  they	  held	  U.S.	  visas	  and	  expected	  their	  entry	  to	  the	  United	  States	  to	  come	  through	  momentarily.	  Unable	  to	  obtain	  employment	  due	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Compare	  the	  Jews	  of	  the	  Dominican	  Republic	  studied	  by	  Marion	  A	  Kaplan,	  
Dominican	  Haven:	  The	  Jewish	  Refugee	  Settlement	  in	  Sosúa,	  1940-­‐1945	  (New	  York:	  Museum	  of	  Jewish	  Heritage,	  2008);	  or	  the	  Jewish	  communities	  of	  Argentina	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  Haim	  Avni,	  Argentina	  y	  las	  migraciones	  judías:	  de	  la	  Inquisición	  al	  holocausto	  y	  después	  (Buenos	  Aires:	  Editorial	  Milá:	  AMIA;	  Universidad	  Hebrea	  de	  Jerusalem,	  2005);	  and	  Elkin,	  
The	  Jews	  of	  Latin	  America;	  an	  exception	  would	  be	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  who	  fled	  to	  Bolivia;	  see	  Leo	  Spitzer,	  Hotel	  Bolivia:	  The	  Culture	  of	  Memory	  in	  a	  Refuge	  from	  Nazism,	  1st	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1998).	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  to	  Cuba’s	  restrictive	  employment	  laws,	  most	  refugees	  were	  forced	  to	  spend	  their	  days	  in	  idleness	  and	  depended	  completely	  on	  U.S.	  aid	  for	  their	  sustenance.	  
In	  Shanghai,	  where	  finances	  were	  much	  more	  scarce	  as	  the	  War	  progressed,	  incoming	  refugees	  used	  any	  means	  and	  skills	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  eke	  out	  a	  living.	  Although	  they	  also	  viewed	  their	  stay	  as	  temporary	  while	  they	  waited	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  emigration,	  they	  nevertheless	  were	  faced	  with	  the	  immediate	  need	  to	  survive	  and	  were	  not	  restricted	  by	  Shanghai	  labor	  laws.	  They	  creatively	  utilized	  a	  multitude	  of	  skills	  to	  earn	  a	  living.	  Those	  who	  were	  proficient	  in	  masonry,	  carpentry,	  and	  construction	  rebuilt	  bombed-­‐out	  Hongkew	  and	  erected	  a	  neighborhood	  that	  reminded	  them	  of	  home.	  Others	  opened	  bakeries,	  restaurants,	  and	  theaters	  that	  became	  a	  staple	  in	  the	  area	  popularly	  known	  as	  “Little	  Vienna.”	  	  
In	  both	  locations,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  U.S.	  funds	  began	  to	  dissipate	  that	  the	  refugees	  made	  any	  serious	  endeavor	  to	  establish	  their	  own	  community	  services.	  In	  Cuba,	  following	  drastic	  JDC	  budget	  cuts,	  the	  refugees	  organized	  into	  the	  Unión	  de	  Refugiados	  (Refugees’	  Union).	  Originally	  formed	  as	  a	  protest	  to	  budget	  cuts,	  this	  group	  eventually	  managed	  to	  provide	  educational,	  vocational,	  social	  and	  recreational	  activities	  for	  the	  refugees.	  The	  Sephardic	  social	  club	  participated	  by	  allowing	  the	  use	  of	  its	  space	  for	  Americanization	  classes,	  and	  the	  American	  rabbi	  serving	  the	  congregation	  in	  Havana	  eventually	  contributed	  by	  starting	  a	  school	  for	  refugee	  children.	  In	  implementing	  these	  services,	  these	  previously	  uninvolved	  communities	  supplemented	  the	  basic	  food,	  housing	  and	  medical	  aid	  dispensed	  by	  the	  JDC.	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  In	  Shanghai,	  where	  the	  length	  of	  their	  stay	  was	  indefinite,	  the	  refugees	  organized	  quickly	  into	  the	  Jüdische	  Gemeinde	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  own	  educational	  and	  legal	  needs.	  Although	  the	  refugees	  did	  not	  plan	  to	  settle	  permanently,	  Horace	  Kadoorie	  of	  the	  Sephardic	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Shanghai	  did	  establish	  Jewish	  schools	  for	  refugee	  children.	  Later,	  in	  the	  “ghetto”	  environment,	  the	  German	  and	  Austrian	  Jews	  managed	  to	  overcome	  some	  of	  their	  deep	  differences	  to	  develop	  a	  rich	  cultural	  life	  including	  operas,	  concerts	  and	  Yiddish	  theater;	  they	  also	  produced	  periodicals,	  literary	  works	  and	  sponsored	  educational	  courses.	  It	  was	  perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  unfamiliarity	  of	  their	  surroundings	  and	  the	  perceived	  length	  of	  their	  stay	  that	  they	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  recreate	  the	  social	  institutions	  they	  had	  known	  at	  home.	  These	  cultural	  frameworks	  served	  as	  unifiers	  in	  a	  community	  that	  had	  been	  deeply	  divided	  by	  place	  of	  origin,	  religion,	  age,	  and	  social	  status.	  	  
In	  both	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai,	  rising	  antisemitism	  became	  a	  serious	  problem	  as	  the	  War	  progressed	  and	  Nazi	  agents	  circulated	  around	  the	  world	  disseminating	  their	  disinformation.	  In	  Cuba,	  antisemitic	  rhetoric	  found	  fertile	  ground	  among	  the	  ruling	  Spanish	  Catholics,	  who	  feared	  economic	  competition	  from	  the	  Jews	  and	  were	  sympathetic	  to	  Franco’s	  fascist	  government.	  Once	  the	  Nazi	  party	  was	  legalized	  in	  Cuba,	  they	  began	  a	  virulent	  anti-­‐Jewish	  campaign	  in	  the	  newspapers	  and	  radio	  and	  succeeded	  in	  organizing	  a	  mass	  antisemitic	  rally	  that	  drew	  over	  40,000.	  The	  anti-­‐Jewish	  sentiment	  reached	  its	  climax	  with	  the	  closing	  of	  Cuba’s	  doors	  to	  further	  Jewish	  immigration	  and	  the	  rebuffing	  of	  the	  M.S.	  St.	  Louis	  with	  its	  desperate	  human	  cargo.	  
In	  Shanghai,	  the	  situation	  was	  far	  more	  complex,	  as	  the	  refugees	  were	  faced	  with	  conflicting	  sympathies	  both	  from	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese	  among	  whom	  they	  lived.	  While	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  the	  outlooks	  of	  both	  groups	  toward	  Jews	  were	  shaped	  by	  their	  general	  anti-­‐Western	  tendencies,	  it	  was	  the	  Japanese	  Jewish	  policies	  that	  most	  affected	  them.	  These	  policies	  underwent	  significant	  changes	  throughout	  this	  period.	  The	  Japanese,	  hoping	  to	  influence	  America	  by	  their	  fair	  treatment	  of	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai,	  at	  first	  were	  very	  accommodating	  in	  their	  interactions	  with	  the	  Jews.	  However,	  once	  the	  Pacific	  War	  began	  and	  any	  further	  offer	  of	  American	  aid	  was	  moot,	  the	  Jews	  lost	  their	  perceived	  value,	  and	  Nazi	  propaganda	  began	  to	  be	  more	  influential.	  	  The	  Japanese,	  however,	  never	  adopted	  the	  violent	  antisemitism	  that	  was	  urged	  upon	  them	  by	  Nazi	  diplomats	  and	  propagandists.	  Instead,	  they	  confined	  the	  Jews	  who	  had	  arrived	  after	  1937	  in	  a	  “designated	  area”	  in	  Hongkew	  in	  order	  allegedly	  to	  maintain	  order.	  Inflation,	  wartime	  shortages,	  and	  the	  discontinuing	  of	  American	  funds	  took	  a	  heavy	  toll	  in	  the	  “Shanghai	  ghetto.”	  With	  many	  refugees	  having	  given	  up	  their	  homes	  and	  businesses	  when	  forced	  to	  move	  to	  Hongkew,	  increasing	  numbers	  faced	  hunger	  almost	  to	  the	  point	  of	  starvation.	  It	  was	  Laura	  Margolis’	  intercession	  with	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  once	  she	  was	  freed	  from	  Japanese	  internment,	  that	  restored	  financial	  aid	  and	  literally	  enabled	  the	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai	  to	  survive	  the	  war.	  
The	  refugees	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  could	  not	  have	  survived,	  however,	  without	  the	  help	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community	  through	  the	  JDC	  and	  specifically	  Laura	  Margolis,	  who	  came	  to	  both	  locations	  and	  administered	  American	  funds,	  bringing	  order	  to	  chaos	  and	  caring	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  refugees.	  Margolis’	  skills	  and	  training	  in	  social	  welfare,	  along	  with	  her	  international	  upbringing	  and	  command	  of	  relevant	  languages,	  ideally	  suited	  her	  to	  function	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  JDC	  in	  these	  areas.	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  In	  both	  locations,	  Margolis	  was	  faced	  with	  Jewish	  populations	  representing	  diverse	  ethnicities,	  socioeconomic	  status,	  age,	  gender,	  political	  views	  and	  religious	  observance.	  Geographic	  origins	  ranged	  from	  Polish	  to	  Russian	  to	  Turkish	  to	  German	  to	  Austrian	  to	  Dutch.	  Political	  views	  spanned	  the	  spectrum	  of	  Zionists,	  Socialists,	  Marxists,	  Communists	  and	  more.	  The	  refugees	  were	  religiously	  Orthodox,	  Conservative,	  Reform	  and	  secular.	  Respected	  intellectuals	  were	  reduced	  to	  begging	  on	  the	  streets.	  People	  from	  all	  walks	  of	  life,	  physicians,	  tailors,	  butchers,	  playwrights,	  all	  found	  themselves	  in	  need	  of	  assistance	  as	  they	  left	  everything	  behind	  to	  flee	  the	  Nazi	  menace.	  Frictions	  arose	  as	  religious	  traditionalists	  refused	  to	  live	  in	  close	  quarters	  with	  more	  liberal	  Jews,	  demanding	  preferential	  treatment	  and	  more	  costly	  food	  and	  accommodations.	  Refugees	  of	  all	  ages	  and	  abilities	  were	  present,	  the	  older	  immigrants	  finding	  it	  far	  more	  difficult	  to	  adjust	  to	  a	  foreign	  environment	  and	  begin	  anew.	  All	  of	  this	  took	  place	  among	  people	  in	  deep	  psychological	  pain	  who	  had	  suddenly	  left	  families	  and	  friends,	  having	  no	  idea	  what	  their	  fate	  would	  be.	  
Margolis,	  as	  director	  of	  JDC’s	  works	  in	  these	  disparate	  regions,	  represented	  the	  Jewish	  people	  of	  America.	  The	  authority	  their	  funding	  gave	  her	  combined	  with	  her	  strength	  of	  personality	  to	  influence	  the	  existing	  leaders	  who	  refused	  to	  cede	  control.	  Powerful	  people	  did	  not	  intimidate	  her:	  she	  interacted	  as	  easily	  with	  men	  of	  immense	  wealth	  like	  Sir	  Victor	  Sassoon	  as	  she	  did	  with	  the	  most	  destitute	  of	  refugees.	  She	  dined	  with	  Mme.	  Sun	  Yat-­‐sen	  and	  worked	  directly	  with	  Consuls	  General	  to	  ease	  emigration	  bottlenecks.	  She	  boldly	  approached	  enemy	  Japanese	  Naval	  commanders	  to	  intercede	  for	  the	  refugees.	  She	  was	  not	  afraid	  to	  confront	  the	  refugee	  leaders	  and	  chide	  them	  to	  put	  aside	  their	  differences	  and	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  work	  together	  to	  solve	  their	  common	  challenges.	  While	  she	  found	  success	  in	  her	  interactions	  with	  American	  embassies	  and	  Japanese	  leaders,	  almost	  all	  of	  her	  attempts	  to	  bring	  unity	  to	  the	  fragmented	  Jewish	  communities	  ended	  in	  failure,	  as	  the	  increasing	  pressures	  and	  stresses	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  caused	  further	  fracturing	  of	  already	  tenuous	  communal	  relationships.	  	  
As	  the	  study	  concludes,	  a	  word	  must	  be	  said	  about	  JDC’s	  policies	  regarding	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  the	  deleterious	  effect	  they	  had	  at	  times	  on	  overseas	  relief	  efforts	  during	  the	  War	  era.	  Speaking	  for	  JDC’s	  executive	  committee,	  JDC	  vice-­‐chairman	  James	  N.	  Rosenberg	  wrote	  to	  the	  entire	  organization,	  
Our	  course	  must	  be	  to	  lean	  over	  backward	  to	  avoid	  engaging	  in	  any	  relief	  work	  that	  might	  infringe	  the	  country’s	  laws.…	  We	  must	  not	  and	  cannot	  let	  our	  desire	  to	  help	  the	  suffering	  cause	  us	  to	  lose	  our	  moorings.	  Our	  rule	  must	  be,	  “When	  in	  doubt,	  ask	  the	  State	  Department.”5	  This	  tendency	  of	  JDC	  leadership	  to	  conform	  in	  the	  closest	  way	  with	  the	  Trading	  with	  the	  Enemy	  Act	  of	  1917	  caused	  deep	  and	  undue	  hardship,	  not	  only	  to	  the	  stranded	  refugees	  in	  Shanghai,	  but	  to	  countless	  others	  behind	  enemy	  lines	  in	  Europe.6	  
Viewed	  in	  context,	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  JDC	  was	  fearful	  of	  furthering	  antisemitic	  sentiment	  by	  opposing	  the	  U.S.	  government	  regulations	  meant	  to	  protect	  the	  country	  during	  wartime.	  In	  the	  1930s,	  America	  was	  still	  recovering	  from	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  did	  not	  look	  favorably	  on	  the	  economic	  competition	  that	  immigrants	  could	  potentially	  bring.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  U.S.	  at	  the	  time	  was	  experiencing	  an	  increase	  in	  antisemitism.	  In	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  35.	  6	  See	  ibid.,	  187–192	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  when	  the	  JDC	  leadership	  learned	  of	  the	  annihilation	  of	  the	  Jews.	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  April	  1938	  Gallup	  Poll,	  58%	  of	  Americans	  said	  the	  persecution	  of	  European	  Jews	  was	  partly	  or	  entirely	  their	  own	  fault.	  In	  November	  1938,	  in	  a	  Gallup	  Poll	  following	  
Kristallnacht,	  77%	  still	  opposed	  the	  idea	  of	  admitting	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  Jewish	  refugees	  to	  the	  U.S.;	  and	  in	  July	  1939,	  31.9%	  thought	  Jews	  had	  too	  much	  power	  in	  the	  business	  world.7	  	  
Not	  only	  was	  antisemitism	  rampant	  in	  America,	  but	  distrust	  of	  aliens	  was	  also	  on	  the	  rise,	  and	  this	  contributed	  to	  JDC’s	  cautious	  stance.	  Once	  war	  broke	  out,	  many	  in	  the	  JDC	  leadership,	  like	  most	  other	  Americans,	  felt	  that	  the	  best	  way	  they	  could	  help	  the	  war	  effort	  was	  not	  to	  do	  anything	  that	  might	  hamper	  it.	  This	  included	  relieving	  the	  enemy	  powers	  of	  their	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  refugees	  that	  were	  under	  their	  care.	  In	  retrospect,	  of	  course,	  this	  was	  a	  harmful	  policy.	  Yehuda	  Bauer	  put	  it	  well	  when	  he	  wrote	  that,	  	  
…the	  people	  at	  the	  New	  York	  office	  were	  constitutionally	  incapable	  of	  serious	  questioning,	  let	  alone	  serious	  criticism,	  of	  an	  administration	  that	  stood	  between	  the	  Jewish	  community	  and	  anti-­‐Semitism	  or	  worse….	  Their	  attitude	  was	  strengthened	  by	  an	  almost	  unbelievable	  naïveté	  regarding	  Nazi	  methods.8	  However,	  as	  the	  war	  progressed,	  the	  overseas	  staff	  of	  JDC,	  including	  Laura	  Margolis,	  felt	  they	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  “change,	  ignore,	  or	  interpret	  directives”	  from	  headquarters.9	  The	  field	  workers	  did	  what	  they	  had	  to	  do	  in	  order	  to	  survive.	  	  
In	  this	  untenable	  situation,	  it	  was	  Saly	  Mayer,	  encouraged	  by	  JDC	  European	  Director	  Joseph	  Schwartz,	  who	  proposed	  the	  solution	  in	  1942	  to	  transfer	  funds	  to	  needy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Hadley	  Cantril	  and	  Mildred	  Strunk,	  Public	  Opinion,	  1935-­‐1946;	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1951),	  384;	  quoted	  in	  Saul	  S.	  Friedman,	  “Official	  United	  States	  Policy	  Toward	  Jewish	  Refugees,	  1938-­‐1945”	  (Ph.D.,	  The	  Ohio	  State	  University,	  1969),	  40.	  Historical	  Gallup	  Polls	  may	  be	  found	  at	  brain.gallup.com.	  8	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  52,	  98–99.	  9	  Ibid.,	  179.	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  communities	  through	  Switzerland.	  The	  JDC	  would	  donate	  to	  their	  Swiss	  Jewish	  outreach,	  and	  the	  Swiss	  community	  in	  turn	  would	  send	  contributions	  where	  they	  saw	  fit.	  This	  way,	  JDC	  leadership	  could	  honestly	  say	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government	  that	  they	  were	  sending	  funds	  to	  a	  neutral	  country,	  and	  they	  had	  no	  specific	  knowledge	  what	  the	  Swiss	  did	  with	  their	  own	  funds.10	  Unfortunately,	  due	  to	  JDC’s	  unwillingness	  to	  communicate	  behind	  enemy	  lines,	  Shanghai	  did	  not	  benefit	  from	  this	  policy	  until	  Laura	  Margolis	  returned	  to	  the	  States	  in	  a	  prisoner	  exchange	  with	  the	  Japanese	  and	  forcefully	  interceded	  with	  government	  officials	  on	  their	  behalf.	  
Both	  the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  as	  well	  as	  the	  incoming	  refugees	  were	  under	  tremendous	  stress	  during	  the	  Holocaust	  period.	  The	  refugees	  had	  lost	  everything,	  and	  the	  established	  communities	  were	  stretched	  beyond	  their	  means	  to	  provide.	  Both	  feared	  for	  their	  futures.	  It	  is	  not	  remarkable	  that	  existing	  differences	  became	  even	  more	  conspicuous	  under	  these	  circumstances,	  particularly	  as	  individuals	  lost	  trust	  in	  their	  fellow	  human	  beings	  and	  were	  forced	  to	  look	  out	  for	  themselves.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  outward	  and	  inward	  pressures,	  it	  is	  indeed	  surprising	  that,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  greatest	  stress	  when	  Western	  funding	  was	  nearly	  exhausted,	  the	  communities	  were	  able	  to	  pull	  together	  and	  build	  a	  thriving	  cultural	  life.	  
Would	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Cuba	  and	  Shanghai	  refugee	  communities	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  help	  of	  the	  JDC?	  Such	  a	  question	  is	  ahistorical	  and	  cannot	  be	  answered.	  But	  this	  study	  has	  shown	  that	  throughout	  the	  World	  War	  II	  era	  and	  beyond,	  the	  JDC	  was	  an	  organization	  that	  provided,	  not	  just	  money,	  but	  also	  contributed	  leadership,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ibid.,	  222.	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  education,	  and	  cultural	  support	  to	  Jewish	  communities.	  Steven	  Schweger,	  former	  Executive	  Vice	  President	  and	  CEO	  of	  the	  JDC,	  often	  reminded	  constituents	  of	  their	  “shared	  commitment	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  kol	  yisrael	  areivim	  zeh	  b’zeh	  —all	  Jews	  are	  responsible	  one	  for	  another.”11	  This	  has	  always	  been	  the	  calling	  and	  burden	  of	  the	  JDC.	  This	  study	  of	  the	  foremost	  American	  Jewish	  philanthropic	  organization	  during	  a	  time	  of	  catastrophe	  has	  only	  begun	  to	  explore	  the	  work	  done	  by	  these	  organizations	  in	  tzedakah,	  the	  aid	  of	  their	  Jewish	  brethren,	  to	  Jewish	  communities	  large	  and	  small,	  in	  Europe	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  periphery.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Steven	  Schwager,	  “Assuring	  Jewish	  Responsibility	  in	  a	  Changing	  World,”	  Journal	  of	  
Jewish	  Communal	  Service	  81,	  no.	  1/2	  (Fall/Winter	  	  ///Fall/Winter2005	  2005):	  29.	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  APPENDICES	  
A1	  -­‐	  The	  Career	  of	  Laura	  Margolis1	  	  
September	  1927	  to	  September	  1928	   Case	  worker	  with	  the	  Associated	  Charities,	  Cleveland,	  OH	  September	  1928	  to	  September	  1929	   Case	  worker	  with	  Jewish	  Social	  Service	  Bureau,	  Cleveland,	  OH	  September	  1929	  to	  February	  1930	   Case	  worker	  with	  Jewish	  Social	  Service	  Association,	  New	  York,	  NY	  February	  1930	  to	  March	  1934	   Executive	  Secretary	  with	  Jewish	  Big	  Sister	  Association,	  Cleveland,	  OH	  March	  1934	  to	  February	  1939	   Executive	  Secretary	  with	  Jewish	  Welfare	  Society,	  Buffalo,	  NY	  February	  1939	  to	  August	  1939	   Director	  with	  JRC,	  Havana,	  Cuba	  August	  1939	  to	  February	  1940	   Migration	  Department	  Supervisor	  with	  NRS,	  New	  York,	  NY	  February	  1940	  to	  April	  1941	   Director	  with	  JDC,	  Havana,	  Cuba	  May	  1941	  to	  September	  1943	   Director	  with	  JDC	  in	  Shanghai,	  China	  September	  1943	  to	  March	  1944	   With	  JDC,	  New	  York,	  NY	  March	  1944	  to	  December	  1944	   Field	  Representative	  with	  JDC	  in	  Portugal,	  Spain	  and	  Sweden	  January	  1945	  to	  June	  1946	   Director	  of	  JDC	  in	  Holland,	  Luxembourg	  and	  Belgium	  June	  1946	  to	  June	  1953	   Director	  of	  JDC	  in	  France	  June	  1953	  to	  June	  1955	   Local	  staff	  with	  Malben	  (JDC)	  in	  Israel	  June	  1955	  to	  September	  1957	   Director	  of	  Day	  Care	  programs	  with	  Jewish	  Agency	  in	  Israel	  September	  1957	  to	  September	  1974	   Special	  Projects	  with	  Malben	  in	  Israel	  September	  1974	  to	  September	  9,	  1997	   Retirement	  in	  Teaneck,	  NJ	  
	  
	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Leavitt	  to	  McDonald,	  “Letter	  OW-­‐2-­‐3-­‐EMF”;	  Zimet	  to	  Schoeneman,	  Esq.,	  “RE:	  Laura	  Margolis.”	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A2	  -­‐	  JDC	  Representatives	  in	  Cuba,	  1938-­‐19412	  May	  1938	  –	  December	  1938	   Jack	  Brandon	  January	  –	  July	  1939	   Laura	  Margolis	  August	  1939	  –	  January	  1940	   Milton	  Goldsmith	  January	  1940	  –	  March	  1941	   Laura	  Margolis	  April	  1941	  –	  October	  1941	   Manuel	  Siegel	  	  
A3	  -­‐	  Organizations	  Affiliated	  with	  
the	  National	  Coordinating	  Committee	  for	  Aid	  to	  Refugees	  	  American	  Christian	  Committee	  for	  German	  Refugees	  	  American	  Friends	  Service	  Committee	  	  American	  Jewish	  Committee	  	  American	  Jewish	  Congress	  	  American	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committee	  	  Emergency	  Committee	  in	  Aid	  of	  Displaced	  German	  Scholars	  	  German	  Jewish	  Children's	  Aid	  	  Hebrew	  Immigrant	  Aid	  Society	  	  National	  Council	  of	  Jewish	  Women.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  JDC	  Countries:	  Cuba	  Index,	  194.	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A4	  -­‐	  JDC	  Expenditures	  per	  Person,	  1938-­‐1944	  
Cuba3	   6,000	   $142.75	  
Shanghai4	   17,000	   $96.83	  
France5	   350,000	   $18.26	  
	  
	  
A5	  -­‐	  JDC	  Expenditures	  in	  Central	  and	  South	  America,	  1939-­‐19406	  
	   1939	   Jan-­‐March	  1940	   April-­‐June	  1940	  Argentina	   $10,875	   $375	   $2,875	  Bolivia	   $137,500	   $40,500	   $31,500	  Brazil	   $57,000	   $11,000	   $15,000	  Chile	   $13,000	   $27,000	   $20,000	  Costa	  Rica	   $1,300	   	   	  Cuba	   $160,000	   $50,052	   $65,400	  Dominican	  Republic	   $2,775	   $1,125	   $1,125	  Haiti	   $700	   $1,565	   $2,000	  Honduras	   	   	   $1,000	  Mexico	   $1,885	   $100	   $2,000	  Panama	   $9,940	   $2,074	   $7,700	  Paraguay	   $150	   $75	   $75	  Peru	   $11,500	   	   	  Philippines	   $35,041	   $163	   	  Trinidad	   $3,570	   $160	   $800	  Uruguay	   $12,800	   $3,300	   $3,300	  Unallocated	   $31,367	   	   $14,860	  TOTAL	   $489,403	   $137,489	   $167,635	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committe,	  “Index,	  Countries,	  Cuba,”	  n.d.,	  192a,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records.	  4	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committe,	  “Index,	  Countries,	  China,”	  n.d.,	  174,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records.	  5	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  159,	  244.	  6	  JDC,	  “Meeting	  of	  Subcommittee	  on	  Refugee	  Aid	  in	  Central	  and	  South	  America,”	  March	  15,	  1940,	  2,	  1933/44:113,	  AJDC	  NY	  Records,	  Executive	  and	  Central	  America.	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A6	  -­‐	  JDC	  Expenditures,	  1938-­‐1944	  
	  
1938	   1939	   1940	   1941	  Cuba	   $16,200	   $189,653	   $195,223	   $38,170	  Shanghai	   $60,000	   $190,000	   $241,026	   $355,166	  Poland7	   $1,245,300	   $8,138,160	   $6,308,342	   $6,078,769	  France	   	  	   $698,760	   $620,661	   $793,384	  Spain	   	  	   	  	   	  	   $33,592	  Portugal	   	  	   	  	   	  	   $221,276	  Belgium	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Holland8	   $128,248	   $439,000	   	  	   	  	  Yugoslavia	   	  	   	  	   	  	   $109,700	  Italy	   	  	   	  	   	  	   $99,725	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	   1942	   1943	   1944	   Total	   Percent	  Cuba9	   $192,581	   $115,990	   $108,687	   $856,504	   2.68%	  Shanghai10	   $361,807	   $98,192	   $340,000	   $1,646,191	   5.15%	  Poland11	   	  	   	  	   	  	   $20,525,271	   64.22%	  France12	   $872,682	   $1,748,500	   $1,657,223	   $6,391,210	   20.00%	  Spain13	   $481,722	   	  	   	  	   $515,314	   1.61%	  Portugal14	   $324,119	   	  	   	  	   $545,395	   1.71%	  Belgium15	   	  	   $140,818	   $540,000	   $680,818	   2.13%	  Holland	   	  	   $36,140	   	  	   $36,140	   0.11%	  Yugoslavia	   $63,000	   $40,000	   $1,745	   $214,445	   0.67%	  Italy16	   $60,000	   $41,000	   $347,534	   $548,259	   1.72%	  
	  TOTAL	   	  	   	  	   	  	   $31,959,547	   100.00%	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  1938	  figures	  from	  Bauer,	  My	  Brother’s	  Keeper:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  
Joint	  Distribution	  Committee,	  1929-­‐1939,	  190.	  8	  Ibid.,	  171.	  9	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committe,	  “Index,	  Countries,	  Cuba,”	  192a.	  10	  Joint	  Distribution	  Committe,	  “Index,	  Countries,	  China,”	  174.	  11	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  73.	  12	  Ibid.,	  159,	  244.	  13	  Ibid.,	  207.	  14	  Ibid.	  15	  Ibid.,	  292.	  16	  Holland,	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Italy,	  ibid.	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A7	  -­‐	  Flow	  of	  Refugees	  to	  Joint	  Relief	  Committee	  in	  Cuba	  
from	  United	  States	  for	  Change	  of	  Status	  
	  
January	  1937	  to	  October	  194017	  	   	   	   	   	  Month	   1937	   1938	   1939	   1940	  Jan	   0	   34	   11	   3	  Feb	   1	   39	   13	   5	  Mar	   3	   53	   25	   5	  Apr	   36	   31	   13	   1	  May	   7	   15	   25	   1	  Jun	   22	   76	   9	   1	  Jul	   28	   68	   12	   7	  Aug	   23	   95	   7	   2	  Sep	   15	   59	   9	   0	  Oct	   19	   85	   2	   0	  Nov	   25	   37	   8	   0	  Dec	   38	   22	   19	   0	  
TOTAL	   217	   614	   153	   25	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Siegel,	  Veissid,	  and	  Margolis,	  Study	  of	  Change	  in	  Status	  Cases	  from	  January	  1937	  to	  
October	  1940,	  9.	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A8	  -­‐	  Refugees	  in	  Shanghai,	  1939	  February	   2,500	  March	   4,000	  April	   7,000	  May	   9,000	  August	   >17,000	  
	  
A9	  -­‐	  Migrants	  from	  Shanghai,	  1946-­‐195218	  1946	   1,400	  1947	   6,700	  1948	   3,300	  1949	   3,000	  1950	   750	  1951	   640	  1952	   235	  
TOTAL*	   16,025	  *By	  1959,	  only	  250	  Jews	  remained	  alive	  in	  all	  of	  China.19	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  JDC	  Countries:	  China	  Index,	  185.	  19	  Ibid.	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A10	  -­‐	  Emigration	  and	  Repatriation	  from	  Shanghai	  
March	  1946-­‐August	  31,	  194820	  
	  
Emigrated	  to	   Germans	   Austrians	   Poles	   Czechoslovaks	   Others	   Total	  USA	   4,361	   554	   611	   70	   305	   5,901	  Australia	   201	   466	   139	   21	   48	   875	  New	  Zealand	   3	   8	   2	   	   	   13	  Africa	   19	   14	   3	   	   4	   40	  Latin	  America	   361	   154	   74	   16	   74	   679	  Canada	   18	   12	   89	   2	   12	   133	  Europe	   90	   107	   28	   4	   24	   253	  Asia	   27	   8	   2	   	   9	   46	  Palestine	   49	   30	   4	   	   24	   107	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Repatriated	  to	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Austria	   	   972	   	   	   	   972	  Germany	   529	   	   	   	   1	   530	  Poland	   	   	   8	   	   	   8	  Italy	   	   	   	   	   5	   5	  Yugoslavia	   	   	   	   	   2	   2	  Hungary	   	   	   	   	   5	   5	  GRAND	  TOTAL	   5,658	   2,325	   960	   113	   513	   9,569	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1948-­‐49	  (New	  York:	  American	  Jewish	  Committee,	  1948),	  710.	  
	   	   	   312	  
A11	  -­‐	  Distribution	  of	  Jewish	  Refugees	  
Estimate	  as	  of	  Dec.	  31,	  193921	  
	   	   	   	   	  Europe	   	   	   Central	  &	  South	  America	  France	   38,000	   	   Argentina	   25,000	  Netherlands	   30,000	   	   Bolivia	   9,000	  Belgium	   30,000	   	   Brazil	   15,000	  Switzerland	   8,000	   	   Chile	   10,000	  England	  &	  other	  countries	   48,000	   	   Cuba	   2,900	  TOTAL	   154,000	   	   Paraguay	   1,000	  	   	   	   Peru	   2,000	  United	  States	   90,000	   	   Uruguay	   3,500	  Palestine	   60,000	   	   Other	   14,600	  Shanghai	   15,000	   	   TOTAL	   83,000	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   Other	  countries	   44,000	  	  
	   	   GRAND	  TOTAL	   446,000	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1940-­‐41	  (New	  York:	  American	  Jewish	  Committee,	  1940),	  600.	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A12	  -­‐	  Jewish	  Emigration	  by	  Area,	  1933-­‐1939	  (Estimated)22	  
Safe	  Areas	   Total	   Areas	  later	  German-­‐occupied	  
Total	  United	  States	   85,000	   Belgium	   15,000	  Latin	  America	   85,000	   France	   30,000	  Palestine	   80,000	   Holland	   27,000	  Shanghai	   18,000	   Other	   38,000	  Australia	  &	  Africa	   7,000	   TOTAL	   110,000	  Britain	   42,000	   	   	  Switzerland	   12,000	   	   	  TOTAL	   329,000	   GRAND	  TOTAL	   439,000	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Bauer,	  American	  Jewry	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  29.	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A13	  -­‐	  Jewish	  Emigration	  from	  Central	  Europe,	  1933-­‐193923	  
Year	   Germany	   Austria	   Bohemia/Moravia	  1933	   37,000	   	   	  1934	   23,000	   	   	  1935	   21,000	   	   	  1936	   25,000	   	   	  1937	   23,000	   	   	  1938	   47,400	   62,958	   	  1939	   68,000	   54,451	   43,000	  
TOTAL	   244,400	   117,409	   43,000	   	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ibid.,	  26.	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A14	  -­‐	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook’s	  Summary	  of	  Jewish	  Immigration24	  
Year	   US	   Cuba	   Brazil	   Uruguay	  	   Argentina	  	   Palestine	  1929	   12,479	   476	   5,610	   2,000	   5,986	   5,249	  1930	   11,526	   1,374	   3,558	   1,600	   7,805	   4,944	  1931	   5,692	   208	   1,940	   1,250	   3,553	   4,075	  1932	   2,755	   165	   2,049	   765	   1,801	   9,553	  1933	   2,372	   197	   3,317	   500	   1,982	   30,327	  1934	   4,134	   612	   4,010	   1,205	   2,215	   42,359	  1935	   4,837	   403	   1,759	   560	   3,169	   61,854	  1936	   6,252	   338	   3,450	   1,262	   4,261	   29,727	  1937	   11,352	   200	   2,004	   1,100	   5,178	   10,536	  1938*	   19,736	   	   530	   3,115	   1,050	   12,868	  1939*	   43,450	   	   4,600	   2,200	   4,300	   16,405	  1940*	   36,945	   	   2,416	   373	   1,850	   4,547	  1941	   23,737	   800	   1,500	   639	   1,464	   3,647	  1942*	   10,608	   	   108	   138	   192	   2,194	  1943*	   4,705	   	   11	   17	   524	   8,507	  1944*	   	   	   	   	   384	   20,848	  1945*	   	   	   50	   	   728	   13,156	  1946*	   	   	   450	   100	   295	   17,761	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  *	  The	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  gathered	  its	  statistics	  from	  HIAS	  and	  HICEM,	  which	  did	  not	  report	  immigration	  numbers	  for	  the	  missing	  years.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1947-­‐48	  (New	  York:	  American	  Jewish	  Committee,	  1947),	  751.	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A15	  -­‐	  Distribution	  of	  Jewish	  Population	  in	  Europe	  Prior	  to	  and	  Following	  
Territorial	  Changes	  Resulting	  from	  German,	  	  














Rule	   Unchanged	  Austria	   181,778	   117,000	   56,000	   	   	   	  Belgium	   60,000	   	   82,000*	   	   	   	  Czechoslovakia	   356,830	   20,000	   160,045	   	   186,720	   	  Danzig,	  Memel	  &	  Saar	   16,565	   13,000	   9,255	   	   	   	  Denmark	   5,690	   	   5,690	   	   	   	  Estonia	   4,566	   	   	   4,566	   	   	  France	   240,000	   	   278,000*	   	   	   	  Germany	   522,799	   281,900	   202,400	   	   	   	  Hungary	   444,567	   	   	   	   444,567	   	  Latvia	   93,479	   	   	   93,479	   	   	  Lithuania	   165,000	   	   	   245,000	   	   	  Luxemburg	   3,144	   	   3,144	   	   	   	  Netherlands	   156,817	   	   86,817*	   	   	   	  Norway	   1,359	   	   1,359	   	   	   	  Poland	   3,325,000	   	   2,200,000	   1,045,000	   	   	  Romania	   758,226	   	   	   320,000	   	   438,226	  USSR	   3,020,000	   	   	   3,020,000	   	   	  Other	  countries	   632,906	   	   	   	   	   680,906	  TOTAL**	   10,345,457	   431,900	   3,179,020	   4,728,045	   631,287	   1,109,242	  	  *	  Including	  refugees	  **	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  total	  prior	  to	  territorial	  changes,	  10,345,257	  and	  the	  total	  after	  these	  changes,	  9,918,194,	  is	  427,063.	  This	  difference	  represents	  overseas	  emigration	  and	  reduction	  of	  population	  from	  natural	  causes.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1940-­‐41,	  600.	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A16	  -­‐	  Estimated	  Losses	  in	  the	  Most	  Important	  Communities	  in	  Europe26	  
Country	  
Number	  of	  






of	  loss	  Austria	   60,000	   40,000	   66	  Belgium	   100,000	   40,000	   40	  Czechoslovakia	   360,000	   300,000	   83	  France	   300,000	   130,000	   38	  Germany	   240,000	   200,000	   80	  Greece	   75,000	   60,000	   80	  Holland	   150,000	   120,000	   80	  Hungary	   403,000	   200,000	   50	  Latvia	   95,000	   85,000	   90	  Lithuania	   155,000	   135,000	   90	  Poland	   3,250,000	   2,900,000	   88	  Rumania	   850,000	   420,000	   50	  Soviet	  Union	   3,020,000	   1,000,000	   33	  Yugoslavia	   75,000	   65,000	   86	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  American	  Jewish	  Yearbook	  1948-­‐49,	  697.	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